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ABSTRACT
PROMOTING GENDER AND BUILDING PEACE: EVOLVING NORMS
AND INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES
Renata Avelar Giannini
Old Dominion University, 2013
Director: Dr. Regina Karp
The United Nations (UN) has incorporated a strong gender perspective into its
peacekeeping operations (PKO) based on a renewed focus on women's rights and
participation in peace processes.

These efforts are part o f a complex organizational

learning process in which women's central role in peace processes and the increasing
efforts to respond to conflict-related sexual violence have become a central component of
9>

the organization's strategy to build a lasting peace. The underlying logic is that it is only
after an equitable society is founded and when the other half o f the population's voice has
been included in the political life o f the state that peace can genuinely be accomplished.
Nonetheless, the UN 's impact on the ground is difficult to measure and remains
limited. While member states have unanimously endorsed these policies aimed at
reducing gender inequalities and embedded them in the organization’s resolutions and
peace operations mandates, the equal status o f women promoted in these policies is in
direct contrast with women’s status within a majority o f the member countries. This
dissertation argues that the UN's renewed focus on gender as a means to build a lasting
peace has had limited results due to member states' inability or unwillingness to adopt
gender approaches themselves, along with other factors such as the persistence o f
patriarch-based and weak institutions
environments and lack of resources.

in intervened societies,

volatile

security

In order to assess this argument, the U N 's organizational learning process will be
evaluated through an analysis o f how gender-sensitive practices were incorporated to
peace processes at headquarters, member states and mission levels. For this purpose, an
analysis o f the UN's normative framework (resolutions, guidelines, training modules, etc)
and states’ compliance will be carried out along with an evaluation o f the advances for
the implementation of these renewed practices in two case studies: United Nations
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) and the United
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

©2013 Renata Avelar Giannini. All rights reserved.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The UN Security Council “stresses that sexual violence, when used or
commissioned as a tactic of war in order to deliberately target civilians or
as a part o f a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations,
can significantly exacerbate situations of armed conflict and may impede
the restoration of international peace and security, affirms in this regard
that effective steps to prevent and respond to such acts of sexual violence
can significantly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and
security (...)”’
“Sexual Violence as a tool o f war can become a way o f life: once
entrenched in the fabric o f civilian society it lingers long after guns have
fallen silent.”2

This project began when, as a consultant, I had the opportunity to spend
approximately 75 days in Haiti and in the Democratic Republic of Congo analyzing the
U N's advances and limitations in peacekeeping practices. The distance between the
political discourse, the U N 's documents and the reality found in the field became my
main area of interest. As 1 researched the contributions o f Latin American peacekeepers
to promote and implement a gender approach to UN peace operations, I had the
opportunity to interact with practitioners from various backgrounds and experience the
challenges encountered by those deployed in mission areas and entrusted with the
responsibility o f applying the U N 's missions' mandates.

1 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1820", June 19, 2008, http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/391/44/PDF/N0839144.pdf?OpenElement.
2 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f the Secretary General on the Implementation o f Resolutions
1820 and 1888", November 2 4 ,2 0 1 0 , http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D274E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/WPS%20S%202010%20604.pdf.

The task o f evaluating how well the U N 's gender mandate is being implemented
and interpreted by different contingents became not only challenging, but also dependent
on a creative process through which the researcher attempts - sometimes after strenuous
efforts - to fit apparently random actions with the norms created at headquarter levels.
The gap between the “bubble” and the “field” is quite impressive and can be perceived in
the way norms are put in practice and, most importantly, through the UN staff s
pragmatic view of what is ideal and can actually be done as opposed to the glimmering
texts of the resolutions. Lack o f personnel, resources and even understanding regarding
these norms are commonplace, reflecting some of the inner problems in UN actions in the
field. Interestingly, however, is the fact that “lacking” has become such a major feature o f
UN peacekeeping practices, and rather than being perceived as a major failure, it is
normal.
This realization troubled me. Not only did there seem to be a gap between
discourse and reality on the ground, but this gap was widely accepted as a feature of
peace efforts. At the same time, scholarly work presented yet another disconnect. With
the exception o f few authors, most analyses about UN peacekeeping actions qualify them
as major failures. Even though it is true that most UN peace missions have indeed fallen
short in successfully fulfilling their mandates and transforming host nations, the
parameters o f analysis used by scholars, politicians and practitioners from civil society
organizations and international organizations seem to be different.
UN documents, missions' mandates and guidelines provide an ideal normative
framework largely associated with Western “recipes” o f success. As argued by Roland
Paris, international interventions have focused on bringing democracy and re-building the
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economic life under liberal premises.3 While these seem logical and appropriate, little
consideration is seriously undertaken in regard to the effects o f these policies on
intervened societies. What is worse, these western based ideals seem unattainable and
sound almost like a joke for many o f those carrying out their functions in the field.
At the same time, however, setting “aspirational goals” rather than “just attainable
goals” may facilitate the spread and diffusion o f norms that have been successful in other
societies, and possibly over time these war-torn nations can indeed work as fully
functional democracies that are concerned with human rights, gender equality and the
well-being of their citizens. In fact, we know little, if nothing, o f what would be the
consequences of setting less “glimmering” goals. Would the international community be
able to act more pragmatically and thus more effectively? Or would that create an even
more dysfunctional organization whose aim is less than peace, thus rendering its
performance even poorer?
Most of the literature dealing with the UN’s gender approach to peacekeeping
points to a gap between the UN’s aspirational goals and their actual performance in
relation to those goals. While these analyses are important because they are constantly
reminding us o f how far the international community is from successfully fulfilling its
mandates, they do not provide useful tools for those in the field aiming to do their best
with what is available.
The departing point of this dissertation was this mismatch between the reality in
the field, the political discourse and the academic analysis. Even though all o f these
conversations deal with the same issues, they seem to have different parameters o f
3 Roland Paris, A t War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge, U.K.; N ew York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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evaluation and often do not complement each other. While small successes are
considered great victories by practitioners in the field, they are seen as irrelevant for
scholars in the comfort of their lives in developed countries, and as political propaganda
for politicians aiming to foster their nations' own interests or organizational success.
My intent was thus to bring these worlds together. Mostly, the scholars' and the
practitioners' world, both of which I have experienced intensively over the past five
years. As a scholar with limited experience as a practitioner, I would like to provide
theoretical and conceptual tools that can actually be understood and used by practitioners
aiming to improve the efficacy of their actions in the field. At the same time, as a
practitioner, I would like to use my academic background to provide scholars with basic
parameters to recognize the work done in the field in accordance with what is possible
and attainable.
For this purpose, I chose the gender approaches to peace operations as a starting
point to bridge these different worlds. Since 2000, the UN has adopted a normative
framework that increasingly connects “gender considerations” as a central component o f
peace efforts. This framework was carefully crafted in what became known as “Women,
Peace and Security Resolution”, a set o f five resolutions that aim to enlarge the
participation of women in peace processes and to better address the impact o f war on
women and girls. Taken together, these efforts are concerned with gender equality or the
emphasis on equal opportunities for women and men and an understanding in regard to
the impact o f policies, events and actions on different gender groups.
Interestingly, these resolution and spin-off documents - including strategies,
training modules and analytical reports - all assert that there is a strong linkage between
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peace and “normal” gender relations. However, while fixing gender relations seems an
appropriate response, it also seems a stretch, particularly considering the cultural reality
and status of women in most of the UN's member states. This, of course, is not to say that
gender equality and actions to address the impact of war on women and girls is
unimportant, but rather it raises questions as to what extent the UN can disseminate these
norms in intervened societies when interveners themselves have not entirely adopted
these norms. As a direct result o f this observation comes yet another question. Can the
UN serve as an agent of dissemination to both intervened and intervening societies? What
positive and negative impact does the presence o f this dual reality present for intervened
nations?
In order to answer these questions I chose the analytical framework provided by
the theory of organizational learning. In the IR field, Ernst Haas has been an influential
exponent o f this theory, arguing that organizational learning occurs when new practices,
based on new norms and purposes, are introduced to a given organization.4 Successful
learning processes, however, are dependent on a given organization’s capacity to
generate cross-cultural consensus, or to be sufficiently ample to be accepted across
different cultures. In an organization such as the UN, cross-cultural consensus can
become problematic, especially when referring to such a controversial matter as gender
and women's status and rights.
As a result, this dissertation attempts to assess whether or not an organization can
learn independently from its member states and serve as an agent of dissemination. In the
specific case o f gender, it becomes clear that the U N 's normative framework is strong
4 Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power: Three M odels o f Change in International Organizations,
Studies in International Political Economy (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1990).

and encompasses a view usually associated with the West. At the same time, the
evaluation o f member states’ compliance to resolutions on Women, Peace and Security,
shows that states which have adopted resolutions provisions are mostly European and
African states that have passed through a UN intervention themselves. It is thus important
to assess the U N 's ability to put forth its gender approach without member states’ full
compliance and, in this case, to assess whether the organization is capable of
disseminating its norms throughout member states and intervened societies.
The argument is that adopting a gender approach to peace operations is part o f an
organizational learning process aiming to improve the UN's response to the challenges of
international peace and security. This response, however, is dependent on member states’
compliance to resolutions' provision and adoption o f gender approaches in the field. As
not all member states are keen to the idea of gender equality, efforts in the field have had
limited impact.
However, the UN's role as an agent o f dissemination cannot be underestimated.
Even though its importance could not be fully assessed, this dissertation provides enough
evidence that the UN presence has had a positive impact in the perception and
understanding of gender in host nations and intervening member states, and has served as
an important platform for norms' dissemination. The following sections will provide a
valuable background as to how gender became central to the UN's agenda, as well as the
concept and mechanism of organizational learning and the overall plan o f development
for this dissertation.
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International security: renewed challenges and rising norms

The transformation of international conflicts and the changing nature of threats
led the United Nations to question its own earlier approaches to promote peace and
international security. Peace operations worldwide were no longer dependent on state
consent; they often became humanitarian interventions, done in the name o f the citizens
whose governments were unable or unwilling to provide their basic needs or purposely
violating their rights. With this shifting paradigm came the dissemination of human rights
norms that elevated the importance o f the individual to the detriment o f states. In this
context, a specific gender approach to peace operations was also put into practice. As a
matter of fact, gender started to be considered an integral component o f peacekeeping
practices.
This unfolding process was possible due to three main factors: rising norms of
human security, the establishment o f peace operations with a protection o f civilians
mandate and, finally, the increasing concern in regard to women's rights and the specific
needs o f women and girls in conflict settings. Taken together, these factors opened the
possibility that gender issues would not only be considered within peacekeeping
practices, but interestingly understood as central to building a lasting peace.
If there is one great idea the dissemination of which can be attributed to the UN it
is that of human rights. Since its creation, the UN has been concerned with the generation
o f internationally defined parameters o f how individuals should be treated by their
governments and what concerned their most fundamental rights. This perspective,
however, has been in constant confrontation with yet another principle that has always
been central to the organization, that of sovereignty.
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The importance o f sovereignty for the UN is expressed through the principles of
non-intervention and territorial inviolability and reflects an organizational culture highly
marked by its member states. Nonetheless, the constant changes in the security
environment and the placement o f the individual as the central target o f warring parties
has contributed to increasing re-evaluation o f the concept of sovereignty to incorporate
that o f humans rights. In other words, governments that are unable or unwilling to protect
its citizens would lose the prerogatives o f state sovereignty and foreign interventions
could be authorized in the name of citizens under threat.
It is in this context that the concept o f human security gained importance within
the UN. Human security entails shifting the focus o f security from the state towards the
individual and considering security as a much broader concept. Although there is not thus
far a consensus over the concept, it is widely accepted that human security goes beyond
the traditional military related sense to incorporate the everyday needs and concerns of
individuals, including access to water, medical services and education, improved living
conditions, etc.5

5 N ot only human security shifts the focus o f security from the state to the individual, it also broadens the
concept o f security. The concept was initially put forth in U N DP's 1994 report on Human Development
when U N D P's ideas o f human purposes o f econom ic development were combined to the new security
agenda. The concept however is highly criticized. The first aspect to emphasize is that the concept is hardly
to completely substitute that o f national security that continues to dominate IR field. The second aspect is
that the broadening o f the concept o f security has also been the object o f serious critics as it security is
broadened, policy design becom es a challenge. Consequently, the field lacks a consensus regarding the
scope o f security, whether it should solely focus on protection against violence or if it should include
elements such as education, development and so on. For a complete account o f the development o f the
concept within the UN, see: S. N eil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, Human Security an d the Un: A
Critical H istory, United Nations Intellectual History Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2006).
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As security is broadened and individuals’ protection becomes an essential part of
international peace and security, United Nations peacekeeping operations6 were also
broadened and began to incorporate functions that went well beyond traditional cease-fire
monitoring. The new operations would oversee elections, re-structure the government, re
build the security sector and attempt to provide the population and its government with
capabilities to survive on its own. Most importantly, the UN security forces were put in
the service of civilians and had the mandate to use all necessary means to protect them.
Since then, peace operations mandates started to slowly incorporate protection of
civilians at the core o f military actions with varying results on the ground. Moreover, the
UN produced documents that incorporate a human rights dimension to peacekeeping,
such as the Brahimi Report (2000) that supported a renewed focus on the protection of
civilians, the Operational Concept on Protection o f Civilians,7 and the Lessons Learned
Note on Protection of Civilians,8 amongst others. Currently, 10 out of 17 peace
operations authorized by the UN have the protection o f civilians as part o f its mandate
and international norms for human rights emphasized the centrality o f the individual.
6 With the transformation o f peacekeeping practices after the 9 0 's, different types o f peace operations
began to be established. United Nations Department o f Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), define five
different types o f operations: 1. Conflict Prevention: involving diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or
inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict; 2. Peacemaking: involving measures
to address conflicts in progress, including diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated
agreement.3.Peace enforcement: involving the application o f a range o f coercive measures, including the
use o f military force under the explicit authorization o f the Security Council; 4. Peacebuilding: aiming to
reduce the risk o f lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for
conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development; and finally 5.
Peacekeeping: in principle, deployed to support the implementation o f a ceasefire or peace agreement.
However, the boundaries between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and
peace enforcement have become increasingly blurred and peace operations are rarely limited to one type o f
activity. Traditionally known as peacekeeping operations, it is often the case that regardless the specific
type o f peace operation, U N 's operations are often referred to simply as peacekeeping operations. See:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml. Accessed: 03/26/2013.
7 Department o f Peacekeeping Operations and Department o f Field Support, "Operational Concept on the
Protection o f Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations" (New York: United Nations, 2011).
8"Lessons Learned N ote on the Protection o f Civilians in Un Peacekeeping Operations" (New York: United
Nations, 2011).
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This transformation has not come without difficulties. Despite the authorization of
more and more complex peacekeeping operations since the 9 0 's, the UN and the
international community in general failed to respond to major atrocities such as the
genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica and the use o f widespread rape as a tool o f war, as
in the case of Bosnia and in many other untold civil wars around the world. In fact, it
became clear that peace would only be accomplished if protection strategies considered
differentiated consequences of conflict on the different gender groups.
In parallel, since the U N 's foundation, there has been a noticeable progress in
considering women's rights and specific women's issues within the UN. In fact, from its
inception, the UN included in the Charter an article containing provisions against sex
discrimination. Considering that up to 1945 there were no internationally defined norms
on women's status, it comprised an important step towards defining common parameters,
rather than considering women's rights as a cultural and thus a domestic issue.
Throughout the years, women's rights were developed in four main areas.
Initially, women's rights were tackled in economic and political domains. In economics,
the need was emphasized for women and men to have equal opportunities in labor
market, education and participation in the economic development and production o f their
countries. Political rights as voters, candidates and legal citizens on their own were topics
present in the political rights o f women. The third area in which women's issues gained
terrain was human rights. In this particular area, the recognition o f violence against
women and discrimination as a human right violation was an important step toward
minimizing cultural considerations and bringing women's concerns to the public arena.
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It is in this context that increasing concerns with the specific effects o f war on
women and girls led women's issues to debut in the field that comprised U N 's raison
d'etre, international peace and security. In 2000, the UN adopted Security Council
Resolution UNSCR1325 and alluded for the first time a link between the impact of war
on women and international security. In the resolutions own terms:
recognizing that an understanding of the impact o f armed conflict on
women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their
protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly
contribute to the maintenance and promotion o f international peace and
security.9
Following 1325 four other resolutions [UNSCR1820 (2008), UNSCR1888
(2009), UNSCR1889 (2009) and UNSCR1960 (2010)] would comprise what is today
known as “Women, Peace and Security” resolutions, or the normative framework for
incorporating a gender perspective to peace processes.

9 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1325" October 31, 2000).
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Table 1: Women, Peace and Security resolutions
UNSCR1325 (2000)
First Security Council
resolution to link women’s
experiences o f conflict to the
maintenance o f international
peace and security. Asserts
women’s leadership and role
in conflict resolution, peace
talks and recovery, requires
build-up o f gender response
capability in peacekeeping
missions and gender training
for all involved in the
maintenance o f peace and
security

UNSCR1820 (2008)___________
First Security Council resolution
to recognize conflict-related
sexual violence as a tactic o f
warfare and a matter o f
international peace and security,
requiring a peacekeeping, justice,
services and peace negotiation
response.

UNSCR1888 (2009)
Strengthens tools for
implementing 1820 through
assigning high-level
leadership, building judicial
response expertise,
strengthening service
provision, and building
reporting mechanisms.

UNSCR1889 (2009)
Addresses women’s exclusion
from early recovery and
peacebuilding and lack o f
adequate planning and funding
for their needs. Asks for a
strategy to increase numbers o f
women in conflict-resolution
decision making, and asks for
tools to improve implementation:
indicators and proposals for a
monitoring mechanism._________

UNSCR1960 (2010)
Provides an accountability
system for addressing
conflict-related sexual
violence, including by
listing perpetrators and
establishing monitoring,
analysis, and reporting
arrangements.

Source: UN Women.

Although mostly focused in the effects o f sexual and gender based violence in
conflict and post-conflict settings, the UN’s gender approach to peace operations is
comprehensive and considers the physical and structural vulnerability of local women,10
adopting protection mechanisms that include the restructuring o f the security sector,
economic empowerment, rule o f law and sound legal and judicial systems. This shift in
the approach meant that issues such as sexual violence could no longer be considered a
silent side effect and legitimate spoil o f war. In order to accomplish peace, the impact of
10 Throughout this dissertation, the terms structural vulnerability and structural insecurity will be used
interchangeably. The use o f the adjective structural attempts to capture Galtung's concept o f structural
violence as a form o f violence where a social structure or institution purportedly prevent people from
meeting their basic needs. Nonetheless, the term here is used more loosely and simply refers to people's
inability to meet basic needs. See: Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," Journal o f P eace
Research 6, no. 3 (1969).

war on women and girls should be adequately addressed and they should be active
participants at negotiating tables.11
Besides requiring changes in military tactics and improved training, actions to be
taken under these resolutions ultimately foresee a change in the structure o f the UN peace
operation with impact during reconciliation and peacemaking phase but also afterwards
in the post-reconstruction and development phases, also known as peace-building. As the
normalization o f gender relations in host nations - founded on a Western-based idea o f
women's rights - becomes a central component o f peace, policies, strategies and the
conduct o f peace operations should incorporate elements often left aside from military
considerations and protection strategies.
Issues such as women's empowerment, social status, political participation
become important elements. Moreover, the use of force to maintain international peace
and security acquires a new meaning and includes actions to protect women and girls
from sexual violence. The logic behind dealing with sexual violence not only results from
the need to address one of the horrors often carried out in wars, but also to rebuild the
fabric of families and communities, re-establish state authority and construct a reliable
justice system.
These three elements can be more adequately addressed when sexual violence is
taken under consideration and not kept as a taboo subject not discussed at the negotiation
table. Sexual violence destroys the fabric o f families and communities by bringing
discord, confusing bloodlines and inheritance matters and by the pervasive psychological
effects it brings to victims and families. UN civilians in cooperation with the police and
" Robert Jenkins and Anne-Marie Goetz, “Addressing Sexual Violence in Internationally Mediated Peace
Negotiations”, International Peacekeeping, V o l.17, Issue 2, 2010.p.261
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the military

are in charge of promoting actions that strengthen social cohesion and

stability and advancing projects that support community development and women's
empowerment. Promoting effective state authority is done in various fronts, however in
this particular topic, the reform o f the security sector and justice system are necessary
conditions for breaking the cycle o f impunity and for putting in place a state apparatus
capable of protecting its population, including women and girls from sexual violence.
Twelve years after the launching o f the first Security Council Resolution
regarding Women, Peace and security, a few changes have been observed. At
headquarters level, implementing tools for UN actors and member states, including
specific strategies to combat sexual violence, guidelines on how to incorporate a gender
approach to the work of military and police personnel and gender training modules have
been created. A structure to support the implementation of these changes was also created
with the establishment o f Senior Gender advisers at headquarters and missions levels and
with the appointment of a Special Representative to deal exclusively with sexual violence
at headquarters level with Senior Advisors at mission level. At the member state level,
countries have adopted the UN's training modules and guidelines and 39 member states
have created National Action Plans (NAPs) that contribute to promoting gender
mainstreaming within their societies, particularly in the national military and the police.12
While the adoption of these policies seems plausible and logical, whether or not
they can be implemented is still unknown. Most of the 39 member states that have
adopted these policies are either developed states, who already have cultural affinity with
the matter, or African nations that have themselves passed through a UN intervention and
12 See: Peace Women, “List o f National Action Plans,” : 03/26/2013,
http://www.peacewomen.org/naps/list-of-naps.
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thus received the organization's incentive to formulate gender policies. Whether or not
these are actually put in practice is another matter (note, for example that the DRC, the
world capital o f rape, has its own NAP).
At the same time, little is known about the efficacy o f gender policies
implemented in the field. Although the objective of this dissertation is not to determine
whether or not they have been successful, it will collect evidence o f what is currently
being done and establish important benchmarks for future research to analyze how
successful gender policies in peacekeeping setting have been. Most importantly, it shows
that although still limited in scope, new policies are being generated and an attempt to
disseminate norms to host nations and member states was made.

Conceptual and theoretical background on gender and women's issues

Before entering into the specific subject of organizational learning and how it
takes place, the first step is to clarify basic concepts used in this dissertation, in particular
that o f gender, gender equality and gender mainstreaming. Despite the advance in the
literature of feminist studies, there still seems to exist a confusion between gender and
women's issues. Although gender does not automatically translate into women's issues,
the U N 's focus on women's issue under the macro scope o f gender and the reproduction
o f gender essentialisms in some o f the organization's resolution may have contributed to
the perpetuation of this wrong image in some circles.13

13 Although this issue will be further developed later, for now, I would like to draw attention to the fact that
most UN Resolutions on “Women, Peace and Security”, take the instance o f women as victims and
vulnerable groups within conflicts and leave aside the important domain in which they act as autonomous
and agentive actors o f transformation. In addition, the central issue o f sexual violence against men is also
left aside, even though that tends to be as problematic and even more silent.
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The experiences and concerns o f men, women, boys and girls, before, during and
after wars are shaped by their gendered roles. These are formed by the cultural, social,
economic and political context where they live and the expected patterns o f behavior and
obligations they ought to comply with.14 Consequently, it is imperative to understand
gender as a social system that not only shapes individual identities and lives, but most
importantly provides a rigid framework that dictates how they should behave, the kinds
of daily activities they should perform, and how much they should be paid for it.15 In
other words “it is a way o f categorizing, ordering, and symbolizing power of
hierarchically structuring relationships among different categories o f people and different
human activities symbolically associated with masculinity and femininity.”16
When gender is understood as a social system, the relationship between
institutions that reinforce gendered stereotypes and distributes power and resources
accordingly becomes even clearer. It is often the case that strong ideologies, hidden under
the premise of “culturally accepted” norms o f behavior, further legitimize it. A powerful
example is the overrated biological differences that are used to dictate the areas where
women can and cannot perform. The military is one of the best examples where these
biological differences, seen as unavoidable and unchangeable seem to still nowadays
determine the kind of roles and branches women can pursue in a military career.17 The

14 Dyan E. Mazurana, Angela Raven-Roberts, and Jane L. Parpart, Gender, Conflict, an d Peacekeeping,
War and Peace Library (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). p. 13
15 Carol Cohn, Women and Wars (Malden: Polity Press, 2013). p.3
16 Ibid.
17 The incorporation o f women into the military worldwide tends to follow the same pattern. First as
professionals, they joined the military in areas that were already associated with “feminine” activities, such
as nurses, teachers, dentists etc. It was only recently that most countries opened combat positions for
women to join the military. In fact, most countries do not have women in combat arms or when they do, the
incorporation is so recent that they haven't still reached higher ranks.
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question remains, as if the differences we found in biology are enough to explain the sorts
of careers that women and men pursue.18
These gendered ideas about men and women influences the kind o f experiences
each gender group has during war with profound consequences for its aftermath. In terms
of violence for example, war related sex crimes tend to be seen as a distortion or spoil o f
war. That is why it has been for so many years excluded from peace negotiation tables.
However, important feminist studies have shown that rather than a distortion, war
violence is the product of a continuum o f violence and a reflection o f the previously
existent violence during peacetime. In other words, peace agreements mean that
organized armed violence is over, and that women will remain victims if gender relations
return to the pre-war normalcy.19
That is why the UN 's approach to gender in conflict and post-conflict
reconstruction needs to go beyond the surface and consider the specific subtleties of the
society where intervention takes place. The U N 's overall approach to tackling gender is
based on a gender equality strategy. The two components of this strategy are gender
balance and gender mainstreaming. While gender balance refers to the degree to which
women and men participate within the full range of activities associated with the UN,
gender mainstreaming refers to actions aimed at assessing the implications of policies and
events to each gender different group. It also attempts to bring the interests o f women and
men to the policy making table. Consequently, it entails that gender groups experience

18 Ibid. p.6
19 Ibid. p.21
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and recover from the effects of violence and destabilization at a different pace and in
different ways.20
Although the appropriateness o f this approach in the paper is clear, it becomes
much more complicated to implement that in practice. Personnel - including civilians are ill-trained to rightly apply gender mainstreaming in its policies, whatever the area of
their expertise. Consequently, instead of becoming a cross-cutting issue in all UN
activities, gender-approaches have been developed as a separate structure.21
Indeed, from its beginning as a separate organ, the Commission on the Status of
Women (CSW) was created to deal with specific women's issues. Despite the thoughtful
argument that women's issues and a gender approach should not have a special and
separated structure, we should not confuse aspirational goals with reality. It would be
ideal if a gender approach could cross-cut all issues and all personnel was able to
recognize the implications o f its policies to all gender groups and to apply discretionary
policies to enhance women's rights and empowerment while also considering the special
needs of men, boys and girls. However, we are not there yet, and just like in 1947 when
the CSW was created, we still need separated gender units to promote gender
mainstreaming in peace operations.
In this context, it is important to emphasize that constantly talking about women
as a vulnerable group that deserves special protection strategies may already be seen as
genderized. Indeed, reinforcing women as part o f a vulnerable group in every UN
resolution may have adverse effects if not done with caution. Although it is imperative
20 Mazurana, Raven-Roberts, and Parpart, Gender, Conflict, and Peacekeeping, p. 15
21 Angela Raven-Roberts, "Gender Mainstreaming in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Talking the
Walk, Tripping over the Walk," in Gender, Conflict, and P eacekeeping, ed. Dyan Mazurana, Angela
Raven-Roberts, and Jane Parpart (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005). p.52.
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that women's agency be addressed and their role in re-building war tom societies
emphasized, it is a fact that war has disproportionately affected them.22
By no means should this statement translate into ignoring the suffering that other
gender groups, in particular men may suffer during war. Nonetheless, the pernicious
tactic involving sexual abuses as part o f a war strategy seems to be more evident when
the victim is a male and the perpetrator another male. When the victim is a woman, the
strategic thinking before the act is suddenly forgotten and replaced by a general
acceptance o f the fact as a spoil o f war and o f “boys doing what they are supposed to
do.”23
Consequently, the thought that “we are just not there yet” seems appropriate, and
separate provisions for different gender groups are still necessary. Unfortunately, genderneutral policies and agreements are all but neutral and tend to systematically exclude
women's special needs and participatory instance. This leads us to the second point often
objected and criticized when discussing UN Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security,
that is, including more uniformed women as a way to better address violence against
women.
By no means does increasing women's participation in peacekeeping efforts
reinforce gender essentialisms that women are more caring and thus local women feel
more prone to communicate with them. Instead, it offers the intervened society a role
model in which women can do the same activities as men, besides creating better

22 On the role o f women in post war period see: Sheila Meintjes, Anu Pillay, and Meredeth Turshen, The
Aftermath: Women in Post-W ar Transformation (London; N ew York: Zed Books, 2001).
23 This insight was provided during lively discussions in the Symposium “The Missing Peace Symposium
2013”, organized by SIPRI North America, United States Institute o f Peace (USIP), PRIO, Human Rights
Center Berkley Law University o f California. The symposium was carried out in Washington, DC, on
February, 2013.
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channels o f communication between the population and the mission. We cannot expect
Sudanese, Congolese, Haitian, or Liberian victim women to react to male uniformed
personnel the same way that a western female victim of sexual violence may react. We
are simply not there yet. And thus this first step is necessary, not only for the local
women, but for all the women who want to be part o f peacekeeping efforts and deserve to
be there.

Organizational learning, institutional transformation and the UN

In order to understand how gender perspectives have been incorporated into
peacekeeping practices as part o f an organizational learning process requires an analysis
of the concept of organizational learning and the mechanism behind it. The study of
organizational learning has always been present in organizational theory; however, it is
relatively novel in the IR field.24 The corporate ontology associated with organizational
theory has contributed to advancing within the IR field the idea that international
organizations can have interests different from that o f member states and pursue their
own agenda. Within organizational theory, the concept of learning itself and how it takes
place in organizations offers an important theoretical foundation to the claim that the
United Nations has learned in terms o f incorporating a gender perspective and may now
serve as an agent of dissemination.
This dissertation’s model o f organizational learning is based on the understanding
o f international organizations as autonomous entities that are able to produce new

24 For learning in the IR field see: Haas, When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models o f Change in
International Organizations', Bemd Siebenhiiner, "Learning in International Organization in Global
Environmental Governance," G lobal Environmental P olitics 8, no. 4 (2012); Lise M oije Howard, Un
Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (Cambridge ; N ew York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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knowledge and practices on their own.25 The socialization of these practices among
member states and their repetition over time is a necessary step for learning to take place.
The ultimate test here is to find out whether or not a unanimous consensus among
member states is necessary for a successful learning process to take place.
In the IR field, Ernst Haas was the first to discuss organizational learning in
international organizations. Since IOs are created and formed by member-states, he
considers that learning can only take place if the recently created practice reaches a cross
cultural consensus amongst all member-states. Nonetheless, when considering such a
diverse organization, as is the case o f the UN, learning would become an extremely rare
process, and thus this dissertation intends to assess whether IOs can learn independently
from member states and become agents o f dissemination themselves.
In this context, learning refers to the process through which a new international
practice is created and included within the framework of action o f a given 10. It also
refers to a process of change in which older practices are substituted by new ones, and
added to the organization's scope o f action. This change can be either superficial or affect
the inner most parts of the organizational culture.
As previously mentioned, the specific case o f gender in peacekeeping has shown
that the UN's renewed normative framework presents inherent challenges to cross
cultural chasms. In fact, the strong link between fixing gender relations and a lasting
peace seems to be at odds with the cultural and political reality o f most member states

25 The understanding o f IOs in this dissertation is mostly derived from constructivist approaches. See:
Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules fo r the World: International Organizations in G lobal
Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004).
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that are tasked with the responsibility o f disseminating gender policies in peacekeeping
settings, and o f host nations' context as well.
Consequently, this dissertation employs a theoretical framework that understands
organizational learning as a two level process. The first refers to the process through
which a new practice is generated, disseminated and institutionalized. The second, also
known as transformation, refers to the ultimate stage o f learning when practices are
consensually accepted and adopted by all member states and become an integral part of
the organizational culture.
First-level learning is originated due to a change in the context or is either driven
by the advocacy work o f members o f an epistemic community26, member states or IO
bureaucracy. It includes five main phases: organizational dysfunction, which refers to the
organization's inability to solve problems with the available set of existing practices; re
examination, or the process through which this existing set o f practices are re-examined
and new ones are proposed; minimum consensus, referring to the need to acquire a
minimum acceptance amongst member states, members of the epistemic community and
IO 's Secretariat; institutionalization, comprising the process of embedding this new
practice in the institutional framework o f the organization through its inscription in
written documents and re-use in other areas dealt by the organization; and finally,
dissemination, the process through which this practice is socialized throughout the layers
of the organization and to member states.

26 As defined by Haas, epistemic communities are formed by a group o f like-minded professionals that
work around specific problematic issues and whose specialized expertise and knowledge are central to
organizational learning.
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In large organizations with headquarters and field offices, a feedback loop
between the two is necessary. Often, practices originated at headquarters level are not
fully applicable in other contexts or, when the proposed practices leave the boundaries o f
the ideational world, it is difficult to actually implement them into practice. The constant
flow of communication between different offices grants the learning process with an
increased chances o f success since it provides updated information on successful and
failed practices.
The second-level learning refers to the process through which practices are
socialized to the rest o f member states and then accepted and adopted by them. It requires
that the executive power o f those states implement changes in their own national policies
in order to implement the new practice. When both the organization and its member
states have changed and learned, that is when organizational transformation takes place.
It is also important to note that organizational transformation also refers to a much deeper
process of change. It comprises a change in the core values of the organization, or its
raison d ' etre. That is why organizational transformation is an extremely challenging and
therefore rare phenomenon.

Promoting gender and building peace

Considering this definition and mechanism of organizational learning, this
dissertation argues that as part o f UN's search for more adequate responses to challenges
in the field of international peace and security it has incorporated a gender perspective as
an integral part o f peacekeeping operations. This process was triggered by the U N 's
inability to respond to challenges provoked by modern-day conflicts with the traditional
mechanism of peacekeeping practice. As a result, an inquiry process led to a re
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examination o f its practices and a shifting focus from the state to the individuals'
security. In practice, operations became multi-dimensional and included tasks concerned
with their structural insecurity as well.
Nonetheless, the transformation of peacekeeping practices was not yet complete,
and in fact, it still isn't. Throughout time, the organization acknowledged that conflicts
and post-conflict settings had a differentiated effect on women and girls, and its pervasive
impact would affect not only those gender groups, but also the societal stability,
economic recovery and state authority. As a consequence, the “Women, Peace and
Security” resolutions were adopted, providing the blueprints for member-states and the
UN to incorporate a gender perspective into its peace processes. This renewed approach
would be the foundation for a lasting peace.
In terms o f implementation, the development o f accountability, monitoring and
implementation tools comprise major advances. Once in place they support the process o f
translating into practice resolutions' provisions. Moreover, a growing number of
supporting documents, such as training modules and checklists for uniformed personnel,
manuals and studies to be used by all actors involved are being generated. Still, a major
implementation gap remains due to three main factors:
1.

Resolutions provisions propose changing inner cultural traits as a ways to build

a lasting peace. While these provisions are plausible, they comprise a reality still far to be
attained not only by host nations, but also by member states intervening in these societies
entitled with the responsibility o f promoting these gender policies. As a consequence,
advances in these policies are slow and often dependent on the personal efforts o f certain
people holding key positions.
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2. Moreover, countries where missions are established are characterized by
extremely volatile environments and any strategy to curb sexual violence and protect the
population from these acts is context driven. As a consequence, success depends on
missions' capacity at field level to constantly adapt its practices to the renewed
challenges that are constantly generated. Field learning and the capacity o f field staff and
personnel to create a specific normative framework that considers the particular features
of that context and incorporate new actions and policies in accordance to a changing
environment is thus a necessary condition as well.
3. And finally, since member states are fully involved with peacekeeping
practices either by sending personnel or by being the main financial sponsor, success also
depends on how well the organization can disseminate its renewed gender policy to
member states. The analysis of the two case studies will show that is where
implementation gap remains widest and most challenging.
In order to assess this UN gender approach and implementation gap, this
dissertation will discuss the evolving norms focused on the individuals, the
transformation o f peacekeeping practices, and how a gender approach was created and
institutionalized in the UN. For this purpose, the implementation o f “Women, Peace and
Security” at headquarters, member states and field levels will be analyzed. While the
analysis of the first two levels will be based on primary documents and literature review
on the subject, the evaluation of field missions will be based on two case studies, Haiti
and the Democratic Republic o f Congo.
The two cases present an scenario where sexual violence is unfortunately a
common feature and where the UN has established integrated peace operations where a
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civilian, a police and a military component perform jointly for the accomplishment of the
mission's mandate. Moreover, both missions have a gender senior adviser and staff
responsible for guaranteeing that a gender perspective is seen as a crosscutting issue in all
missions' activities. However, and most importantly, the specific context o f each country
and the different conditions on the ground resulted in a differentiated awareness
regarding gender issues that resulted in different policies and strategies to achieve the
same goal, gender equality and a lasting peace.
Haiti not only is not a post-conflict country but also a country where massive
rapes as part o f a systematic tactic of war is not observed, where the problem is more
readily associated and related to political oppression, a generational mindset and current
insecure social, economic and political situation.27 With the earthquake and the enormous
displacement of people in the country, there was an increasing concern regarding the
recurrence of sexual violence cases, particularly within the IDP camps, where the lack o f
security and separation between public and private spheres contributed increasing rates o f
rape in the country. These cases however, should not overshadow the politically
motivated and gang rape that has been present in the country throughout the country's
history.
At the same time, MINUSTAH has an active Gender Unit with a Senior Adviser
Gender Focal point to ensure that gender mainstreaming is taken under consideration at
all levels on the ground and by all components, including actions to prevent, combat and
eradicate sexual violence. Nonetheless, MINUSTAH does not have a protection of

27 Haiti is not considered by Haitians and the international community in general as a post-conflict country.
However, as the levels o f violence reached extreme levels at the turn o f the century and further hampered
the living conditions o f the population, the United Nations was called to act and restore peace.
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civilians’ strategy nor clear guidelines to combat sexual violence. In cases such as Haiti,
where sexual and gender based violence is not a clear and pervasive face o f a conflict, it
can become a forgotten issue.28
Interviews on the ground showed, however, that thanks to the efforts undertaken
by some actors in the field - namely the MINUSTAH's Gender Unit, Police Gender
Team, UN agencies involved with the issue and civil society organizations - the issue has
gained momentum, even though it is overly focused on the IDP camps' cases. In the
absence of specific mandates, guidelines, and strategies to tackle this problem, much of
what has been done within MINUSTAH depended on the personal efforts o f the staff
involved with gender issues. It becomes clear that building a context specific normative
framework is an essential step to maintaining institutional sustainable efforts throughout
time. Simultaneously, there seems to exist a mindset amongst much o f the UN staff, but
especially the military, that sexual and gender based violence was a cultural matter,
indicating that when the relationship between conflict and sexual violence is not clear, the
issue is associated with the local culture and as a random and opportunistic act.
Congo has passed by two major wars where the targeting o f civilians was the
foremost feature o f the tactics implemented by armed groups and government forces in
the battleground. Moreover, the use of sexual violence against women became the most
prominent characteristic quickly associated with the conflict in Congo. As part o f UN
efforts to tackle the problem, the establishment of a peace operation with a strong
protection o f civilian mandate was put in place. For this purpose, a UN System-Wide

28 While gender based violence specifically refers to violent acts incurred to a person due to its specific
gender, sexual violence necessarily refers a sexual contact against som eone's will, including rape, forced
impregnation, genital mutilation, among others.
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Protection o f Civilian Strategy29 was established and is currently implemented by all
mission's components and UN agencies. Furthermore, troop-contributing countries
(TCCs) are authorized to use all necessary means including force to better protect the
local population. Specific offices that deal with gender mainstreaming and sexual
violence are also part of MONUSCO's task force intended to better protect the local
population and where a specific strategy to combat sexual violence is in place.
If in contrast to MINUSTAH, MONUSCO has a sound normative framework,
specific strategies, guidelines and tasks clearly defined for each o f the components to
fight sexual violence, one would expect that the impact on the ground would be positive
and that measurable success could be perceived. In fact, the mission has contributed to
creating a local state-sponsored infra-structure to combat and deal with sexual violence in
the country. As part o f these accomplishments is the launching o f a national strategy
against sexual violence,30 undertaken by both the government and different UN
implementing actors, the improvement o f the legal system and specific law on the
subject, and the support for female candidates, besides the promotion o f a number o f
projects dedicated to empowering women and implementing 1325 in that country.31
Nonetheless, as the fight continues, levels o f violence against women do not
dwindle. At the same time, the UN military constantly receives accusations o f inaction or
o f letting cultural considerations in regard to women affect their actions. Some of the

29 United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic o f Congo, "Un System-W ide Strategy
to Protect Civilians in the Democratic Republic o f Congo", 2010,
http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Democratic_Republic_Congo
/files/U N _W ide_Protection_Strategy_Final_ 150110_EN.pdf.
30 Republique Democratique du Congo, "Strategic Nationale D e La Lutte Contre Les V iolences Basees Sur
Le Genre" (Kinshasa: Ministere du Genre de la Famille et de 1'Enfant, Novembre, 2009).
31 The strategy is divided in five main components, each o f them has a government and a UN implementing
partner. Details on the strategy are available on Appendices and on Chapter Five.
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contingents have been accused o f not talking to women nor allowing UN women staff to
spend the night in their base. Moreover, contingents located in close-by areas that have
been attacked are accused o f not responding in a timely manner to the crying requests o f
help from Congolese population.32
Lack of success in Congo comprises a major drawback, especially because one
would expect that where UN policies have generated more instruments exclusively
dedicated to address the special needs of women and girls in the field, measurable
success could be accounted. However, two main factors ought to be considered. The first
and most obvious is that Congo is an ongoing and complex conflict that further fuels
violence, while Haiti has passed through high levels o f disturbance that are now mostly
stabilized. The second and most interesting for the topic of organizational learning is who
comprises the troop- contributing countries in each country. Even though the scope o f the
analysis developed here will not allow major conclusions about the influence o f member
states cultural considerations, it will certainly provide valuable insights on how these can
have an impact in the field.
The two cases highlight different challenges confronted by the UN to fully
implement gender as an integral part o f peace practices. They also show that as threats
against the individual are context driven, so should be the strategies to protect them. The
following section will further describe the methodology applied in this project and the
analytical framework employed for the analysis o f the case studies.

32 In the Walikale massacre (2010), for example, when 303 women, children and men were raped in only
three days, UN peacekeepers in the surrounding area did not respond to attacks.
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Methodology

In order to evaluate the U N 's organizational learning, this project draws on
document and case study analyses. In this context, the analysis of how integrating gender
approaches became central to UN peace efforts and the advances carried out at
headquarters and member-states level is based on the qualitative analysis o f UN and
member states primary documents, particularly the Reports o f the Secretary General and
National Action Plans and participant observation through the participation in two
Workshops designed to improve the U N 's gender training modules. The case studies
analysis mostly draws on participant observations and the semi-structured interviews
carried out during three field works in Haiti and the Democratic Republic o f Congo in
2011 and 2012 as I worked as a consultant for the NGO Latin America Defense and
Security Network (RESDAL).
As protection o f civilians and specifically protection of women and girls is a
context driven task, the analysis o f the two case studies offer a detailed contextual
analysis of UN actions in this areas and the sort o f challenges that arise from such distinct
environments. Overall I spent about 45 days in Haiti (May 2011 and September 2012)
and 30 days in the DRC, where I carried out extensive interviews with UN actors from all
components, including military, police and civilian, along with interviews with
representatives from UN agencies, such as the Office for the Coordination Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA), UN-Women, UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), UN Develop Fund
(UNDP) amongst others.

These interviews were complemented by interviews with

government representatives from the Ministry o f Women's Condition in both countries,
and interviews with local and international non-governmental organizations. Besides the
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interviews, I have participated in several coordination meetings among different
missions' sections and agencies and in military patrols. My analysis also stems from my
personal observations as I participated in these meetings and activities.
Interviews were carried out individually or in group. Uniformed personnel
interviews were mostly carried out in small groups, particularly with the military and
formed police units. However, a pattern of group interview could not be established since
in some cases commanders would remain with the group or officers would be mixed with
non-commissioned officers. While that may have interfered with the kind o f answers
provided by some groups, it also highlighted the kind of relationship established within
military and police units that requested interviews to be carried out in the presence of
commander. In some cases, separate group interviews with commander, officers, non
commissioned officers, troops and female peacekeepers could be carried out.
Most interviews with UN agencies, government representatives and NGOs were
carried out individually, or with more than one individual from the same organization,
section, agency or government institution in their office. In this case, specific questions
about their activities were abundant and are not reflected in the questionnaire.
Occasionally, interviews with civilian substantive sections and UN agencies were also
carried out in groups. In this case, the way they interacted and how much they knew
about other sections/agencies activities was also evaluated.
Interviews were carried out while I worked as a consultant for RESDAL, were
consequently focused on the organization's research focus, that is the action o f Latin
American peacekeepers on the field and their contribution to the U N 's initiative to curb
sexual violence. Due to the large amount o f interviews that were carried out and variety
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of actors (including besides Latin American contingents, Asian, African and European
peacekeepers, along with civilians and police working for the UN), this dissertation's
argument could be developed.
Interviews followed a basic questionnaire specific for each actor but were
complemented by questions done on the spot based on interviewees' answ ers.33

Analytical framework fo r case studies

The case studies' analysis focuses on the various UN efforts aimed at improving
capacity to respond to threats against local women in conflict and post-conflict settings as
a central piece in the organization's strategy to build a lasting peace. Hence, the cases
show how the organization addresses women's specific needs through a comprehensive
strategy to protect them not only by improving the security situation, but also by
promoting economic and political empowerment, a sound justice system, reliable security
and defense forces and ultimately a more equitable society, the necessaiy condition for
establishing a lasting peace.
For this purpose and based on the underpinnings of U N 's resolutions on Women,
Peace and Security, each of the case studies' gender policy will be evaluated according to
the five pillars that compose UN strategy on the ground:

33 V iew Annex I for questionnaire and Annex II for interviewed actors.
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Table 2: Case Studies indicators
Components
Legal
fram ework

Description
Existence o f specific mandates and
guidelines regarding protection o f
civilians, and in particularly women and
girls against sexual violence, and how it
translates into practice

Indicators
Qualitative analysis o f missions'
mandates.
Qualitative
analysis
of
a
comprehensive strategy to protect
civilians, and in particular women
and girls against sexual violence.
Qualitative analysis on gender
issues is included in the routine
activities o f the mission.

G ender Balance

Female
representation
amongst
uniformed personnel and the role they
carry out. It also refers to the existence
o f affirmative policies to include more
women amongst personnel (uniformed
and civilian), and in decision-making
positions within the mission.

Quantitative analysis on women
representation in the police and
military.
Qualitative analysis o f the role
they carry out.
Qualitative analysis on the role
that civilian women carry out in
the mission.

Security Sector
Reform

As defined by the UN, security sector is:
“a broad term often used to describe the
structures, institutions and personnel
responsible
for
the
management,
provision and oversight o f security in a
country.”34 These include defense, law
enforcement, corrections, intelligence
services and institutions responsible for
justice system, border management,
customs and civil emergencies. Actors
that play a role in the security sector
include ministries, legislative bodies and
civil society groups.
For the purpose o f this dissertation, only
the
initiatives
related
to
the
improvement o f the justice system, rule
o f law and police institutions are taken
into account.

Qualitative analysis o f U N 's
actions towards the improvement
o f the host nation's security sector,
including the revision o f the
constitution
and
other
legal
instruments that guarantees legal
gender
equality
and
the
criminalization o f all forms o f
violence against women; the
strengthening o f the judiciary
system as ways to break the cycle
o f impunity and accomplish justice
and the formation and training o f
forces responsible for maintaining
a stable and safe environment in
the host nation.

34 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f the Secretary General on Securing Peace and
Development: The Role o f the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform", January 2 3 ,2 0 0 8 ,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp7symboUA/62/659.
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Table 2: Continued

Com ponents
Protection

Description____________________________ Indicators______________________
Actions undertaken by the police and Qualitative analysis o f the actions
military component to protect women undertaken by UN uniformed
and girls from gender based violence
personnel
with
the
specific
objective o f protecting women,
such as patrols, escorts and
checkpoints.
Em powerm ent
Initiatives undertaken by all missions Qualitative analysis o f initiatives
component with the objective o f aiming to strengthen women's
strengthening women's social, economic social, economic and political
__________________ and political status in the society._________ status in the society.______________

Chapters outline
The following chapters reconstruct the United Nations organizational learning
process, illuminating how a gender approach to peace processes was created as an
international practices to improve the U N 's response to modem day security challenges
and as a central element o f its strategy to build a lasting peace. They also highlight the
U N's major drawbacks when implementing this strategy.
In this context, Chapter Two carries out a detailed analysis of organizational
learning in organizational theories and in IR field. The literature review on organizational
theory concepts and mechanisms o f learning was particularly useful since it escaped the
deterministic approach often present in IR field and which considers IOs as a mere
instrument of states national interests. Moreover, it also offered important insights into
the organizational learning process itself, particularly in regard to each o f its phases and
learning enablers or the conditions or factors that facilitate learning. In the IR field, an
analysis o f Haas model o f organizational learning was carried out, highlighting its main
contributions for this research, that is his concept o f learning as the introduction of
renewed practices to solve problems the 10 is no longer able to solve with the existing
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tools and the participation o f epistemic communities as enablers of learning. Haas'
model, however, emphasized that organizational learning would only take place once
member states transformed their practices and learned themselves. In order to assess the
possibility that the organization can learn without member states full commitment, a fivephase model o f learning (organizational dysfunction, re-examination, minimum
consensus, institutionalization and dissemination) requiring only a minimum consensus
amongst part of membership was proposed.
Chapter Three evaluates the factors that enabled this learning to take place and
puts forth the evidence at headquarters level that the UN has incorporated a gender
perspective to peace process as a product o f its most recent learning process. The
emerging norms centered on the individual, the creation o f peace operations with
protection o f civilian mandates and the diffusion of women's rights are important factors
that allowed gender to be included in U N 's actions in the field of international peace and
security.
The specific impact of war on women and girls mobilized epistemic communities
and UN actors, leading to the debut o f a gender approach in peace processes. In this
regard, UN resolutions on “Women, Peace and Security”, provided the blueprints for the
incorporation o f a comprehensive strategy to incorporate gender considerations to all UN
sponsored peace processes. Major accomplishments in this regard, including the creation
of implementing tools, guidelines, manuals, etc. are all described in Chapter Three, along
with the main challenges and shortcoming that the UN has confronted thus far.
Chapter Four contains the case study o f Haiti, providing a rich overview o f the
country's unstable political life and the status o f women in Haitian society. While an
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analysis o f the nature o f sexual violence in this country is provided, the chapter focuses
on the analysis o f MINUSTAH gender policy on the ground in accordance to the
previously defined five indicators (legal framework, gender balance, security sector,
protection and women's empowerment). The chapter shows that the absence o f a specific
protection of civilians mandate and/or strategy to combat violence against women
impacted on the mission's ability to mainstream gender throughout all its activities and
became dependent on the personal efforts o f the people working in the field.
In contrast, Chapter Five portrays Congo's case study and highlights that when a
context driven normative framework and implementing tools are formulated, gender can
be more easily mainstreamed throughout all mission's components and actions in the
field. As in Chapter Four, a rich overview o f the country's historical

background,

particularly the years o f dictatorship and abuse and the two Congo wars is provided along
with the status o f women in Congolese society, emphasizing their role in the subsequent
peace process and the impact the conflict has had on them. The analysis of MONUSCO's
gender policy on the ground was carried out in accordance to the previously defined five
indicators (legal framework, gender balance, security sector, protection and women's
empowerment) and shows that in this case, the extremely volatile conditions in the
country

and

differentiated

learning

among

member

states

have

affected

the

accomplishment of positive and measurable impacts o f MONUSCO's gender policy on
the field.
Considering the model o f organizational learning adopted in this dissertation,
Chapter Six synthesizes the evidence that the United Nations' incorporation o f a gender
perspective to its peace process is a dynamic learning process and that the organization is
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currently acting as an agent o f practices dissemination. The main challenges encountered
in the two case studies for a full implementation of the U N 's renewed gender policy is
also highlighted in the light of each specific context of each country. This analysis
indicates that despite the different contexts, violence against women was part of a
continuum of violence and previous status held by women in each society. Appropriately
and according to resolutions' provisions, the UN has adopted a comprehensive protection
strategy that considers these prevalent features; however, the volatile conditions on the
ground, differentiated learning pace among member states and absence of a context
driven normative framework impacted negatively on UN actions. Finally, a few
recommendations on how the UN can improve its implementation strategies, including
the strengthening feedback loops between field operations and headquarters and lessons
learned sharing system among field missions are also provided.
The dissertation concludes with observations on the current state o f the U N 's
learning process, accomplishments and challenges to the future.
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CHAPTER 2
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING AND TRANSFORMATION: A
THEORETICAL APPROACH

The incorporation of a gender approach to peacekeeping operations (PKO) is part
of a complex organizational learning process initiated by the UN in order to improve its
response on the ground. This process was triggered by the transformation o f modern-day
conflicts, the severe implications to women and girls and the increasing importance of
gender concerns internationally. As a consequence, the UN has re-evaluated its
peacekeeping practices re-focusing on individuals' security and qualifying gender as an
integral part of peace processes. Evidence of learning can be found in the organization's
documents, such as resolutions; guidelines and training modules; and in practice, with the
creation o f units dedicated to conceptualizing and disseminating a gender approach in
peace operations around the world.
Nonetheless, the adoption o f a gender perspective by member states is still far
from being accomplished. In order to assess whether an organization can implement and
disseminate practices in the absence of a full commitment from the membership, an
analysis o f how organizational learning processes take place is deemed necessary. The
study o f organizational learning is central to this analysis by pointing out the process
through which new international practices are created and socialized within the different
layers of the organization and to member states. “As human collectivities that serves the
personal interests of their member states, as well as the general ends o f their mandators,”
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1 international organizations (IOs) must be able to balance political constraints
imposed by state units and the communal interests that founded them.
Studying organizational learning models derived from organizational theory adds
to an understanding of organizational culture, its structure and different components, as
well as how each of these components can learn simultaneously but at different paces.
Highlighting the differences between organizational and member states’ learning is thus
an important step towards understanding the UN’s limits and advances in fostering a
gender approach as an integral part o f peacekeeping operations. For this reason, the
purpose o f this chapter is not to extensively dwell on organizational theory literature, but
rather to identify important concepts in mainstream literature on the subject that is useful
for the analysis.
The concept and mechanism behind organizational learning is central. Learning
refers to the process through which new practices are created with the objective o f
solving problems that the organization is no longer able to solve with the existing set of
norms, rules and procedures. Based on a constructivist understanding o f IOs, the
conceptualization of IOs in this chapter is that o f autonomous entities who can act
generate norms on their own. Their capacity to disseminate these norms to member states
will be the main focus and point of scrutiny in this dissertation. Hence, in the
construction of the organizational learning model, IOs’ autonomy was translated into the
differentiation between organizational learning and individual member states’ learning. In

1 Gayl D. Ness; Steven R. Brechin, "Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as Organizations,"
International Organizations 42, no. 2 (1988).
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other words, the model attempts to establish whether or not IOs are able to learn even
when unanimous consensus over a new practice has not been reached by member states.
The absence o f unanimous support for the creation and institutionalization o f new
practices is intrinsically related to the concept of practice itself. As defined by Adler,
practices are patterned meaningful actions developed in a particular context to solve a
problem that need the concerted action of states. In this context, the compliance o f all
states is not required to implement practices. In fact, since these practices entail
socialization, they also encompass learning and the transfer o f knowledge from one state
unit to the other. Accordingly, organizational learning is a two part process: it creates and
institutionalizes practice and disseminates it amongst member states.
The ultimate stage of organizational learning is transformation. In this context,
organizational transformation refers to the process through which the product of
organizational learning has been passed on to member states, which in turn have learned
and changed their national policies to accommodate the new learning product. Once an
organization manages to transfer the knowledge to its member states, then it is able to
transform itself.
In order to unpack this model, this chapter is divided in three main sections. The
first deals with the concepts and understandings of organizational learning derived from
organizational theory. These approaches are derived from other social science fields such
as administration and economics and conceive organizations as independent from their
individual members. Organizations, different from international organizations, are not
formed by member states but private individuals or collectivities working for a common
purpose. This theoretical perspective has informed a particular stream of IR literature that
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liberates IOs from the constraining state-centric ontology that has long conceptualized
IOs as instruments o f states, providing them with autonomy and agency. Two important
concepts were derived from organizational theory and applied to this project’s model of
organizational learning: organizational culture, or the core values and assumptions that
guide organizational behavior; and organizational learning itself, since it separates
individual members’ learning from organizational learning.
The second part of this chapter discusses organizational learning in IR theory and
underlines the challenges found by previous authors who have ventured into this subject.
The objective o f this section is to unfold what other IR authors have proposed as to how
processes o f learning in international organizations can take place. The literature
indicates that amongst IR scholars that have ventured this topic, a major cross cultural
consensus amongst member states is necessary for a successful learning process to be
accomplished.
While the difficulties o f implementing gender approaches to peacekeeping
practices reinforces this argument, the third and final section lays out an organizational
learning model that requires only a minimum consensus amongst memberships. This
five-phase learning model perceives IOs as agents o f dissemination and accepts
differentiated learning pace among member states. The transfer o f knowledge between
the organization and its field and regional offices was also examined. In this regard, the
establishment o f a feedback loop that informs headquarters o f lessons learned contributes
to the successful examination and implementation of a practice.
This final section also deals with the topic of transformation and its relationship
with organizational learning. Once organizations have successfully learned and new
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practices are established, states are socialized and learning can be transferred from one
state unit to another and/or from the organization itself to member states. The unanimous
consensus of member states over a new practice and its implementation at the national
level will complete the transformation. The establishment of this theoretical framework is
the first step to evaluate whether U N 's current strategy o f dissemination, that is
establishing ideational goals still far from being a reality on most member states and
intervened societies can actually contributes to disseminate these norms.

Organizational learning: definition and approaches

The corporate ontology associated with organizational theory has contributed to
advancing within the IR field the idea that international organizations can have interests
different from that o f member states and pursue their own agenda. According to this
theoretical strand, organizations are highly formalized structures formed by private
individuals with well-defined goals. However, while they serve individuals' interests,
they also separate themselves as autonomous entities with an organizational culture that
has been formed either by the interaction of its individual members or influenced by the
leadership. In any case, the organizational culture is different from that of its members.
The concept o f organizational culture is understood here as the practices, norms
and artifacts o f organizations that make organizations' behavior predictable. This concept
is linked to that of organizational learning for two main reasons. First, it informs how
learning can take place, that is, how within a particular set of norms and procedures, new
information is analyzed and categorized. Second, and most importantly, organizational
learning involves a change in the organizational culture. Whether the change is profound

43

or relative, it is within the organizational culture that learning is portrayed and
institutionalized.
Within organizational theory, the concept of learning itself and how it takes place
in organizations offers an important theoretical foundation to test whether or learning can
successfully take place without a unanimous consensus n the part o f member states. In
fact, a brief literature review on organizational learning shows that most authors accept
the separation between individual members' learning and organizational learning.
The concept of organizational culture and the mechanism o f organizational
learning will be analyzed in this section because these tools offer important insights into
the process through which learning can take place in IOs.

Organizational culture

The concept o f organizational culture is central because it both highlights the
“content” o f organizations in terms o f what lies behind their actions, such as their
normative framework, values and principles, as well as, how changes can occur in the
context o f that underlying organizational culture. Schein defines culture in general as a
dynamic process enacted either “by our interactions with others and shaped by leadership
behavior, and a set of structures, routines, rules and norms that guide and constrain
behavior.”2 It is formed either by informal processes, whereby the constant interaction
between group members eventually leads to the adoption o f common patterns and norms

2 Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 3rd ed., The Jossey-Bass Business &
Management Series (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004). p. 1
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of behavior, or by a more formal process through which the “personal views, goals,
beliefs, values and assumptions o f the leader will shape the group culture.”3
Hence, organizational culture is specifically defined as a pattern o f shared basic
assumptions that was learned by a group (...) and that has worked well enough to be
considered valid and therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to
perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems.”4 In other words, organizational
culture is accumulated learning by its members and a struggle towards patterning
practices that have been successful thus far. Because culture implies some level of
structural stability in the group, changing its meaning is difficult as group members are
attached to the meaning and predictability rendered by that particular culture.
The author explains that organizational culture can be perceived at three different
theoretical levels within an organization. The first level, also called “artifacts”, refers to
the visible organizational structures and processes. These could refer to the organization's
building, its particular architecture, its location and its constitutive charter, structure and
processes. The second level, or “espoused beliefs”, refers to the strategies, goals and
philosophy behind the organization. Within this category are the shared and consensual
assumptions amongst group members based on prior learning which are usually explicit
in the organization's documents, such as guidelines and strategies. Finally, the third level,
named “underlying assumption” by the author, is comprised of the unconscious and
taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts and feelings that guide the formulation of
purposes, strategies and actions within the organization. This is the ultimate source of

3 Ibid. p. 15
4 Ibid. p. 17
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organizational behavior and it tends to be implicit. Because they are non-confrontable
and non-debatable, these beliefs are extremely difficult to change.
The concept o f organizational culture as defined by Schein is o f utmost
importance to understanding the nature of organizations and how they may possess an
identity of their own. In the IR field, understanding organizational culture as a mere state
sponsored enterprise overshadows the processes through which they interact amongst
each other and the Secretariat's staff, generating patterns of behavior that do not
correspond to one or another group. This is an important step toward understanding the
process through which IOs can learn, retain knowledge and generate new practices on
their own before disseminating them to member states.

Learning and change in organizations

Although varied definitions of organizational learning co-exist in the literature,
they underscore the core element of organizational learning as “a change in the
organization that occurs as the organization acquires experience.”5 Schein's explanation
of culture is particularly helpful to understanding the mechanism of change behind
organizations. Indeed, a major reason why change sometimes fails to take place is the
neglect of important aspects o f organizational culture that may not be so easily
substituted by another and consensually accepted by the group.6
The concepts of organizational learning and change are almost synonymous,
though learning involves more than mere change and encompasses the transfer of

5 Ella Miron-Spektor and Linda Argote, "Organizational Learning: From Experience to Knowledge,"
Organization Science 22, no. 5 (2011). p. 1124
6 Mats Alvesson and Stefan Sveningsson, Changing Organizational Culture : Cultural Change Work in
Progress (New York: Routledge, 2008). p.3
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knowledge as well. Indeed, within the literature, learning is identified as a change in the
organization's knowledge due to accumulated experience or its re-examination. This
knowledge can be either tacit, such as a change in the organization or its members'
cognition, or explicit, such as a change in the procedures and practices carried out by the
organization.7
Broadly speaking, an organization can be said to be learning when it acquires new
knowledge or is able to process different kind o f knowledge. Some authors,8 argue that it
is through members that most organizational learning takes places, as it is usually through
them that new knowledge is acquired, deposited and then transferred to other members or
to the organization's structure (guidelines, strategies, etc.). However, organizational
learning does not equal individual members learning.9 Individual learning may not
necessarily transfer to the organization's structure nor reflect in its actions. However, if
this individual learning is translated into new procedures widely accepted by the rest of
the group and embedded in the organization's structure, documents, strategies, etc, then
learning has taken place and knowledge transfer has been initiated.
Along these lines, Argote and Spektor perceive the complete organizational
learning process as having three sub-processes: creating, retaining and transferring
knowledge.10 The process of creating knowledge refers to the process through which an
organization's unit learns something new and changes its practice according to the
recently acquired knowledge. Once this new knowledge is widely recognized within the

7 See: Mark Easterby-Smith, Mary Crossan, and Davide Nicolini, "Organizational Learning: Debates Past,
Present and Future," Journal o f M anagement Studies 37, no. 6 (2000).
8 See: Miron-Spektor and Argote, "Organizational Learning: From Experience to Knowledge."
9 Donald A. Schon and Chris Argyris, Organizational Learning Ii: Theory, Method, and P ractice, 2nd ed.
(Addison-W esley, 1996). p.6
10 Miron-Spektor and Argote, "Organizational Learning: From Experience to Knowledge." p .l 128.
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organization, it can be repeatedly re-used and is consequently retained in the organization
through repeated practice and occasionally institutionalization. The final sub-process,
knowledge transfer, is defined within this literature as indirect learning or the process by
which one unit learns from the experience of another unit.
The literature review on organizational learning is extremely useful in the context
of acknowledging the possibility that these international organizations can learn and
change overtime. The ontology of organizational theory opens up the possibility of
understanding international organizations in similar ways, suggesting that IOs can learn
from their experience, generate knowledge and transform themselves. Moreover, the
discussion of how learned knowledge can be transferred offers an explanation as to how
knowledge can travel throughout the many layers and structure of an organization such as
the UN’s field offices and headquarters and its member states.

Triggering learning

The literature review on organizational learning reveals that learning processes
can be mindful and attentive, as a result o f a conscious effort to change the organization's
action11 and less mindful or routine, referring to those instances through which superficial
learning takes place when improving performance.

19

Because unconscious learning

usually refers to the improvement of an action and its increase in frequency that does not
result in profound changes in the organizational culture, this project’s model of

11 Karl E. Weick; Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, "Mindfulness and the Quality o f Organizational Attention,"
ibid. 17, no. 4 (2006).
12 Daniel Levinthal and Claus Rerup, "Crossing an Apparent Chasm: Bridging Mindful and Less-Mindful
Perspectives on Organizational Learning," ibid., no. 6.
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organizational learning can benefit more from an analysis focused on conscious learning
efforts.
In this context, learning is necessarily triggered by the identification o f a
problematic situation and a “mismatch between expected results o f action and what is
actually achieved (...), [blocking the flow of] spontaneous activity and giving rise to
thought and the search for a solution and the re-establishment of the flow o f action.” 13
Problems thus give rise to a process of inquiry that may result in the proposition o f new
practices that are more suitable to solve the problem than the existing set o f actions.
Interestingly, Schon and Agyris attribute to individuals within an organization the
responsibility of identifying a problem, initiating the inquiry process and proposing
solutions. 14 However, learning may not necessarily be passed on to the organization.
Only after learned knowledge is successfully embedded in the organization, be it through
the organizational memory held by other individual members or through epistemological
artifacts, such as the organization's documents, does learning take place.
In other words, organizational learning is initiated by the identification o f a
problem that the organization's existent rules and procedures can no longer solve. This
identification then triggers a process o f re-examination and, as a result, new rules and
procedures are proposed. It is only after these become consensually adopted practices
within the organization that learning is considered to have occurred.
Learning is then facilitated either by agents of change, such as the organization's
leadership or other individual employees that push for reforms, or by environmental-

13 Schon and Argyris, Organizational Learning Ii: Theory, Method, and Practice, p. 11
14 Ibid. p. 12
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driven forces, that is, changes in the context where the organization operates.15 In the
latter, the transformation of the context may generate problems that were not previously
considered by the organization, or it may happen that the existing set o f organizational
actions is no longer enough to solve a problem due to changes in the context. At the same
time, the work of individuals capable o f identifying problems and pushing for the process
o f inquiry and proposing solutions is as necessary as the rising of the problem itself, since
in their absence the problem may not even be identified in the first place.
This analysis has shown that a model o f organizational learning applied to
international organizations can benefit from the agentive and autonomous character
delegated to organizations in organizational theory literature. Moreover, the mechanism
behind organizational learning highlights important phases, such as the rise o f a problem,
the examination o f issues and the elaboration o f a new set o f rules that could be used in
the process of organizational learning and applied to IOs. The following section will
highlight the main characteristics o f IOs and lay the basis for the construction o f the
organizational learning model used to test whether or not organizational learning
processes can be concomitant to member states' learning and contribute to the
dissemination of renewed norms and practices.

15 The analysis o f the organizational environment marked the important recognition o f how environmental
forces shape goals, internal procedures and ultimately the behavior o f organizations. Early analysis o f
organizational environment showed how their variance determined the best organizational structure for
higher efficiency performance rates. See: Brechin, "Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as
Organizations"; Paul R. Lawrence and Jay William Lorsch, Organization an d Environment; Managing
Differentiation and Integration (Boston,: Division o f Research, Graduate School o f Business
Administration, Harvard University, 1967).
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Organizational learning in international organizations

The previous analysis has shown that organizational theories can influence the
study of international organizations by adopting an analytical instance that does not put
member states at the center of organizational action. Within the literature o f international
organizations, some approaches have benefited from the perception that organizations
can be autonomous from its members and are able to learn and change over time. The
first IR theoretical strand to take advantage o f sociological studies on organizational
behavior was functionalism, introducing a normative aim and a teleological purpose for
IOs.16 Later on, having incorporated the precepts of a more modem idea o f international
politics, theories such as constructivism and principle-agent theory also based their
theoretical foundations on the sociological understanding o f organizations. O f particular
note is W eber's emphasis on the agentive power of bureaucracies and delegated authority
of states as the seminal source of IOs' autonomy.
The possibility

o f organizational

learning

and

change

in

international

organizations has also been present in IR literature. Among mainstreaming authors, Haas'
description of two interrelated process - learning and adaptation - can occur within IOs.
According to the author, organizations can reinvent themselves and redefine their original
16 David Mitrany is amongst the first scholars that made use o f organizational theory. His main
contributions were the definition o f peace and welfare as the normative aim o f organizations and the focus
on technically specialized functions as means that would lead to political considerations that would render
conflicts unnecessary. The involvement o f states in these organizations would produce shifts in their
cognition and values, leading them to support a more integrated world community. Changed values would
imply the erosion o f the strict national loyalties, while the simple involvement in IOs would enmesh
participants in beneficial exchanges and raise the costs o f war. However, Mitrany’s theory was based on a
rather naive view o f organizations as mere tools o f their creators. Other functionalists, beginning with
Haas, updated the contents o f this theory by drawing more on sociological studies and relaxing the view o f
IOs as mere tools and founding neo-functionalism. See: Brechin, "Bridging the Gap: International
Organizations as Organizations"; David Mitrany, A Working P eace System (Chicago,: Quadrangle Books,
1966); Robert W. Cox; Harold K. Jacobson, The Anatomy o f Influence (N ew Haven: Yale University
Press, 1974).
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goals if member states agree to do so. In other instances, IOs adapt and improve their
performance due to changes in their procedures and rules as a better way to tackle
problems, even though their underlying values, principles and purposes remain the same.
The core difference between these two processes lies in the deepness of change and
cross-cultural consensus.
Haas’ conceptualization o f organizational learning and his description o f the
mechanism driving change are enlightening because they approach the “problem” o f
having states as founders and members o f IOs and how they can impact the process of
learning. Without a unanimous state consensus, learning cannot take place. Hence,
learning would be an extremely rare phenomenon in organizations so culturally diverse
such as the UN.
Nonetheless, the study o f IOs' autonomy and their capacity to create and
disseminate norms among member states indicates the possibility of separating IOs’
knowledge from that of states'. In fact, an analysis o f UN contributions to various issues
indicates that the organization has norms o f its own, apart from member states and
attempts to function as an agent o f dissemination. A number of UN documents, written
by the Secretariat, serve as a source o f principles, values and norms, besides also
providing guidelines o f action in a number of cases. Although not all states agree on all
issues, a number o f these documents are actually implemented and may even serve as
ways of disseminating the norm and/or monitoring states behavior in issues such as
human rights.
For this reason, a discussion on the concept of international practices is also
necessary. Practices, understood here as patterned meaningful actions, is a ways of

52

socializing states to behave in certain ways. In international organizations, new practices
can be the result of a learning process, created to solve issues that states cannot solve on
their own. The dissemination of practices within international organizations is a ways of
transmitting learned knowledge to member states.
The discussion on IOs’ autonomy, Haas’ model of organizational learning, and
the concept o f international practices and how they are disseminated form the theoretical
basis o f the model o f organizational learning developed here.

Organizational learning vs. member states learning

This dissertation’s conceptualization o f international organizations is based on a
constructivist theoretical approach that assumes IOs are social creatures formed by “a
distinct social form o f authority with its own internal logic and behavioral proclivities.” 17
Other theoretical approaches to organizational learning applied to IOs take a similar
instance and differ only in the degree to which IOs can learn and transform apart from
member states.
IOs' internal and behavioral logic aligned to the set of norms, ideas and principles
that inspired and guided their creation, are at the core of the organizations’ identity and
comprise their organizational culture. Although every organization differs, IOs share a
few

distinct

characteristics.

As

most

institutionalists

emphasize,

international

organizations are comprised by rigorous procedures and rules that conditions their
behavior and grants the system with predictability.18 Indeed, one of IOs' main

17 Barnett and Finnemore, Rules f o r the World: International O rganizations in Global Politics, p.3
18 See: Robert Keohane, International Institutions an d State Power: Essays in International Relations
Theory (Bolder: W estview Press, 1989); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation an d D iscord
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contributions to international politics is the establishment o f a set o f rules that provides
more transparency to transactions and increases the possibility of cooperation between
states.
At a rudimentary level, international organizations' authority is “delegated
authority from the states”19; organizations are created to solve specific problems and are
granted authority by states to act on their behalf, in accordance to the rules and
procedures commonly agreed upon by their members and based on the specific expertise
they possess.

Once IOs are granted with that authority, their actions are seen as

impersonal, legitimate and representative of the larger community's interest. From that
moment on, the separation of states' interests from IOs' behavior is a necessary condition
for maintaining IOs' legitimacy. At a practical level, IO staff work with this sense o f
authority when following the rules and procedures.
The centrality of rules in IOs' behavior as well as their delegated authority from
states form the basis of IOs' authority. Other elements, such as their specialized expertise
and the pursuit o f higher goals and moral principles in the name of state community, also
provide them with legitimacy. Since IOs are usually endowed with tasks directed towards
the common good o f the group, they are granted with a moral authority that further
legitimates their advice and actions. Indeed, IOs' employees are civil servants that do not
represent the interests of their own states, but rather that of the organization. This staff
tends to be highly qualified and knowledgeable on the subject matter that concerns the IO

in the World P olitical Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Bruce M. Russett and
John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace : Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations
(New York: Norton, 2001); Robert Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise o f Institutional Theory,"
International Security 20, no. 1 (1996); Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories and Empirical
Studies o f International Institutions," International Organizations 52, no. 4 (1998).
19 Barnett and Finnemore, Rules fo r the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, p.22
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for which they work. Because o f their specialized expertise, they are considered an
“authority” on the subject of their work and thus have legitimacy to propose actions on
their own. As wisely put by Barnett and Finnemore, it is this sound authority that
provides IOs with relative autonomy to propose new norms and actions that are often also
adopted by states.
Along the same lines, principal-agent theory also grants IOs with autonomy. This
approach, developed in other areas o f social sciences such as economics and American
politics, has been hijacked by IR scholars in recent years.20 Researchers within this
theoretical strand focus on the relationship between principals (or states) and agents (or
international organizations) and how the former delegate the later with authority to act on
their behalf. In IR literature, the basis o f this argument is the finding that delegation
mechanisms found in domestic politics can be similar to those found at the international
level.21 States exercise varying levels o f control over their agents, but this control varies
in degree rather than by type of mechanism.
The process of delegation would then entail that states as principals would grant
authority to IOs who have thus been empowered to act on their behalf in certain pre
defined matters. The definition o f agent and principal is mutually constitutive, that is, one
can only be defined in relation to the other. However, principals are able to both grant
and rescind authority to agents. In the specific case of international organizations, it
20 See for example: Tamar Gutner, "Explaining the Gaps between Mandate and Performance: Agency
Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform," Global Environmental Politics 5, no. 2 (2005); Darren G.
Hawkins, D elegation an d Agency in International Organizations, Political Economy o f Institutions and
D ecisions (Cambridge, U K ; N ew York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Daniel L. N ielson and
Michael J. Tierney, "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank
Environmental Reform," International Organizations 57(2003); Mark Polack, "Delegation, Agency, and
Agenda Setting in the European Community," ibid.51, no. 1 (1997); Roland Vaubel, "Principal-Agent
Problems in International Organizations," R eview o f International Organizations 1, no. 2 (2006).
21 Hawkins, D elegation and Agency in International Organizations, p.5
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becomes clear states are the principals. Occasionally, other actors in the international
system, such as the media and other organizations such as NGOs, may act similarly to
principals. However, only states are able to empower and disempower IOs from acting on
their behalf on certain previously defined areas.
The analysis of why states may delegate authority to IOs has been extensively
discussed in IR theory. Principal-agent theory proponents emphasize arguments similar to
those put forward by institutionalists when explaining the possibility o f cooperation
between states. In fact, they claim that states can take advantage of IOs because they are
themselves a form of cooperation. The possibility of establishing a division o f labor as
well as the advantages of counting with specialized expertise are important motivations to
join IOs and endow them with authority. Other motivational factors for states include
saving resources, managing policy externalities, facilitating collective decision-making,
resolving disputes, and enhancing credibility.22
The possibility o f conflicting interests between agents and principals is also
considered within this theoretical approach. As a result, control mechanisms may exist
including rules, monitoring practices, reporting obligations and institutional checks and
balances. Despite them, agents are usually granted with the autonomy to pursue the
principal's goals in ways that are integrally or partially defined by agents themselves. The
degree o f institutional autonomy thus varies from organization to organization and
depends on the level o f control mechanisms established by principals.
Nonetheless, international organizations do possess a window o f opportunity to
act on their own within the boundaries o f the role and functions states have defined. In

22 Ibid. p. 13
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this context, the principal-agent theory coincides with the constructivist approach that IOs
possess agency and may act in ways that are not entirely in accordance with member
states' interests. These two theories also converge in their claim that IOs are provided
with leverage to pursue an independent agenda through the authority delegated to them
by states and because o f their specialized expertise and the legitimacy conferred by their
multilateral forum.
The idea that IOs have autonomy to pursue the goals defined by its founders as
well as the ability to create and disseminate norms indicates that there may be instances
in which they can produce knowledge on their own. This knowledge is then disseminated
within IOs' structure and membership before it is recognized as a new and
institutionalized practice. It is in this context that learning can take place.

Organizational learning in IOs: a review o f Ernst Haas model

Within IR literature, the seminal work of Ernst Haas takes the debate of
organizational learning to a new level as he describes the specific process through which
international organizations can adapt, learn and change over time. The specific
consideration of states' roles in this process is one of his main contributions to the study
o f organizational learning in IR field. Specifically, he argues that learning can only occur
once a cross cultural consensus amongst all members is achieved. Moreover, his
elaboration on the definition of epistemic communities as enablers o f learning is key to
this study because this group of like-minded individuals from various backgrounds practitioners, scholars, etc - and with specialized know-how provides organizations with
valuable expertise, necessary for a successful learning process. His writing on
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organizational learning and adaptation were highly influential to the study of
international organizations, particularly in regard to environmental issues.23
Haas theorizes that organizations are embedded in a particular historical context
and have their own organizational cultures. Haas' concept o f organizational culture can
be divided in two inter-related elements that resembles Shein's description o f third and
second level elements o f organizational culture. The first, or underlying assumptions,
refers to the principles, values and goals that guide IOs’ action. These are deeply rooted
features o f IO's organizational culture and are difficult to change since they are at the
core of its “genetic code” and are an integral part o f them as beings. The second level
element refers to secondary features o f IOs' organizational culture, such as the
procedures and strategies to pursue the organization's goals. Although both can change,
the process of changing the former is far more difficult.
In this context, Haas’ understanding of learning involves a change in the
organization's purposes, principles and values, or underlying assumptions.24 In an
incomplete learning process, an observable change in organizations’ behavior and
activities would occur, but without fundamental redefining o f organizational goals and
values. This process is defined as “adaptation” and comprises a change in the ways

23 See for example: Peter M. Haas and Ernst Haas, "Learning to Leam: Improving International
Governance," G lobal Governance 1, no. 3 (1995); Nielson and Tierney, "Delegation to International
Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform"; Frank Biermann, Bemd
Siebenhiiner, and Anna Schreyogg, International Organizations in G lobal Environmental Governance,
Routledge Research in Environmental Politics (Abingdon, Oxon ; N ew York, NY: Routledge, 2009);
Stephen Bauer, "Does Bureaucracy Really Matter? The Authority o f Intergovernmental Treaty Secretariats
in Global Environmental Politics," G lobal Environmental Politics 6, no. 1 (2006); Peter Haas,
"International Institutions and Social Learning in the Management o f Global Environmental Risks.," Policy
Studies Journal 28, no. 3 (2000); Siebenhiiner, "Learning in International Organization in Global
Environmental Governance."
24 Haas, When Knowledge Is Power: Three M odels o f Change in International Organizations, p. 3
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through which the organization pursues its purposes, or a change in its secondary
features.
It is important to note that not all adaptation process is positive and these changes
do not always improve IOs’ actions on the ground. Haas clarifies that adaptation can be
either incremental or turbulent resulting in positive changes in the former and in a
continuous non-growth in the latter.25 The difference between these two adaptation
categories lies in the organizational ability to promote changes coherently and in
accordance to the defined goals and with positive consequences.
As an illustration, the author cites the creation o f peacekeeping operations within
the UN 's system o f collective security system in 1956. Since this initial change was
within the boundaries o f the previously defined goal o f maintaining international peace
and security and in accordance to U N 's underlying principle of sovereignty and non
intervention, it consisted o f an incremental adaptation. Haas, however, rightly evaluates
that the transformations in peacekeeping practices that occurred in the beginning o f the
9 0 's degenerated into a turbulent non-growth model.

Indeed, the invention of UN

peacekeeping operations (PKO) comprised an innovative change to overcome contextdriven forces, particularly the Cold War and the Security Council's inability to act.
However, as the Cold War ended and the nature of conflicts changed, the UN increased
its scope of action within PKOs by adding activities in contexts that were considerably
different from those where the organization intervened during the past decades. This
increment, however, was not accompanied by a reflection process that would result in the
re-examination of the principles and doctrines necessary to maintain the coherence o f UN

25 Ibid. p . 3
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actions in the field. The subsequent failures in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, amongst
others, are the result of an incoherent increase in the scope o f UN actions, followed by a
loss of authority from which the UN is still recovering.
Consequently, an important tool for organizations to maintain their authority is to
“learn how to learn” or adapt.26 Organizations with the ability to constantly change in
changing contexts thrive in a state-centric dominated international system. As previously
indicated, change in organizations can be triggered by a change in actors' interest or in
the environment or context. “Learning in an international organization implies that the
organization's members are induced to question earlier beliefs about the appropriateness
o f ends of actions and to think about new ones to revalue themselves.”27 The learning
process thus involves a common understanding of the causes o f the problem that
triggered the reflection process on new shared solutions and consensual “set of larger
meanings about life and nature not previously held in common participating members.”28
The ability to leam is thus the ability to recognize failures and re-examine existing set of
principles and actions.
Because international organizations are engaged in the implementation of
transnational policies and continuous interaction between politically and culturally
diverse actors such as national governments, non-governmental organizations, interest
groups, business firms, professionals, etc, learning depends on the ability to “share
meanings across cultural and ideological chasms.”29 In other words, “collective problem

26 Haas and Haas, "Learning to Leam: Improving International Governance."
27 Haas, When Knowledge Is Power: Three M odels o f Change in International Organizations, p. 15
28 Ibid. p.24
29 Ibid. p.33
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solving among 160-odd30 states o f widely different cultural commitments and with
divergent historical memories would seem to depend on the ability to transcend cultural
and historical boundaries, to establish trans-cultural and trans-ideological shared
meanings.”31
Haas’ introduction of the cultural element is particularly useful for the object of
this dissertation. Gender may be a controversial and sensitive subject within certain
cultures and the analysis o f UN learning in “gender-related” practices would be
incomplete if it ignored the vast cultural differences between member states. At the same
time, though, it may be necessary to free the model o f organizational learning from the
“problem of states” so that it is possible to evaluate whether changes in the organization's
norms and practices that are initiated by the Secretariat may result in changes in the
actions implemented by member states.
As rightly put by Finnemore and Barnett,32 ignoring the special nature o f IOs
formed by sovereign state units is as much a mistake as defining IOs autonomy as the
ability to follow an agenda despite powerful states’ willingness to comply. States possess
different power potentials within organizations and, conflicting interests with these may
hamper organizational change.

Learning enablers

Haas and Haas grant epistemic communities a special role in promoting
organizational learning by defining them as a group o f like-minded professionals that

30 Haas was referring to the United Nations, which, at the time had around 160 member states.
31 Ibid. p. 17
32Bamett and Finnemore, Rules fo r the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, p. 154
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work around specific problematic issues, and whose specialized expertise and knowledge
are considered central to a successful learning process. In this context, organizational
learning can be either initiated by these actors working outside the organization or by
actors working within the boundaries o f the organization.
Epistemic communities, or professionals working for NGOs, business firms, etc,
scholars and practitioners in the area, can initiate the learning process by pushing the
Secretariat to consider their specific point o f view on an issue they want the organization
to pursue. They can also search for member states support and form a coalition of
favorable states to convince other member states and the Secretariat to look into their
proposals and adopt them. Once the Secretariat has been persuaded by one dominant
epistemic community along with a coalition o f willing states, the learning process can be
initiated and transferred throughout all o f the organization's layers. It is also common that
once the learning process has been initiated, the organization selects members of the
epistemic communities to actively participate in the search for new shared solutions,
either as consultants or as an integral part o f the team dedicated to that particular issue.
This practice is evident in the preparatory meetings before major conferences
where NGOs, scholars and other practitioners are invited to discuss the Conference topic
and propose issues to be included in discussions with states’ representatives.
Occasionally, the selected members are also granted observer status and are able to
participate and, on some occasions, speak on a number of issues. This free flow o f ideas
between these professionals and states is an important process through which new
knowledge can be inserted in the organization during the learning process and further
improving it.
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However, the authors admonish that “organizational learning requires that the
efforts o f epistemic communities be accepted and advocated by a coalition of hegemonic
member states rather than being endorsed by majorities o f weak states.”33 This comment
seems to be in line with the idea that although it is possible organizations promote their
own norms, the need to gather strong states’ support is a necessary condition for a
successful implementation o f the norm. The ultimate stage of organizational learning
would be the adoption and acceptance by member states’ executive power o f the new
policies in accordance to the learning process the organization has gone through.34
Because organizational learning involves consensual knowledge, the authors point
out that learning is extremely rare, particular in organizations like the UN, which is
formed by very culturally and politically different members. Moreover, they point out to
yet another factor that makes learning a difficult process to take place: the organizations'
capacity to promote linkages between issues.35 They argue that the need to have “linkage
capacity” to promote organizational learning is a result o f the transformation o f the
international political arena, where deconstructing and setting problems apart in different
categories is no longer possible.
Because issues are so interconnected, solutions ought to be multi-disciplinary in
order to be adequate. Although setting issues apart and promoting separate actions may
seem easier when addressing different problems, responses are likely to be inadequate as
they will leave behind important interconnected causes of the problem. Although
complex linking among policy issues is necessary for success, international negotiations

33 Haas and Haas, "Learning to Learn: Improving International Governance." p. 261
34 Ibid. p.261
35 Ibid. p.257
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are bloated as they call for larger package deals and long-term policies that member states
may not be willing to fully commit themselves to.
It becomes evident that the process of learning within organizations depends on a
number o f factors, such as the capacity to promote political and ideological consensus,
establish linkages between issues and allow the free flow of ideas between the
organization and members of the epistemic community. The literature also indicates that
a number of actors working within and outside IOs function as enablers of learning.
Among those actors, epistemic communities’ contributions have been highly emphasized
as important sources of specific knowledge that can generate new and more adequate
practices.
However, epistemic communities are not the only facilitators o f learning and
change. In fact, member states themselves can actively work toward the promotion of
learning by framing issues o f their interest and forming coalitions o f other states and
members o f the epistemic community to support their cause.36 Depending on which states
join, there is a great possibility that they may be successful, especially if these are rich,
developed and powerful states.
Other learning enablers include the bureaucracy within the organization and the
context itself. A strong bureaucracy can propose new ideas and push the Secretariat to
adopt its proposal. It can also search for member states’ support and form a “coalition of
the willing”, thus increasing chances that their proposal will be considered by the high

36 Similarly to earlier functionalist texts, Haas duels over the influence o f member states producing change
in organizations. He argues that changes are produced by member-state dissatisfaction and pressure for
change. According to him, these can be interpreted as a threat to organizational autonomy, since if
proposed changes do not meet membership requirements, they may lose funds, personnel, prestige, etc.
See: Haas, When Knowledge Is Power: Three M odels o f Change in International Organizations.
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level staff within the 10 and by member states’ representatives. Finally, changes in the
environment may also trigger a learning process. Indeed, the transformation of the
political and historical context along with shifts in the regulatory and normative patterns
in the environment may render IOs’ action inefficient and obsolete and the need to learn
and/or adapt would become necessary.
This analysis has thus far shown that there is a theoretical stream in IR literature
that accepts IOs as capable o f acting on their own even when member states do not fully
agree with their policies. These scholars also accept the idea that organizational learning
is possible. However, they condition this process to the achievement o f a consensual
trans-cultural agreement among member states, Secretariat's civil servants and members
of the epistemic community on new forms o f structures and norms. Under these
conditions, learning becomes an extremely rare phenomenon.37 In this context, there are a
few factors that contribute to the process o f learning, including the capacity to link issues
and allow the free flow of ideas between the epistemic community, IO staff and member
states. The actions of these three groups o f actors, along with changes in the environment
where the organization operates, are the main contributing factors that enable learning.
By identifying functional problems and pushing for solutions, these actors can trigger a
learning process.
However, the presence o f all these necessary conditions together seems to
conceptualize learning as an extremely rare process and the important steps taken by
organizations on their own seem to be relatively ignored. Consequently, I would like to
draw attention to Barnett's and Finnemore's central argument regarding IO 's agency and

37 Siebenhttner, "Learning in International Organization in Global Environmental Governance." p.96
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their capacity to spread norms, fix meanings and categorize the world, bringing important
knowledge that may be reflected not only in the practice of organizations, but also in the
text of central documents. In this context, Emanuel Adler's practice-based approach38
will contribute to the understanding of how practices are generated and socialized to
states. In the particular context of this dissertation, a focus on practices generated within
IOs will point out to how they can engender new knowledge to be later disseminated to
states.

International practices

A practice oriented approach emphasizes the social construction o f practices as
consensually adopted forms o f action in the international system. For the proponents of
this renewed approach, “world politics can be understood as structured by practices,
which give meaning to international action, make possible strategic interaction, and are
reproduced, changed and reinforced by international action and interaction.”39
In this context, practices are understood as patterned actions developed in a
particular context that provides them with socially constructed meaning. In other words,
practices can be defined as meaningful behavior that has been repeated over time as a
result of positive feedback, or as an action socially recognized as meaningful based on
background knowledge acquired through experience.

38 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, International P ractices, Cambridge Studies in International
Relations (Cambridge N ew York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
39 Ibid. p.5
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Adler unpacks the notion o f practice in five different elements.40 The first element
is performance, or the process o f doing something; the second is pattern, pointing out to
the fact that practices exhibits some regularity over time and space; the third is
competency, or the social recognition o f practices as being competent; the fourth is the
background knowledge or the accumulated experience and understandings; and finally,
the fifth is the linkage between discursive and material worlds as practices are themselves
a connection between implicit meanings and explicit actions.
Resembling Haas' notion o f epistemic communities, Adler’s argument is that
practices are exercised and transformed in the framework o f community of practices.
These are “inter-subjective social structures that constitute the normative and epistemic
ground for action, but are also agents, made up o f real people, who - working via
network channels, across national borders, across organizational divides, and in the halls
of government - affect political, economic and social events.”41 Their action thus
contributes to both the generation and ending o f the life cycle of practices by creating,
disseminating and institutionalizing them. This process involves engaging groups of
agents “in a community of practice where learning takes place and meanings and
identities are negotiated and transformed.”42
The life cycle of practices first includes generation as a socially recognized
meaningful action, then diffusion in the system and, finally, institutionalization. Not all
practices pass through all these phases; for example, institutionalization may be

40 Ibid. p.7
41 Ibid. p. 17
42Emanuel Adler, "The Spread o f Security Communities:Communities o f Practice, Self-Restraint, and
N ato’s Post-C old War Transformation," European Journal o f International Relations 14, no. 2 (2008).
p. 196
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problematic, as many of them can deteriorate and disappear over time. In this context,
organizational learning could be understood as the process through which practices
become institutionalized within a particular international organization, embedded in its
super-structure and carried out by its members and staff.
The single most important aspect o f international practices for this dissertation is
the concept o f practice dissemination through socialization. As Adler points out, the
process through which practices are generated does not depend on the unanimous
acceptance o f its validity. Instead, it is the constant repetition of practice that socializes
states to accept and institutionalize them. Consequently, international practices are not
dependent on a consensus about their importance, but on their socialization and
dissemination in the system. Accordingly, this dissertation attempts to assess whether
learning can take place without unanimous consensus from member states, as practices
are generated independently from states, the question of whether they can actually be
implemented remains. According to Adler's argument, as practices are generated, they
are later socialized and adopted by a number o f member states, which permits this new
practice to be institutionalized.
Rather than just focusing on the practice of “promoting gender in PKOs”, this
dissertation will focus both on the content o f this specific practice and in the mechanism
that may or may not disseminate this new practice within the UN and to its members.
This has been possible thanks to the combined effects of the epistemic community
dedicated to this issue and the institutionalization of protection of civilians into the U N 's
normative PKO framework in the 21st century. For this purpose, the following session
will lay out the organizational learning mechanism used to determine whether and how
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promoting gender in PKO has been proposed and institutionalized by the UN and what
consequences this new international practice has produced thus far.

A model of organizational learning

This dissertation’s model o f organizational learning is based on the understanding
o f international organizations as agents o f dissemination that are able to produce new
knowledge and practices and later diffuse them to its members. The socialization o f these
practices among member states and their repetition over time is a necessary step for
learning to take place. However, the institutionalization o f a new practice does not
depend on the unanimous consensus among member states.
In this context, learning refers to the process through which a new international
practice is created and included within the framework o f action o f a given IO. It also
refers to a process o f change in which older practices are substituted by new ones, and
added to the organization's scope o f action. This change can be either superficial or affect
the inner most parts of the organizational culture. For this reason, a thorough
understanding of the concept o f organizational culture in international organizations will
help clarify the different levels in which learning can take place. In fact, as argued by
Haas, changes in the core values and principles o f organizations are much more difficult
to enact and often require the member states’ unanimous consensus.
For this reason, this dissertation employs a theoretical framework that understands
organizational learning as a two level process. The first refers to the process through
which a new practice is generated, disseminated and institutionalized. The second, also
known as transformation, refers to the ultimate stage o f learning when practices are
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consensually accepted and adopted by all member states, and become an integral part of
the organizational culture.
First-level learning is either originated due to a change in the context or driven by
the advocacy work o f members o f an epistemic community, member states or IO
bureaucracy. It includes five main phases: organizational dysfunction, which refers to the
organization's inability to solve problems with the available set of existing practices; re
examination, or the process through which this existing set o f practices are re-examined
and new ones are proposed; minimum consensus, referring to the need to reach a
minimum acceptance among member states, members of the epistemic community and
IO's Secretariat's staff; institutionalization, comprising the process of embedding this
new practice in the institutional framework o f the organization; and finally,
dissemination, the process through which this practice is socialized throughout the layers
of the organization and to member states.
In large organizations with headquarters and field offices, a feedback loop
between the two is necessary. Often, practices originated at headquarters level are not
fully applicable in other contexts or, simply confront major challenges to be translated
into practice. The constant flow o f communication between different offices grants the
learning process with increased chances o f success since it provides updated information
on successful and failed practices.
The second-level learning refers to the process through which practices are
socialized to the rest of member states, and then accepted and adopted by them. It
requires that the executive power of those states adopt national policies in accordance to
the new practice. When both the organization and its member states have changed and
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learned, that is when organizational transformation takes place. It is also important to
note that organizational transformation also refers to a much deeper process o f change. It
comprises a change in the core values o f the organization, or its raison d ' etre. That is
why organizational transformation is an extremely challenging and therefore rare
phenomenon.
The following sections will thus analyze this two-level learning process. First, the
concept o f organizational culture and its content will shed some light on how and where
the process of learning takes place. Following this discussion is a full description o f the
learning process, conditions under which learning more easily takes place and an
evaluation of the possibilities for a full-blown transformation to occur.

Organizational culture in IOs

As shown in Schein's analysis, organizational culture is the guiding principle that
leads organizations to behave, act and understand the world in specific ways. Any change
in the organization or learning process necessarily implies a breach in the original
organizational culture. His three-level analysis is particularly helpful because it allows
the audience to determine how profound the change was and if it resulted in a complete,
partial or imperceptible organizational change.
The application o f Schein's three-level concept o f organizational culture to
international organizations needs a few considerations as the state-centric ontology
embedded in analyses concerning IOs is absent from his analysis. Moreover, since the
kind of states that are members o f the analyzed IO influences its underlying and espoused
values, considerations about state representation ought to be included both in the
definition of organizational culture and in the mechanism o f organizational learning.
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Therefore, the three-level definition o f organizational culture applied to international
organizations will be defined as follows.
The first level, or “artifacts”, consists o f the physical world surrounding the
organization and its ordering principles; the building, its structure and how the
organization is internally organized-such as the voting process and the different level o f
executive power conferred to each o f the organization's bodies—are important elements
to be considered in this level. The second level, or “espoused values”, refers to IOs' goals
and strategies to pursue them. Espoused values are embedded in the rules, procedures,
strategies, and guidelines within the organization and can be easily comprehended
through a analysis o f the organization's written documents. Finally, at the third level, or
“underlying assumptions”, lie IOs' norms, principles and values that may not be
explicitly stated but are part o f the underlying beliefs, perceptions, thoughts and feelings
within the organization. One important aspect within this level is the espoused values by
member states.
The presence o f member states and the relative constraining power and control
mechanisms they possess are common features to all international organizations.
However, the types of member states are not. A fully western international organization
with modem capitalist democracies as members will be different from an organization
that is comprised o f mostly non-Westem states with different forms o f government. The
point I am trying to make is that the state composition of an IO may incur certain values
and principles located in the third level of Shein's organizational culture definition.
While the addition o f new members may not mean a transformation per se, the inclusion
o f considerably different states with values different from that of the organization may
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lead to a learning process and the generation o f an extra set o f problems the organization
will have to deal with.
The first and second levels of organizational culture are physical, procedural and
action based evidence of the organization's underlying principles. That is why changes in
the first and second levels of organizational culture are more easily attainable and may
reflect Haas' concept of adaptation, that is, the inclusion of actions with the purpose of
solving a problem without necessarily changing the organization's core principles and
values. However, the concept o f learning here encompasses that o f adaptation and
indicates the adoption o f new and successful actions to solve problems that could not be
previously solved by the existing set o f activities developed by the organization. A
change in the core values of the organization, similarly results from a learning process,
though a much deeper one, initiated by the re-examination o f its core values and the
generation o f new and more adequate espoused values and artifacts, resulting ultimately
in the complete transformation o f the organization.
A second consideration is now necessary. Haas’ definition o f organizational
learning implies the questioning o f earlier beliefs and the re-definition o f new solutions
that are consensually accepted by the members o f a culturally and politically different
group. For the author, a learning process is only achieved if disseminated and adopted by
these culturally and politically different units. Considering Haas’ definition, in an IO with
similarly represented states, learning seems to be more easily accomplished than in
culturally diverse organizations such as the UN. Nonetheless, can the learning process in
a universal organization such as the UN have its importance minimized because it was
not fully adopted by 193 member states? Particularly, in regard to gender issues even
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though we have asserted that UN's resolutions present intrinsic challenges to be adopted
by all member states, the organization is still attempting to disseminate renewed gender
norms and practices.
As a consequence, in order to assess whether this practices can be adequately
implemented by these culturally diverse member states, the organizational learning model
proposed here will take these aspects under consideration and establish a framework o f
analysis that considers the differences between learning and transformation and
emphasize organizational agency in the establishment of international practices.
Departing from Adler's definition o f international practice as socially meaningful
patterns of actions competently affecting the environment, we consider the end of an
organizational learning process as the successful institutionalization o f international
practices through an IO.

The model

As previously discussed learning is a two-level process, the last o f which involves
organization transformation with the acceptance o f changes in the core values o f the
organizational culture by all member states. However, the completion o f a learning
process does not require second-level learning to happen. In fact, organizational
transformation is an extremely rare phenomenon heavily dependent on membership and
context.
This section will thus focus on first-level learning, or the process through which a
new international practice is created, disseminated and institutionalized within an IO. It
can be divided in five different but complementary phases: organizational dysfunction,
re-examination, minimum consensus, institutionalization and dissemination.
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Organizational dysfunction

Every IO has a set o f well-defined aims, strategies and actions designed to
effectively accomplish those goals. Occasionally, changes in the environment in which
IOs operate provoke the rise o f a new set o f problems or the re-modeling o f old ones.
These changes often lead to a mismatch between the existing set of strategies and actions
available and the challenges brought about by the new problem. This mismatch will be
reflected in the IO 's inability to put forward an adequate solution, rendering the system
dysfunctional and trigging a process o f re-examination of rules, procedures, strategies
and actions available.

Re-examination

This is the process by which IO staff and member-states' representatives re
examine the existing framework in search for a new and more appropriate one. As rightly
suggested by Haas, the free flow of ideas from the epistemic community or like-minded
professionals with the specialized expertise in a particular issue area or problem has been
identified as a necessary condition for the rise of a suitable solution. Although the
participation o f Haas' epistemic community in the formulation of a new framework of
action is not necessarily part o f the re-examination phase, it is definitely a contributing
factor in the search for a framework that can adequately and successfully address the
challenges of a constantly changing environment.
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Minimum consensus

Because unanimity is almost impossible, learning would be an extremely rare
phenomenon if dependent on an absolute consensus between all member states, IO staff
and the epistemic community. Accordingly, a minimum consensus on the proposed
solution is deemed necessary before it is institutionalized and put into practice. This
consensus should be reached by a group of states’ representatives, including powerful
ones, IO staff and members o f the epistemic community. If epistemic communities,
comprised o f like-minded professionals with deep expertise in a given issue area, do not
agree with the prescribed solution, they may influence opposition. Consequently, it can
be difficult for consensus to be reached or institutionalization and dissemination initiated
if the epistemic community disapproves o f the proposed solution. The same is true in
regard to IO staff and member states, particularly the powerful ones that may have other
resources besides coalitions to stop a proposal from being disseminated and implemented
in practice.
However, it is important to consider that states do not necessarily place the same
importance on all issues; it may be the case that some of them do not fully engage in the
process of finding and agreeing on a new solution and their initial support is not
necessary. Moreover, it may be the case that their voice is not fully heard if powerful
states are in favor of the proposal. Finally, under certain conditions, particularly when
learning refers to practices outside the sphere of interest of powerful states, it may be that
minimum consensus does not require the support of powerful states. However, these are
rare occasions, and in any case, learning would have occurred only superficially without
affecting the core of the organizational culture.
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Institutionalization

Institutionalization refers to the process through which a given practice is
institutionalized in the organization's structure by being added to the set of existing rules,
procedures, actions, etc. that governs the organization or by substituting a former one.
Institutionalization refers to the process o f explicitly ingraining the recently acquired
knowledge into the organization as an integral part o f its organizational culture.
Interestingly, institutionalization occurs before dissemination. As it can be observed from
the case of gender approaches to peacekeeping, the strong link between normalized
gender relations and a lasting peace is already embedded in many o f the organization's
documents and doctrines of action even though few member states have adopted
resolutions provisions.

Dissemination

The final stage o f organizational learning, dissemination refers to the process o f
putting into practice the recently agreed solution. As this action is successfully
implemented, it is then disseminated and reiterated over time and space. Its validity will
depend on the successful results it generates when applied to similar problems in
different times and geographical positions.
It is important to emphasize the role of IOs' agency in the process of
organizational learning. As previously emphasized, most IOs have a Secretariat staffed
with civil servants that do not work in the name of their national governments but rather
for the organization. It is this group o f individuals that is tasked with the responsibility o f
re-examining the existing framework and coming up with a more adequate one. It is in
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this particular phase that the window o f opportunity to create and spread norms in the
system is the largest. Although a group of member states’ representatives is usually
selected to either actively participate or simply consult in the re-examination process, it is
the Secretariat's responsibility, not that o f any particular state, to create a new and more
adequate framework for future actions.
When states’ unanimous compliance and the differentiated levels o f change are
added to the equation, learning becomes more possible and IOs’ agency more easily
perceived. This model can be applied for both small and larger organizations; however, in
the case o f the later it is important that lessons learned from field offices are readily
available for headquarters and vice-versa. Occasionally, it may happen that a learning
process is not complete because lessons learned from the field do not inform headquarters
about most appropriate actions and thus it is not replicated in other places, lacking
institutionalization. This is why a learning feedback loop is necessary.
The following section will discuss the mechanism through which knowledge is
transferred and learning can take place in the organization as whole rather than only in
individual units. The analysis will be based on the notion o f a first and second loop
learning, the latter being the stage when new knowledge becomes lessons learned and are
transferred to the organization's headquarters and disseminated to other field offices. If
applicable to other contexts, then learning becomes an integral part of the organization's
culture and fully integrated into its normative framework and actions.

Learning feedback loop

International organizations are considerably different in terms o f purpose, size,
procedures and member-states. They can be regional organizations, comprised o f
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culturally, politically and socially similar states or larger organizations composed of
coalitions o f diverse states. They can have specific and functional purposes such as
enhancing economic cooperation in particular issue areas like coal and steel, as was the
case in the European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC) arrangement o f 1951 between
the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Germany, France and Italy. Or they can be
comprehensive organizations such as the European Union, which evolved from the ECSC
and deals with major political, economic and security issues, while enjoying greater
powers and more encompassing initiatives as illustrated by the adoption o f a common
currency by twelve o f its member states.
For this reason, a digression about organizational learning in a large organization
with regional and/or field offices is necessary. In these cases, learning can become a more
complex process, especially when initiated at a field or regional office. While field
offices can accomplish learning on their own, new practices may or may not be
transferred to the headquarters and, consequently, also used by other units/departments or
offices. In this context, Lise Moije Howard's analysis about first and second level
learning can be enlightening.43 She analyzes UN missions that have been considered
successful in the literature - Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern
Slavonia and East Timor - and determines that the main factor explaining the missions’
success is the presence of first level learning.
The author defines first level learning as individual learning on the field or at
mission level. An effort is required to understand the local causes of conflict as a ways to
better address them, and actions to fulfill the mandate are constantly changing based on

43 Howard, Un Peacekeeping in Civil Wars.
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what is learned by UN personnel through their interaction with the local population and
context. This individual level learning, however, should be translated into a change in the
structure and strategies ruling the mission, thus affecting other actors within the mission
and how they interact in that particular environment.
Hence, organizational learning becomes manifest when these lessons learned
result in organizational procedures, routines strategies, structures and goals. Second level
learning, is a change in the organization's overall means, structures, and goals at
headquarters level in response to new understandings o f problems and their causes at
mission level.44
Considering Howard’s understanding o f learning as a looped process between the
field and headquarters, we can easily think about field and headquarter learning as
comprising first and second loop learning respectively. In other words, first loop learning
can be understood as the refining o f a practice implemented on the field or at another
regional office, while the second loop learning involves the redefinition o f the practice at
the headquarter level and then transmitted to the other units/departments/offices within
this same organization.
It is important to notice that in many cases first loop learning may lead to second
loop learning. Depending on the issue area, problems are identified by regional and field
offices and quite often they are in better position to advocate for solutions based on the
reality and conditions on the ground and which may not be entirely known at the
headquarters. In fact, interviews carried out on the field in the UN peacekeeping
operations in Haiti and the Democratic Republic o f Congo have shown that field staff and

44 Ibid. p. 19
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headquarters do not necessarily agree on a number of issues.45 In fact, field staff usually
has a much more thorough understanding o f conditions on the ground and are thus in
better position to come up with solutions that are more suitable to that particular context
and based on the resources they have on the ground.
Digressions about how headquarters procedures cannot be fully employed in the
context o f field peacekeeping operations were also common among interviewees. Often
called “the bubble”, headquarters may produce procedures and rules that may not be fully
applicable to the field, especially if they have not been based on information fed by the
field itself. While field operations follow the overall same underlying assumptions of
headquarters and frame their actions on the same espoused values following general
guidelines and strategies formulated by headquarters, at that level, they also have their
own specific norms which are often more adequate to the challenges they confront on that
particular context, with their own standard operations procedures, strategies and
guidelines.
In this context, it is important to maintain a feedback loop between the field
and/or other regional offices and the headquarters so that practices created at headquarter
level are well informed, based on the reality on the ground, and have better chances of
being successful. This feedback loop not only informs headquarters o f positive and
negative actions, but also comprises an important set o f lessons learned that will help the
institutionalization o f a new practice and the completion o f a learning process. There are
several ways through which organizations can establish this feedback loop, including the
establishment o f reporting processes through which field and regional offices send the
45 Interviews were carried out during two extensive field works carried out in Haiti (June/2011 and
September/2012) and Democratic Republic o f Congo (February/2012)
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headquarter reports on their activities, and o f monitoring initiatives with headquarters'
staff visiting and evaluating field activities.
As an illustration, UN peacekeeping practice has a well-established and complex
process o f feedback loop that constantly informs not only the Secretariat but also member
states at the General Assembly and Security Council o f the field activities, lesson-learned
and challenges.46 Each peace operation has a Special Representative o f the Secretary
General on the field in direct contact with Secretariat in New York, who is also
responsible for gathering information on the mission's activities and sending it to the
headquarters periodically. Moreover, mission components - police, military and civilian
- maintain databases on activities, that are sometimes fed daily, and either shared with
New York or sent through daily reports.
While this is an important practice since it allows headquarters to create adequate
policies that reflect the reality on the ground and ,most importantly, lessons learned from
one mission can be passed on to another, it is surprising how so far from reality UN
documents tend to be. If the gap between the field and headquarters cannot be explained
by the lack of information, it becomes even more challenging to find out what specific
factors account to this paradoxical reality. One successful example is the formulation o f
an inventory of best practices to curb sexual violence in peacekeeping settings.
Nonetheless, even though the inventory comprises an excellent mechanism to transfer
knowledge and thus facilitate learning, whether or not these lessons learned are actually
being disseminated is a different story.
46 The most easily available set o f information compiled through this feedback loop process is the reports o f
the Secretary General to either the Security Council or to the General Assembly. They can either be on the
progress o f implementing certain practices, on specific peace missions, or on the overall activities o f the
United Nations as a whole.
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In fact, the different realities and feedback from the field is not always taken into
consideration in the formulation of new practices. Moreover, the lack of resources in
some international organizations can be a further challenge in the process of
organizational learning. Haas' example o f turbulent non-growth experienced by the UN
when the scope of its peacekeeping operations was increased in the 9 0 's illustrates the
damage that the absence o f a functioning feedback loop between the field and
headquarters can cause, especially if conjunction to lack o f resources. In that situation,
failures on the ground were not well informed to other missions and mistakes were
repeated; most importantly though, the grand vision o f a complex peace operation was
not accompanied by a grand contribution from member states, resulting in dysfunctional
peace operations that had ample purposes and extremely small resources. Failure then
should be expected.
This section has shown how the transfer of knowledge occurs in large
organizations, particularly those that have offices in locations that are different from that
of the headquarters. This knowledge transfer is part o f the learning process previously
described and is an extremely important element o f organizational learning processes in
large organizations.
Nonetheless, there is yet another important aspect that ought to be taken into
consideration. The organizational learning model suggested that only a minimum
consensus was necessary to have a new practice disseminated throughout the layers o f the
organization and put into practice. In some situations, though, if practices are to be
directly implemented by member states rather than Secretariat’s staff, as is the case of
military troops in peace operations, then learning becomes dependent on those states’
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willingness to implement practices; sometimes, these states were not part of the minimum
consensus.

Organizational learning vs. organizational transformation

Organizational learning and organizational transformation are two different but
correlated processes of change. The first feature o f transformation is a shift in the
defining values, and principles o f the organization, or the core o f its organizational
culture. Secondly, another main difference between these two processes lies in the degree
to which states fully adopt learned experience and change themselves and their practices.
In fact, as previously explained, transformation is the final stage of learning, when the
learned practice is transmitted and accepted by member states. Not all learning processes
result

in

transformation;

however,

transformation

necessarily

results

from

a

comprehensive learning process.
As described earlier in this chapter, the process o f learning proposed here does not
require a consensus among all member states, although a minimum consensus is always
necessary before recently acquired knowledge can be put in practice. Indeed, it would not
be fair to say that the UN, for example, has not learned in terms of a gender approach to
peacekeeping operations because countries do not comply with the goal o f having 10% of
female peacekeepers on the ground. Not only has the UN Security Council approved a
number of resolutions in that regard, but training modules, guidelines and new units were
created with the objective of reaching that goal. Nonetheless, the question o f whether or
not non-state compliance affect UN efforts in peace settings remain and as will be noted
in the case studies may even hamper positive impact in the field. That is why we
introduce the concept of organizational transformation, or the ultimate stage o f learning.
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In order to further illustrate this point, one can examine the case o f protection of
civilians, which is the result of a re-evaluation process that has placed the security of the
individual as the top priority of peace operations. The successful practice o f protection of
civilians depends on a number of factors, among which are the elaboration o f an adequate
strategy, the implementation of comprehensive programs that address economic, social
and security threats to the individual and finally the adequate establishment o f protection
mechanisms to be implemented by the military component. Taken together, the
successful implementation o f a protection o f civilian mandate depends on the hard work
of the Secretariat staff, o f member states’ financial contributions and on a good
performance o f national troops deployed in peace operations worldwide.
Although protection of civilians does constitute a learning process that had almost
universal consensus about its importance and has been repeatedly transferred from one
operation to the next, it still cannot be counted as an organizational transformation. The
reason lies primarily on the degree to which states are willing to implement changes in
their national structure to support transformation. In fact, states such as China and Russia,
with a clear diplomatic inclination against any clumsy notion o f sovereignty, may give
conditional support to mandates that go against their inclinations. They may evaluate
their support on a case by case basis rather than conceding universal support. In other
cases, the implementation of a successful protection o f civilians mandate may depend on
states' willingness to use force and provide troops with adequate training. However, it is
often the case that states have special memorandum o f understanding with the UN that
does not allow their nationals to get involved in certain types of operations or may not
provide them with the kind of training required for an adequate job.
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Most importantly, protection o f civilians as a new practice incurs in changes at the
core of the organization's values and principles. Since its creation, the UN has been the
depository o f sovereign countries. The increasing importance of the individual and the
spread of norms such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is definitely affecting the
U N's action on the ground, with peacekeeping operations that are increasingly becoming
more robust. Although a learning process has been initiated, R2P is not yet a consensual
practice among member states. In fact, the international community is still quite far from
a consensus in this particular area.
In these situations, although learning has taken place, a full transformation has
not. Transformation thus necessarily involves a change at the core o f the organization's
values and a cross-cultural consensus that would result in change at the national level of
each member state as well. That is where the co-existence o f politically, culturally and
economically different member states may impose important obstacles for a successful
transformation.
IOs with culturally similar states may experience transformation more often than
those that don't. In cases such as that o f the European Union, it may be easier to achieve
organizational transformation. In this context, the specific rules of each organization and
the specific subject area where learning took place may affect the degree o f difficulty for
an organization to accomplish transformation.
Organizational transformation is thus a sub-process of organizational learning, or
its ultimate stage. By differentiating organizational learning and member-states’ learning,
the process through which international practices are created, disseminated and
institutionalized through their socialization between states is clarified. Moreover, it also
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explains how organizational transformation can take place, that is, by the acceptance and
adoption of a new practice by the totality o f the membership. This new practice would in
turn entail changes in the core values o f the organization, or those deep rooted underlying
norms and principles that guide the organization’s action.
However, the presence o f certain factors may facilitate or impose further obstacles
to both process o f organizational learning and transformation. They will be analyzed in
the following section.

Organizational learning lessons learned

There are a number of factors that can influence the occurrence o f learning in
international organizations. Among those, four are the most significant: One,

the

constant flow o f ideas between epistemic communities and a given 10; Two, the presence
o f a learning feedback loop between regional/field offices and headquarters; Three, the
establishment o f performance monitoring;47 Fourth and finally, the particular issue area
where a new practice is to be created. Taken altogether, these factors influence the
possibility and speed of learning.
As earlier emphasized, the free flow o f ideas between epistemic communities and
the organization is an important step towards generating and refining international
practices. These experts, having different backgrounds and specific know-how and
experience on a given issue, will facilitate the creation o f an adequate practice, improving
consensus and enhancing chances o f success. At the same time, the presence o f opposing
epistemic communities in the process o f generating a new practice may slow down the
47 The idea o f performance monitoring as a ways to enhance organizational learning was taken from Haas
and Haas, "Learning to Learn: Improving International Governance." p.271.
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process. In any case, their presence during all phases o f organizational learning is only
beneficial, and also serves as an important source o f performance monitoring and reevaluation.
Learning feedback loops further enhance organizational learning processes,
particularly in large organizations with field/regional offices and headquarters. The
establishment o f information sharing systems and communication mechanisms are
necessary to maintain a constant flow o f information between all o f the organization's
units. They will inform the Secretariat whether practices have been successfully
implemented and how performance can be further improved. They will also map the
exact conditions under which practices are less likely to be effective, while contextdriven analysis will be able to determine the applicability o f the practice throughout
space and time.
Performance monitoring is a good way of maintaining a system o f checks and
balance that will readily identify organizational dysfunction and pinpoint the need to
change. The increased socialization of international practices and upturning consensus
over their validity may hinder the ability o f the organization to identify problems that can
no longer be adequately solved by the existing set of actions at the organization's
disposal. It is important that a panel o f experts from the epistemic community constantly
participates in monitoring and revaluation processes, since their expertise and outside
perspective may facilitate the identification of problematic areas.
Finally, the specific issue area where a new practice is to be generated may also
impose further obstacles or contrarily facilitate learning. Interestingly, most IR literature
on organizational learning deals with environmental issues, indicating that there is a
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niche within that particular area that has attracted scholars’ attention. Indeed, many have
determined that certain organizations have learned, such as the United Nations
Environment Program and the World Bank. The absence o f writing on organizational
learning on other issues can be evidence o f the challenges for learning when applied to a
given field. In fact, according to Haas and Haas, ecology, natural sciences and
engineering are areas where learning can easily occur, while in economics, social science
and law, learning is extremely challenging. The authors' explanation points to the
absence of a strong epistemic community within the last group. Despite the challenges
posed by the area o f social science to the development o f new practices, a their lack of
institutionalization, is not due to the absence o f epistemic communities but to the nature
of the subject matter that may be controversial and render a minimum consensus difficult
to be achieved.
To conclude this section, an important consideration regarding 10 membership is
necessary. As analyzed earlier, the specific cultural and political characteristics of
member states is an important feature within IOs. They can affect the process of
organizational transformation, since it can be extremely difficult to achieve unanimous
consensus and have states implement new practices if they are culturally and politically
diverse. However, the existence o f cultural, ideological and political chasm between
member states may hinder the process o f organizational learning as well. In some cases,
there might be coalitions o f opposing states battling to foster their own causes within IOs,
seriously hampering the organization's ability to achieve even a minimum consensus.
The purpose o f this sub-section was to provide readers with some factors that can
impact learning and transformation processes. Although they are not triggers o f learning,
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they form an important set of conditions that may hinder the process o f learning if not
taken under consideration. In the current international system, where the context tends to
change frequently, new sets of problems are continuously generated. It is important for
organizational survival that they are able to learn and change in order to comply with the
imperatives o f this constantly changing international order.

Conclusions

The model o f organizational learning laid out in this chapter supports the
differentiations between organizational and member states’ learning, and between
organizational learning and transformation. This differentiation was necessary in order to
assess the argument that member states inability to adopt gender policies themselves
negatively affect U N 's actions in peacekeeping settings.
As it was shown, learning is an evolving process that may be triggered either by
environmental-driven forces or by agents o f change, such as member states, 10 staff and
members o f the epistemic community. The initial phase is the identification o f a problem
and the organization's inability to solve it with the available practices, which leads to the
subsequent phases of re-examination and the generation o f a new practice, the search for
a minimum consensus amongst member states, and finally the institutionalizations and
dissemination of the new practice.
Organizational transformation refers to the process through which changes in
deep-rooted values, principles and goals of the organization have been shifted and
accepted by member states. This is an extremely rare phenomenon, dependent on the
organization's ability to achieve cross cultural and ideological consensus. It also points to
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the existence o f a fundamental problem with the organization's raison d'etre, since it
refers to a change in the core o f its organizational culture.
The analysis of these processes is essential to understanding the current process of
learning and transformation that the United Nation is passing through. This chapter
provided the framework o f analysis central to the argument o f this dissertation, that is,
that the U N 's gender approach to PKO is part o f a learning process centered in the
increasing importance of the individual in detriment of the state. Since its creation,
sovereignty has been one of U N 's crowning principles. The focus on sovereignty was
translated into the principle of non-intervention and a focus on traditional security issues
that are mostly concerned with the state and its survival. It reflected the historical
moment that marked the creation of the United Nations.
Throughout the years, though, environmental-driven forces have forced the UN to
adapt to a new context. The changing nature of conflicts and threats indicated that
individuals living within the states were bearing the brunt of suffering. As a consequence,
new norms and practices were generated in order to better address the needs o f those
whose rights have been violated.
The discussion of gender as an integral component of PKO is part o f this
changing security environment. It comes from the recognition that modem day conflict
affects women, girls, men and boys differently and is concerned about addressing these
specific needs accordingly. Within a renewed normative framework, where protection o f
civilians is a top priority and peace can only be accomplish with social development and
societal healing, gender in PKO became central in most o f UN documents in the field of
international peace and security.

The subsequent chapters will show the gender approaches were incorporated and
their main challenges in field missions. Chapter three will focus on the development of
protection o f civilian norms and on when and how gender was included as an integral
part o f that process. Chapters four and five, will analyze the two case studies, pinpoint the
initiatives on the ground that reflect this learning process and evaluate how successful
they have been so far. Finally, chapter six will analyze the possibilities o f further
advancing this issue and the future o f gender in PKO as an international practice.
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CHAPTER 3
FROM EVOLVING NORMS TO INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES:
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING AND GENDER APPROACHES

United Nations' learning process in incorporating a gender perspective as an
integral part of peacekeeping practices was generated due to three main factors: the
evolving norms focused on the individual, in particular human security; the establishment
o f protection o f civilians mandated operations with comprehensive protection strategies
that consider physical and structural vulnerabilities of individuals; and finally, the
surfacing norms focused on gender equality. Despite drawbacks due to the co-existence
o f different cultural approaches to problems such as discrimination, women's rights and
violence against women, the UN has consolidated an important normative and legal
framework as essential embryonic inputs to the dissemination o f gender-based
international practices in the security domain.
As previously shown, organizational learning occurs when the organization
identifies a mismatch between its actions and their subsequent impact in the field and as a
consequence, searches for renewed practices that may improve their response on the
ground. Throughout the years, as international security environment changed, the U N 's
practices in peacekeeping settings had to incorporate new functions and shift the focus of
its approach from the state to the individual. While protecting civilians is a trend in
current peacekeeping operations, it confronts major challenges since the centrality o f the
state is still a major feature o f its organizational culture. It is in this context, that the
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consideration o f specific women's needs in the context o f war became not only important
for the organization, but the basis for founding a lasting peace.
Although the United Nations has been concerned with sex discrimination from its
inception,1 it was only after the elapse o f half a century that women's issues would be
considered within the sphere of peace and security, at the core o f the organization's
raison d'etre. The normative progress in addressing the different impact that complex
emergencies and conflicts have on women and girls and the new gender-sensitive
practices in peace operations gained attention with the securitization o f sexual violence
and the increasing consensus that it has been used as a tool o f war. In this regard, the
unremitting efforts of women's organizations was central to bring the issue to the UN
main executive body, the Security Council. They also formed the backbone of UN
progress in areas related to women's issues and gender based approaches.
The feminization of poverty, illiteracy and war casualties is a reality. Not only do
more women die as a consequence o f war,2 they also comprise 60% o f worldwide
refugees and 70% o f IDP populations.3 Consequently, it is imperative that policies
explicitly address the special needs of the different gender groups.
The disproportionate victimization o f women in particular in terms of sexual and
other gender based violence is a reality that needs to be dealt with. While a rights-based
or needs-based approach to conflict is necessary, the return to peace invariably means the
1 United Nations, "Charter o f the United Nations", October 24, 1945,
http ://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/.
2 See for example: Patrick Meier and Helga Hemes Christin Ormhaug, "Armed Conflict Deaths
Disaggregated by Gender," in A Report f o r the Norwegian M inistry o f Foreign Affairs (Oslo: PRIO, 2009 );
Bethany Lacina and N ils Petter Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A N ew Dataset o f Battle
Deaths," European Journal o f Population 42(2005); Human Security Report Project, "The Shriking Costs
o f War," in Human Security Report (Vancouver: HSRP, 2010).
3 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Returnees,
Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons", June 15, 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/4cl If0be9.html.
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return to the gender status quo, prior to conflict, irrespective o f the roles and gains
afforded to women during conflict.4 Hence, reconstruction efforts must also be concerned
with the normalization of unfair gender relations that destabilize societies, social fabrics
of communities and families and ultimately undermines peace process.
As a result o f this concern, throughout the 9 0 's, and especially after 2000, the UN
organized events and elaborated resolutions that would deal with the problem of gender
in war. Urging member states to provide more female uniformed personnel, granting
gender training to peacekeepers and staff, and establishing the relationship between
sexual violence and a lasting peace, the United Nations gave an important step toward
improving its capacity to respond to these threats.
In order to analyze this evolution, this chapter will be divided in three main
sections. The first will discuss the normative context that opened the way for the
consideration o f women's special needs in conflicts as part o f the organization's efforts to
attain international peace and security. Since its creation, the UN has been the main
venue and sponsor of human rights. The evolution o f norms focused on individual's
rights was transposed to the security area through the concept of human security that
shifted the referent of security from the state to the individual and put the same security
apparatus at their service. Peace operations have become more robust and mandates
expanded to include protection o f civilians as a top priority. Military force was no longer
the primary means to accomplish peace; democracy, human rights and humanitarian

4 While a needs-based approach prioritizes social and material needs, the rights-based approach focuses on
political reorganizations (human rights, justice, equality, elections, pluralism, participation). The literature
however tends to emphasize that conflict opens up the possibility o f empowering women and effecting
structural social transformations and reproducing new social, economic and political realities that redefine
gender and caste hierarchies. See, for example: Meintjes, Pillay, and Turshen, The Aftermath: Women in
Post-W ar Transformation.
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assistance would become important dimensions of UN's strategy to enhance individual's
security.
The second section focuses on the surfacing norms focused on women's rights
and its status in international politics. Initially focused on economic and political rights,
the international women's movement grew stronger and managed to transform certain
issues, such as violence against women, that were previously treated as a private matter
into an international concern. When women's issues entered the human rights arena, it
took advantage of the development o f international defined parameters and monitoring
mechanisms that further facilitated the universalization of their rights. The increasing
concern to women's issues and the rampage reality of the use o f sexual violence in
conflicts led the UN to finally consider it as a matter of security and initiate a learning
process that would culminate with the adoption o f gender approaches to peace operations.
The third section will focus on the specific framework developed by UN
resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, which constitute the normative background
o f this learning process. While they reflect a learning process through which new
international practices were introduced to UN peacekeeping practice, they also suffered a
major implementation gap. The cultural differences between states and organizations
within the UN constituted the primary obstacle for the full incorporation o f a gender
perspective on the ground.
In a nutshell, this chapter will show what factors led the UN to initiate a learning
process and how it has been developed thus far. While the increasing importance for
individual's concern, women's issues and war-related sexual violence are important
factors that account for the unleashing o f the process, the continuous cooperation
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between the UN and civil society organizations contemplated the generation o f an
important normative framework.

United Nations organizational culture and evolving human rights norms

The transformation of international conflicts and the changing nature of threats
led the United Nations to question its own earlier approaches to promote peace and
international security. Peace operations worldwide were no longer dependent on state
consent; they often became humanitarian interventions, done in the name o f the citizens
whose governments were unable or unwilling to provide their basic needs or purposely
violating their rights. This shifting paradigm came along the dissemination of human
rights norms that elevated the importance of the individual in detriment o f the states. In
this context, a specific gender approach to peace operations was also put into practice. As
a matter o f fact, gender started to be considered as an integral component of
peacekeeping practice.
In order to comprehend this process and the challenges it entails, understanding
UN organizational culture is central. Since its creation, the UN has been the arena of
continuous disputes between states and o f various attempts to foster national interests
internationally. Nonetheless, the UN has also been the scenario to the development of
great ideas that were disseminated to member states and adopted internationally as central
practices and norms to guide politics amongst nations. The presence of these two worlds
within the UN is an important aspect o f the organization's culture. Indeed, it is this
remarkable feature that explains the concomitant advances and drawbacks in the advance
of a gender approach as a consensual practice to peace operations.
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While placing individuals as the main object o f security have not reached a crosscultural consensus amongst member states, within the UN the norm o f “responsibility to
protect” has the support o f some major member states, resulting in peace operations with
broader mandates and centered on protection o f civilians. This section will thus explain
UN's organizational culture and how the rising norm o f human security has been
translated into renewed peacekeeping mandates focused on protection of civilians.

Organizational culture: sovereignty vs. human rights

Understanding U N 's organizational culture is a necessary step not only to
understand how a learning process can take place within the organization but also to
establish a lower critical threshold when determining the importance o f international
organizations as norm socializing actors. The single most important feature o f UN's
organizational culture is its dual composition, being at the same time the arena where
states battle to foster their own national interests, and by another the showground where
ideas aimed to solve the world's common problems are generated.
This internal division in U N 's composition has been noted before. In 1996, Inis
Claude's influential piece on U N 's internal division influenced the rise o f analyses that
conceived the organization as composed by two separate entities with different
capabilities and purposes. (Claude 1996)5 The first UN was formed by the battalion o f
civil servants and the Secretary General, who work under the UN flag supposedly to
provide impersonal and neutral judgment on various issues. The second UN, on its part,
was comprised by the states and comprised the arena where they battled to advance their
5 Inis L. Claude, "Peace and Security: Prospective Roles for the Two United Nations," G lobal Governance
2, no. 3 (1996). p.291
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own agenda or to cooperate in the search for partnerships and common solutions for
shared problems.6
The strong presence o f these two worlds within the organization is often
translated into often irreconcilable practices and principles. In no area this is truer than in
international peace and security where the legacy o f state sovereignty translates into the
principle of non-intervention and territorial inviolability, and the surfacing norms of
human rights into the use o f force to protect civilians. In other words, the organization is
the arena where the triumph and recast o f state sovereignty has taken place.7 While it is
true that the dissemination of human rights norms and the emergence o f concepts such as
that of human security and human development has dislocated the focus from the state to
the individual, the strong presence o f states throughout U N 's history still raise doubts of
whether or not the organization is able to act impartially during circumstances where
gross violations of human rights have been identified. The UN's behavioral record in
contrast shows that Westphalian features remain a strong part o f U N 's character and
politics.
The implications o f U N 's dual composition character becomes evident when
states act in the reassurance of their rights. From the very beginning, the founding fathers
of the UN created a structure that would accommodate the interests o f World War II
winner states and included principles that would ultimately protect them. Since the
League of Nations failed due to lack of effectiveness and protection mechanisms to major

6 The international civil service is a legacy o f the League o f Nations. According to W eiss, Carayannis and
Jolly (2009), UN staff comprise 55,000 civil servants, excluding another 20,000 that work for the
specialized agencies, the 100,000 temporary staff in peace operations and 15,000 short-term em ployees at
the International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group.
7 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty : O rganized H ypocrisy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1999).
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states' interests, the UN would have a powerful executive body, the Security Council,
where the Big-5 with veto power could participate in the emerging liberal order while
maintaining their status quo. Under this premise, sovereignty and non-intervention were
at the core of the organization's principles.
These, however, were not the only principles that were celebrated in San
Francisco. Human rights and gender equality were discussed and included in the Charter,
being part o f the new organizations espoused values from its foundation. The atrocities
committed during the Second World War contributed to a growing sentiment that the new
order should be built on the respect of human rights. Although 1948 resulted in a
Universal Declaration o f Human Rights rather than an International Bill containing clear
actions to curb gross violations o f individuals' rights, it constituted the first
internationally organized effort to improve life conditions o f worldwide citizens.
Throughout the years, due to increasing assertiveness on the part o f the Secretary
General and the influence o f civil society organization, human rights assumed a
prominent space within the UN.8 In fact the UN has been the main venue and sponsor o f
various human rights conferences, covenants and treaties. The Declaration would be
complemented by two covenants, several conventions and multiple conferences that
further enhanced the dissemination of human rights on a variety o f issues including

8 The increasing influence o f civil society organizations, experts and scholars within the UN led some
authors to re-evaluate Claude's analysis o f the two UNs and include a third one. The third UN would then
be comprised o f nongovernmental organizations, independent commissions, experts, consultants, scholars
and other group o f individuals that engage with the first and the second UN influencing their priorities,
policies, ideas and ultimately, their actions. It is formed by like-minded professionals from different
backgrounds that provide their expertise on a number o f issues, coming close to Hass' epistemic
communities. They have played a significant role in the development and promotion o f U N 's current ideas,
lobbying for them and influencing public opinion. See: Thomas W eiss, Tatiana Carayannis, and Richard
Jolly, "The Third United Nations," G lobal Governance 15, no. 1 (2009).

100

torture, genocide, racism, sex discrimination, minorities and children.9 Interestingly,
groups that have traditionally been excluded from rights-based considerations, such as
minorities, women and children, gained their own space and experienced an important
expansion and international diffusion.10
The UN also created a supporting structure to further enhance the monitoring and
standardization of states behavior in defending individual's rights, including the early
creation o f the Commission of Human Rights (1947), the Office o f the High
Commissioner of Human Rights (1993) and the Human Rights Council (2006), that
substituted the first. Despite intense criticism to the actual efficacy o f the Commission
and most recently the Council, it is important to note the role that the special rapporteurs
had not only in promoting new ideas and understanding of human rights and its
protection, but also calling attention to states that were not complying with
internationally established behavioral norms and often unleashing actions.
A final piece o f evidence o f the development o f human rights and how these laid
the foundations for a shift in the focus o f international politics towards the individual is
the creation o f Special Tribunals (former Yugoslavia and Rwanda), the signing o f the
Rome Statute in 1998 and the creation of the International Criminal Court that came into

9 Universal Declaration o f Human Rights (1948), Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the
Crime o f Genocide (1951), Convention Relating to the Status o f Refugees (1954),Convention on the
Elimination o f A ll Forms o f Racial Discrimination (1964), International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (1976), International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1976), Convention on the
Elimination o f Discrimination Against Women (1981), Convention Against Torture (1987), Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples Convention (1989), Convention on the Rights o f the Child (1990),International Convention
on the Protection o f the Rights o f All Migrant Workers and Members o f Their Families (2003), Convention
on the Rights o f Persons with Disabilities (2007), International Convention for the Protection o f All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2010).
10 For a complete account on the UN role in generating human rights norms and mechanisms o f protection,
see: Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi, Human Rights a t the Un: The P olitical H istory o f U niversal Justice,
United Nations Intellectual History Project Series (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2007).
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force in 2002. Its main importance lies in the criminalization of human rights violations
and the establishment o f international mechanisms to punish those responsible for these
atrocious acts.
The linkages between individuals' security and that o f the state would later be
established by the concept o f human security, further enhanced by the linkage between
these two and development. Despite U N 's occasional difficulties implementing actions to
better protect the individual, the organization has been the arena where central concepts
and ideas to improve the life conditions of billions have been generated and slowly
disseminated to member states.

Human security: the theoretical base to protect the individual

The U N 's goal to foster cooperation between states, serve as “an impartial
broker” and as the main engineer in the construction o f new norms and patterns of
behavior is the most debatable of its features. Critics pertaining to varied theoretical
strands have emphasized its limitations particularly when confronting member-states
unwillingness to cooperate and adapt to these emerging international concerns.11 On the
other hand, the organization's focus on civilian issues in attempt to improve social and
economic indicators along with the security situation is underlined by theorists as an
undeniable contribution from the worlds' organization.12
U N 's ideational role in promoting the individual is at the core of this
dissertation's argument. In fact, it has been the renewed emphasis on the humanization of

11 These theoretical strands are mostly associated with realism and neo-realism.
12 Constructivist authors have been particularly adamant on the organization's contribution in terms o f
knowledge and ideas.
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development, security and the establishment o f protection mechanisms centered on the
everyday lives o f individuals that laid the foundation for the consideration o f specific
women's rights and needs. The incorporation of a gender approach as an integral part of
peacekeeping practices and of peace processes is an interconnected process based on a
comprehensive protection strategy that encompasses the central aspects o f both human
development and human security concepts.
The appearance of these two concepts in UN's discussions is not recent. In fact, as
rightly argued by Macfarlane and Khong13, ideas related to human security are as old as
the Westphalia order itself. It was only with the changing context that these flourished at
the end o f the 20th century. At the core o f human security's concept is the idea that states
are responsible for the security o f its citizens. The establishment o f sovereignty and the
principle o f non-intervention in 1648 had as the objective to impede other nations from
intervening in the domestic affairs o f other nations, particularly in regard to how these
nations treated its own citizens. However, by linking states' security with states'
responsibility over the lives o f their own citizens, Westphalia itself opened the possibility
for what centuries later was enunciated as the “responsibility to protect” and which led to
a recast - though not consensual - o f the meaning of sovereignty.
Concerns in regard to the individual and its protection were further enhanced
through International Humanitarian Law, in particular the four Geneva Conventions that
attempted to protect the wounded, prisoners o f war and non-combatants. International
law regarding minorities, refugees and workers, along with the mechanisms to protect
them, are also important pre-UN initiatives that supported framing the individual as an

13 MacFarlane and Khong, Human Security and the Un: A Critical History, p.6-7
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important referent o f security. However, it is undeniable that although the germination of
ideas that led to the concept o f human security were incubated outside the UN, it was
through the organization's multiple forums o f discussions between states, epistemic
communities and Secretariat that the concept was embedded in norms and ideas,
protection mechanisms created and practices disseminated.
As previously discussed, the UN was the main venue for the development of
human rights norms and mechanisms o f monitoring and implementation, as expressed in
the series of Covenants, treaties and conventions sponsored by the organization. In
addition to this aspect, the UN has also been the arena o f fruitful creations, such as the
concepts o f human development and human security itself, especially through the work
of United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) reports, and Secretary General incisive
actions, all in the pursuit o f a space for the individual in international negotiations.
The linkage between development and security was an important step towards a
more comprehensive approach to causes o f conflicts and better ways to address it. Human
development, expressed in UNDP's first human development report in 1990, first
connected development with issues beyond the economic development o f the state, such
as education, mortality levels, life expectancy, etc.14

Most importantly, was the

advancement of the notion that what counts is not so much the national aggregate, but
“individual quality of life and capacity of individuals and communities to exercise control
over their lives”.15

14 United Nations Development Fund, "Human Development Report 1990" (New York; Oxford: UNDP,
1990).
15 MacFarlane and Khong, Human Security and the Un: A C ritical H istory, p. 11
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The humanization o f development referred to the process through which statist
development perspectives were substituted by others focused on the individual family
and community needs, incurring in the reorientation o f public policies related to welfare
and economic development o f the state. This renewed understanding has merged the
discussions on human development and security. In fact, the core o f the debate on human
security revolves around development and protection, making the differentiation between
these two instances somewhat artificial, especially in conflict settings.16
As emphasized in UNDP's Human Development Report 1994, the concept of
security was leveled down to the level of the individual and incorporated important
aspects o f human development:
For most people, a feeling o f insecurity arises more from worries about
their daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Will their
families have enough to eat? Will they lose their jobs? Will their streets
and neighborhood be safe from crime? Will they be tortured by a
repressive state? Will they become victim o f violence because o f their
gender? Will their religion or ethnic origin target them for persecution?17
In this context, there was also an increasing consensus on the link between
development and security. In fact, as early as 1992, Boutros Boutros Gali, then Secretary
General of the United Nations, had already brought attention to the pervasive effect of
war on the population and to its sources as deeply rooted in the society itself, including
social, economic and political instability.18 As a strategy to accomplish international
peace he was the first to propose the curtailment o f sovereignty and a comprehensive

16 Ibid., p. 141
17 United Nations Development Fund, "Human Development Report 1994" (New York; Oxford: UNDP,
1994).
18 United Nations Secretary General, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and
Peacekeeping", January 31, 1992, http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf.
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peacekeeping strategy that addresses economic, social and political development of
states. As emphasized by Boutros Boutros Ghali:
The time o f absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed (...)
It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find
balance between the needs o f good internal governance and the
requirements of an ever more interdependent world. Commerce,
communications and environmental matters transcend administrative
borders; but inside those borders is where individuals carry out the first
order o f their economic, political and social lives.19
Hard hitting speeches on the concept o f sovereignty and the need to respond to
atrocities within member states with or without its consent continued during Kofi
Annan's tenure. Following the “humanization” o f security and its linkage with
development, there was an obvious shift away from an exclusive military approach to the
safety o f states. Not only did the safety o f states depend on factors beyond traditional
military power, state security was increasingly related to that of its citizens; and thus to
the four elements of sovereignty defined in the 1934 Montevideo Convention
(population, territory, government, and international recognition) to which a fifth would
be added, the responsibility to protect its own citizens.
As part of the work o f the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty, the 2001 report “The Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) encompasses the
essential dichotomy present within the UN. Claiming that it is the responsibility o f the
international community to intervene when states are unwilling or unable to protect its
own citizens, this emerging norm puts the protection of individual rights at the top of
UN's priorities and is in striking opposition to the traditional notion o f sovereign and its
accompanying principles o f territorial inviolability and non-intervention.

19 Ibid.
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The innovative feature of R2P lies in the implementation of a mechanism to
enforce the protection of human rights. The use o f force, initially envisage as a ways to
protect states’ territorial and political independence was now being urged as a means to
accomplish the protection of the populations living therein. Despite its promises though,
R2P has been the objective of serious critics, especially in regard to the selective
character o f its intervention that seem to fulfill a more national agenda o f member states
rather than the need o f individuals whose rights were being violated. Finally, within the
global south, countries have even developed alternative views o f the R2P, such as
Brazil's Responsibility while Protecting (RwP),20 that emphasizes non-coercive measures
to protect civilians as a ways to avoid the legitimization of unilateral policies in the name
o f the broader international community interests.
As the analysis has shown, the U N 's organizational culture is characterized by its
dual composition and the presence o f dichotomous principles at the core o f its espoused
values. In fact, the perpetual mismatch between the first and second UNs is fully
represented in the occasional instances where the organization remains gridlocked. In no
other area this is truer than in the intersection between the intervention with the use of
force and human rights. Although the development o f human rights norms has initiated a
process of institutional learning, one in which the individual is placed before the state, it
is probable that this learning process will remain incomplete and occur at a different pace
throughout UN 's member states. Trouble with the universalizing o f human rights and
selective use o f robust measures to protect rights are recurring features o f U N 's actions in
this area.
20 Department o f Peacekeeping Operations and Department o f Field Support, "Operational Concept on the
Protection o f Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations."
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The incorporation of a gender approach to peace operations is directly related to
this discussion and as such suffers from the same illness. Different interpretations within
member states in regard to human rights and the priority given to women's rights
translates into an unequal learning process. As much as U N 's recast o f sovereignty is still
underway, so are the protection mechanisms to protect individuals and the ideas that
incorporate gender as a cross-cutting element in all UN activities, and in particular in the
pursuit o f a lasting peace.

Multi-dimensional peacekeeping and protection o f civilians

“Changing ideas, to the extent that they are meaningful, are rooted in changing
realities.”21 The evolving norms focused on the individual and the formulation of
mechanisms to guarantee individual's safety was the result of changes in the international
environment.

The changing nature of conflicts and threats are amongst the main

contextual transformations that generated the need to change and the initiation of an
inquiry process through which new practices were created.
94% o f all armed conflicts fought in the 9 0 's comprised civil wars with a 90%
rate of civilian death rate as a consequence of deliberate warfare strategy o f targeting
civilians.22 As a result, the UN's approach changed. From 1948 to 1988 peacekeeping
operations had only two functions - observe peace through the monitoring and reporting
of cease fire and keep peace through the establishment o f buffer zones and zones o f

21 Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, an d the Vietnam D ecisions o f
1965, Princeton Paperbacks (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992). p.3
22 Paris, A t War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict.
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disengagement.23 Throughout the years though, the UN incorporated a new strategy for
managing the problem of civil unrest and state failure: deliver humanitarian assistance,
protect civilians and re-build failed or collapsed states.
This first effort to deal with this new set o f problems was the so called “second
generation” o f peacekeeping operations. Initially, however, as argued by Haas,24 these
were not accompanied by a thorough process of re-examination and devolved into a
disorganized practice with wide encompassing mandates, limited resources and no clear
purpose or rules o f engagement. After major failures and with the important intellectual
contribution o f the Secretary General and Secretariat staff, renewed norms were
introduced and peace operations were backed by an institutional and normative
framework that supported actions on the ground. What was previously an effort to outwit
the Security Council's inability to act during the Cold War gridlock, became U N 's central
effort in the terrain of peace and international security. Peace operations would only grow
in number, budget, size and functions.
The increase in peacekeeping activities was impressive. From 1948 to 1978 a total
number of 13 peacekeeping operations were established. In the following period (19781988), no operation was authorized and it was only after the 9 0 's that new peace missions
were authorized by UN's Security Council.25 In fact, the number o f authorized peace
operations tripled in the following decade. (Michael W. Doyle 2006)26 Evidence that the
permanent members of the Security Council were more agreeable is the fact that four

23 Richard Jolly, Louis Emmery, and Thomas George W eiss, Un Ideas That Changed the World, United
Nations Intellectual History Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).
24 Haas, When Knowledge Is Power: Three M odels o f Change in International Organizations.
25 Jolly, Emmerij, and W eiss, Un Ideas That Changed the World, p. 173
26 N icholas Sambanis Michael W. Doyle, Making War and Building Peace (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2006). p.6
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times more resolutions were approved while the amount of sanctions authorized
increased seven times. Most impressively, the peacekeeping budget skyrocketed from
230 million before the 9 0 's to 3.6 billion at the turn of the century.27
Since 1948, a total of 67 DPKO led operations have been established, 14 o f those
are ongoing.28 As o f January 2013, total o f around 111,880 field personnel are spread in
the UN peace operations around the world.29 Amongst those, 92,968 are uniformed
personnel (80,764 are military and the other 12,204 are police), and 18,912 are civilians
(international staff comprising 5,082, local staff 11,748 and the UN volunteers 2,082).30
While all 193 member states contribute one way or another, either with staff, equipment
or funds, 114 o f those contribute with uniformed personnel.31 Most impressively the
current peacekeeping budget recently reached 7.3 billion.32
The expansion of peace operations meant that previously simple functions carried
out by lightly armed soldiers would give place to complex and multidimensional tasks.
Some of these tasks include organization o f elections and carrying out of elections,
Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration (DDR), training and organizing
security and defense institutions, in addition to supporting government structures in areas
such as rule of law, human rights and development, amongst others.
This comprehensive approach to peace operations not only responds to the new
logics of conflicts but is also in accordance to the precept of human security.

27 Ibid.
28 Data available at DPKO's statistics section. See: Department o f Peacekeeping Operations, “
Peacekeeping Fact Sheet,” 03/18/2013,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml.
29 Ibid.
30
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Increasingly, peace operations' focus was shifted from the state to the well-being o f the
individuals living within them. Conflict negotiations and reconstruction programs became
concerned with the root causes o f conflicts and the strengthening o f states institutional
ability to function properly and provide adequate living conditions for its citizens.
Under this premise, the structure of peace operations became more complex,
mandates focused on protection of civilians and personnel would no longer be solely
comprised of “boots on the ground”, but also professional and expert civilians hired by
the Secretariat. As the peace operations themselves, protection strategies would depend
on an integrated and comprehensive approach, centered on physical and structural
vulnerabilities of individual human beings. The focus on the individuals and the
integrated character o f peace operations would become the fundamental features of UN
contemporary peace operations. These practices alongside the increasing importance of
human rights considerations and human security perspectives provided an opening and
set the stage for the introduction o f gender approaches to peace operations.
As much as the new practice seemed to be in accordance to the changing nature of
conflicts and threats, critical literature on the U N 's actions piles up. The UN failure's to
avoid a sequence of massacres during the 9 0 's has led the organization to rethink its
mandate in peace operations. The genocides and horrific attacks against civilians in
Rwanda, Srebrenica, Bosnia, etc, has brought the international community to a halt; the
status, vulnerability, significance and role of civilians in modem conflicts have changed.
When belligerents terrorize the population by attacking them, raping the women
and volunteering kids as child soldiers, civilians are no longer collateral damage, they are
the target and an important audience to conquer. As fights and battles get closer and
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closer to home, capturing the hearts and minds o f the population has never been more
important.

In the age o f communication, building and maintaining global and local

legitimacy is a necessary condition to achieve strategic goals. The impact o f conflicts on
civilians is vital: not only have they moved from the sidelines to being the cornerstone of
military operations, they are also a critical factor determining strategic outcomes, and
thus the need to transform.
Committed to improving its response to the atrocities committed in contemporary
warfare the UN embarked in a process o f inquiry and search for best approaches to peace
operations. In 1998, former Secretary General o f the United Nations Kofi Annan urged
the international community to pay closer attention to ways through which the UN could
ensure that the civilian population is protected from atrocities and human rights violations
during conflicts. The logic was that if the UN is to protect civilians, then its peace
missions ought to have a mandate that supports these actions. And so, in 1999, the United
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was authorized to “take the necessary
action... within its capabilities and areas o f deployment, to afford protection to civilians
under imminent threat o f physical violence.” 33
In this context, the 2000 Report o f the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations
(also known as the “Brahimi Report”)34 offered an in-depth critique o f the conduct o f UN
operations and provided a series o f recommendations to improve previous failures. In
summary, the report emphasized the establishment o f peace operations with clear and
achievable mandates, an integrated peace operation structure with civilian, police and

33 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1270", October 22, 1999,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/l 270( 1999).
34 The report was named after the Panel chair, UN Under-Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi.
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military components working together and developing complementary and joint tasks,
and adopting a comprehensive strategy that included actions dedicated to improving the
security and institutional environment within intervened states.35
Although the Brahimi report provided important benchmarks for the improvement
of UN actions in conflict and post-conflict settings, it did not provide a definitive answer
as to how civilians could be better protected.36 Following Kofi Annan's pledge for a new
normalcy where civilians are protected, and the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect
during U N 's General Assembly in 2005, the normative framework for a protection of
civilians mandate and the implementation o f robust operations was found.37
Bellamy argues that the R2P manages to shift the focus from the intervening
countries to the host country, and that it plays with the interface between states'
responsibility as part of its sovereignty and the duty o f the international community to
respond.38 However, putting together the concept of sovereignty and that o f human rights
defense was never consensual, even after the 2011 Libya intervention, when R2P was for
the first time used to justify military intervention under Security Council Resolution
1973.

35 For a complete review o f the report, see: William J. Durch et al., "The Brahimi Report and the Future o f
Un Peace Operations," (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003).
36 Robert Schutte, "Minding Gap: Approaches and Challenges to Robust Civilian Protection Approaches "
(New York: Friedrich Ebert Stifitung, 2011). p. 2
37 The R2P was only once explicitly used to justify a military intervention when in 2009, under Security
Council Resolution 1973, military force was authorized to protect civilians in Libya. Operations that
counted with protection o f civilians mandate and were established prior to the intervention in Libya, did not
explicitly use the normative framework provided by R2P. In fact, the United Nations Organization
Stabilization M ission in the Democratic Republic o f the Congo (M ONUSCO) and the United Nations
Mission in Darfur (UNAM ID) are important recent cases where protection o f civilians is a top priority,
albeit not authorized under R2P premise.
38 A lex J. Bellamy, G lobal Politics an d the Responsibility to Protect: From Words to D eeds (New York:
Routledge, 2011). p.9
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In fact, although currently 10 out of 17 peace operations authorized by the UN
have the protection of civilians as part o f its mandate, none o f which were authorized
under the explicit “claiming” o f R2P. Two o f these operations, the United Nations
Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and United Nations Mission in Darfur
(UNAMID) have protection of civilians as top priority, and do not use the R2P language.
Protection o f Civilians (PoC) mandated peace operations, though, seem to be
more widely accepted. The main problem is the implementation gap and the absence o f a
shared understanding of what PoC means and how it should be implemented by the
various actors on the field, namely the military, the humanitarian community and
international and local political actors, such as mission's senior leadership and host
government. The absence of a shared understanding about PoC and a comprehensive
strategy to implement the protection o f civilian mandate has caused various missions to
take different actions with varying results.
It is also important to mention that PoC is extremely dependent on the specific
context o f the host nations. While is certain occasions urban militias are the main threat,
in others it is armed groups acting under the cover of vast jungles in the heart of Africa.
As a consequence, PoC strategies require context-driven actions, planned in accordance
to the specific threats present on the ground. Assessing local populations’ main source of
vulnerability is also central to a successful PoC strategy. Hence a continuous dialogue
with the local population and collaborative work with the civilian component is the
necessary condition for an adequate response.
The analysis shows that traditional peacekeeping no longer holds in the era o f
intrastate conflicts and civilian bloodshed. UN peace operations have become
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multifaceted, multidimensional and more robust. In the absence o f a strong and legitimate
governmental authority, local perspectives regarding the UN troops are fluid and do not
necessarily resemble that of the government. The kind o f challenges imposed to the
military component are dramatic, not only does their traditional modus operandi need to
be readapted to include new capabilities and innovative strategies, but they can no longer
work on their own
In this context, the increasing concern with civilians and crimes committed
against them including the massacres, disappearances, looting, fire, kidnapping, and
torture, amongst others, has opened the possibility for the treatment o f violence against
women be dealt with as a matter o f security. Although sexual and other types o f violence
are common during conflicts - occasionally even a deliberate strategy to undermine
opponents during war - these are not included in peace accords are not dealt with during
pacification and post reconstruction efforts.
For a long time, gender based crimes during war were met with silence (and they
still are!) and apathy, and very few concrete actions were undertaken by the international
community to actively engage this particular issue when dealing with matters o f peace
and security. Nonetheless, the advances o f the last decades in terms o f re-focusing the
object o f security on the individual and adding to the military component functions that
include the protection of non-combatants, sexual violence was finally recognized as a
tool of war and a threat to international peace and security.
By placing this renewed focus on this issue, gender issues could be tackled in
peace operations environment. The adoption of Security Council resolutions attested the
relationship between security, peace and an environment free o f sexual and other gender
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based violence. It also generated a several actions to better implement resolutions'
provisions: the creation o f bodies to promote gender mainstreaming on all UN actions,
including its protection strategies; the elaboration of training modules, so that the military
and the police can adequately respond to these crimes on the field; and the adoption o f
comprehensive protection strategies that further legitimizes the complex nature o f this
crime, by reinforcing the need to promote economic development and women's
empowerment as a ways to improve its vulnerability and better protect them.
Even though the impact o f these actions is still limited, they comprise important
benchmarks when analyzing progress made in the area. The following section will
discuss how gender considerations and women's rights became central to the UN agenda,
laying the foundation for the incorporation o f a gender approach as an integral part of
peace operations.

The road to international peace: evolving norms on women's rights

UN's renewed concept o f human security and the focus on peacekeeping
approaches to protect civilians constituted important steps towards the consideration of
the specific needs o f women and girls in conflict settings. Nonetheless, it was the parallel
development of norms centered on women's rights, the securitization o f the systematic
use of sexual violence as a tactic of war and the assumption that a lasting peace depends
on the foundation of more equitable and fairer societies that provided the final push for
the special consideration o f women's issues on the ground.
Based on these surfacing norms o f individual's security and protection, women's
rights' agenda, and gross violations in conflict areas, the UN developed a comprehensive
gender-sensitive approach to peace operations as a way to better address women's
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vulnerability in mission areas. This strategy is based on gender equality and aims to
promote equal opportunities for men and women in peace processes as well as to consider
the specific impacts of different policies for each o f the different groups. Although
gender does not translate automatically into “women's issues”, there is an important
interface between the two due to the fact that in conflict settings women are the most
victimized and suffer all types of violence including sexual violence.
The description o f how women's rights became central in the U N 's agenda along
with the understanding o f the systematic use o f sexual violence as a tool of war are
central to trace the origins of gender approaches to peace operations. Above all, it was
only after some women's issues, such as sex discrimination and violence against women,
entered the human rights arena, that matters that were previously considered private was
slowly put in the public sphere o f the state and were subjected to internationally defined
parameters to which states should abide. Once this linkage was established and the
serious consequences of the systematic use o f sexual violence clarified, the security
apparatus was put in service o f this agenda and robust force was accepted as a way to
stop these acts from happening in mission areas.

Women's rights

As much as the UN has been the main venue for the development o f human rights
internationally, the same is true in terms o f women's rights. The UN has been the arena
where women's organizations have battled for the inclusion of women's issues as a
special concern and the major sponsor of international instruments to enhance their
rights. Throughout the UN's history, women's rights advancement passed through
different phases. While initially focused on economic development and political rights,
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after the 9 0 's women's issues gained in the human rights arena, and issues such as sex
discrimination and violence against women became violations of human rights. Aligned
to UN's focus on individual protection, the development o f women's rights was the main
venue for its debut in the international security arena.
During the San Francisco Conference, where the UN charter was signed in 1945,
four women representatives and around 40 civil society organizations managed to include
a historical reference against sex-discrimination in the founding document o f the United
Nations.39 The reference comprises an under-looked advancement in the development of
women's rights, since it was the first time that discrimination on the basis o f sex was put
in an international legal instrument, and differed considerably, from other previously
established international organizations. IOs had mostly remained silent in regard to the
existence o f an international minimum standard to the treatment o f women's issues and
considered the subject cultural specific.40
The inclusion of that reference on the Charter was vital to the subsequent creation
of the Commission on the Status o f Women (CSW) and the subsequent work developed
by the organ 41 The first mostly recognized product delivered by the Commission in
conjunction with ECOSOC was a comprehensive Declaration on the Elimination of
Discrimination against women.

Even though the Declaration comprises only an

aspirational rather than binding law, it was an important step in expressing international
39 On the importance o f Article 3, and how it was included in the Charter, see: Devaki Jain, Women,
Development, an d the Un : A Sixty-Year Quest f o r Equality and Justice, United Nations Intellectual History
Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005); Charlotte Bunch, "Women and Gender," ed.
Thomas W eiss and Sam Daws, The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007); Jolly, Emmerij, and W eiss, Un Ideas That Changed the World.
40 Bunch, "Women and Gender."
41 Before 1987, the Commission would meet only once every other year and counted with the steady
participation o f about 30 to 50 NGOs. Over time, though, CSW ’s functions and importance increased, and
meeting were held more often. By the 9 0 ‘s more than 600 NGOs were involved with its activities.(Ibid.)
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parameters on the status o f women internationally and which would later be the founding
basis for the Convention on the Elimination o f Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW).
W omen's participation in the economic development of the country and their
political rights grew stronger throughout the first four decades of U N 's creation, with the
establishment of the “UN Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace” in
1976 and the four Conventions on Women, carried out in Mexico City in 1975,
Copenhagen in 1980, Nairobi in 1985 and finally in Beijing in 1995.42 Most importantly,
these conferences served as a forum where women's organizations could connect with
governments to push for their agenda and trigger changes at the political level.
These conferences also served for networking and issue linkage.43 While it
became clear that worldwide women shared some common problems, they also had
differing agendas, as illustrated by the North/South divide and other divisions caused by
race and social class considerations. 44 Although these conferences were majorly focused
on economic and political rights, discussion on subjects that would later become central
to our discussion, such as violence against women were also present. Participants were
adamant in reiterating that more attention should be paid to the subject and that the

42 For a detailed account on the development o f w om en's rights within the UN See: Jain, Women,
Development, and the Un : A Sixty-Year Quest f o r Equality and Justice. A shorter version can be found on
Bunch, "Women and Gender." and a summary o f Devaki's findings in Jolly, Emmerij, and W eiss, Un
Ideas That Changed the World. Chapter 4.
43 Kathryn Sikkink and Margareth Keck underlines the benefit o f networking and issue linkage in book:
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: A dvocacy Networks in International
Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998). Connecting between organizations from the south
and the north allowed financial flows and strategy that had northern countries' government pressure
southern governments to adopt accepted human rights norms. Moreover, issue linkage, such as connecting
women's rights with other issues, such as development, environment, etc, could expand the support for
specific causes.
44 Bunch, "Women and Gender." p. 487-8
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conference needed to find instruments through which the role of women in peace and
development was reinforced.
In fact, the Beijing Platform o f Action, the resultant document from the Fourth
Conference on Women carried out in 1995 in Beijing, defined the status o f women in
conflict zones as a critical area where women's rights should be pursued.45 The
Conference also underlined what is now widely known, but not as much back then, that
is, civilian casualties in conflicts have outnumbered that of the military and that most of
those were comprised by women and children.
Other vital contributions o f these Conferences was the creation o f organs within
the UN that would later be central to the placement of women's issues also in the
international peace and security arena. Amongst these organizations, is the creation o f
United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) in 1976, an agency that
became central in advancing the women's agenda in the UN and in the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and later in the adoption

of

UNSCR1325.46
The International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement o f Women
(INSTRAW), created in 1980 was yet another cornerstone UN body that provided an
enormous contribution to the advancement o f policies and ideas that no longer defined
the status o f women vis a vis their relation to men, but considering the broader

45 Kathleen R. Kuehnast, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, and Helga Maria Hemes, Women an d War: P ow er and
Protection in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 2011). p.l
46 The importance o f CEDAW cannot be overstated. It provided provisions and spelled out social,
economic, political and civil rights o f women in both private and public sphere. Interestingly, although the
convention has been ratified by 185 countries it also contains the largest number o f reservations.
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implications o f global economic, political and social changes and their impact on
women's lives.
In 1993, during the Vienna Conference, a great success in the women’s rights
agenda was accomplished, when violence against women was proclaimed a human right
violation, not a private matter, but one that should be dealt according to internationally
established parameters. With the establishment o f a Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women after the Conference, an emerging regime with minimum standards
arose, and although implementation remains a challenge still nowadays, the initiative
constituted an important step toward the recognition o f women's rights as an universal
human right.47
The issue of violence against women has also been present in other instances.
From its inception, in 1993, the Office for the High Commissioner o f Human Rights
(OHCHR) had gender mainstreaming as part of its mandate and as a consequence, most
of its reports had a separated section on the effects o f certain human rights violation for
women. In the same year, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW). Although the declaration comprised
a non-binding law, it set standards and identified violence against women in three spheres
- family, community and state - further contributing to the “publicization” o f a matter
that has long been considered a private concern 48
These initiatives led UNIFEM to start a trust fund on the elimination o f violence
against women and implement projects towards that end. While from 1994 to 2006 the

47 It is important to note that within the human rights arena, women's rights present important tensions,
especially between the principle o f universality and cultural specificities.
48 Bunch, "Women and Gender." p. 501.
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former Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution on the subject every year,
from 2006 onwards the Secretary General himself reported to the General Assembly on
the accomplishments thus far achieved by the organization. The Secretary General's
involvement with this issue cannot be overstated. From his position he is able to
influence emerging norms and practices to be adopted by member states. In this regard,
the creation o f the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary General on Gender
Issues and Advancement o f Women (OSAGI) was another great step forward. High level
official reports and policy recommendations were directly sent to the Secretary General.49
As the individual became an important focus for the UN, so did women's issues.
The 1994 Human Development Report, previously cited as an importance instance
towards the “humanization” of development, launched the gender-related development
index, establishing an undeniable link between gender and human development. This link
would only be reinforced in 2000, during the Millennium Summit, when gender equality
and empowerment of women became concrete targets o f the Millennium Development
Goals.
Although the formal association between women's rights, violence against
women and international peace and security would only be established with Resolution
1325, the earlier connection with development and the establishment o f international
patterns regarding violence against women comprised an important sustaining basis for
the progressing normative framework on the matter. The final act in terms of gender
mainstreaming in all UN activities was the creation of the UN-Women, the U N 's agency
49 Throughout the years, OSAGI would greatly contribute to the debut o f gender issues in peace and
security. The organ served with important leadership on gender mainstreaming issues and on inter-agency
networks on women and gender equality. Most importantly, an inter-agency task force on women peace
and security was created as an attempt to understand the effects o f war on women.
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responsible for placing gender as a cross-cutting issue that should be considered
throughout all programs implemented by the organization. The UN-Women is a hub o f
gender initiatives as it merged and built on the important work of four previously distinct
parts o f the UN system, which focused exclusively on gender equality and women’s
empowerment: 1. Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW); 2. (INSTRAW); 3.
Office o f the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement o f Women (OSAGI);
4. United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). The merger o f these four
organizations also meant that a single structure was responsible for promoting gender
mainstreaming in all UN activities in a more coordinated and effective way.
The implementation gap in terms o f women's rights is still a reality and one o f the
most contentious areas where the universality o f human rights is continuously disputed.
However, it is important to notice how throughout time, the UN served as the main venue
to the development o f a normative framework through the arduous efforts o f civil society
organizations and UN staff committed to the cause. Despite this gap, it is often the case
that UN documents are the only legal instruments that can be used by local groups when
attempting to exercise pressure on national governments to accomplish change.
These advances, particularly after women's rights became a central human right
issue and an integral part o f the development effort, are an important foundational basis
for the consideration of gender in the domain o f international peace and security, and
wartime gender based violence as a threat to peace consolidation processes. The
following sub-section will thus focus on the main factor that led the consideration of
gender issues to the Security Council.
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The interface between wartime sexual violence and international peace and security

U N's Analytical and Conceptual Framing of Conflict Related Sexual Violence,
defines it as:
(...) rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form o f sexual violence... against women, men,
girls and boys. Such incidents and pattern occur in conflict or post-conflict
settings or other situations o f concern (e.g. political strife). They also have
a direct or indirect nexus with the conflict or political strife itself, i.e. a
temporal, geographical and/or causal link.50
Two important aspects stand out in this definition. First is the important fact that
it includes sexual violence committed against other gender groups that many resolutions
leave aside, and secondly it shows the differing aspects of sexual violence. Indeed, the
level and type of sexual violence varies from conflict to conflict from state to state and
assuming it is a systematic tool o f war in every instance also hampers our ability to
recognize the contextual specificities that are necessary to generate adequate policies.51
Although motivations vary, it is often the case that war-time related sexual violence is not
just a matter of opportunity and throughout history battles were often fought on women's
bodies as a result o f previously existent unequal gender status.52
Using sexual violence as a tool o f war has proved to be extremely effective. It
affects social stability by disrupting interpersonal relations within the micro universe of

50 UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict, "Analytical and Conceptual Framing o f Conflict Related
Sexual Violence," (New York: United Nations, 2011). p.3
51 Amelia Hoover Green Dara Kay Cohen, Elisabeth Jean Wood, "Wartime Sexual Violence:
Misconceptions, Implications and Ways Forward," in Special Report (Washington D.C.: United States
Institute o f Peace, 2013). p.2
52 O ffice for the Coordination o f Humanitarian Affairs, "Use o f Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts:
Identifying Gaps in Research to Inform More Effective Interventions" (New York: Policy Development
and Studies Branch, June 26, 2008).
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the families and communities; and it impacts on economic recovery and state authority.53
As long as women's recovery is hampered, their active participation in economic and
reconstruction activities are seriously obstructed. Moreover, the often widespread
impunity environment that sinks in after peace agreements leads to increasing
discontentment with government institutions and lack o f trust.
As a consequence, the strategy to address women's vulnerability to sexual
violence is based on comprehensive protection strategy, reinforcing the relationship
between development, security and women's empowerment. Although the focus on
sexual violence has been disproportionate, actions to curb sexual violence are intended to
have positive spill-over effects to other gender-related issues, such as supporting
women's participation in the economic reconstruction and improving local rule-of-law
and public security systems. Ultimately, these efforts aim to form the foundational basis
for an equitable society and reinforced peace.
Although sexual violence remains widespread there are a few accomplishments
that ought to be noted. In particular, the advancement of international legal mechanisms
that qualifies sexual violence as a war crime and crime against humanity was central to
the evolution of norms and protection mechanisms. Sexual violence, whatever the type,
has been documented to have happened in the past, such as during the Second World War
and the use of “comfort women” by the Japanese army, however specific mention to
sexual crimes during the Tokyo War Crime Trials were minimal.
This reality, however, started to change first with the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993, allowing victims o f sexual violence
53 Robert Jenkins Anne-Marie Goetz, "Addressing Sexual Violence in Internationally Mediated Peace
Processes," International Peacekeeping 17, no. 2 (2010). p.265.

125

to step forward and accuse perpetrators; then the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (UNICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, both o f which included sex
crimes amongst the long list o f criminal activities that have taken place during the
conflicts in these countries.54
The signing o f the Rome Statute in 1998 - in force in 2002 - which culminated
with the creation o f the International Criminal Court (ICC) also adds to the array of
positive legal advances in terms o f addressing war-related sexual violence and curbing
impunity. Not only does the Statute recognize rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution,
pregnancy and sterilization as forms of sexual violence and, as such, as crimes against
humanity, it also relates women trafficking with slavery. The creation o f a witness
protection program, the existence o f counseling services for victims, and the possibility
of awarding victims with reparations under the scope of the ICC shows the increasing
recognition of the need to address this crime and a concern for comprehensive
approaches as a way to deal with the matter.55
Unfortunately, the Court has limited jurisdiction. Not only has it depended on
which state are parties, only crimes committed after it entered into force (2002) can be
prosecuted by the Court. In some instances, U N 's Security Council can bring a case to
the Court's attention, as was the case with Khadafy in the aftermath o f Libya's
intervention; most o f the times, though, the permanent members of the Security Council
do not reach a consensus and cases are not brought to the Court. As an illustration, as

54 Other legal instruments include regional agreements. The International Conference on the Great Lakes
Region's Protocol on the Prevention and Suppression o f Sexual V iolence Against Women and Children is a
great example
55 Sanam Anderlini, "Translating Global Agreement into National and Local Commitments," in Women and
War: P ow er and Protection in the 21st Century, ed. Kathleen Kuehnast, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, and
Helga Hemes (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace, 2011). p. 23
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state-sponsored human rights violations - including sexual violence - spurred in Syria,
the Security Council was unable to both act or bring the case to the ICC due to China's
and Russia's veto powers and unwillingness to authorize an intervention on a political
ally.
UN's Security Council’s inability to act is not new. However, it is important to
recognize instances in which the organ did reach an agreement and prompted sustaining
efforts to promote international peace and security. One of such efforts was the inclusion
o f gender approaches to peacekeeping activities and the recognition that sexual violence
was a threat to international peace, providing the foundations for the authorization o f all
necessary means to address this issue.
Thus far, the analysis has shown that parallel to the development of a security
concept focused on the individual and peacekeeping practices dedicated to protect them,
the UN was the main venue for the development o f women's rights and the sponsor o f
manifold initiatives that contributed to disseminate international norms to protect their
rights and further consider their status and special needs in conflict zones. They form the
backbone o f the normative framework that allowed these issues to be linked with the
organization's main purpose and raison d'etre, promoting international peace and
security.
The following section will cover the adoption o f a gender approach to peace
operations, explaining what it consists o f and detailing the main challenges for its future
implementation.
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Gender as an integral part of peacekeeping practices

Promoting gender balance and equality has been a UN goal since its creation;
however, it is only after the year 2000 that the organization started to focus its action in
yet another area: peace and security. As part o f U N 's efforts to promote and maintain
peace, gender approaches were gradually included in all UN's missions' mandates.
Although the systematic use o f sexual violence as a tool o f war has hijacked the “gender
and peacekeeping” agenda, important consideration towards increasing the participation
of women in peace processes as better ways to attend to their needs and ultimately
accomplish peace are also in place. That is not to say that war-related sexual violence is
not an important issue, but rather part o f a bigger discussion on the role o f women in
societies and the need to enhance their participation when reconstruction takes place.
The importance of adopting comprehensive protection strategies also lies in the
fact that war-time violence usually represents a magnified reflection o f gender based
violence that was already present during peacetime. During war, when previously
established gender relations are redefined, it is often the case that women are left alone
and as the head of household, occasionally they also become combatants. However, they
are usually excluded from DDR programs, or have their previous gains reversed when the
conflict ends and gender relations are normalized again. Hence, the end o f conflicts is an
important moment where innovative actions to reverse dire gender relations;
reconstruction and protection strategies must thus consider this continuum o f violence
and attempt to lay the foundations o f a fairer and more equitable state.56

56 See for example: Tsjeard Bouta, Georg Frerks, and Ian Bannon, Gender, Conflict, and D evelopm ent
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005); Meintjes, Pillay, and Turshen, The Aftermath: Women in P ost-W ar
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The absence of sexual violence from peace-agreements is also striking. When
gender considerations are not included in agreements, the voices o f women will most
probably be left out o f reconstruction programs.57 Moreover, silencing on the topic of
war-time sexual violence not only undermines women's recovery, it also contributes to
the normalization o f this crime. We must remember that in some cases widespread
conflict-related sexual violence has allegedly contributed to the normalization o f this act
amongst civilians, who then carry out similar actions under the premise o f being
“accepted” and “normal”.
In order to address these issues the UN has created a comprehensive gender
approach to peace operations. This strategy is based on a series of resolutions approved
since 2000 with the objective o f enhancing women's participation in peace processes and
improving the organization's response to sexual and gender based violence. They form
the base of the organization's learning process and the foundation o f international
practices aiming a lasting peace.
Despite the advances on the normative realm, the implementation o f practices has
proved to be challenging. In order to better assess where challenges remain, this section
will not only show the evolution o f the normative realm, but also evaluate the
implementation gap. While this section will mostly focus on the implementation gap at
headquarter and member states level, the following chapters will provide a thorough
evaluation of how this strategy is being - or not - implemented on the field.

Transformation; Haleh Afshar and Deborah Eade, Development, Women, and War: Feminist Perspectives,
Development in Practice Reader (Oxford: Oxfam, 2004).
57 See for example: Mazurana, Raven-Roberts, and Parpart, Gender, Conflict, and Peacekeeping; and
Donald Steinberg, "Women and War: An Agenda for Action," in Women an d War: P ow er an d Protection
in the 21st Century, ed. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat Kathleen Kuehnast, Helga Hemes (Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute o f Peace, 2011).
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Women, Peace and Security resolutions: the normative realm

The adoption o f resolution 1325 in October 2000 by the Security Council was the
result of the diligent work of civil society organizations and UNIFEM that exercised
pressure on members o f the organ and organized a forum through which country
representatives could hear directly from those affected on the ground, including victims.
It also comprised a historic evolution in the way the matter was internationally seen,
since a clear relationship between peace and an environment free of sexual violence was
established and a series o f actions towards improving UN actions in this regard were put
in place.
It was common knowledge among women's organizations and UN institutions
concerned with gender that the comprehensive Brahimi report lacked a nuanced analysis
on the causes o f conflict and paid insufficient attention to sexual and gender based
violence.58 The Windhoek Declaration, on its part, and the resulting Namibia Plan o f
Action was strictly concerned about gender approaches in peace operations. Organized by
DPKO's Lessons Learned Unit and hosted by the Government of Namibia in May, 2000,
the seminar “Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support
Operations” looked at practical ways through which the UN system could put in practice
a series o f actions to enhance a gender approach to peace operations. As a matter o f fact,
the “Namibia Plan o f Action” was the base document for Resolution 1325 and
maintained much o f its content.59

58 Raven-Roberts, "Gender Mainstreaming in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Talking the Walk,
Tripping over the Walk." p.47
59 Louise Olsson, "The Namibian Peace Operation in a Gender Context," ibid. (Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers), p. 169.
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Two related events taking place in New York in October 2000 further contributed
to the adoption by the Security Council o f Resolution 1325 (UNSCR1325). These were
an open discussion on Women, Peace and Security between members of the Council and
the other was an Arria Formula meeting on the same topic where members o f the Council
could discuss the impact o f violence on women and their role in peace processes with
representatives from local civil society organizations and victims themselves.60 While the
former counted with declarations of support from 40 member states, the latter constituted
an informal and confidential meeting where women from Zambia, Sierra Leone and
Guatemala were heard.
Despite subsequent criticism, UNSCR1325 was an important step towards the
advancement o f a new format to peace operations concerned with the security o f the
individual and with the different impact that conflicts and destabilization have on
different gender groups. The resolution provided a series of actions to be undertaken by
the UN system and member states in order to improve the organization's response to the
challenges on the ground, particularly, the specific effects on women. Moreover, it was
the first time women's experiences in conflict were linked to the maintenance of
international peace and security, stressing that women's leadership in conflict resolution
and gender approaches in peacekeeping are necessary steps to build a lasting peace. 61
The main objective was to increase women's participation in peace processes and

60 Mazurana, Raven-Roberts, and Parpart, Gender, Conflict, and Peacekeeping, p. 15
61 Under the broad reference o f gender approaches to peacekeeping a series o f specific actions can be
identified: these include gender mainstreaming in terms o f specific considerations on the impact o f policies
on gender groups, promoting gender balance, and improving protection through training and a renewed
protection o f civilians role for the military.
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decision-making related to conflict resolution as well as improve protection o f women
and girls on the ground through increased female personnel and better gender training.
Although the resolution fails to establish monitoring mechanisms, enforcement
actions or benchmarks for progress evaluation, it set the first comprehensive series of
actions aimed at better attending the special needs o f affected women on the ground.
Noting the slow progress at the national level, in 2004 the Security Council called
member states to implement National Action Plans (NAPs) or other national strategies as
a way to articulate and implement provisions o f UNSCR1325.62 NAPs are basically a
policy and binding document that captures the specificities o f the national structure and
establishes parameters and benchmarks to accomplish better gender mainstreaming in
accordance to the provisions o f the resolution. Calling for inter-government cooperation
and civil society participation, NAPs are also an important tool to avoid duplicated
actions while also complying with UN renewed normative framework for peace
operations.
Because the responsibility to implement the resolution belongs to multiple actors
including the UN system, member states and parties to the conflict, it is a challenging
task. The need to include more women as peacekeeping personnel (in all components)
and as peace negotiators, the establishment o f gender units on the ground, and improved
training on the military as a ways to better assess gender based crimes, can be highlighted
as important provisions to be implemented. While state compliance has varied immensely
within the UN system, the involvement o f multiple UN actors, lack o f leadership and of

62 United Nations Security Council, "Statement by the President o f the Security Council", October 28,
2004, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/S-PRST-2004-40-E.pdf.
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inter-agency coordination has led to inconsistent implementation o f the resolution's
provisions.
It is important however to underline that despite difficulties to implement this
evolving normative framework, the United Nations is taking important steps forward, in a
continuous process of inquiry and quest for better ways to address challenges on the
ground and improve the UN system response. Indeed, efforts to reinforce the U N 's
actions in addressing the special needs of women and girls were further enhanced by four
subsequent resolutions, mostly focused on the systematic use o f sexual violence as a tool
o f war.
The first of those was Security Council Resolution 1820 (UNSCR1820), adopted
in 2008. Its main contribution was shifting the UN response to sexual violence from the
humanitarian to the security approach, further reinforcing the need to change the structure
o f peace operations and its doctrine and tactics.63 Resolution 1820 was the first to spell
out the harsh effects sexual violence has on communities and established a clear link
between international peace and an environment free o f sexual violence. Urging the
Secretary General and member states to ensure that sexual violence in conflict is
addressed in conflict resolution and post-conflict recovery efforts.
In this regard, provisions under resolution 1325 are complementary to 1820 and
include increasing the number of uniformed female personnel, improving training
modules, including sexual violence in peace agreements, communication with local
women's organizations and specific protection strategy to address this problem in conflict
zones, amongst others. While the Secretary General has been releasing yearly reports on

63 Anne-Marie Goetz, "Addressing Sexual Violence in Internationally Mediated Peace Processes." p.261
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the implementation o f these resolutions, a network o f 13 UN entities has been created to
better coordinate these efforts has been created. The “UN Action Against Sexual
Violence in Conflict” supports coordination efforts and work closely with other local,
national and international actors to improve actions on the ground.64
Resolution 1888 (UNSCR1888) was adopted in 2009 and has the objective of
strengthening tools for implementing 1820 through assigning high-level leadership,
building judicial response expertise, strengthening service provision, and building
reporting mechanisms. In this regard, it calls for the appointment o f a Special
Representative o f the Secretary General on Sexual Violence, and the provision o f
strategic support on actions to combat sexual violence to UN country teams and peace
Operations. The peace operations in Darfur, Liberia and the Democratic Republic o f
Congo are the first to have sexual violence components primarily dedicated to elaborating
comprehensive protection strategies to curb sexual violence on the ground. These
strategies encompass actions that aim to improve judicial, security-related and political
responses to sexual violence on the ground. Due to lack o f specific data on sexual
violence measuring impact is a challenging task, however important advances in terms of
implementing renewed strategies and monitoring actions have been accomplished.65
Resolution 1889 (UNSCR1889) was also adopted in 2009 and calls attention to
the exclusion of women from early recovery and peace building activities leading to the
continuous inadequate planning and funding o f actions aimed at attending the special

64 For further information on their work, see: UN Action Against Sexual V iolence in Conflict, “ Stop Rape
N ow ,” 03/18/2013, www.stoprapenow.org.
65 Data on sexual violence is a challenge. A s an example o f the challenges, increasing trends may only
signal better reporting systems rather than an increase in cases. Moreover, it is often the case that different
actors on the ground use different reporting systems, making it difficult to have a unified reporting system.
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needs of women. As prescribed by UNSCR1325, a strategy to increase the number of
women in conflict-resolution and decision-making and the establishment o f specific
monitoring mechanisms and indicators towards this goal are imperative. These indicators
and plan for implementation o f gender-responsive peacebuilding were presented by the
Secretary General in 2010. 66
It thus becomes clear that these resolutions as well as its implementation
indicators and strategic plans are all complementary and were often bundled together
under comprehensive implementation strategies and reports o f the Secretary General on
the advancement o f UN actions on this issue. The last o f Security Council Resolutions on
this topic thus far is resolution 1960 (UNSCR1960), adopted in 2010. Following critics
on the absence of accountability mechanisms to guarantee the implementation o f these
resolutions, RES 1960 provides an accountability system for addressing conflict-related
sexual violence that includes reports on parties credibly suspected o f committing sexual
violence, establishment o f monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements on conflict
related sexual violence and the need to submit annual reports on advances.
UNSCR1960 represents an important advance in comparison to the other
resolutions since it provides “teeth” or actual mechanisms for monitoring and
implementation. In particular, the tactics of “naming and shamming” with the list of
armed groups that apply sexual violence as tactics o f war represent a more aggressive
approach to end this practice. The mechanism was first used in the January 2012 report of

66 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f the Secretary General on Women, Peace and Security",
September 24, 2010, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?sym bol=S/2010/498. For more
information on the topic see also: "Report o f the Secretary General on W omen'S Participation in
Peacebuilding", September 7, 2010,
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/un-women-participation-inpeacebuilding-report-of-the-sec-general-2010-09-07.pdf.
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the Secretary General on Sexual Violence that documented conflict related sexual
violence and specifically referring to the names of military forces, militia and other
armed groups allegedly using sexual violence as a tool of war.67
The five resolutions on Women, Peace and Security constitute the normative
framework towards the incorporation o f a gender approach as an integral component of
peace operations. Its adoption also signals the recognition that threats to international
peace and security include individual threats to civilians and proposes a renewed focus
centered on individuals protection. Although some of these resolutions do not have
accountability mechanisms - as is the case o f UNSCR1325 (2000) and UNSCR1889
(2009), others have specific provisions on the formulation o f indicators, strategies and
commitments towards the implementation of actions to accomplish U N 's overall gender
equality policy in peace operations, ensuring that specific gender crimes, especially
sexual violence, are rightly addressed, and that women are a central participant in peace
processes.
Although implementation remains a challenge and there is still a gap between the
normative and practical realms, gender approaches to peace operations is in the
international security agenda.

From evolving norms towards international practices: the implementation gap

Considering the renewed challenges in international security environment and the
organization's inability to adequately respond to threats, the United Nations initiated a
learning process in search for improved ways to better respond to the renewed threats
67 "Report o f the Secretary General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence", January 13,2012,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/33.
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encountered on the ground. In this context, while a renewed security concept refocused
on the individual has evolved, international practices dedicated to better protect civilians
arose. As part of these efforts, specific concerns with women's interests, rights and
protection needs assumed renewed importance within the organization. Not only has the
organization been the main venue for the development of specific women's rights, it has
also been pivotal in securitizing the issue and linking it with the organization's main
purpose. In this context, maintaining international peace and security also means
addressing the specific effects o f conflicts on women, particularly combating systematic
use o f sexual violence as a tool o f war.
As analyzed, the series o f UN resolutions on Women, Peace and Security have
mostly confronted an implementation gap. Although resolutions set important standards
towards the enhancement o f women's security and improvement of its vulnerable status,
they often fail to create binding and enforcement mechanisms so that all involved actors
take the necessary actions to establish and disseminate these specific provisions as
international practices.
Considering the practice o f gender approaches to peace operations, two
dimensions ought to be considered. First, there are the necessary changes at headquarters
and member states level, these include for example the adoption of National Action Plans
by member states and the provision o f gender training modules, appointment o f gender
advisers to missions and establishment o f monitoring mechanisms by UN headquarters.
The second dimension refers to the specific in-mission practices, such as the
incorporation of gender in missions' mandate, the establishment o f specific protection
strategies and activities towards improving national capacity to respond to sexual and
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gender based violence. A feedback loop between these two dimensions is also necessary,
so that norms create at headquarters level take under consideration lessons learned from
the field.
The evaluation of practices that have been widely incorporated by member states
and UN staff and further disseminated from mission to mission and state to state,
provides a diagnostic of the state of U N 's learning process. It also pinpoints the main
challenges and highlight key areas where further normative development ought to take
place. This section will thus evaluate some of U N 's main accomplishment at
headquarters level and define the central components for a successful gender approach
strategy in-mission.

The implementation gap at headquarter and member state level

Since UNSCR1325, the United Nations has taken important steps towards
translating into practice the norms it has created. While each of the five resolutions
further refines a gender approaches to peace operations as an international practice,
supporting analytical documents, the establishment of benchmarks and monitoring
mechanisms measuring success and the elaboration and adoption of new training modules
for military forces and National Action Plans are the first real evidence o f change. At the
same time, however, difficulty to measure the impact of UN policies and slow pace of
progress in certain areas - such as the increased presence o f women in peace operations mount against any idea o f progress.
The search for establishing specific targets, implementing, monitoring and
reporting mechanisms along with accountability systems comprise the greatest success.
Mostly dependent on the work carried out by the Secretariat and other sister agencies,
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since the debut o f women's issues in the international peace and security arena,
supporting documents to aid the work on the ground have multiplied and as exemplified
by UNSCR1960 (2010), some have even established binding mechanism and time-bound
commitments towards the implementation o f a gender approach to peace operations.
Among these documents, there are the reports o f the Secretary General on Women, Peace
and Security, on Sexual Violence, and on the Implementation of the Resolutions 1820
(2008) and 1888 (2009); specific studies carried out by U N 's Department o f
Peacekeeping Operations, and the several training modules designed to improve response
on the ground.68
As previously discussed, one of the main critics to UNSCR1325 was the inability
to create effective action plans for all implementing parties and absence o f an
accountability mechanism. As a result, in 2004 the Security Council called a Systemwide Action Plan (SWAP) for the implementation o f UNSCR1325 provisions and an
Inter-Agency Task Force on Women, Peace and Security was created.69
Since then two SWAPs were created, one comprising the period o f 2005-2007
and the other covering 2008-2009 period. Nonetheless, the yearly Reports o f the
Secretary General on Women Peace and Security, have highlighted that the elaboration of
these System-wide Action Plan have had little impact and the UN system have not met
with the recommendations. In 2010, in celebration of the ten year anniversary of
' resolution 1325 a report o f the Secretary General stated that SWAP results remained
disappointing and that the possibility of measuring achievements was a challenge.
68 For a directory on U N 's training materials on gender and wom en's issues, see: Women watch, “
Directory o f UN resources on gender and w om en's issues”, 03/19/2013,
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/directorv/gender training 90.htm.
69 United Nations Security Council, "Statement by the President o f the Security Council."
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As a result, in July 2011 a UN Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace
and Security: 2011-202070 with specific goals, targets and indicators to measure UN
progress in the area. The framework established a High-level United Nations Steering
Committee on Women, Peace and Security (HLSC-WPS) to oversee and monitor
progress and defined four broad areas where advances ought to be accomplished:

Figure 1: Women Peace and Security four implementation pillars
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Source: UN Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace and Security: 2011-2020.

Although it is still soon to evaluate U N 's progress in accordance to each o f these
areas, the continuous reformulation o f targets and recurrence o f open debates every
October and informal council meetings on the subject, shows the organization's
commitment to improve and disseminate this practice. Other accomplishments in this
area include: the Inter-Agency Task Force on Women, and Peace and Security in

70 United Nations, "Un Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace and Security: 2011-2020" (New
York: United Nations, July 2011).
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February 2001, the creation o f a Gender Unit at DPKO headquarters and in mission,71
appointment of women/gender focal point to all departments and missions' components,
the elaboration o f gender training modules and guidelines for integrating a gender
perspective into the work o f the military and the police in peacekeeping, the elaboration
of a gender equality policy for peacekeeping,
Besides promoting gender mainstreaming in all missions' activities, these senior
advisers are responsible for guaranteeing that local women are included in peace
processes, that their concerns are considered within local legal and judicial system and
procedures and that the necessary measures to protect women and girls from sexual
violence are taken by all missions' components.72

Gender balance

Evaluating the presence of women in peace processes activities is a direct
measurement o f the implementation o f one of UNSCR1325 provisions. It also points out
where exactly the main challenges remains, whether on the field or at headquarters and
which implementing actor is most falling behind with the resolution's compliance.
In terms of civilians, from the period 2000-2010, there has been a shy increase of
3.3% in the number o f female staff working at U N 's Secretariat, from 35.5% (1,785 out
o f 5,034) in 2000 to 38.8% (3,945 out o f 10,175) in 2010. This data, however, does not
71 The appointment o f focal points for women should be seen in the context o f the GA resolution 59/164 on
Improvement o f the status o f women in the United Nations system and the letter to senior managers from
the Secretary General o f 3 April 2008, which reaffirms the urgent goal o f achieving 50/50 gender
distribution in all categories o f posts within the UN system.
72 The eight missions where senior gender advisers are present are: UN Organization Stabilization M ission
in the Democratic Republic o f the Congo (MONUSCO), UN Mission in Liberia (UNM IL), UN
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (M INUSTAH), UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), UN M ission in
South Sudan (UNM ISS), African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAM ID), U N Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAM A), UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
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separate those working in the area of conflict resolution nor includes the staff on the field,
where the discrepancies between male and female staff tend to be the largest. As the
graph bellow shows, the percentage of women in high level positions is the lowest, while
its presence in less skilled jobs, as those required by the P-l level is the highest.73

Figure 2: Gender distribution staff in the Professional and higher categories
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Source: UN Women, 2010.

According to Puerchguibal, in 2008, out o f 66 top management positions in peace
building only six were occupied by women.74 In fact, DPKO's proportion of women's
participation increased by only 1.3 percentage point in comparison to the same period.
73 P -l to P-5 positions refer to professional positions, being P -l with the lowest qualification demands and
P-5 the highest. D -l and D-2 refer to director and chief positions, representing important high level
positions within the UN. The UG on its part corresponds to those leadership positions that include the
Secretary General, Under-Secretary General, Assistant Secretary General, Director General and Deputy
Director General.
74 Nadine Puechguibal, "Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction," in Gender
Matters in G lobal P olitics: A Feminist Introduction to International Relation, ed. Laura Shepherd (New
York: Routledge, 2010).
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While in 2000 women comprised only 31.7% o f total personnel - 59 out o f 186 - in 2010
they comprised 33% - 108 out of 327.

Figure 3: Gender distribution staff at the DPKO
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Source: UN Women, 2010.

In peace operations, civilian women staff comprises a total o f around 7,500 or
30% of the total international civilian personnel working for peace operations around the
world. Amongst national staff women summed up to a meager 17%.75 Three women lead
peace operations as Special Representatives o f the Secretary-General (SRSG) and one as
acting head (Afghanistan, Darfur, DRC). Nonetheless, the number for military and police
women are considerably lower. Out o f approximately 125,000 peacekeepers, women
constitute 3% of military personnel and 10% o f police personnel in UN Peacekeeping
missions. However, there are three all-female Formed Police Units (FPU) serving in three

75 This and the following data were all gathered at DPKO's webpage. See: Department o f Peacekeeping
Operations, “ Gender and Peacekeeping”, 03/26/2013,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/womeninpk.shtml.
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different peace operations. These are the Indian FPU serving in Liberia and the two
Bangladeshi FPUs, one serving in Haiti and the other in the Democratic Republic of
Congo. The goal is to reach at least 10% o f women's participation in the military by 2014
and 14% o f women's participation in the police by the same year.
Despite challenges to increase these numbers, they already constitute an advance.
According to DPKO, in the 32 years between 1957 and 1989 a total o f only twenty
women served as uniformed UN peacekeepers. Besides, until the adoption o f the
resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, no women had served as Special
Representative o f the Secretary General. Since the adoption o f UNSCR1325, there has
been an increase in female uniformed personnel, especially as military observers as their
presence doubled in only five years, going from 2% in 2005 to 4.1% in 2010. However,
as the DPKO's statistical report on female uniformed personnel shows, it was not until
2005 and 2009 that sex disaggregated data were compiled for the military and police
personnel respectively.
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Table 3: Evolution of Female personnel in UN operations

17,423

47,131

44.230

36,948

30.743

67,807

74,341

1.30%

1.63%

83,32*

33.576

95,419

1.96%

3.07%

Source: DPKO/OMA Statistical Report on Female Military and Police Personnel in UN Peacekeeping
Operations Prepared for the 10th Anniversary o f the UNSCR 1325, 2010.

Despite that, many challenges remain to ensure an adequate representation of
women in peace processes. As they are underrepresented in decision making structures of
political parties and armed groups they are not automatically invited to participate as
delegates in peace talks. According to Anderlini, since 2000 women have comprised only
7% o f peace negotiators and less than 3% of signatories.76 “The support provided by
peacekeeping missions in this area has been uneven and often lacks a coherent
strategy.”77 It is often the case that women directly affected by conflict or disasters, such
as those within IDP camps and in rural areas are left out. This o f course, is not true for all
missions, but has unfortunately been a trend.
76 Anderlini, "Translating Global Agreement into National and Local Commitments." p. 27
77 Department o f Peacekeeping Operations and Department o f Field Support, "Ten-Year Impact Study on
Implementation o f Un Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security in
Peacekeeping" (New York: United Nations, 2010). p. 16
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An interesting initiative that may have spill-over effects in this area is the support
to increase the participation o f women in political processes. UN missions with this
mandate have worked hard sensitizing stakeholders, promoting affirmative actions and
gender sensitive electoral laws, training women candidates and providing security women
candidates during elections.78 There has been a measurable increase o f women candidates
elected and women voters, at least in a number o f countries with UN presence - such as
DRC, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Haiti, Sudan and East Timor.

NAPs

The adoption o f National Action Plans by member states was not a mandatory
policy directive from UNSCR1325. However, following Security Council's discussion on
how to improve implementation on 1325 and the call for UN System-Wide Action Plan,
member states were also urged to launch Action Plans on their own. However, because
the implementation o f NAPs depends entirely on member states willingness and
commitment to the cause, compliance has achieved mixed results. As for today 39
countries have launched NAPs, most of them coming from developed areas, in particular
Europe, and African countries that have themselves been the object o f an intervention in
recent years. Below is a complete list o f countries that have launched NAPs.79

78 Ibid. p. 18
79 The complete list can be found on the report o f the Secretary General on Peace Women and Security,
2011, see: United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f the Secretary General on Women, Peace and
Security", September 29, 2011,
http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/SecurityCouncilMonitor/Reports/sg_report_wps_oct_2011 .pdf.
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Table 4: Evolution in the launching of National Action Plans
Country

NAP

Date

Australia

National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325

March, 2012

Austria

National Action Plan on Implementing
UNSCR 1325

August, 2007/ Revised in
January, 2012

Belgium

National Action Plan on the
implementation o f UNSCR 1326

May, 2010

B osnia H ezergovina

National Action Plan for the
Implementation o f the UNSCR 1325

July, 2010

Burundi

National Action Plan on Security Council
Resolution 1325 and 1820

August, 2011

Canada

Action Plan for the Implementation o f
United Nations Security Council
Resolutions on Women, Peace and
Security

October, 2010

Chile

National Action Plan for the
Implementation o f the UNSCR 1325

August, 2009

Cote d'Ivoire

National Action Plan for the
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325

January, 2007

Croatia

National Action Plan for the
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325

2011

Denm ark

Action Plan for the Implementation o f
UNSCR 1325

June, 2005/Revised in
2008

D em ocratic Republic of
Congo

National Action Plan for the
implementation o f the UNSCR 1325

June, 2010

Estonia

Action Plan for the Implementation o f
UNSCR 1325

November, 2010

Finland

National Action Plan for the
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325

September, 2008/ Revised
in 2012

France

National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325
Women, Peace & Security

November, 2010

Georgia

National Action Plan on UN SCR 1325

December, 2011

Germ any

National Action Plan on the
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325

December, 2012

Guinea

National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325

July, 2011

Guinea-Bissau

National Action Plan on UNSCR
1325 and Implementation Matrix

July, 2011

Iceland

National Plan o f Action for the
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325

March, 2008

Ireland

National Action Plan on UNSCR

November, 2011

Italy

National Plan o f Action for the
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325

December, 2010

147

Table 4: Continued
Country

NAP

Date

Liberia

National Action Plan for the
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325
Action Plan for the Implementation o f
UNSCR 1325 on Women Peace and
Security

March, 2009

Nepal

National Action Plan for the
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325

October, 2010

Netherlands

National Action Plan for the
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325

December, 2007/
December, 2011

Norway

Action Plan for the Implementation o f
UNSCR / NAP Strategic Plan for 20112013

March, 2006

Philippines

National Action Plan for the
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325 and
1820

Mar-10

Portugal

National Action Plan for the
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325

August, 2009

Rwanda

National Action Plan for the
Implementation o f the UNSCR 1325

May, 2010

Senegal

National Action Plan for the
Implementation o f the UNSCR 1325 i

2-M ay-11

Serbia

National Action Plan for the
Implementation o f the UNSCR 1325

2011

Spain

National Action Plan for the
Implementation o f the UNSCR 1325

November,2007

Sierra Leone

National Action Plan for the
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325

March, 2011

Slovenia

National Action Plan for the
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325

July, 2011

Sweden

National Action Plan to implement
UNSCR 1325

October 2006/Revised in
2009

Switzerland

National Action Plan to implement
UNSCR 1325

O ct-10

Uganda

Uganda Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 &
1820 and the Goma Declaration

December, 2008

United Kingdom

National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325
Women, Peace & Security

November,
2011/Revision: February,

Lithuania

December, 2011

2012
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Table 4: Continued
Country

NAP

Date

United States

National Action Plan on Women, Peace
and Security

December, 2011

Source: Peace Women, “List o f National Action Plans”, 03/19/2013, http://peacewomen.org/naps/list-ofnaps.

The table shows two important aspects in the adoption o f NAPs by member states.
The first relates to the institutional constraints imposed by regional institutions
committed to the subject, in particular the European Union and NATO, leading all
member states to launch their action plans. The second reinforces the importance o f
taking advantage of peace operations as an important instance to promote more equitable
societies, since the majority o f African states that have launched National Action Plans
are also those that have been subjected to UN peace efforts. Despite the difficulty of
proving the effectiveness o f these foreign-sponsored plans o f action, they give pressure
groups and women's organizations leverage to encourage national governments to
recognize the impact of wars on the status of women and urge continued efforts towards
more equitable societies.

Training modules and guidelines

Initiatives to create gender training modules for peacekeepers were already in
place prior to the adoption of UNSCR1325 (2000). 80 These modules were further
developed and currently gender is one of the obligatory training modules that all
peacekeepers receive before and during deployment. Besides, guidelines and checklists
80 Angela Mackay, "Mainstreaming Gender in United Nations Peacekeeping Training: Examples from East
Timor, Ethiopia, and Eritrea," in Gender, Conflict, and Peacekeeping, ed. Dyan Mazurana, Angela RavenRoberts, and Jane Parpart (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005). p.265
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for incorporating a gender perspective into the police military components have also been
created in 2008 and 2010 respectively.81 These included a detailed checklist with specific
tasks to be carried out at tactical, operational and strategic levels.
These materials were complemented by specific gender training modules that
were also recently created. These were prepared throughout 2010-2012 and a pilot course
in Africa, Latin America and Asia was carried out with training modules for tactical,
operational and strategic levels. The elaboration o f these specific training modules was
carried out with the participation o f external consultants, member states representatives
and gender specialists.82
Other gender training includes those directed to gender focal points for military
and police in mission as well as civilians directly related to gender policies. The main
problem, however, is to guarantee that these training are adequately passed to troops to be
deployed. Although some countries invite United Nations representatives to carry out
pre-deployment training, member states are responsible for carrying out the training
themselves. Another great challenge is the fact that gender issues tend to be readily
associated with Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) and uniformed personnel, in its
majority still comprised by men, tend to be wary to discuss these issues.
The UN-Women, have also developed a scenario-based training, but mostly
focused on sexual violence issues. Interestingly, the responsible for the training is Gen.
Patrick Cammaert, former Brigade Commander in the DRC. In missions, gender training

81 Department o f Peacekeeping Operations and Department o f Field Support, "Guidelines for Integrating
Gender Perspectives into the Work o f United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Missions," (New York:
United Nations, 2008).
821 have participated as an external consultant in one o f the consulting workshops on the elaboration o f
these modules guideline. They consisted in the review and editing o f the text and formulation o f practical
scenarios.
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is often provided by civilians, and most o f the time by women. Although they tend to be
the experts on the field it is important to have someone aware o f military culture to
provide this training. They tend to better understand, if course is given using simple and
direct language followed by specific tasks, which is why checklists tend to work better
for them. Using a former male general may be an excellent strategy to pass the message.

Prevention o f conflict related sexual violence

Initiatives to incorporate a gender policy and enhance women's leadership role
are complementary to the initiatives to prevent sexual violence on the field, and have
been planned in conjunction with those. Since UNSCR1820, first considered widespread
and systematic use o f sexual violence as a threat to international peace and security,
training modules, studies and strategies to address sexual violence have been developed
at headquarters and mission level. The accountability mechanism present in the text o f
UNSCR1960 was first put in practice through the “naming and shaming” strategy on the
first report o f the Secretary General on Conflict Related sexual violence, that cited armed
and militia groups allegedly related to sexual violence and started a monitoring, analysis
and reporting system on cases o f sexual violence cases around the world.83
The report also provided examples on how sexual violence has threatened
security, undermined peace efforts and was used as political tool o f oppression during
elections or civil unrest in countries such as Chad, Central African Republic, Nepal, Sri
Lanka, Timor-Leste, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Guinea,
Kenya, Syria among others. Finally, it also specified the initiatives in place that seek to
83 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f the Secretary General on Conflict-Related Sexual
Violence."
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identify signs o f sexual violence and protect the population and finally ensure that the
issue is included in peace agreements.84
The creation of the inter-agency coordination network, the UN Action Against
Sexual Violence, has further synchronized efforts to reduce combat related sexual
violence. This coordination mechanism has generated the previously cited joint
DPKO/UN-Women scenario-based trainings on sexual and gender based violence for
military peacekeepers. Other two important initiatives that UN Action Against Sexual
Violence follows closely have been the appointment of Special representative o f the
Secretary General for Sexual Violence in 2010 and the subsequent policies, and the three
field offices representatives of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic o f Congo,
Darfur and Liberia.
The presence of a sexual violence component is peace operations have been
positive because it managed to include the issue into the planning, execution and
evaluation o f missions' mandates. Moreover, the formulation o f local strategies to
combat sexual violence can also be cited as a direct result o f the establishment of these
units that work exclusively on this issue. Additionally, peace operations (not only those
with sexual violence units) have also provided technical expertise to the drafting and
enactment of major pieces of legislation aimed at combating sexual violence as it is the
case in Afghanistan, DRC, Liberia, Sierra, Leone and East Timor. The creation of
specialized sexual and gender based violence local police units is also a UN victory in

84 U N N ew s Center, “U N Report on Sexual Violence During Conflict Singles Out Worst Offenders”,
February 23, 2012, Accessed: 03/19/2012,
http://www.peacewomen.org/news article.php?id=4745&tvpe=news.
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Burundi, Chad, Darfur, DRC, Haiti, Liberia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Sudan and East
Timor.85
However, as SGBV remains prevalent in mission areas around the world and due
to the slow pace of progress that has been shown an Analytical Inventory of
Peacekeeping Practice for Addressing Sexual Violence has been issued in 2010 and a
second edition in 2012, pinning down specific tasks that the military can carry out to
better protect civilians from sexual violence.86
The Inventory calls attention to a major analytical and implementation gap. As
much as national authorities should be held accountable for protecting their citizens, and
local and international civilian personnel from the UN and other international and civil
society organizations are in better position to understand the problem, the potential role
of uniformed peacekeepers to help fight sexual violence remain under-looked.
Indeed, due to increasing critics against peacekeepers that have been identified
with SEA and sexual violence themselves, commanders remain wary o f sending out
troops to have an increased contact with local women. In this regard, the innumerous
cases of misconducts by peacekeepers (and also by civilian and UN police personnel)
piles against U N's conduct record on the field. It was only in 2003, that the organization
launched a Zero Tolerance policy, forbidding sexual contact between UN personnel and
locals and only in 2005 that a Conduct and Discipline Unit was created to provide
guidance and record allegations against the UN. Despite that, the challenge as to how

85 Department o f Peacekeeping Operations and Department o f Field Support, "Ten-Year Impact Study on
Implementation o f Un Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security in
Peacekeeping." p. 31.
86United Nations Department o f Peacekeeping Operations, "Addressing Conflict Related Sexual Violence:
An Analytical Inventory o f Peacekeeping Practice" (New York: DPKO, 2010).
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make individuals accountable remains, since most o f them have immunity and it becomes
member states responsibility to prosecute them. Cases o f misconduct have disastrous
effects on UN image and ultimately undermine peace efforts, these, however are still
common.
Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that the military can easily pick on some
signs of violence, and if adequately trained on gender issues they could help prevent
these hideous acts from happening. By being the armed institution on the ground, not
only they have a primary role in protecting women from the violence itself, they can also
support individuals’ social and economic development, improving their structural and
physical security and decreasing its vulnerability. Consequently, connecting to the
civilian staff is not enough, understanding the distinct contribution that the military
component can perform in a peace operation o f this sort is essential to contribute to this
agenda. The military can reach remote areas, provide daily patrols, and offer a security
response to a problem that currently lacks a security framework.
Most frequently, uniformed personnel are the first point of contact with victims.
They must thus know how to carry out a first response, which ought to assure medical
support and confidentiality of the victim. As the Analytical Inventory points out, how
they respond to these cases affect the image o f the mission and the overall ability to
deliver strategic outcomes. For that reason, understanding the gender and cultural
dynamics o f certain societies may be indispensable for achieving an enduring peace.
However, in many cases, they are simply not prepared. A representative from the sexual
violence unit highlights “they try to do their best, but the wrong way. In the eager to be
effective, they take pictures of the victims, they get names, where they live, they question
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everybody. Instead of helping, by doing that they end up putting victims in more
danger.”87
Actions on the field are not only important for conflict resolution and protecting
civilians. They help to build a fairer society by providing a role model in which gender
concerns are taken seriously. In post-conflicts societies, building a new normalcy is
strategic to build a more gender balanced and equitable society and thus an enduring
peace.
More than protecting civilians against sexual and other types o f violence it has
also become the role o f the UN to avoid that sexual violence is normalized. Calling a
dreadful act a hazy cultural feature o f a people can be misleading and may undermine all
efforts. As much as the general role of protecting civilians requires a coordinated work
between all missions’ components and o f those with other actors on the field, the same
holds true for protecting women and girls from sexual violence.
As a former MONUC SRSG stated in 2009:
There will never be enough resources... this is why, for example, we are
trying to understand the communities better... We need to recognize that
protection is more than just having military boots on the ground. It’s about
how you use them, and how you can connect with your civilian staff. 88
In order to assure a protective environment and the restoration o f security, a
lasting peace agreement and a healthy political and social environment is necessary for
the development to take place, decreasing thus the structural vulnerability o f local
population to suffer this particular type of physical violence.

87 Interview carried out with Sexual V iolence Unit Representative on February, 2012, Democratic Republic
o f Congo.
88 United Nations Department o f Peacekeeping Operations, "Addressing Conflict Related Sexual Violence:
An Analytical Inventory o f Peacekeeping Practice. " p.8
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Being that the military the component where most difficulties have been found to
incorporate a gender approach, it remains the questions if we, as scholars and
practitioners can indeed request them to perform these functions. It is often the case that
they do not fully grasp the concept of a gender perspective and as the Secretary General
himself states “there is an equally enduring belief in some military circles that bullets,
bombs and blades constitutes the ‘war’, while rape is a disciplinary infraction or a private
aspect of culture based gender relations.”89
That is why providing military and police for that matter with specific tasks,
standard operations procedures and checklist is an important initiative. It is also essential
that they are able to perform gender analysis and include incidents in patrol reports as a
ways to better assess specific threats women may be subjected. As the subsequent
analysis of the case studies in chapters 4 and 5 will show, the military component reflects
where cultural considerations and member states unwillingness are a major obstacle for a
successful completion of a learning process. With inadequate training, undisciplined
soldiers and vastly male composed, the military has been a standing stone bastion where
gender approaches have been most challenged.

UN gender strategy on the field: the 5 pillars

UN Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security highlighted the road towards
improving the effects of conflicts on women and girls. This strategy is based on gender
equality and included gender balance and gender mainstreaming actions, varying from
increasing the number o f uniformed personnel on the ground to the establishment of
89 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f the Secretary General on the Implementation o f
Resolutions 1820 and 1888."
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better protection mechanisms to attend women and girls victims o f sexual and gender
based violence. In order to accomplish these tasks, missions on the ground usually have a
specific gender component responsible for carrying out the mission's gender policy and
guaranteeing that gender is fully integrated into the planning and execution o f missions'
mandates.
Considering resolutions' provisions and supporting documents towards the
enhancement of women's status, U N 's gender approach to peace operations is based on
five main components: legal framework, gender balance, protection, security sector and
empowerment. These are focused on improving the situation of local women, better
responding to their specific needs and improving their status, constituting thus a
comprehensive strategy that goes beyond their physical security and considers their
structural security as well.
The first o f these components would be the reinforcement o f a legal framework
that place specific provisions for the protection and empowerment o f women and girls,
particularly in the mandate o f peace operations. The absence o f gender specific
provisions in peace operations is often translated in the lack of necessary resources,
adequate equipments and context-specific training necessary to prevent, deal and combat
widespread and/or systematic sexual violence on the ground.90 Lack of resources may
further translate in U N 's inability to install efforts to improve local justice system and set
reparations mechanisms.
But mandates are not the only elements o f a strong legal framework that can help
sustain continued efforts to support women and girls on the ground. Specific strategy to

90 Anne-Marie Goetz, "Addressing Sexual Violence in Internationally Mediated Peace Processes." p. 263
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protect civilians and/or to combat sexual violence would provide mission with specific
tasks for all components - military, police and civilian - based on the local context to
better respond to the specific threats against women and girls.
A second important element central in UN's gender approach to peace operations
is gender balance. As previously explaining gender equality gender balance refers to
equal participation between men and women in all levels and positions. It is important
that a quantitative analysis is accompanied by a qualitative analysis of the specific roles
women are carrying out within the mission, and in particular within the military
component.
An increasing presence o f women in peace operations is particularly important to
guarantee that women's special needs are considered in the planning execution and
evaluation o f missions' mandates and specific tasks. In the case of uniformed personnel
in particular, female personnel supports disseminating a role model to intervened society,
by showing that women and men can participate in the same kind o f activities, and
further enhance channels of communication with the local population. Despite critics that
arguing that more uniformed women enhance contact with local women reinforces
gender essentialisms, the reality on the ground shows that indeed women are more at ease
to communicate their problems to other women. Considering that in many o f these
countries where sexual violence is a common feature, state and militia forces are usually
those most involved with perpetrations it is understandable that uniformed female staff
may facilitate contact with victims.
Another important component o f UN's gender approach on the ground is
protection. Protection strategies are mostly carried out by uniformed personnel, although
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combined efforts o f multi-agency teams tend to provide better threat assessment and
response to populations based on a multi-dimensional understanding o f their needs.
However, as previously emphasized by the UN Analytical Inventory, the military
component in particular can comply with a specific and very important role in terms o f
facilitating contact, transportations and protection through the use o f force to vulnerable
populations.
If an ostensive presence already provides dissuasive effects on armed groups, the
actual use o f military forces to provide escorts and patrols to local women may even have
more positive results. The same holds true for police and civilian components if clear
integrated protection tasks and responsibilities are planned according to the specific
context where they are deployed. In some environments, particularly those o f urban
criminality it will be the UN Police who will have direct contact with victims. On the
other side, professional civilians, with specific expertise, such as rule o f law, human
rights, etc, can assess different situations and identify the priority needs o f the population.
In a context o f sexual violence they may offer valuable insights on how improve the
vulnerable status o f women on the ground.
The fourth component is central for a sustaining protection effort in the aftermath
of conflicts and the establishment o f a more equitable society. Security sector is broadly
defined as “the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management,
provision and oversight of security in a country.”91 These include various institutions
responsible for law enforcement, justice system, and defense. Since the 9 0 's UN peace

91 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f the Secretary General on Securing Peace and
Development: The Role o f the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform", January 23, 2008,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/62/659.
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operations have broadened its mandate to include a series o f actions, amongst which are
several related to strengthening the local security sector. Training o f local police and
military, improvement of justice and legal systems are some of the tasks UN personnel
are responsible on the ground.
Improving the local security sector, particularly in terms of strengthening security
and defense forces capacity to maintain a safe environment, is already an important
measure to guarantee sustained efforts to better protect local women and girls. However,
occasionally, UN personnel is involved with the provision o f specific gender training to
local police and military, guaranteeing that specific gender provisions are included in the
national constitutions and legal documents. Unfortunately, it is often the case that sexual
violence and gender based violence are not criminalized in intervened societies. In these
cases UN civilian staff responsible for rule of law and human rights have a central role in
making sure that the national system adopts the necessary measure for the prosecution of
these crimes and that discriminatory practices are outlawed.
The final component o f U N 's gender approach in peace operations is the
empowerment of women in the economic social and political life o f the state, through
gender balanced actions during reconstruction process. This strategy is based on the
assumption that vulnerability of women is based on discriminatory practices and a low
social, economic and political status of women in these societies. Consequently, it is also
the UN's role to guarantee women's empowerment as the foundation for a more equitable
society where women's vulnerability is decreased.
Although some of these elements receive more attention than others. The analysis
o f UN actions on the ground underlines the importance o f this integrated approach as a
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ways to respond to the specific needs o f women. The underlying logic is that these
actions will produce a multiplier effect on the host nation’s capacity to provide its
population with a stronger, more equitable society

Conclusions

Since its creation, U N 's greatest contribution has been the production of
knowledge and ideas in an attempt to solve the world's common problems. Throughout
the years the organization has provided essential data and expertise for creating
knowledge that feeds in the formulation of new norms that inform the design of policy
programs and international practices.92 In other words, learning has been a constant in the
organization's behavior. The integration o f a gender perspective into peacekeeping
practices is part of a learning process focused on the increasing importance of the
individual in international security and responds to renewed challenges on the ground
with spill-over effects to U N 's overall protection strategies.
With the increased impact of conflicts and other threats to individuals' security
and rights the UN initiated a learning process to adapt its structure and policies and better
respond to these challenges. As part of this process, a conceptual framework based on
human security has arisen and with that peace operations focused on the security o f the
individuals living within the state were put in practice. Despite the repeated failures, the
UN is continuously re-examining its practices and generating new ones in a continuous
learning process.

92 Leon Godenker and Christer Jonsson, "Evolution in Knowledge," in The Oxford H andbook on the United
Nations, ed. Thomas W eiss and Sam Daws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). p.83
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The incorporation of a gender approach to peace operations is part o f that. While
norms focused on the individual have arisen, women's issues have gained terrain within
the UN. In fact, the organization has been the principal venue for the development of
women's rights and specific gender concerns. Although women's issues have been
developed in separated structures, recently there is a tendency of considering the matter
as a cross-cutting issue in all o f the organization's activities. Evidence o f that is the
creation o f the UN-Women, the merger of four different institutions dedicated to the
advancement of women as a ways to better coordinate efforts and enhance gender
mainstreaming.
The debut of gender considerations in the international peace and security has
been mostly focused on the specific needs o f women and girls in conflicts, specifically
their vulnerability to conflict-related sexual violence. Although other gender groups are
often victims of these acts as well, women have been disproportionately affected, and
thus the UN has taken important steps to address this problem. In this context, the
“Women, Peace and Security Resolutions” offer the blueprint for a better response on the
ground. As such, it has disseminated and institutionalized gender in peacekeeping
practices as part of U N 's organizational learning. Despite that, there is still an
implementation gap, especially on the field and among part o f the membership that raise
obstacles this learning to have a deeper impact on the ground.
In terms of implementation, the development o f accountability, monitoring and
implementation tools comprise major advances. Once in place they support the process of
translating into practice resolutions' provisions. Moreover, a growing number of
supporting documents, such as training modules, and checklists for the military
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component, manuals and studies to be used by all actors involved are being generated.
The challenge however, remains member-states compliance.
In fact, despite commitments to put gender equality in practice, the different
organizational and national cultures present within the UN comprise the main obstacle for
a universal dissemination of a gender approach. 93 The full implementation o f these
practices depends on member states compliance and staff willingness to incorporate
gender approaches to its daily work. Nonetheless, their “cultural baggage” and
detrimental considerations to women's issues becomes clear when policies are generated
without the full consideration o f how they impact on women's lives.94 In no other area
this is clearer than within the military component deployed on the ground. As the analysis
o f case studies will show, certain battalions are 100% male and refuse to communicate
with local women, further hampering the organization's ability to provide an adequate
response to gender based violence.
Still, the development o f these renewed norms and practices focused on women's
specific needs, rights and status comprise a great accomplish on its own. Gender
approaches provide a more nuanced analysis of the context and available policies,
shaping the way certain issues are perceived as well as the design o f protection strategies.
By promoting a gender approach to peace operations the UN is promoting more equitable
societies and ultimately a stronger base for founding a lasting peace.

93 Heidi Hudson, "Peacekeeping Trends and Their Gender Implications for Regional Peacekeeping Forces
in Africa: Progress and Challenges," in Gender, Conflict, and Peacekeeping, ed. Angela Raven-Roberts
Dyan Mazurana, Jane Parpart (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005). p .l 11
94 Angela Raven-Roberts, "Gender Mainstreaming in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Talking the
Walk, Tripping over the Walk," ibid., ed. Dyan Mazurana, Angela Raven-Roberts, and Jane Parpart
(Rowman and Littlefield Publishers).p.43-44.
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In this context, UN's learning process has been successful in creating and
institutionalizing new practices however whether or not the organization has thrived in
disseminating these to its membership and field missions remains a question. Member
states are adopting changes at a different paces, as it becomes evident in the analysis of
the case studies. Another challenge is the military behavior itself and their relationship
with renewed protection o f civilian tasks. As rightly put by MacKay, it is in the nature of
the military itself, “there is a contradiction between the warrior soldier, trained for arms
and to fight and kill, and the image of the peacekeeper, trained to negotiate, protect and
defuse tension.”95 And so the question o f whether or not we can request them to perform
the kind o f tasks that a gender approach requires persists.
The following two chapter will focus on U N 's gender strategy on the ground and
will evaluate both the cases o f Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The two
cases offer a rich analytical context since the context and nature of sexual violence are so
different in the two countries. Most importantly, while sexual violence has reached
unprecedented levels in the DRC, attention has been captured and a specific mandate to
protect women and girls was established. Haiti, by contrast, only had the protection of
women against sexual violence included in its mandate recently. While a complete
learning process depends on the adoption o f renewed practices by both the UN and
member states, the evaluation o f the two cases will show that learning at the two levels is
interdependent. And in this case, the UN has taken the first step in addressing gender
based violence.

95 Angela Mackay, "Mainstreaming Gender in United Nations Peacekeeping Training: Examples from East
Timor, Ethiopia, and Eritrea," ibid. (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers), p.278
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CHAPTER 4
WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI

Adopting a gender perspective to UN peace operations is part of a learning
process initiated by the organization to improve its response to the renewed challenges
found on the ground. As a result, an inquiry and re-examination process o f existing
practices was initiated, leading to the formulation of a renewed sound normative
framework. While the new normalcy focused on the

protection of individuals and

women's rights, novel international practices focused on the impact of war on specific
gender groups were launched. The logic was simple: addressing the specific impacts of
war on women, better protecting the population from sexual and other gender based
crime and improving the social, economic and political status of women would promote a
more balanced, equitable and fair society, establishing the foundations for a lasting peace.
However, as the preliminary analysis in chapter 3 showed, the initiative suffers
from an implementation gap. Although guidelines, training modules, strategies and infra
structure have been generated to accommodate the new provisions, the UN still confronts
major challenges, including member states compliance and lack o f resources. While
missions are still established under encompassing mandates and limited resources,
member states fail to send effective, well-trained troops with the participation of female
personnel. This of course is not the only challenge, but has become the most visible.
In order to further pinpoint where the implementation gap takes place and
supports a mainstreaming strategy to further disseminate these renewed practices, this
chapter analyzes the case study o f Haiti and the actions on the ground that have been
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carried out by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)1. On the
one hand, it attempts to identify initiatives that contribute to promote a gender
perspective in the host nation, on the other it evaluates if UN directives are adopted by
troop contributing states (TCCs). This analysis will contribute to determine whether the
U N's organizational learning and its renewed focus on the individual are being
implemented, are taken into account by member states, and whether changes towards that
goal are being promoted.
Haiti is an interesting case study. It has been plagued by sexual and other forms of
gender based violence against women for a long time, and has been the object o f different
UN peacekeeping missions since the 1990s. Moreover, it reflects a paradoxical reality: it
is not a conflict or post-conflict situation. Gang rivalries led to the multiplication of
several political upheavals and the worsening o f the security and humanitarian situation.
Although Haitians fought Haitians on the streets, it was just enough not to be called or
considered a civil war by the international community and the Haitians themselves.
MINUSTAH has been active in the country since 2004 and despite the
accomplishment o f important goals, such as the establishment o f a democratic
government and the improvement o f the security situation, Haiti confronts a complex
humanitarian crisis exacerbated by the constant recurrence o f natural disasters and the
dependence on foreign aid. As Haitians demand the UN to leave, its weak government
structure shakes dangerously in the light o f new political disturbances and lack of
resources to address its population's basic needs.

1 From the French “Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haiti”.
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Nonetheless, the absence o f a clear protection of a civilian mandate as a high
priority shows that the incorporation o f protection strategies into the planning, execution
and evaluation o f operations is dependent on the context. The same is true in regard to
specific provisions to respond to women's special needs and threats. It was only after the
earthquake and the increased levels o f violence against women and girls that tasks that
specifically deal with the matter were explicitly mentioned in the mission's mandate and
translated into practice.
As this realization is an important contribution to the strengthening o f the U N 's
efforts worldwide, it also shows that it is not until violence becomes a quintessential
feature o f a conflict, post conflict or reconstruction setting, that specific protection
mandates are formulated. Finally, it is only after this legal framework is established that
specific tasks are designed to be carried out by the mission personnel on the ground.
This chapter will thus be divided in three main sections. The first will provide rich
background information on Haiti's historical context, emphasizing the role that weak and
corrupt governments have had on the elevated levels of violence and the specific
consequences for Haitian women. The Haitian state has long been characterized as
predatory, having oppressed the population and inflicted elevated levels o f violence
against them. In this context, women have not escaped. Although being traditionally
considered second-class citizens, they suffered during the bloodiest o f the dictatorships
that reined the country, the Duvalier dynasty. During that period, Haitian women were
oppressed and victimized as much their male compatriots, being further subjected to sexspecific violence, such as rape. The practice continued throughout the years and
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subsequent governments. Currently, gang related and opportunistic violence is the most
common feature o f gender based violence in Haiti.
The second section will look into the UN’s presence in Haiti since the 1990s,
underlining the limits of intervention and the current format o f the mission. As an
integrated peace operation, MINUSTAH's actions are carried out by its three components
(police, military and civilian), often in cooperation. Although each have distinguished
mandates, challenges on the ground become complex and multi-dimensional joint efforts
become necessary. It is important however, that as the country stabilizes, the mission
enters a new phase and is preparing to leave. Understanding how this process will take
place is imperative to address the government's capacity to maintain sustained efforts on
its own in the subsequent period.
The final section will evaluate how MINUSTAH has incorporated a gender
perspective in accordance with the five previously defined indicators, that is, legal
framework, gender balance, security sector, protection and empowerment. Despite its
limits, MINUSTAH's gender policy has improved throughout time and has given
important steps towards the consideration o f gender as a cross-cutting issue for a
successful reconstruction and development strategy.

From the pearl of the Caribbean to a broken nation

Haiti, “the mountainous land”,2 is the home of 10 million inhabitants, the poorest
o f the Americas. It is also the place where there are more NGOs per square meter are
settled and fight over the scarce available international resources in an economic crisis
2 Haiti means “Mountainous language” in the Arawak language o f the original Taino inhabitants o f the
Hispaniola Island.
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setting. However, not even concentrated aid has managed to rescue Haiti from its current
gruesome condition. The socio-economic devastation, gang-related crime, a weak and
corrupt government, an under-prepared national police and a disillusioned population are
just some o f the countless challenges ahead.
Current literature on Haiti emphasizes the ghastly effects o f the January 2010
earthquake that hit the island and brought 60% o f the capital city to the ground.
Nevertheless, few analyses went beyond the obvious grisly economic conditions as a
main reason explaining the country's unpreparedness for a high magnitude earthquake.
Haiti's long history of authoritarianism and oppression, class cleavage - often expressed
in the form o f state corruption and embezzlement of official funds - foreign intervention,
neglectful and dishonest leaders compound the picture of this complex state.
Understanding these factors is a step forward to formulate adequate and responsive
policies and to comprehend the UN strategy in the country.
At the same time, understanding how these factors affect the lives of Haitian
women is central for an adequate assessment o f their current living conditions. Despite
the widespread presence o f gang related and politically motivated violence against
women, the media have emphasized insecurity in IDP camps as the main explanatory
factors behind these violent acts. Although it is true that with the reasonably controlled
political situation and the pacification of areas where these armed groups acted may have
contributed to a decrease o f systematic acts of violence against women, violence follows
at a continuum and is still present in Haitian society.
They have historically been victims of violence and still are. Violence against
women is not only politically motivated, a tool o f war or an opportunistic act, it reflects
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the status o f women in society and a particular mindset that justifies it. Hence,
understanding women's vulnerability to violence also includes learning about their living
conditions, their political participation and possibilities for the future. This section will
then focus on the tale o f how Haiti became a violent nation and the specific implications
of it for Haitian women.

A contextual note: class divide, violence and corruption

Most people know Haiti for the disasters it has endured and not for its historical
past or the wonders that once made this country known as the “Pearl o f the Caribbean”.
The road to a broken nation has been a long one. In fact, the history of exploitation and
oppression is as long as the country's existence as a political entity from the moment the
first Spanish colonizer stepped on the island. During the French colonization, initiated in
1697, the country was dedicated to the production of sugar and became the richest and
most prosperous of the Caribbean, hence “the Pearl of the Caribbean”. Nonetheless, only
landowners, that is 5% of the Haitian population would benefit during the French
domination period.3
The enormous class divide has been present in Haiti's history from the beginning.
In fact, it is the alignment o f the elite with either corrupt governments or the military that
has resulted in the frequent political disturbances and the despotic inheritance as
illustrated by the numerous individuals that declared themselves emperors, presidents and
governors for life since Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the first Haitian ruler. A “predatory
republic”, as Haiti has been called, “is a regime in which the trappings o f a liberal

3 Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: The Breached C itadel (Toronto: Canadian Scholar Press, 2004). p.7

170

democracy co-exist with the Hobbesian struggle to monopolize the few sites o f public
power with access to wealth and privilege.”4 In other words, the government has been
repeatedly used by a minority to maintain its political and economic status at the expense
of everybody else, reinforcing a “generalized pattern o f callous indifference and a
thoroughly individualist attitude.”5
Indeed, the country has consistently been plagued by weak and often corrupt
successive governments. The constant political disturbances have also caused economic
paralysis and chaos throughout Haiti. It was only recently that a democratically elected
president handed the government over to another democratically elected president.
Oppression and coups d'etat have also been a constant in this country where serious
violations o f human rights, including torture, forced disappearances, kidnapping, amongst
others have often been committed against the civilian population.
Haitians often appeal to superstition when trying to cope with the country's
enormous problems. During the night, the sounds of the voodoo practices could be heard
in different locations and stories about how Haiti became a broken nation fill the
imaginary o f the local population. Whether ancient Haitians, practitioners o f voodoo, are
responsible for bringing disgrace to the country through an evil pact with the devil is
unknown; however, many believe that an equally powerful and mystical action is
necessary to rescue the country from its current humanitarian situation.6

4 Robert Fatton, Haiti's Predatory Republic : The Unending Transition to D em ocracy (Boulder, Co.:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). p.8
5 Ibid.
6 During the field-work, different interviewees commented that Haitians truly believe that the country is
cursed as a result o f a pact that Haitian ancestors did with the devil.
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Throughout history the now extinct Haitian Armed Forces have been used to
oppress the population and are the main perpetrators o f serious human rights abuses
during the ever-lasting military rule. With few exceptions, including the US occupation
period (1915-1934), the majority o f Haitian presidential regimes have been headed by
generals. After independence and with no official recognition on the part of France or the
United States until 1825 and 1862 respectively, Haitian liberators with no knowledge or
culture o f democratic practice, proclaimed themselves the defenders and the permanent
government o f the island, following the French model of military organization that they
knew.7 And so they built up a militarized state, with weak civilian institutions and
ministries, and a senate and a parliament crowded with military personnel. In a nutshell, a
government by the military for the military.8
Because there was an important concern about the possibility o f external
intervention, the army opted to create a de-centralized and fragmented institution,
resulting in competing units across the region. The competition among these different
military units would result in the constant struggle between them over the central power,
as shown by the successive different military governments that governed the country
coup after coup. In 1915 though, with the US occupation, the army was re-structured,
centralized and professionalized. Under US control, the Haitian armed forces were
consolidated in Port-au-Prince and assumed mostly a police function, while the external
defense was entrusted to the marines.9 A new constitution established that the president

7 Michel S. Laguerre, The M ilitary and Society in Haiti (Knoxville: University o f Tennessee Press, 1993).
p.57
■
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid. p.57
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was the head o f the army and throughout that period, civilian presidents, supported by the
foreign forces, were able to govern the country.
Nonetheless, as nationalist movements against the occupation and international
pressure grew stronger, the marines left and with that old habits resumed. The
interference o f a now more organized and professional army in the political affairs o f the
state was once again an easily identifiable feature o f Haitian politics. The alliance with
elite interests though was a necessary condition for the success of military actions in the
country's politics. As the army's role became to abolishing unhelpful dictators, the
Duvalier strategy was plain and simple: neutralize the army and stay in power.
The Duvalier reign, composed by father and son presidential turns for almost 30
years, passes in Haiti's history as one of the bloodiest of all the dictatorships. Under a
populist and black nationalist platform, Francois Duvalier won the 1957 elections.
Neutralizing the army and maintaining his corrupt rule was a priority, and thus, Papa Doc
- as he was also known - created a paramilitary force, the Tonton Macoutes.10 During his
presidency, the Tonton Macoutes were used to counterbalance the army and oppress
political opposition. By dismissing and transferring military dissidents to recently created
military attache posts overseas and the introduction of the Tonton Macoute as an
auxiliary force o f the army, the army's ability to overthrow the dictator was seriously
undermined. At the same time, oppression against the population reached unprecedented
10 The creation o f this paramilitary force was a slow process that according to Laguerre (1993, p .l 10) can
be divided in three phases. Firstly, when they were known as “cagoulards”, their identities were kept secret
and they would function as spies and oppressing “police” for the regime, being responsible for
intimidations and physical harm to members o f the opposition. The second phase, consisted o f the slow
process through which they started to carry out interrogations and arrests on their own, culminating in the
official creation o f the Tonton Macoute, a paramilitary force, trained by the army, who would receive more
benefits and have more authority than the army itself. In practice it resulted in a parallel, more powerful
and less organized armed organization. It is said that occasionally not even the central government would
know for sure the number and identities o f its members.
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levels to the point that it pitted all o f society against the regime: poor, middle class or
rich, men or women, suffered from the atrocities committed by the president's militia. It
was during his tenure that many Haitians left the country never to return.
The atrocities continued in the following government of Jean-Claude Duvalier,
Baby Doc, only to further prevent the country from getting on track. Paradoxically, the
excesses committed during the Duvalier era is a turning point in Haitian history that led
to the rise and strengthening o f social movements and a renewed political conscience
among the citizenry in general. Unfortunately, the emergence o f a civil society in Haiti as
a force to limit and counterweight the use o f violence by the state apparatus against the
population has had limited effects thus far.
Following the fall o f Baby Doc, exiled in France, a series of military governments
controlled the country. However, a popular movement bom during the Duvalier period
would be strengthened and emerge as a promising political force whose agenda was more
closely identified with that o f the majority o f the Haitians. The Lavalas movement was
headed by Jean Bertrand Aristide, carried the slogan “tout moun se moun” (every person
is a person) and swept the streets o f Port- Au-Prince and the rest of the country. In the
1990-91 elections, 67% o f Haitians cast their ballots and elected Aristide as the new
president of the Republic.
That was an important moment in the historical memory o f most Haitians, who
finally saw a change in the dominant political structure. Indeed, prior to the coup that
would overthrow Aristide after only seven months, he put in place a thorough program
responsive to the demands of the lowest sectors, including basic needs programs and
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more public spending on health, education, potable water, electricity, judicial reform,
rural infra-structure, and so on."
Aristide's government, however, inherited endemic problems that resulted from
the political culture and structure of Haitian society: a civilian opposition including
hardcore Duvallierists, a discontented business community and an army wary o f the
president's intention to separate the police from the military.12 As a result, the balance
between the interests o f the elite and those of the military was once again destabilized,
resulting in the coup that culminated in the bloody government of Raoul Cedras for the
next three years.
Increasing international pressure led to a UN/US armed intervention in 1993
counting more than 20,000 soldiers involved. Aristide was authorized to return at the end
o f 1994 after spending three years in exile. His return, though, was considered a major
disappointment, since the old patterns o f corruption and despotism would resume. Most
importantly, due to the numerous problems caused by the Haitian military, it was
dismantled in 1995 and a new police institution was created with the support o f the UN.
Many o f the former military joined the new Haitian National Police (HNP), while
others joined gangs and other armed groups, often related to those paramilitary forces,
such as the Tonton Macoutes, that have constantly contributed to increased levels of
violence in the country, particularly in some neighborhoods o f the capital Port-au-Prince.
11 Beverly Bell, Walking on Fire : Haitian Women's Stories o f Survival an d Resistance (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 2001). p. 154
12 Laguerre (1993, p.6) argues that the army 's strong opposition against the separation o f the army and the
police prompted the coup. He points out four main reasons as to why the army was strongly against the
creation o f a separate civilian police force. Firstly, it would severely reduce the army's size and hence its
influence; secondly, the police comprised an important source o f legal income and a point o f contact with
civilian politicians and civil society; thirdly, an independent police force may be a nuisance to the army's
influence and illegal activities; and finally, it would just become harder for the army to depose a
government as they had been doing throughout the years.
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Also worth mentioning is the fact that Aristide himself created the chimeres, another
paramilitary group used to silence opponents. Other groups, such as the ziglendos,
constituted criminal organizations, without a political agenda, but usually involved in
drug trafficking and other illegal activities that terrorized, looted and abused the
population for its own economic benefits.13
In 2004, the international community yet again watched another political uprising
in Haiti. The country's usual political disturbances would soon disrupt Aristide's second
term initiated after his election in 2000. In February 2004, a revolt began in the city of
Gonaives and soon spread to other parts o f the country. As the government lost control
over the capital city, politically motivated and gang related violence resumed again. Jean
Bertrand Aristide was removed from power and exiled in Africa. While the participation
of the US government in those events could not be confirmed, an interim government led
by Boniface Alexandre as President and Gerard Latortue as Prime Minister was
established.
The UN's first reaction was to authorize a Multinational Interim Force soon to be
substituted by a stabilization mission to support constitutional political process and the
establishment o f a secure and stable environment.14 MINUSTAH was soon established
with the primary mandate of restoring a secure and stable environment, promoting the

13 Fatton, Haiti's P redatory Republic : The Unending Transition to Democracy.
14 This Multinational Interim Force was established under Security Council resolution 1529 (2004). United
Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1529", February 24, 2004,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/l 529(2004).
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political process, strengthening Haiti's government institutions and rule o f law structures
and finally promoting and protecting human rights.15
In 2006, democratically elected Rene Preval assumed the presidency until Michel
Martelly won the following elections and assumed his position as the new president in
2011. The peaceful and uninterrupted transition from one democratically elected
government to

another

is considered by

MINUSTAH

officials

an

important

accomplishment to the democratic tradition in this rather volatile country.
The years of 2006 and 2007 marked the entrance o f a renewed security situation
when several of the most dangerous districts within the capital o f Port-au-Prince were
pacified by UN soldiers. Gangs were dismantled and there was no organized violence
against the Haitian state. In that context, insecurity would be more related to fights
amongst different gang members, drug and arms trafficking, robberies and kidnapping.
This context led to another phase in the reconstruction of devastated Haiti. The
years from 2008 to 2010 left the “peace enforcement” phase behind and focused on
strengthening the Haitian government and institutions as well as maintaining a controlled
security situation. However, the 2010 earthquake was a serious and severe blow to Haiti's
economic, social and political recovery. In the light of 220,000 deaths, the complete
destruction o f 60% of all government buildings and other important infrastructure,
including the UN headquarters, the Security Council authorized an increased deployment

15 MINUSTAH was established under Security Council resolution 1542 (2004). "Resolution 1542", April
30, 2004, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/l 542(2004).
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o f forces to the fragile country to support the immediate recovery, reconstruction and
stability efforts.16
The earthquake, whose epicenter was just 15 km southeast o f the capital Port-auPrince, caused US$7.2 billion worth in damage that surpassed Haiti's 2009 entire GDP
by 20%. As the already fragile economy and political infra-structure o f Haiti yielded to
the 7.0 magnitude earthquake, the security and humanitarian situation worsened to
alarming levels. Joint planning with humanitarian agencies and UN-country teams was
encouraged and the mission's efforts to stabilize the country were driven by the
earthquake context until recently. Currently, humanitarian efforts are being phased out
and a development approach focused on strengthening the government capacity is being
put in place.
As this brief context shows, Haiti is a very complex and paradoxical case.
Thinking about gender in Haitian society also means tackling the problems related to its
history o f corruption and despotism, economic dependency and inability to build a
reliable police force and a justice system accountable for the rule of law and the abuses of
those in power. The following section will provide an overview of the status o f Haitian
women and the development o f the women's movement in the country.

Women in Haiti and gender based violence

The persistent exclusion and discrimination o f women since the foundation o f the
Haitian state aligned with the Republic's continuous political unrest, extreme poverty and

16 Data displayed in the official website o f the Office o f the Special Envoy for Haiti. See: Office o f the
Secretary General Special Adviser, “ Key Statistics,” 10/16/2012, http://www.haitispecialenvoy.org/reliefand-recovery/key-statistics/.

178

succession of weak and corrupt governments have contributed to the vulnerable condition
of Haitian women. The paralysis o f the economic system, the lack of security on the
streets, the anxiety caused by the extreme conditions in which most o f the population
lives and the blurring o f the barriers between the public and private spheres also
contribute to violence and to the opportunistic brutal acts often suffered by women.
Likewise, Haitian women have historically been defined as minor citizens by the state
and submitted to politically motivated gender based violence. Haiti may not have a
conflict and the violence against women may not be called a tool of war, but it can
certainly be called a tool o f oppression.
Throughout history, Haitian law has defined women as daughters and wives of
Haitian men. Until 1979 married women were legally considered minors and Haitian
women married to foreigners would lose their citizenship and property rights.17 As a
matter of fact, according to common law marriage, in the wake of the husband's death,
and in the absence of an offspring, the couple's property and goods would go to the dead
husband's parents and siblings. Moreover, the criminalization of rape in Haitian law
came late, only in 2005, and to this day formal prosecution o f any type o f criminals is
rare.18
Numerous reports from different human rights organizations documented
widespread violence against women particularly in the 1990s, indicating that besides
being victims o f all forms of violence as much as male counterparts, they were further

17 Bell, Walking on Fire : Haitian Women's Stories o f Survival a n d Resistance. p.21
18 Interview with representatives from some NGOs on the field, including Avocats sans Frontier, Viva Rio
and SOFA indicated that occasionally, an informal arrangement in the form o f financial compensation
exists between victim 's family and perpetrator. Interviews with these NGOs representatives were carried
out in Port-au-Prince, June, 2011.
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inflicted with sexual violence, including rape, beatings, physical mutilation and assaults.
These politically motivated rapes were particularly common during the Duvalier period
and after the 1991 military coup d'etat that overthrew President Jean Bertrand Aristide.
However, as much as historical accounts ignore the participation o f Haitian
women in key turning points o f Haitian history, such as the anti-colonial struggle, 19
reports on gender based violence in Haiti only started to appear in the 1990s. The first
report on rape in Haiti was not published until 1994. It discussed the organized state
violence against women during the 1991-93 coup, finding that women were often raped
and/or subjected to other forms o f gender based violence for their political beliefs and
their relationship with others that would hold political beliefs other than those o f the
dictatorship.20 Acts were generally committed by members o f the armed forces in ProAristide neighborhoods. Another report by the UN/OAS Civilian Mission (MICIVIH) in
Haiti showed that 52% of rape victims were close relatives o f activists while 18% were
activists themselves.21
Nonetheless, a prominent author in the literature of Haitian feminism, Carolle
Charlies,22 argued that the violence and the sex-specific abuses inflicted on Haitian
women - and men for that matter - during the Duvalier government reached extreme
levels and contributed to changing gender relations within the society. Women, for the
19 The role played by women and their participation in the anti-slavery and anti-colonial war o f
independence are left out o f historical accounts. In fact, their “political” participation tended to focus on the
benevolent actions o f the w ives o f leaders. However, their active participation took varied form o f protests
and other actions including “suicide, poisoning, participation in marronage and rebellions”. (Charlies,
1995.p. 146)
20 National Coalition for Haitian Refugees and Human Rights Watch, "Rape in Haiti: A Weapon o f Terror"
(New York, July, 1994).
21 UN/OAS International Civilian Mission in Haiti, "Haiti: Droits D e L’homme Et Rehabilitation Des
Victimes," (Port-au-Prince, 1997).
22 Carolle Charlies, "Gender and Politics in Contemporary Haiti: The Duvalierist State, Transnationalism,
and the Emergence o f a N ew Feminism (1980-1990)," Feminist Studies 21, no. 1 (1995). p .139
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first time, were viewed as an important political actor, and thus they would become the
target of state violence as much as male compatriots.
Throughout the years and Haitian history, political disturbances and state
organized violence have affected the development and institutionalization o f women's
movements. The first Haitian feminist organization, the Ligue Feminine d'Action Sociale
[Feminine League for Social Action], was created in 1934 and was dedicated to women's
political rights, such as universal suffrage and other rights, including marriage equality
and equal access to education. These women came from privileged backgrounds and
were more concerned about gender in its relationship with the state rather than within the
household. They have contributed to the accomplishment o f important goals such as the
right to vote and access to higher education in 1950, although those were still limited to
Haitian women of select segments o f society.23
With the inauguration of the Duvalier dictatorship

in

1957, women's

organizations, members and activists were systematically targeted and attacked,
banishing them to the underground and limiting their activities throughout the period.24
However, since the state no longer considered them politically innocent actors, they
became conscious of their role. By the end o f Baby Doc's reign, in 1986, women groups
had staged various protests, including a march against all forms of gender discrimination
that counted more than 30,000 women.25 The period marked by high levels o f violence

25 Ibid.p.146
24 Anne Fuller, "Violence: Haitian Women Unite W om en's Rights and Human Rights," Association o f
Concerned African Scholars (1999).
25 Charlies, "Gender and Politics in Contemporary Haiti: The Duvalierist State, Transnationalism, and the
Emergence o f a N ew Feminism (1980-1990)." p .152
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resulted in renewed awareness amongst women groups o f their collective subject of
social change.
It was also during this period that the first Haitian exodus occurred and the
women's movement gained another boost from exiled Haitian women in the United
States and Canada. Initially centered in the patriotic movement, these movements would
soon be organized around clear gender issues. Charlies argues that immigrants in North
America were confronted with the ascribed social and sexual roles they had forgone.26
Increasing control over the household resources and identification with the problems that
Canadian and American women also confronted, they turned their political agenda
toward gender issues in addition to the general mission against Duvalier’s oppressive
regime.
The end o f the Duvalier period and the return o f many of these refugees resulted
in an enormous momentum for the development o f the women's movement in the
country. Some of these organizations are still currently active, such as Fanm D'Ayiti
[Haitian Women], Comite Feminin [Feminine Committee], SOFA and Kay Fanm
[Women's Home]. The presence of these returned refugees in these organizations is
striking, reaching up to 60% o f their members.27 Moreover, although poor women had
been consistently left out of feminist movements, the Duvalier dictatorship leveled class
differences and united women. During this period, they came together in the struggle for
women's rights and lobbied the government to fulfill its duties as the guarantor of those
rights.28

26 Ibid. p. 149
27 Ibid. p. 152
28 Bell, Walking on Fire : Haitian Women's Stories o f Survival an d Resistance, p. 150
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Under Aristide's rule, the movement accomplished important victories. In 1994,
the army was dismantled and a Ministry of W omen's Condition and W omen's Rights
was created. In fact, six o f Aristide's ministries, including the post o f prime minister,
were headed by women, giving space to the implementation of top-down initiatives for
the rights o f women.29 In 1995, Haiti was represented by the Minister of W omen's
Conditions and W omen's Rights at the Conference on Women in Beijing. At the same
time, Haitian civil society organizations carried out dissemination and awareness
campaigns regarding the Conference and its importance in the country. Over the years the
Ministry has had its budget reduced and was almost shut down a few times, indicating
that women affairs are nowhere close to being a priority for the Haitian government.
More recently, particularly after the second time Aristide was overthrown in
2004, violence against women has increased again.30 Cases o f gang rapes have
multiplied, particularly in the years between 2004 and2006. Although accurate data on
this kind of crime is difficult to find, a report by the Inter-American Commission o f
Human Rights on the situation o f violence and discrimination on women reported that
GHESKIO hospital received approximately ten rape cases per day during the month o f
November 2006.31 The Commission also acknowledged having received documentation
from varied sources on several more cases of horrendous nature, such as family members
being forced to have sexual intercourse with relatives. In most of the cases, unidentified
armed groups or gangs were the primary perpetrators o f violence. Accounts o f women

29 Besides the Ministry o f W omen's condition and the Prime minister, the ministries o f Foreign Affairs,
Education, Commerce, Social Affairs and Labor and Information were represented by women.
30 Joe Mozingo, "In Haiti's Chaos, Unpunished Rape Was Norm," The Miami Herald, May 16th, 2004.
31 Inter-American Comission o f Human Rights, "The Right o f Women in Haiti to Be Free from V iolence
and Discrimination" (Washington D. C.: Organization o f Ameircan States, March 10, 2009). Paragraph 50.
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being forced to work for gangs are also mentioned. Besides serving their aggressors,
many women were also subjected to beatings and sexual violence.
During this period, there were entire sections of the capital that were controlled by
gangs with near total absence of the state in several areas where not even the UN could
fully operate. On the bright side though, the subsequent pacification o f these
neighborhoods highly contributed to decreasing levels o f urban violence, including those
perpetrated against women. This is one o f MINUSTAH's successes.
Haiti is a signatory o f important covenants and conventions on women's and
human rights. As an original UN member, the country has ratified the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. It has also ratified the Convention for the Elimination o f
all Forms o f Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1981, and the Inter-American
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication o f violence Against Women
in 1996. Moreover, with the exception o f the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights and the Convention Against Torture, and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Haiti has signed all major conventions and
covenants. However, signature o f these legal instruments has had little practical and
formal significance.
What is more, the country has a long-history o f discrimination against the female
population, which has resulted in the current vulnerable status o f women in Haitian
society. Discriminatory practices also hinder efforts to make the state accountable for its
duties. By signing these international agreements, the Haitian government has
acknowledged its responsibility for addressing gender imbalances and violence against
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women. It should be stressed that its inability to do so constitutes a human rights
violation.
Interestingly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reported in 2009
that the current situation o f women in Haiti “(•••) is a result o f the historical
discrimination and inferior treatment they have faced because of their sex, compared to
their male counterparts. (...) forms of discrimination against women have been a fixture
in the history o f Haiti, both in times o f peace and in times of unrest and violence.” 32 The
report also establishes a relationship between the discriminatory behavior of men and the
brutal acts o f violence against women, also fueled by the general acceptance of
discrimination. The existence o f these social conceptions regarding female inferiority and
subordination, have historically limited women's access to education, health, justice and
labor in Haiti.33
The field work showed that culture was the primary explanation for gender based
violence in Haiti. According to most of the interviewees, women’s status in Haitian
society is a submissive one. Being responsible for the support of the family, they easily
end up as victims of economic exploitation by their own partner and are targeted in
unsafe environments, like that o f the post-earthquake scenario.
This is also the primary reason why many civil society organizations, both
international and national, along with UN actors, emphasize that the earthquake context
only brought to the surface a problem that has always been present in Haitian society. It
is true that with the displacement o f 1.5 million people as a result o f the earthquake and
the establishment of numerous IDP camps, women became even more insecure. Food
32 Ibid. paragraph 7.
33 Ibid.
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shortenings, lack o f separated male/female latrines, limited light, and the absence of
government or UN forces in the camp in the months following the earthquake were
factors that contributed to this increased vulnerability. Nonetheless, an understanding of
the historical conditions that put women in their current vulnerable status in the Haitian
society is necessary.
Since the earthquake, various reports have pictured the staggering conditions of
women living in IDP camps and reported on the increased levels o f violence against
them.34 In a 2012 civil society report, it was emphasized that not only numbers of rape
and sexual assault have risen, but also that survival sex has increasingly been the only
option for poor women and girls in their quest to survive.35 Survival sex is understood as
the exchange o f sex for food, cash favors and protection in an environment where women
struggle to cover their basic needs.
Within MINUSTAH, civilians were the most reticent in categorizing SGBV as a
security problem. However, they did recognize that the occurrence o f sexual and other
forms of violence against women have been frequent within IDP camps. In an interview
with MINUSTAH's Gender Unit, it was confirmed that the current security conditions
have facilitated the recurrence of SGBV in Haiti, particularly in the camps, and for that
reason security counter-actions had been taken.36 Consequently, the UN has tackled the

34 See for example: Amnesty International, "Aftershocks: Women Speak out against Sexual Violence in
Haiti'S Camps," (London: International Amnesty, 2011).; Brooke Stedman, "Security after the Quake?
Addressing Violence and Rape in Haiti," in Peace B rief {Washington DC: United States Institute o f Peace,
2011).; Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, "Yon Je Louvri: Reducing Vulnerability to Sexual
Violence in Haiti’s Idp Camps," (New York: CHRGJ, 2012).;Center for Human Rights and Global Justice,
"Sexual Violence in Haiti'S Idp Camps: Results o f a Household Survey," (New York: CHRGJ, 2011).
35 KOFAVIV International W om en’s Human Rights Clinic, MADRE, Center for Gender and Refugee
Studies,Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, Global Justice Clinic "Struggling to Survive: Sexual
Exploitation o f Displaced Women and Girls in Port Au Prince, Haiti," (2012).
36 Interview carried out with representative o f MINUSTAH's Gender Unit, in Port-au-Prince, June, 2011.
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problem of sexual violence with a stronger military and police presence in the IDP
camps, contributing to a decrease in the levels o f physical insecurity in these places.
However, it is also important that these intrinsic social stereotypes and state
weaknesses are addressed. While the first step is to increase awareness about Haiti's
social and historical context among those tasked to protect the population, other steps
should follow, including efforts to strengthen the judiciary system, the police and
government capacity to promote equal access to education, health care, justice and the
labor market.
Accordingly, the UN-Women and many other civil society organizations, such as
Doctors Without Borders (MSF) and SOFA, a Haitian NGO dedicated to reporting and
eradicating sexual gender based violence (SGBV), also provided their opinion on the
matter. They argue that it is a mistake to blame IDP camps for the problem o f widespread
sexual violations and other types o f gender based violence (GBV). “It perpetuates a
wrong view o f the problem, GBV has always been present in Haiti; the IDP camps
violations has only brought the topic to the surface and the international community
could no longer ignore it”.37
Gender based violence in Haiti is thus different from that in conflict or postconflict situations. First of all, Haiti is not considered by the Haitians or by the
international community as a conflict or post-conflict zone, despite similar destructive
signs. And second, the kind of massive rapes and violations used as a tool o f war are not
observed in Haiti, where the problem seems to be more related to political instability, a
generational mindset and the current insecure social, economic and political situation.
37 Interview carried out with representative o f UN-W omen field office in Haiti in Port-au-Prince, June,
2011.
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While women are constantly victims of several types of GBV, particularly
domestic violence, they confront yet another vast array o f challenges to pursue treatment
and justice. As informed by Concertation Nationale [National Dialogue], a national
platform related to the fight against SGBV comprising local organizations, government
ministries and international UN agencies, there are only a few health centers that treat
SGBV victims and even fewer provide them with the “medical certificate”, or official
proof o f crime, necessary for victims to start a law suit.38 Not only the limited number of
centers challenges their access to medical centers, but also the fact that it is costly, as
transportation and fees may apply.
Moreover, the Haitian Police lack the capabilities to address these crimes. Not
only are forensic specialists absent, there are also only a limited number o f personnel
trained in gender issues. Even if victims surmount those obstacles, the justice system will
pose the next challenge. Barely working, it rarely condemns criminals, who may also
become victims of the system, being thrown in prisons without judgment or defense
lawyers.
This debate encounters another difficulty: the reporting system. The “problem of
data” was common ground in almost all interviews performed. While some would point
out that the earthquake destroyed the database, others would emphasize that the different
ways o f reporting did not, up to now, allow the establishment of a joint database. As a
consequence, patterns o f SGBV occurrences cannot be determined.
Nonetheless, there seems to be an even more worrisome reason as to why the
reporting system is so debatable. It seems that there is no consensus on the definition of

38 Interview carried out with representative from the Concertation National in Port-au-Prince, June, 2011.

188

SGBV and different actors interpret it in different ways. “What is reported as SGBV?
Just because the victim is a woman, it does not mean that it involved a case o f gender
based violence. You cannot say that a female victim o f an assault is a victim o f gender
based violence”, explained a UN police officer.39
The position of the MSF representative was a similar one. When asked if the
organization had a database on SGBV cases it was explained that they did. However, they
would not make it public because it is not in their interest to officialize
misinterpretations.40 In this regard, the UN-Women representative added that there had
been several studies published recently that had emphasized the increasing number of
SGBV cases, however, it was questioned:
“How do you know if the data indicate that SGBV has increased or if there was an
increase in reporting violations? The only conclusion one can make out of this is that
awareness campaigns may be working better and women are less shy to report cases. It
doesn't necessarily mean there was an increase in sexual violations, it can mean there
was an increase in reporting the crimes.”41
And that is true. The situation in Haiti is not favorable for reliable quantitative
data. Not only did the existing database dissolve with the demise of the Ministry of
W omen's Condition,42 but not a single method of collecting data seems to follow any
statistically reliable technique. Moreover, as gender becomes a fashionable topic and
more organizations are interested in working in this area, there is a gap between the

39 Interview carried out with UNPol representative in Port-au-Prince, June, 2011.
40 Interview carried out with representative from the Doctors Without Borders (MSF) in Port-au-Prince,
June, 2011.
41 Interview carried out with representative o f UN-W omen in Port-au-Prince, June, 2011.
42 Along with the Ministry o f W omen's Condition, other ministries' buildings and the National Palace
collapsed with the 2010 earthquake.
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generally accepted definitions of sexual and other types of gender based violence and
those of many field workers who do not seem to have an adequate or appropriate idea
about the nature of the issue.
The recent endorsement o f the new Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe and the
publication of new constitutional amendments, though, represent important progress in
improving women's vulnerable status in Haiti. Mr. Lamothe was sworn in with a cabinet
o f 22 ministers, o f which 7 were women. Furthermore, with the new constitutional
amendments, a quota of at least 30% women's in government was approved. These are
important steps in addressing inequality in a society where gender relations can easily be
disrupted. Most importantly, it is a small step towards women's empowerment and the
improvement o f their social status.
The analysis has shown that Haiti's history o f extreme violence, class divide and
government corruption has contributed to the gruesome condition that the country
currently experiences. Violence has been the product of loyal government forces, para
military forces, armed groups and militias often associated with a political figure seeking
protection. As they were not adequately demobilized, they would still terrorize the
population long after their “creators” lost power. In recent years though, MINUSTAH
actions in the most dangerous neighborhoods has contributed to the decrease o f activities
by these criminal groups.
The elevated levels of violence present in Haitian society were always harshly felt
by women. If their precarious social, political and economic status increased their
vulnerability, the presence of these politically motivated violent groups would only result
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in even more violence for them. Quite often, violence against women, meant sexual
violence.
Throughout the years, though, the issue has gained attention under a different
facet. As displacement increased in the country, particularly after the earthquake, these
acts of sexual violence were mostly associated with the lack o f security conditions within
camps and viewed as isolated and opportunistic. Although it is true that the enormous
displacement has facilitated widespread acts o f sexual and gender based violence in Haiti,
protection strategies only focused on this explanation do not consider the continuum of
violence and the pre-existent conditions that facilitate the spread o f such acts in Haitian
society. It is true that levels of violence are exacerbated as insecurity in camps grows, but
this only reflects the vulnerable status o f Haitian women. Protection strategies should
thus remember the past, consider the historical and cultural context and plan accordingly.
The following sections will provide some background on UN action in Haiti and
give a detailed account of its gender policy on the ground.

Haiti and the UN: a working partnership coming to an end?

As Haiti's historical context has shown, political instability is a constant in Haiti's
history. Hence, the U N 's involvement in Haiti started well before the establishment of
MINUSTAH in 2004 and it has been accompanied by increasing criticism due to the lack
of enduring positive outcomes. Missions established prior to MINUSTAH though, had a
limited mandate and/or were limited to a short duration only. Since it was primarily
concerned with the development o f Haitian police forces after the dismantlement of the
army during the 1990s, the police remains MINUSTAH's main priority and is the
primary indicator o f when MINUSTAH will leave the country.
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This section will provide important insights into previous UN interventions, the
current security situation and challenges for the future. A brief explanation on
MINUSTAH's structure and the role o f each component in the light o f the mission's
mandate will also be provided. As the mission prepares to leave the country, re
adjustments will occur and it is imperative that gender considerations are highlighted
during this process.

The UN presence in Haiti

Before 1993, two observation missions were established in Haiti: the United
Nations Observer Group for the Verification o f the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) in
1990 and the joint UN-OAS International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH),
established after Aristide's overthrow in 1991 to observe the status o f human rights in the
country. However, the first peacekeeping operation was only established in 1993, when
the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was authorized by the Security Council
with the mandate o f supporting the modernization o f Haitian armed forces and creating a
new police force.43 Despite the request o f the Haitian government, discord between the
civilian government and the military forces obstructed the fulfillment o f UNMIH's
mandate.
In 1994, UNMIH's mandate was revised, authorizing the formation o f a
multinational force to prompt the return of the legitimate Haitian government and the
establishment of the rule of law. The force o f about 20,000 men, led by the United States,

43 UNMIH was established by Security Council resolution 867 (1993). United Nations Security Council,
"Resolution 867", September 23, 1993, http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/515/30/PDF/N9351530.pdf?OpenElement.
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successfully reestablished civilian authority and UNMIH's renewed mandate could be
fully carried out in 1995.44 According to the new mandate, the mission was tasked with
assisting the national government in fulfilling its responsibilities, establishing and
maintaining a stable environment, professionalizing the troubled armed forces and
creating a separated police force. The returning president, Aristide, then dismantled the
army and created a new civilian police with the support of the UN peacekeeping mission.
After the legislative and presidential elections - both held in 1995 - Aristide, who
completed his interrupted presidency, handed his position over to the democratically
elected Rene Preval, who took office in 1996 and officially requested UNMIH to extend
its mandate until the end o f June o f that same year 45 Following UNMIH, the United
Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) was established in July 1996 with the main
responsibility o f professionalizing and training the recently created Haitian National
Police (HNP), besides promoting institution-building, national reconciliation and
economic rehabilitation in Haiti. 46
UNSMIH was substituted by the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti
(UNTMIH) from August to November 1997. UNTMIH had a small military component
mostly concerned with the security o f UN personnel and a bigger civilian police
component mostly focused on training HNP's specialized units in crowd control, rapid

44 UNM IH's mandate was revised in 1994 and 1995 through Security Council resolutions 940 (1994) and
975 (1995). See: "Resolution 940", July 31, 1994, http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/312/22/PDF/N9431222.pdf?OpenElement; "Resolution 975", January
30, 1995, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/028/26/PDF/N9502826.pdf7OpenElement.
45 UNM IH's mandate was extended until June 30th, 1996 by Security Council resolution 1048 (1996). See:
"Resolution 1048", February 29, 1996,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1048(1996).
46 UNSMIH was established under Security Council resolution 1063 (1996). See: "Resolution 1063", June
28, 1996, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1063(1996) . .
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reaction force and palace security.47 It was the Secretary General's opinion that without
the support o f the international community, H aiti's new police force would disintegrate
and be unable to promote a safe and stable environment.
In this context, the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)
was established in December 1997.48 The mission lacked a military component and was
concerned primarily with the establishment o f a “professional, self-sustaining, fully
functioning national police of adequate size and structure, able to conduct the full
spectrum o f police functions, to the consolidation o f democracy and the revitalization of
Haiti's system of justice.”49
When the government fell in 2004, armed groups and gangs took control o f varied
parts o f the city. When MINUSTAH was first established, it was authorized to perform
disarmament and demobilization in any remaining military militia in the country. The
presence of armed groups and gangs in these safe havens in the capital contributed to an
increased level of urban violence in Haiti. These gangs, responsible for violent crimes in
different neighborhoods, are considered “an inherently political phenomena,”50 and were
used as instruments of political warfare by discontented elites that funded their activities.
Since the control o f the slums in Port-au-Prince by these armed groups constituted
a threat to the recent reinstalled and fragile government of Haiti (2006), the neutralization
of their actions was a priority. Consequently, MINUSTAH conducted a series o f military
and police operations with the intention of pacifying the people in these places and
47 UNTMIH was established under Security Council resolution 1123 (1997). See: "Resolution 1123", July
30, 1997, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/l 123(1997).
48 MIPONUH was established under Security Council Resolution 1141 (1997). "Resolution 1141",
November 28, 1997, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/l 141 %281997%29.
49 "Resolution 1123."
50 Robert M. Perito and Michael Dziedzic, "Haiti: Confronting the Gangs o f Port-Au-Prince," in Special
Report (Washington, DC: United States Institute o f Peace, 2008).
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capturing gang leaders. The success o f this initiative is considered M INUSTAH's number
one accomplishment.
The pacification o f these neighborhoods, particularly Cite Soleil, Bel-air and Cite
Militaire led Haiti and MINUSTAH to a different phase in the peace efforts. Now,
development and economic recovery are the country's top priorities. Haiti's gruesome
economic condition is indeed responsible for its fragile infra-structure and vulnerability
to the natural disasters that continuously hit the island. Around 2.3 million people were
displaced after the most recent earthquake and to this day around 390 thousand still live
in the IDP sites spread around the capital.51
In a context where financial resources are not readily available for the population,
violence, criminality and political unrest can easily affect the country. Although
MINUSTAH has passed through a long period o f relative calm in past months, the
volatility of Haiti's security is a widely recognized feature of the country and one
intrinsically related to the country's economic dependency. The 2012 Report of the
Secretary General on MINUSTAH efforts showed an increase in homicides throughout
2012.52 As for the source o f increasing instability, it is attributed to the remaining
presence o f armed gangs, usually involved with murders, kidnapping, robberies, narcotics
and small arms trafficking, racketeering and fights for territorial influence. In fact, 85 to
90% of these crimes occurred in sensitive areas of Port-au-Prince, such as Bel-Air, Fort

51 Data displayed in the official website o f the Office o f the Special Envoy for Haiti. See: O ffice o f the
Secretary General Special Adviser, “Key Statistics,” 10/16/2012, http://www.haitispecialenvoy.org/reliefand-recovery/key-statistics/.
52 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f the Secretary General on the United Nations Stabilization
Mission in Haiti ", August 30, 2012, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/628.
paragraph 11.
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National and Martissant, and others widely known for their elevated levels o f criminal
activities, including Cite Soleil, Carrefour and Croix des Bouquets.
But security is not the only problem. For instance, bilateral and multilateral
donors have allocated 12 billion dollars in humanitarian aid for the post-earthquake
response, greatly exceeding Haiti's GDP. Because Haiti is so dependent on foreign aid,
one of the main challenges for stabilization efforts in the future is economic recovery.
Investment of hundreds o f millions of dollars in an uncertain intervention and
additional hundreds of millions in aid has produced poor returns. Although the
democratic government has been reestablished along with other state institutions since
2006, there is a gap between the state's capabilities and its desire to be free from the
international presence within its territory. “Without MINUSTAH, Haiti will return to the
pre-MINUSTAH state o f nature”, was a common response in all interviews with
international actors performed during the field work. If that is true, it may not take long
until we find out. MINUSTAH's forces are being downsized and civilian efforts to build
governmental capabilities to take over MINUSTAH's tasks are already in place.
According to resolution 2070 that renewed MINUSTAH's mandate in 2012, a
number o f political milestones were accomplished and are a sign of progress in the
process of stabilization.53 Among them, the resolution cites the parliament’s ratification
o f a new prime minister, the installation o f the Superior Council of the judiciary, and the
publication o f the constitutional amendments. It is also important to note advances in the
security sector, elaborated in the five-year 2012-2016 Haitian National Police (HNP)

53 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 2070", October 12, 2012,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2070% 282012% 29.
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Development Plan, and jointly presented by MINUSTAH and the Haitian National
Police.
The strengthening o f the Haitian security sector, including the judiciary system
and the police, is an important step toward improving the protection and physically
vulnerable status of Haitian women. Although the current condition o f Haitian police is
still precarious, it is a necessary improvement for a sustained secure environment after
the UN leaves the country.

MINUSTAH: mandate, structure and personnel

MINUSTAH is an integrated peace operation and as such it has a civilian, a
military and a police component under a civilian political leadership that collaborates to
fulfill the U N 's mandate on the ground. Although each component has different tasks,
overall their joint effort contributes to improving the government's authority and its
capacity to govern the country.
The civilian component is mostly involved in institutionalization efforts and the
strengthening of the government capacity through the work o f its substantive sections,
such as Civilian Affairs, Rule o f Law, and Human Rights, amongst others. At the same
time, they are also working on efforts to improve security and the social and economic
situation in the country. As an illustration, the Community Violence Reduction Section
implements projects that aim to provide the local population with temporary jobs and/or
training to develop basic skills for their own survival. This section, along with Civilian
Affairs, often provides funding for projects implemented by various actors including the
military, thus facilitating their relationship with the local population. Human Rights on its
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part, has been involved in resolving problem o f the inadequate response by the criminal
justice sector to rape complaints.54
The police component’s mandate priority is the mentoring of the Haitian National
Police and the overseeing of their actions on the ground. This component is thus divided
in two main pillars: operations and development. While the latter is focused on capacity
building and training, the former comprises operational work carried out by the police to
support stabilization efforts and HN P's actions on the ground. An example o f the
activities carried out by the UN police includes joint patrols with the HNP and the
military component, training, and generation o f tools such as the Standard Operation
Procedures (SOPs) for gender based violence.
MINUSTAH's police component is formed by Formed Police Units (FPUs) and
individual police, also known as UNPol. Among the biggest challenges encountered by
the UN police on the ground, the language barrier, the differentiated training and the
relationship with the HNP were most cited. Many UNPol come from Canada, France and
French speaking countries in Africa. Nonetheless, the vast majority o f UNPol officers
speak only English as a second language, complicating the internal communication and
the communication with those they aim to protect. UNPols come in individual missions
and usually work with police from different countries that have received different
training. These differences can, sometimes, pose obstacles to full integration and optimal
functioning of the system. Finally, because the UN police component does not have the
executive mandate, it depends on joint actions with the HNP for the success o f its
54 A report by this section found that between June to August 2010, 62 cases o f rape were reported and as
o f December 2011, only one had reached prosecution stage pending trial. For more information, see:
Human Rights Section and Office o f the High Commissiner for Human Rights, "A Profile o f Police and
Judicial Response to Rape in Port-Au-Prince" (Port-au-Prince: United Nations, June 2012).
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operations. This relationship can sometimes be complicated, since HNP lacks personnel,
infra-structure and is often accused o f corruption and not trusted by the population.
Consequently, one o f UNPoFs objectives is also to improve their interaction with the
HNP and that o f the HNP with the local population.

Figure 4: Military contingents in Haiti
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Finally, the military component has the primary mission of promoting a stable and
safe environment, conducive to the successful implementation of the UN's mandate and
the strengthening of government authority and its institutions. The military component
currently has a total o f eight infantry battalions (Argentina, Brazil [2], Chile, Jordan,
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Nepal, Sri Lanka and Uruguay), two infantry companies that are also the Force
Commander's force of reserve (Bolivia and Peru), a naval unit (Uruguay), a military
police unit (Guatemala) and six engineer companies (Brazil, Chile-Ecuador, Indonesia,
Japan, Korea and Paraguay).
However, the military component is currently being downsized. In fact, since the
pacification o f the most dangerous neighborhoods in the capital and other areas o f the
country, the military component has been increasingly involved in the implementation of
social and economic projects aiming to decrease the physical and structural insecurity of
Haitian citizens, including the revitalization o f public spaces, illumination, and
professional training.
The downsizing o f the military component is part of the mission's strategy. After
reaching a peak o f 8,940 military personnel after the 2010 earthquake, MINUSTAH
forces are being reduced to a maximum of 6,270 troops.55 According to the Special
Representative o f the Secretary General (SRSG), the security situation has been calm and
humanitarian efforts are being phased out to be substituted by developmental initiatives
aiming to strengthen the national government.56 In fact, MINUSTAH's military
component is no longer present in four o f the country's 10 d&partements [departments or
regions] (South, Grand-Anse, Nippes and North-West) and is slowly being substituted by
Formed Police Units (FPU), who are taking over the responsibilities for maintaining a
stable environment. The police component will also be reduced from a total o f 3,241 to

55 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 2070." Paragraph 2.
56 Interview carried out with the Special Representative o f the Secretary General and Head o f Mission
Mariano Fernandez from Chile in Port-au-Prince, September 2012.
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2,601 personnel, with the withdrawal o f 400 individual police and the reduction o f a total
number of formed police units to 10.
As important stabilization goals are achieved, MINUSTAH continues to adjust its
format to the national context and to draft a plan for a reconfiguration and conditionsbased consolidation for the mission. The mission has agreed with the local government,
civil society partners and UN country team that a few benchmarks are to be established
serving as key indicators o f progress in the stabilization process. While the operational
effectiveness of the HNP is the top priority, other benchmarks should evaluate the
maturity of key rule o f law institutions, the capacity to organize fair elections, amongst
others.
This section provided the background information on the UN's presence in Haiti,
the current security situation in the country and the challenges for the future. As
MINUSTAH prepares to leave the country, it is important that stabilization efforts can be
sustained by the national government on its own. As previously shown, extreme
conditions in which most of the Haitian population lives in insecurity, have appalling
effects on the lives o f Haitian women. Consequently, it is important that a concerted
effort to maintain stability and improve living conditions can be sustained over time.
MINUSTAH's current configuration is one of an integrated mission. Considering
Haiti's context, that is the best format to address the complex challenges confronted by
the country. At the same time, the calm security environment and absence o f conflict
means that the country no longer needs a UN mission with such an expanded military
component. The longer the mission stays and the more armed it is, the more Haitians
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openly criticize its presence. During this downsizing phase though, it is important that
gender receives due attention and that efforts are sustained.
The

following

section

will

analyze

MINUSTAH's

efforts

in

gender

mainstreaming. As will be explained, by emphasizing an inclusive approach to improve
the status of Haitian women, positive spillover effects for the development o f a more
equal Haitian society may be accomplished, facilitating the improvement o f social and
economic conditions of the population in general.

Incorporating gender into peacekeeping: MINUSTAH gender policy and the UN
learning process

A successful learning process entails an interdependent relationship between the
organization and member states. As previously analyzed, the UN has done a relatively
good job in promoting the transformation o f its practice in the field o f international peace
and security by incorporating a gender perspective as a way to accomplish a lasting
peace. While advances have been noted, it is in the field that major challenges can be
found. The analysis of MINUSTAH's gender policy and how those five previously
defined components of UN gender strategy are being implemented in the field can offer
valuable insights into the specific challenges for the future.
The five variables - legal framework, gender balance, security sector, protection
and empowerment - represent a comprehensive gender strategy that not only looks into
the physical protection o f women but is also concerned about the existing factors that
contribute to their vulnerability, including living conditions, political and social status
and weak state institutions, particularly the judiciary and the police. This section will thus
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provide detailed information on MINUSTAH's gender policy and describe its
accomplishments and shortcomings for each of the five variables.

MINUSTAH's gender policy

Overall, despite the slow pace, MINUSTAH has been successful in implementing
a gender policy throughout its components and has taken important steps to increase
women representation within the national government and to improve its capacity to
respond to gender group specific needs. Particularly, the police component has played a
fundamental role in improving the national police ability to address gender based
violence. At the same time, the military component has also shown progress, albeit
slowly Although gender is not fully incorporated into the routine work o f soldiers,
important accomplishments such as the appointment o f gender focal points at battalion
and company levels show the mission's increasing commitment to gender issues.
The Gender Unit is one of MINUSTAH's civilian substantive sections and has the
main objective o f promoting gender mainstreaming within all MINUSTAH components
and sections and guaranteeing that their actions are gender sensitive with a positive
impact for local women. For this purpose, it attempts to cooperate with civil society
groups, women's organizations and government partners as a way o f promoting a more
equal society and making sure that women’s needs are considered and that the
government's capacity to protect their rights is enhanced.
MINUSTAH is one of the few missions that have participated in DPKO's
preliminary testing o f the “Guidelines to Incorporate a Gender Perspective into the work

203

o f UN Military in Peacekeeping Operations”57, and thus is an example o f missions in
which the civilian component is familiar with the topic and understands UN directives on
Women Peace and Security. Moreover, it is also one o f the nine UN missions that have a
Senior Gender Adviser in accordance with Resolution 1325.s8
Like most UN missions with a gender office or unit, MINUSTAH's Gender Unit
works closely with appointed gender focal points within all o f the mission's sections and
components; in collaboration they attempt to promote gender as a cross cutting issue in
all implemented projects and actions. Within the military, gender focal points are
appointed at the component level - currently the G9 or Civil-Military Chief under the
mission’s military command occupies that position - and battalion level. As a result, the
whole military force and each national contingent, including the smaller company units,
have a designated gender focal point. The police, for its part, have a Gender Team that
operates in the offices o f the MINUSTAH Gender Unit. Some UNPol commissariats also
have gender focal points. Although still in progress, these three actors - the Gender Unit,
Chief of U-9 and Chief of Police Gender Team - are increasingly coordinating their
actions to increase efficiency and promote a positive impact on the ground. The
challenge, though, is to overcome the bureaucratic complexity of the mission that often
hampers a timely and integrated response between all components.

57 Department o f Field Support Department o f Peacekeeping Operations, "Guidelines for Integrating
Gender Perspectives into the Work o f United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations," (New York:
United Nations, 2010).
58 DPKO maintains a Gender Unit in the following missions: UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic o f Congo (MONUSCO), UN Integrated M ission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), UN M ission in
Liberia (UNMIL), UN Stabilization M ission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), UN operation in Cote d'Ivoire
(UNOCI), UN M ission in South Sudan (UNM ISS), African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
(UNAM ID), UN Assistance M ission in Afghanistan (UNAM A) and UN Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL)

204

In order to improve collaboration and understanding on gender issues, the gender
unit provides the tools to strengthen the mission's capacity to include a gender
perspective in its actions. For example, they administer induction training on gender for
all uniformed personnel (military and police) and specific gender training for gender
focal points and uniformed personnel working in IDP camps.59
With regard to the cooperation between MINUSTAH and other UN agencies in
gender related issues, there is a gender thematic group that existed since before the
earthquake, but was put aside during post-disaster relief. As the post-earthquake context
improved, this thematic group has returned and is under the leadership o f the UNWomen. Moreover, there is also a SGBV cluster led by UNFPA (due to its expertise in
collecting data), which is currently under a protection cluster led by Human Rights
Agency that is currently being phased out. For that reason, this cluster may go to the
gender thematic group. Interestingly the Ministry o f Women's Condition is getting
involved and is taking ownership of coordination actions.
Within the police, the integration of gender issues has benefited from a top-down
approach, starting with the Police Commissioner, aimed at expanding the UN police’s
capacity to respond to specific security needs of women. He was responsible for creating
the Gender Team and placing its officers within the Gender Unit to facilitate cooperation.
The UN police component’s main mandate is to strengthen HNP's capabilities.
Therefore, UNPol’s key strategy to incorporate a gender perspective into its work has
been to train the HNP in this matter. The goal are sustainable efforts and that local police

59 While the induction training is a quick and standard 45 minutes training, the specific gender training
usually lasts three days and is tailored according to the target group and functions they will comply with.
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are able to fulfill all the functions MINUSTAH's police component is currently carrying
out and to protect women and girls from sexual and gender based violence.
Moreover, improving UNPols’ capacity to address sexual violence is also part of
this component's strategy to advance overall mission efforts in the area. In an interview
with a representative o f the Police Gender Team, it was explained that generating tools to
better deal with sexual and gender based violence in Haiti is also a priority to the Police
Gender Team.60 For this purpose, they were tasked with the writing o f Standard
Operations Procedures to deal with sexual violence, an awareness manual for UNPols
stationed in the IDP camps, and the terms o f reference for the commissariats' gender
focal points, amongst others. Furthermore, they participate in the induction training on
the recently created SOPs and on gender issues.
Finally, the UN police also have a gender based violence specific database. The
database was created in 2011, and although initially thought to incorporate data from all
security sectors, so far it is only the police who feed it. The database is directly under the
leadership of the Police Commissioner, who employs a desk officer responsible for
inputting data. As data is central for analysis, planning and the evaluation o f operations,
the initiative is an important way to include a gender approach to police planning.
The inclusion o f a gender approach within the military component has been
slower. Currently, gender does not figure as an important component o f military
planning, reporting and analysis, except in a few instances such as duties performed
within the IDP camps. The increasing vulnerability of women within IDP camps led to a
tailored military response, with increasing military patrols within IDP camps, where they
60 Interviews with representative o f UN Police Gender Team carried out in Port-au-Prince, September,
2012.
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were not initially allowed to enter. Although patrols occur only in the biggest and most
dangerous IDP camps, this is an important initiative and represents a way through which
gender can be integrated into military actions. However, it encompasses a limited view of
the Haitian women's reality and can be further improved. The military has an
extraordinary capacity to analyze and recognize signs o f threat. If this capacity is used to
recognize signs o f abuse and violence, it can help to prevent gruesome acts from being
committed against women and girls.
Nevertheless, the military reporting cell does not have a category for gender based
violence, and thus it becomes very difficult to take gender into account in military
planning and analysis, when reports analyzed by the intelligence cell does not specify
gender crimes. The Gender Unit has been pushing the inclusion of a category that
incorporates a gender feature to improve military planning and is currently working
closely with the Office o f the Force Commander to start implementing top-down
approaches so that gender can be more easily mainstreamed within that component.
An example o f a top-down approach, initiated by New York and reinforced by the
Office of the Force Commander, was the issuance o f a 2011 directive from the Force
Commander appointing a Gender Focal Point within the military component. Very
recently (in 2012) national contingents also were requested to appoint gender focal
points. Although focal points still lack understanding o f their role and how the military
component can include a gender perspective into its routine work, the initiative represents
a true instance o f cooperation between the civilian and military components in gender
issues.

207

The absence of specific guidelines on the role and tasks of MINUSTAH's military
gender focal point and each contingents' gender focal points is a challenge still to be
addressed. It demonstrates that progress is dependent on the personality and commitment
of those holding that position and of military commanders. While these personal efforts
are responsible for the current progress found in the military component, it is important
that guidelines are written so that initiatives are sustainable throughout time.
This is particularly true in regard to contingents' gender focal points. They
receive a three-day training in gender created by the gender unit and U-9 and carried out
jointly with the military training cell. Although they retain general knowledge about the
matter, a meeting with all of MINUSTAH's gender focal points showed they were
reluctant to speak about their role, possibly because they were unsure about the tasks and
roles entrusted to them.61
It is important that gender focal points and personnel in general understand that
gender is not only about women and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA). During field
work carried out in 2011, most contingents would relate gender issues with the behavior
of their personnel towards the local population or were simply unaware o f UN resolutions
on Women, Peace and Security and what they entail. Although SEA is an important part
of integrating a gender perspective into the work of the military component, the
protection role of the military and their support o f local women could be enhanced, if an
appropriate view of gender is to be understood.
Nonetheless, the 2012 field work showed a slightly different reality. Despite some
exceptions, most contingents showed a better understanding of the resolutions at least

61 Interview with contingents' gender focal points were carried out in Port-au-Prince, September 2012.
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among the higher ranked officers. In an interview with a representative o f the Gender
Unit, it was explained that most personnel that receive the induction training on gender
are mostly unaware of gender issues in general and emphasizes that member states should
reinforce pre-deployment training.62 Although all personnel sent to peace operations
receive a pre-deployment training module dedicated to gender named Core PreDeployment Training Module (CPTM )63 it is the member states' responsibility to
provide the course or invite UN experts to give them.
An important aspect o f a mission's gender policy is the kind o f policies that are in
place to curb misbehavior, particularly sexual abuse and exploitation that can seriously
undermine the UN's image in the host country. MINUSTAH in particular has recently
been in the spotlight for serious accusations of sexual abuse by Uruguayan marine
peacekeepers and a local Haitian boy, who was allegedly raped. A video recorded by the
marines themselves was made available online and caused enormous trouble for the
contributing country and the UN. Although Uruguay took exemplary actions, with the
repatriation o f the accused and a trial where the costs for the victim's trip to Uruguay was
paid, the negative image of the country and of the UN has persisted among the
population.

62 Induction training is an obligatory training for all officers as they arrive in the mission. Depending on
commanders orders and the size o f the battalion or company sent, more personnel including non
commissioned officers can also take the course. It is obligatory, though that every soldier receive the
training either by MINUSTAH representatives or by the officers who have attended the course.
Nonetheless, gender is only one o f 16 different modules that is given to participants in a period o f two days.
Consequently, it is common that participants do not retain all information received.
63 A s in the case o f the induction training, the CPTM also have different modules, being gender only one o f
them. The way the CPTM is administered varies a lot from country to country. Many countries have their
own peacekeeping training center with their own instructors others invite the UN to give with the course. It
is also common that other organizations, such as the UN-W omen, are invited to give the gender module, as
it is the case o f Brazil. All these aspects differ from country to country.
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In an interview with the Conduct and Discipline Unit, it was emphasized that the
military is the component that proportionally gives them least trouble. However, due to
the immunity and the public image o f peacekeepers, it is also these cases that mostly
affect the organization's image. It was mentioned that the unit is currently dealing with
various paternity cases, and that an accountability strategy ought to be developed. While
civilians can be somewhat constrained from these behaviors by affecting their salaries, it
becomes more difficult in the case o f the military. A proposed strategy is to link
commanders' accountability to misbehavior o f soldiers and the possibility o f getting a
personal commitment from peacekeepers that they will refrain from misconducts.
However, the challenges for a successful accountability strategy are huge.
As shown, the presence o f the Gender Unit as the hub o f gender awareness
initiatives has been extremely important in the Haitian context, which is characterized by
increased urban violence, including gender based violence, but which is not easily
associated with women's vulnerable status. However, as the context has shown, Haitian
women have long been victimized and oppressed, and the understanding of their
vulnerability and the improvement o f the mission's capacity to respond to these sexspecific threats is of the utmost importance.
The following sections will evaluate MINUSTAH's gender policy according to
the five previously defined variables: legal framework, gender balance, security sector,
protection and empowerment.

Legal framework

This indicator refers to the existence of specific mandates and guidelines
regarding the protection of civilians, in particular women and girls, against sexual
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violence and how it translates into practice. The complex reality o f the Haitian context
was translated into encompassing mission mandates since its establishment in 2004.
These mandates include several responsibilities that vary from the establishment o f a
peaceful and secure environment to the support o f government institutions’ govemability
and efforts to promote human rights and assistance in the wake of the constant natural
disasters that affect the island. Although protection o f civilians figures as part o f the
mandate since Resolution 1542 of April 2004 first authorized the deployment o f the
mission, it was never mandated as a top priority.64
Specific challenges confronted by women, including the need for political
representation, human rights abuses and special needs as a vulnerable group, were
included in the Security Council resolutions that renewed MINUSTAH's mandate
throughout the years. Moreover, resolutions have also reaffirmed the importance of
resolutions on Women, Peace and Security and the need to address violence against
women,

supporting

government

institutions

to

carry

out

this

responsibility.

Unfortunately, though, the mission does not have specific strategies to protect civilians in
general, nor to protect women against specific gender crimes to which they may be
subjected.
Although all resolutions that renewed MINUSTAH mentioned the affairs of
Haitian women in one way or another, it was only after the 2010 earthquake and the
widespread violence committed against women within IDP camps, that specific tasks to
protect women, including the strengthening o f mechanisms to address sexual violence,
increased joint patrols, training o f HNP on sexual violence issues and improvement of

64 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1542."
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women's access to justice, started to be more systematically included in the text o f these
resolutions. The last Security Council Resolution 2070 specifically “encourages all actors
in the Haitian Government, the international community and civil society to renew their
efforts to eliminate sexual and gender-based violence in Haiti; as well as to improve
response to rape complaints and access to justice for the victims of rape and other sexual
crimes.”65
Also worth mentioning is that Resolution 2012 (2011) requests the elaboration o f
a protection o f civilians plan, when explaining the effects the earthquake has had on the
population and the kind o f threats confronted within IDP camps, and in particular those
confronted by vulnerable groups such as women and children. Although the plan has not
yet been created, it shows the U N 's commitment to the cause. It also shows that the
context highly influences the elaboration of strategies such as the one regarding the
protection o f civilians. Although the Haitian population, and women for that matter, have
been victims o f state and gang sponsored violence throughout the years, it was not until
the harsh conditions of the IDP camps were highly publicized and figures reached
alarming proportions, that a legal document explicitly requested a plan to deal with the
matter. Along the same lines, after the inclusion o f new duties and tasks related to the
protection of women in IDP camps, actions such as increased patrols within IDP camps
were included in the planning o f operations and undertaken by uniformed personnel,
indicating a strong relationship between mandate's priorities and their translation into
practice.

65 "Resolution 2070."
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Reports of the Secretary General have a pre-defined framework that includes one
section for gender. These reports are helpful and they group all gender related actions
undertaken by MINUSTAH and the national government throughout the period covered
by each o f them. They also provide recommendations on how to improve the areas that
need strengthened efforts. Besides being an important source o f information, they
encourage the consideration o f gender as a cross-cutting issue and remind member states
o f their commitment to enhance gender equality in host nations and improve women's
protection.

Gender balance

This indicator refers to the analysis o f female representation amongst uniformed
personnel and the roles they carry out. It also refers to the existence o f affirmative
policies to include more women amongst personnel (uniformed and civilian), and in
decision-making positions within the mission. Unfortunately data on civilian personnel
disaggregated by sex is not available, and thus an analysis of the civilian component
could not be included. The participation o f civilian women in the mission leadership is
limited. Amongst MINUSTAH substantive sections, few are headed by women,
including the Gender Unit.
As expected, the MINUSTAH military component has a total representation of
women at only 2,45%. Moreover, with few exceptions most military women occupy
professional posts, such as those within the medical branch or logistics, and have limited
contact with the population. Nonetheless, this is a general trend all over the world since
the militaries in various parts o f the world still put several constraints upon the
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participation of women in all military branches, particularly those closely related to
combat.
Women within MINUSTAH's police component on its part do better than those in
the military with a 10.07% representation, being right on the UN 10% goal. The UN
police component has a total o f 2,780 uniformed personnel including individual police
and Formed Police Units. The Police Commissioner and its deputy are men; however, the
head of the Police Gender Team is a dedicated police woman, highly experienced in the
field.66 The combined figure for uniformed personnel is 5.75% o f women representation.

Table 5: Uniformed personnel disaggregated by sex, as of October 2012
Contribution

M ale

Fem ale

Total

% o f W om en

UNPol

951

153

1104

13.86%

FPU

1549

127

1676

7.58%

Total Police

2500

280

2780

10.07%

Military

7114

179

7293

2.45%

TOTAL

12114

739

12853

5.75%

Source: DPKO Statistics, 2012

The lack o f women representation accounts for one o f the biggest challenges
within the military component. Consequently, one o f the main directives of RES 1325
main directive is also the most challenging to implement as changes are highly dependent
on contributing states' willingness to implement them within the national context.

66 Interviews with representative from the Police Gender Team carried out in Port-au-Prince, September
2012.
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Currently, three contingents do not have any women within their contingents: Indonesia,
Jordan and Sri Lanka.67
This is not the only problem though. Most o f them are in health and logistics
branches being mostly within the limits o f barracks and having very limited contact with
the population. Indeed very few contingents have women in combatant positions and
carrying out similar functions as its male peers. Amongst all interviewed contingents the
only countries that had women with combat training and thus carrying out patrols,
checkpoints and other activities that result in more contact with the population were
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala and Uruguay.
Nonetheless, women in doctor, nurse and dentist positions are also important as
most contingents provide health care to the local population and having female
representatives within the medical crew is an important way o f increasing the relationship
with the local women and discussing issues such as sexual and gender based violence. In
fact, within Brazilian and Bolivian contingents, the female medical personnel indentified
genital infections as one o f the most common cases they have found when treating the
population. In these cases, the personnel can support local women's awareness on
protection from STDs, birth control, and in the case o f abuses and violence, be readily
able to recognize signs o f violence.
Amongst contributing troops, Bolivia, Guatemala, Philippines and Argentina
presents the highest percentages of women representation within its personnel, with
7.18%, 7.25%, 7% and 6.78%, respectively. It is important to highlight that the
Philippines provides all MINUSTAH's clerks, consequently, the female personnel along
67 Visit to Jordanian Battalion and interview with senior officers, staff and personnel was carried out in
Killick, September, 2012.

215

with the male counterparts work independently in the various military cells and branches
within MINUSTAH.
The percentage of women in the deployed forces overseas and their function is a
direct reflection of these countries' national policies and how the incorporation o f women
is carried out nationally. For example, Argentina's Ministry of Defense has a strong
gender policy, having sent guidelines on the specific work that the battalion's gender
focal point ought to carry out, including contact with local women's organizations and
promotion of gender awareness courses for the rest o f the personnel. Although the
interview with the Argentinean focal point showed that not all o f those functions are
carried out (particularly contact with women's organizations), it shows national
commitment at the state level and initiatives such as that can be used as an example in the
mission to be duplicated.68 In fact, Argentina's Ministry o f Defense is working on its
Plan o f Action in accordance to RES 1325 to be fully implemented within the national
Armed Forces.
In this regard it is worth mentioning Chile, that since 2009, under Michelle
Bachelet's government, has created a National Action Plan to improve gender
mainstreaming within its defense and security forces.69

Bolivia also presents an

important female contribution to MINUSTAH and its personnel seemed to be well
integrated into the contingent's daily activities.70 However, one important observation
ought to be made. With the exception of one young Lieutenant, who had received

68 Interview with Argentine senior officers, gender focal point and personnel was carried out in Gonaives,
June 2011.
69 Interview with Chilean senior officers, gender focal point and personnel was carried out in Cap Haitien,
June 2011.
70 Interview with Bolivian senior officers, gender focal point and personnel was carried out in Port-auPrince, June 2011 and September 2012.
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military training and was able to carry out the same functions as the male peers, including
patrols in the IDP camp of Tabarre under Bolivia's responsibility. The rest of the
personnel were civilians, mostly from the health branch that works for the Army back in
their home country as civilians, but are sent as military with the company deployed in
Haiti.71 That is one of the main reasons why they are not allowed to go on patrols even
though military medical personnel often go on patrols as well. However, the Bolivian
case should further be highlighted because it was one of the first countries to incorporate
women into the officer military academy, having women with the rank o f colonels and
soon to be general. Missions around the world, such as that established in the DRC count
with female Bolivian commissioned officers serving as military observers.
Both Brazil and Paraguay do not have women in combat positions within their
armed forces - with the exception o f Brazil's air force - and thus their female personnel
are limited to those allowed to join the military, comprising mostly doctors, nurses,
dentists, and in the case of Brazil, there are also translators and others in logistic
functions, such as lawyers.72 Interestingly though a recent law approved by Brazilian
President Dilma Rousseff obliges the military institutions in Brazil to incorporate women
in all positions within the next five years. It is an important development considering the
country's aspiration to have a permanent seat at the Security Council, this step is indeed
necessary to show to the world the country's ability to promote peace in accordance with
the organization's guidelines. In fact, many countries of the developing world use the

71 This data refers to the period o f September/2012. With the personnel rotation, the reality within Bolivian
personnel may have changed.
72 Visits to Brazilian Battalions I and II and Interview with senior officers, gender focal point and personnel
were carried out in Port-au-Prince, June 2011 and September 2012. Interview with Paraguayan Engineer
Company senior officers, gender focal point and personnel was carried out in Port-au-Prince, September
2012.
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participation in peace operations as a ways to enhance its influence in international
politics. An interesting way to accomplish national commitment to resolution 1325 is
tying it to political national aspirations, perhaps through contact with the permanent
mission in NY and/or diplomatic representations in the host nation.
An important consideration to be made is that in order to take advantage o f
women's presence within the military forces deployed, it is important that they are able to
speak to the women directly or have female translators, particularly in cases of sexual
crimes and gender based violence. This issue was raised by Brazilian Battalion I that
explained that they lack local female translators and while they put their female personnel
to participate in CIMIC activities and speak to local women, they are sent with local male
translators and that may hamper this effort. This is an interesting point to be taken to
MINUSTAH's administration. Although many of the military contingents do not have
women, having local female translators may also support the contact with the local
population.
In the case o f Sri Lanka, two o f the six translators were female, but differently
from their male peers they were not allowed to do the night shift or go on patrols.
Specific orientation on the use of female translators could thus contribute to enhance the
component's overall capacity to respond to women's protection needs.
It is also important that women have the same routine duties, such as guard, so
that male counterparts do not believe they have been privileged. In some contingents,
women were sent on patrols even when not coming from combatant arms. Whilst this
initiative supports the UN goal to have more uniformed women as facilitators o f contact
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between the military and the local population, it is not a UN nor a national policy, but a
personal choice o f the commander.

Table 6: Military contribution disaggregated by sex, as of October 2012
Country

M ale

Female

Total

% o f W omen

Argentina

674

49

723

6.78%

Bolivia

194

15

209

7.18%

Brazil

1,872

21

1,893

1.11%

Chile

486

13

499

2.61%

Ecuador

66

1

67

1.49%

Guatemala

128

10

138

7.25%

Indonesia

178

0

178

0%

Japan

223

2

225

0.89%

Jordan

251

0

251

0%

Nepal

354

7

361

1.94%

Paraguay

160

2

162

1.23%

Peru

364

8

372

2.15%

Philippines

146

11

157

7.01%

Republic of
Korea
Sri Lanka

235

6

241

2.49%

861

0

861

0%

Uruguay

922

34

956

3.56%

Total

7114

179

7293

2.45%

Source: DPKO Statistics, 2012

In the police, women representation amongst UNPols is considerably higher than
within the FPUs, reaching 13.9% versus 7.6%, respectively. One of the main reasons is
that UNPols interested in participating in peace missions are sent on individual missions
and the process of selection and deployment is based on merit, not appointment. FPU's
on its part has a similar modus operandi to that present in the military. They live within
the constraints of their bases and usually have a paramilitary structure, mostly comprising
military police.
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In terms of proportional female representation within the UNPol, seven countries
have women comprising more than 30% o f national personnel. These are India with
66.67%, Norway with 57.14%, Thailand with 41.67%, Rwanda with 40%, Burkina Faso
with 36.25%, and Russia and Uruguay with 33% each.

The elevated percentage of

women is also explained by the limited personnel deployed as most o f these countries
contribute to less than 10 UNPol (with the exception o f Burkina Faso, Rwanda and
Thailand).
Burkina Faso is further highlighted due to the important number o f women police
contribution in absolute terms. Out of 80 police officers deployed by this country in Haiti,
29 are women, being the country that most sends female police complying with
individual mission. Rwanda, on its part contributes with 12 female UNPols out o f a total
of 30. Burundi, Canada, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, and the United States, also contribute with
more than 10 female UNPols.

Table 7: UNPol contribution as of October, 2012
Country

M ale

Fem ale

Total

% of W omen

Argentina

17

3

20

15%

Bangladesh

10

0

10

0%

Benin

35

0

35

0%

Brazil

2

0

2

0%

Burkina Faso

51

29

80

36.25%

Burundi

30

10

40

25%

Cameroon

50

5

55

9.09%

Canada

78

10

88

11.36%

Central African Republic

3

1

4

25%

Chad

8

1

9

11.11%

Chile

10

4

14

28.57%

China

16

0

16

0%

Colombia

14

3

17

17.65%
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Table 7: Continued
Country

M ale

Fem ale

Total

% of W omen

Cote d'Ivoire

113

10

123

8.13%

Croatia

5

0

5

0%

Egypt

31

0

31

0%

El Salvador

10

4

14

28.57%

France

32

2

34

5.88%

Guinea

11

1

12

8.33%

India

1

2

3

66.67%

Indonesia

9

1

10

10%

Jamaica

1

0

1

0%

Jordan

34

0

34

0%

M adagascar

3

1

4

25%

Mali

27

1

28

3.57%

Nepal

9

1

10

10%

Niger

66

13

79

16.46%

Nigeria

3

1

4

25%

Norway

3

4

7

57.14%

Pakistan

10

0

10

0%

Philippines

23

3

26

11.54%

Rom ania

21

3

24

12.5%

Russian Federation

2

1

3

33.33%

Rwanda

18

12

30

40%

Senegal

20

2

22

9.09%

Serbia

5

0

5

0%

Sierra Leone

3

1

4

25%

Spain

17

1

18

5.56%

Sri Lanka

19

2

21

9.52%

Sweden

1

1

2

50%

Thailand

7

5

12

41.67%

Togo

3

0

3

0%

Turkey

17

1

18

5.56%

United States

72

13

85

15.29%

Uruguay

2

1

3

33.33%

Yemen
TOTAL

29
951

0
153

29
1104

0%
13.86%

Source: DPKO Statistics, 2012
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Female representation amongst FPUs is relatively high in Haiti due to
Bangladesh's all female FPU. Bangladesh deploys two FPUs to MINUSTAH, a male and
a female, consequently,

its

female representation reaches

33.13%,

while

the

representation of women within the FPUs is o f only 7.6%. Nepalese, Rwandan and
Senegalese FPUs also contribute with limited number of police women, each with a total
of 10, 4 and 7 women, and a total female representation o f 7.25%, 2.5% and 5% each.
India, Jordan and Pakistan do not deploy any women amongst their FPU personnel.

Table 8: FPU contribution as of October, 2012
Country

M ale

Female

Total

% o f W om en

Bangladesh

214

106

320

33.13%

India

459

0

459

0%

Jordan

319

0

319

0%

Nepal

128

10

138

7.25%

Pakistan

140

0

140

0%

Rwanda

156

4

160

2.50%

Senegal

133

7

140

5%

TOTAL

1549

127

1676

7.58%

Source: UN Department o f Peacekeeping Operations.

Bangladesh's female FPU has been sent to Haiti since 2010. The current
personnel comprise a total of 160, 106 o f which are women. In an interview with the
Bangladeshi senior officers it was explained that all officers are women and that male
representation in the unit comprises non-commissioned officers dedicated to minor
tasks.73 In this regard, it is important to emphasize that it is not only about having more
women on the ground, but also putting them in key functions so that they can serve the

73 Interview carried out with senior officers and personnel was carried out in Port-au-Prince, September
2012.
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purpose the UN underscores as the reason why more women should be sent to peace
operations. Not only a matter o f gender balance, their position within MINUSTAH and
what they are doing is what really matters to have a decisive impact on the ground.
During a first field work carried out in MINUSTAH in 2011, an interview with
the 1st all female Bangladeshi FPU was carried out and it was argued that it was not until
the end o f their stay in Haiti that they were sent to IDP camps and patrolling activities
that would promote an encounter with the local population, being previously restricted to
security o f UN facilities and other duties not directly related to the population.74
The third Bangladesh contingent though, seemed to be fully integrated within
MINUSTAH structure, performing the same kind o f functions that other FPUs were
carrying out including crowd control, IDP camp patrolling and security o f UN facilities.
In a conversation with the personnel, they confided that the language is the toughest
barrier to bond with the population. Although they have various English interpreters,
most of the troop does not speak English, and even less French. This further complicates
the matter because if they cannot communicate with those they aim to protect,
successfully fulfilling this duty can be challenging. This is felt even more so when the
cultures of these two countries are so different and the interaction between them can be
affected by the different codes of conduct that each culture has.

Security sector

As defined by the UN, a security sector is: “a broad term often used to describe
the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and

74 Visit to the Bangladesh Female FPU was first carried out in Port-au-Prince, June 2011.
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oversight o f security in a country.”75

These include defense, law enforcement,

corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for justice system, border
management, customs and civil emergencies. Actors that play a role in the security sector
include ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. For the purpose o f this
dissertation, only the initiatives related to the improvement o f the justice system, rule of
law and police institutions are taken into account.
Security sector reform is a vital component o f stability and longer-term
development in Haiti. However, due to the specific Haitian context where the sole state
institution is the Haitian National Police, MINUSTAH's approach to the reform o f the
country's security sector differs considerably from other peacekeeping contexts.76 Hence
UN's support to SSR in Haiti is mostly focused in police capacity building, an effort that
has been undertaken since 1993, when the first of several UN missions mandated to
strengthen HNP's capabilities was established.
UN Police is the component most directly involved with SSR in Haiti. The
provision o f training, equipment and the building of internal control capacities have been
the major focus. Moreover, with the purpose o f building a strong national police able to
respond to gender based violence, the UNPol presents two main initiatives dedicated to
this goal: the first is the Police Academy, the second is the so called “Norwegian Sexual
Violence Team”.
The Haitian Police Academy was created in 2006, and it is an important training
center for the local police. There are 25 UNPol offices that work within the Academy
75 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f the Secretary General on Securing Peace and
Development: The Role o f the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform."
76 United Nations Department o f Peacekeeping Operations, Office o f Rule o f Law and Security Institutions,
Security Sector Reform Unit, "The United Nations Ssr Perspective," (New york: SSR Unit, 2012).
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overseeing the quality and standard o f the training provided there. It is the HNP officers
themselves who train their counterparts. Mostly, UNPol officers are responsible for
providing the initial training for trainers and for a continued monitoring o f the courses
and training carried out by the Academy. In fact they are divided in different sections,
considering their own skills and work with HNP officers to improve the different courses.
According to a UNPol representative, “working together with the HNP and overseeing
their training activities is a ways o f slowly passing all responsibility for them, so they can
act on their own when MINUSTAH leaves.” 77
In regard to gender and SGBV, the police academy is mostly focused on the
training of the judges, the HNP inspector and the Commissioner, while the Norwegian
Team is responsible for the standardization o f basic gender training of all HNP police
agents. The content of the course covers specific techniques and methods for questioning
victims and suspects and searching. More than providing HNP with the basic knowledge
to carry out serious investigations regarding SGBV, this initiative is important because it
brings gender to the forefront of police work and is the first steps toward making them
accountable for addressing this problem and protecting the vulnerable.
The Norwegian Sexual Violence Team consists o f a two-part project fully
financed by Norway and implemented on the ground by a team of six Norwegian UNPols
sent to Haiti to work exclusively on this particular project.78 The independence o f their
work, in parallel to the UN's time consuming bureaucracy and separate budget is to

77 Interview carried out UNPol representative within the Police Academy in Port-au-Prince, September,
2012 .
78 Interview with the Norwegian Team was carried out in Port-au-Prince, September, 2012. .
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blame for the important accomplishments achieved by the Team in a period of only a
year.
They carry out two main projects: 1. Strengthening individual local capacity
through training courses, and 2. 2. Strengthening institutional capacity through an
improved HNP structure to conduct gender affairs and promote coordination with
regional offices.
The first project focuses on the standardization of all gender training received by
all HNP police officers. Having also trained the trainers, HNP now has certified gender
instructors that provide training in Creole and advance gender issues within the local
police. The second project, focuses on improving coordination and infrastructure, having
accomplished the construction o f an office for HNP's Head o f Gender Policy and having
the construction o f regional offices for all administrative departments under way. The
objective is to ensure that gender polices are easily implemented at the regional level and
in accordance to its particular context.
Appointed in 2005 as the Gender Policy person for the national police, Madam
Gauthier calls herself “an army o f One” as she is the only currently appointed HNP
officer to work on gender issues.79 The Norwegian project also intends to address this
lack of personnel by having officers appointed in each department and an office where
they can carry out their activities.
As it was explained, the project initially financed by Norway is running out o f
money. Nonetheless, the members o f the team explained this is a UN original idea that
Norway endorsed and currently other countries are studying the possibility o f joining the
79 Interview with the Head o f HNP's Gender Police Office, Madam Gauthier, was carried out in Port-auPrince, September 2012.
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project and contributing with the financial resources necessary to complete the project.
Amongst the countries interested in funding the project are Brazil and Spain.
Since Haiti does not have military forces,80 the MINUSTAH military component
is not engaged with strengthening local's institutional capacity to maintain a stable and
safe environment, its activities are mostly dedicated to carrying out activities that support
the accomplishment of a stable Haiti. Nonetheless, few joint activities are carried out
with the National Police. In this sense, the military carry out checkpoints and patrols with
the local police in its areas of responsibility. This interaction has been qualified as
positive by most o f the contingents, as they do not have the jurisdiction to act on their
own. Regardless, the relationship with the HNP has been often qualified as difficult, due
to the bad reputation of their interventions.
Finally, there is a MINUSTAH Rule of Law section dedicated to strengthen the
country's justice law. An important accomplishment in terms of SSR in Haiti has been
the re-opening of the School o f Magistrates in 2009, the presidential appointment of the
President of the Supreme Court in October 2011, and the elaboration o f the five-year
2012-2016 Haitian National Police (HNP) Development Plan, jointly presented by
MINUSTAH and the Haitian National Police.

80 The absence o f a Haitian Army does not mean that this possibility is completely o ff the table. President
Martelly has promised during his presidential campaign to bring the military back and former members o f
Haitian Armed Forces were seen occupying former military bases, training and on parades in the beginning
o f this year. The FC and the SRSG have both admitted they were indeed around, but with the cut o f funds
and without the international community's support, it is very difficult that Martelly can maintain its
campaign promise. To curb their actions, MINUSTAH launched Operation Sunrise, in order to curtail the
movement the circulation o f illegal weapons. However, and despite the HNP's improvement, MINUSTAH
needs to put some thought into this matter and maybe having the military component involved with special
training on areas such as engineer, coast guard, and reforestation. The fact o f the matter is that if Haitian
armed forces are to be recreated or any other form o f force, such as a gendarmerie or specialized forces
such as those cited, a gender perspective ought to be included from the beginning, and the involvement o f
both Haitian government and M INUSTAH's gender experts is paramount.
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The HNP Development Plan foresees the achievement of 15,000 fully operational
service police officers serving by 2016. That would require an entry level o f 1,200 cadets
in each promotion year (currently at 241 level) and the improvement o f middle level and
senior officers to ensure adequate training and supervision o f new recruits.81 Moreover,
the Plan also includes the attainment o f “adequate logistic and administrative capacity,
accountability and respect for human rights and rule o f law, a robust vetting process, and
enhanced recruitment procedures and training, with an emphasis on specialized units and
strengthened border control and deterrence of transnational organized crime.”82
In regard to Haiti's justice system, prison overcrowding and arrests without trial
are amongst the top challenges. In an interview with a UNPol correction officer working
at one of the prisons in Port-au-Prince, it was emphasized that there are many detainees
who never had a trial and are just thrown in prison.83 Cases o f witnesses being arrested as
criminals were also cited. According to a UN 2012 Justice Review,84 MINUSTAH
Justice Section has been providing logistical support for the establishment and overall
management o f legal aid offices. The report also mentions that since the opening o f the
first legal aid office in February 2008, 10,838 consultations have been provided and
4,793 liberations have been obtained.

81 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f the Secretary General on the United Nations Stabilization
M ission in H a iti"
82 According to the Report o f the Secretary General on M INUSTAH dated from August 31st, 2012, the
progress in vetting police officers is a serious challenge. Although vetting centers have been established in
2006, “to date not a single officer has been dismissed as a result o f the vetting exercise.” Ibid.(Paragraph,
23)
83 Interview with UNPol Correction Officer was carried out in Port-au-Prince on June, 2011.
84 United Nations Department o f Peacekeeping Operations, Office o f Rule o f Law and Security Institutions,
Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service, ”2012 Justice Review," in Justice Review (N ew York: DPKO,
2012 ).
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A final comment on SSR in Haiti, refers to the various reference by different
actors on the field, including the Ministry o f W omen's Condition and Rights, and all
MINUSTAH substantive sections on the existence o f “informal community based
arrangements.” Interviewees confirmed the existence of a parallel justice system that
tends to promote financial arrangements between the victim and the perpetrator, rather
than taking it to the formal justice system.85 As it was explained, the system formally
exists under the name o f “Justice de Proximite”, where “a juge de paix”, or judge,
facilitates the arrangement usually between the victim's family and the perpetrator. The
system was blamed by many as one o f the sources of impunity and the persistence o f a
mindset that disregarded gender based violence, including rape, as minor crimes.
However, it was emphasized by MINUSTAH Rule o f Law section that it does not consist
o f an informal arrangement since it is foreseen in Haitian Law and that they are working
to improve their capabilities as well.86

Protection

This indicator is mostly concerned with actions undertaken by the police and
military component to protect women and girls from gender based violence. Protection
within MINUSTAH is undertaken by both the military and the police. Specifically in

85 A group interview with MINUSTAH substantive sections - Gender Unit, Human Rights, Civilian
Affairs, Child Protection, Community Violence Reduction, Joint Military Analysis Center, Conduct and
Discipline and Rule o f Law - was carried out in Port-au-Prince, February, 2012. Interview with
Representatives o f the Ministry o f W omen's Condition and Rights were conducted around the same period.
86 This was an point o f disagreement amongst different actors. Within the Ministry o f W omen's Condition
for example, there were interviewees with different opinion in regard to the matter, emphasizing that the
intervention o f the ju g e de paix in minor cases would be ok, others would emphasize that is the Haitian
Law prescribes an act as crime that should be dealt with the Justice System not the ju g e d e paix.
MINUSTAH Rule o f Law section, left the meeting before more questions could be addressed and
unfortunately the subject could not be thoroughly explored.
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regard to gender, both the police and the military have initiatives to enhance women's
protection, however, the approach tends to be limited and focused on the displacement
feature of the Haitian context. The Gender Unit on its part provides tools by improving
training on sexual violence and develops initiatives with local institutions to enhance
their performance in these matters.
In this regard, one of the successful actions undertaken by the Unit in
collaboration with the Ministry is the creation of private spaces within IDP camps to
receive victims o f sexual violence. The initiative was qualified by a Gender Unit
representative as very good as “she [the victim] may not be in good conditions and may
need a private place to be received.” While one of those has already been established in
the Carradeux IDP camp, two others are under way in two other IDP camps and in seven
national police stations. These initiatives are important not only because they improve
treatment to victims, but also because they support the establishment o f an infrastructure
and a mindset that will stay after the mission leaves, therefore having an enduring and
positive effect on the local society.
Along with the International Organization for Migration the Gender Unit also
organized 28 trainings for national police officers on police response to sexual and
gender based violence, in addition to 27 training sessions for Haitian legal professionals
on legal recourse for victims o f sexual violence.87 Interestingly, the Unit also participated
in the training o f 30 community leaders to support the establishment o f community
networks to raise awareness of how to prevent sexual and gender based violence. Finally,
the Unit provided support to women's organizations during the 360 training and
87 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f the Secretary General on the United Nations Stabilization
M ission in Haiti " Paragraph 34

230

awareness-raising workshops that resulted in the creation o f a national platform o f action
for women and their communities.
The military is directly involved with protection. Besides being tasked with the
mandate to establish a safe and stable environment in Haiti, the military component in
MINUSTAH is also tasked with protection of civilians, although different from
MONUSCO it does not explicitly comprise a top priority in UN documents. In the
fulfillment of its mandate, the protection of women and girls against violence and
promoting gender is accomplished mostly indirectly. However, it is important to keep in
mind that the military component has successfully carried out operations that curbed gang
activities, and the analysis o f H aiti's complex political situation showed that women were
constantly victimized by these and other armed groups. Consequently, the capture of
gangs leaders, their ban from some neighborhoods and the overall decrease in criminal
activities had thus an immense effect on women protection that is not often cited as one
the main contributions o f the military component to women's protection, possibly
because it is not directly associated by the military themselves as one o f the merits of
their actions.
In this context, it is also worth mentioning the work carried out by the engineer
component. In a displacement environment where the differentiation between the public
and private spheres is rather blurry, the building of infrastructure can be accounted as an
important factor that affects the security of women and girls. Although dependent on a
civilian structure within MINUSTAH - the Mission Planning Cell - six countries have
sent military engineer companies to support reconstruction efforts in Haiti. The
companies develop projects throughout Haiti and do not have a specific area of
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responsibility being sent to carry out different projects in the capital and elsewhere.
Although not under the direct leadership of the force commander, the engineer
component is central to the overall efforts carried out by the mission.
Unfortunately, engineers have confronted enormous challenges to respond to all
the demands received. Consequently they work under a priority plan. In this sense, it
would be important to have gender defined as one o f the priorities in this plan. In Haiti,
private matters such as taking a shower is often done publicly, further complicating the
context in which sexual and gender based violence take place. The engineer component
could contribute to addressing this problem by focusing on gender sensitive projects that
contributes to enhancing the separation between private and public spheres. In fact,
possibilities are endless and the engineer component could be used to increase women's
security and improving their status in the society by being tasked with projects that have
a positive and direct effect on women's structural and physical vulnerabilities.
Protection by the police is undertaken by UNPols deployed in the various
commissariats throughout Haiti. In regard to women's protection an important project is
underway: the Gender Mobile Unit. The Gender Mobile Unit is responsible for patrolling
IDP camps to support victims o f sexual violence.88 Currently formed by 15 UNPol, three
o f which are men, they are divided in three teams o f five police officers, whose job is to
be present in different IDP camps, promoting sensitization campaigns amongst local
population regarding sexual violence and accompanying victims to get medical care and
to report the incident. For that purpose, they ought to maintain a close relationship with

88 Interview with members from the Gender Mobile Unit were carried out in Port-au-Prince, September

2012 .
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the IDP camp community leader and with local organizations involved with gender issues
in order to organize and promote sensitization campaigns.
They also have a close contact with the HNP and the UNPol commissariat who
receives victims and immediately calls them when a sexual violence case comes up.
Furthermore, they have the contact of hospitals and clinics that will give the medical
certificate necessary for victims to start a law suit against perpetrators. Finally, they also
have contact with organizations that proceed with the follow-up on victims once the
Haitian justice system is activated. In fact, a UNPol Gender Team representative
commented that due to its non-executive mandate, the UNPol do not usually do the
follow-up on cases. Nonetheless, MINUSTAH Human Rights Section does and
consequently, they often consult with that section to leam about how cases are being
handled within the Haitian judiciary.
One o f the main constraints o f the Gender Mobile Unit is that it only works within
the IDP camps and only in a few o f those (the biggest and most dangerous). As it was
explained by a representative o f the Gender Unit, the Gender Mobile Unit program
initiated under the Police Gender Team covered areas other than the IDP camps.
Nonetheless, with the reorganization of UN police structured they were transferred to the
umbrella o f the IDP camp pillar, and thus were constrained to patrols within those.
Initiatives to relocate them would highly benefit Haitian women and enhance their
protection.
An important component of protection is the ability o f the mission to
communicate with to the population and identify their priority needs. The military
component is relatively well related to the local community and, in a few cases, to the
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local government as well. Nonetheless, their relationship with women's organizations or
government institutions related to women's affairs and gender issues is very limited and
often channeled by the U-9 and Gender Unit. The police, on its part has an extensive
contact with the local community and women's groups, particularly within the IDP
camps where the Gender Mobile Unit operates.
The military component community outreach is mostly carried out through a
steady relationship with local community leaders, particularly within IDP camps and the
OQ

development of CIMIC activities.

CIMIC activities have become one of the central

pillars of the military component and the face o f the mission. All interviewed contingents
carry them out in various places and neighborhoods. CIMIC activities are fulfilled on a
voluntary basis and thus depend on resources each contributing country provides to its
deployed military; nonetheless they are always carried out in consultancy with the U-9
and local partners that express the population's primary needs in a determined area.
The military component also has the chance o f developing social and economic
projects with the support o f the Civilian Affairs (CA) and Violence Reduction
Community (CVR) sections. These sections support the Quick Impact Projects (QIP) and
the Labor Intensive Projects (LIP) and end up having a dual purpose: serving the
community and facilitating the military component relationship with the population.
These projects are varied and each component is entitled to identifying needs on its area
of operation, formulating the project and carrying it out if funds are approved. In the case

89 The constant communication with the local population, though is hampered by an important element: the
language. Most personnel do not speak French and creole for that matter. English knowledge may also be
limited, particular amongst non-commissioned officers and thus continuous communication with the
population may be a problem. However, possibly because o f the presence o f foreigners in Haiti for so long,
an increasing number o f Haitians speak Spanish, Portuguese and English, the language o f the intervening
countries. This is mostly observed in the cities and is not generalized.
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o f QIPs, projects have a limited budget and must be carried out in a short period o f time.
As an illustration o f the projects currently being carried out by the military component, a
few can be cited: the construction o f a school in Mome Casse, rehabilitation of a square
in Cite Soleil, Vocational training in Cap Haitien, rehabilitation of drainage system, and
provision of school.
Interestingly, none o f the interviewed military contingents maintained regular
meetings with local women's organizations to address the protection needs they view as
important. In fact, the military component's relationship with the local women's
organization is well below the optimum. Despite that, a few positive initiatives were cited
in some of the contingents and are worth mentioning as a ways to encourage others to
replicate the initiative.
A noteworthy initiative was undertaken by the Brazilian battalion under the
leadership of the U-9 and the Gender Unit. Talks with couples about family matters and
women's rights were carried out with the support o f local groups that helped with
translation and the adaptation to the local context. Although not originated within the
battalion, this initiative is particularly important as it addresses one o f the biggest
problems regarding gender in Haitian society, that is, the discrimination that Haitian
women are sometimes subjected to, encompassing a proactive action pursuing positive
change. Other contingents should be involved with activities of this sort, maybe first
under the leadership o f the Gender Unit and U-9 until it becomes a regular activity as
many others that have been incorporated into the military component's routine and are
not part o f its mandate, such as the CIMIC activities themselves.
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Other talks about women's rights, breast feeding and sexual violence were also
carried out by the same battalion. Other contingents have also mentioned similar
activities, such as the Bolivian contingent. In fact, within the Bolivian contingent, it was
mentioned that surprised by the high number o f pregnant young women, they often carry
out talks about how to protect themselves from sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV
and how to avoid pregnancy. Some of the Bolivian women that have participated in these
talks confided that many had seen a condom for the first time when they showed it to
them. These talks were given to both men and women and were carried out by Bolivian
male and female officers.
The doctors and nurses within this same contingent also said that in some
occasions, during CIMIC activities they are provided with private rooms so they can treat
local women that have genital infections, appointed as one of the most common diseases
they find when examining the local population. Although they often do not speak the
local language they are able to understand them by the gestures and provide medicines.
On the positive side, most contingents mentioned offering medical services to the local
population and have female staff to attend local women.
Amongst interviewed contingents, only one confirmed having received Haitian
women victims of sexual and gender based violence. Brazil's Battalion II (BRABATT II)
has a company permanently established in Bel-air, a complicated neighborhood in Portau-Prince. Within the company's base Brazilian civil defense has established a clinic
open to the local population. BRABATT II's commander reported that in a period o f 4
months (April to September, 2012) they had attended 46 victims of SGBV in that clinic.
Personnel stationed in that base commented that the population often trusts the military
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component and looks for help. Interestingly, within that base there is a HNP
commissariat dedicated only to gender issues as well as an UNPol establishment with a
gender focal point. In an interview with a public information officer stationed in that base
in 2011, the research team was informed that victims are treated or taken to hospital
depending on the seriousness o f cases, while the HNP and the UNPol are called to
proceed with legal matters with the
In regard to the police, as previously mentioned, the police component is one o f
the most integrated on the ground and has a close relationship with the local population,
the Haitian National Police, and NGOs and other agency partners. Particularly in regard
to sexual violence victims' care, UNPol has an extensive network o f contacts that varies
from the HNP itself to hospital and organizations that can provide medical and
psychological care, besides legal advising. The Mobile Gender Unit makes contact use o f
these contacts, for example.
Overall, UNPol tends to maintain a close relationship with community leaders and
local women's organizations to bond with the local context and populace, particularly in
the UNPol commissariats within the IDP camps. Community leaders channel the
communication between the population living in the camps and organizations that works
there, such as NGOs, UN agencies and the UNPol. They often have a few demands that
are presented to different actors in the hope that requests are going to be fulfilled.

Empowerment

It refers to initiatives undertaken of the mission's components with the objective
o f strengthening women's social, economic and political status in the society. W omen's
political and economic empowerment are amongst the top o f the Gender Unit objectives,
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and various initiatives on this particular matter are undertaken in partnership with the
Ministry of Women's Condition and local civil society organization. The military has
also increased the promotion o f gender sensitive QIPs and CVR programs that can
economically benefit women, while Police efforts within the framework o f Haitian SSR
have contributed to promote Haitian women's participation within the National Police.
Amongst UN agencies, various develop economic and empowering projects with the
local population, particularly the UNDP, UN-Women and UNHCR.
The Gender Unit has accomplished a remarkable goal in terms o f women's
political empowerment. The inclusion o f the 30% women representation in government
quota in the constitutional amendment counted with the Gender Unit involvement and
active support. Also, during the last elections, they were involved with activities that
aimed to enhance women candidates and to protect them during the election. The
increased number o f women in politics can have long-term effects upon the effective
promotion o f Haitian women's rights. This initiative is also positive in terms o f putting
women's issues in the forefront o f politics, having a spillover effect in terms o f
advancing a mindset change in Haitian society.
In regard to the military component empowerment activities, although CIMIC
activities and the fulfillment o f those social and economic projects with the economic
support o f Civilian Affairs and CVR are not part o f the military mandate, those are part
of their daily activities and some o f them are designed exclusively to benefit women.
While there is an emphasis on the distribution o f food and water to women, some projects
particularly those regarding professional training directly affect women's conditions by
providing them with skills that can improve their economic and thus social position
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within the society, further decreasing its vulnerability. Although these projects are
limited, and mostly lack a conscious understanding on the part of the military component,
if more gender sensitive projects are designed, more women can be benefited and enjoy
enhanced status within the society.
UN agencies have strong linkages with local organizations and some have
projects designed to benefit women.90 In fact a gender marker has been created so that all
projects implemented by the agencies explain how they can also benefit gender
mainstreaming. UN-Women, UNFPA and UNHCR argued they have safe houses for
victims o f sexual violence. Most importantly, is that these houses also offer training and
limited compensation, so that they can re-start their lives afterwards. They allow victims
to stay in the houses for a period o f 3 months and also provide them with training so that
they are able to work and sustain themselves. After this period they refer to partners to do
a follow up on the cases.
UNDP

clarified, that since they finance projects undertaken by other

organizations they have many projects that are gender sensitive. 70% o f UNDP's
programs streams gender, however, the UNDP representative highlights that mostly these
projects are closely related to enhancing women's economic power and the other to their
protection. Particularly after the earthquake special attention o f projects that can
specifically address women's vulnerability were enhanced.
Finally in regard to UN W omen's work in Haiti. It was explained that their main
focus is promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women as the main

90 A group interview with UN agencies - UNHCR, UNDP and OCHA - was carried out in Port-au-Prince,
September, 2012. An interview with UN-W om en representatives was carried out in Port-au-Prince, June
2011.
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ingredients for a successful reconstruction effort and the accomplishment o f development
goals. For these purposes, its representatives have emphasized the need to remove
structural obstacles, such as cultural attitudes and institutions that prevent the progress of
women within the Haitian society.91 One of its main areas o f engagement is increasing
women's voice, being through the political participation or in a broader sense, such as
within professional organizations or the civil society. Another important priority for the
UN Women is economic development. As most o f Haitian households are headed by
women there is an urgent need for encouraging employment opportunities and creating
livelihood opportunities for women.
As the analysis has shown, women's empowerment is carried out by different
actors in the field, including MINUSTAH components and UN agencies. Although the
agencies are clearly separated from the mission, due to its impartiality principle, their
relationship is increasingly strengthening and collaboration is necessary for sustainable
positive outcomes to be accomplished in Haiti.
The analysis of each one o f these indicators has provided a rich account o f how
MINUSTAH's gender policy is being incorporated throughout all mission's components
and has offered some insights on the impact o f these efforts in Haitian society. Overall,
there are important advancements in all components and a gender perspective is slowly
being incorporated as an integral component o f all mission's policies. Although there is
still the need for a separated structure to promote gender mainstreaming to exist, their
efforts are impacting on personnel's ability to consider gender on the ground and
progress, although slow, is continuous.

91 Interview with UN-W omen representatives were carried out in Port-au-Prince, June, 2011.
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Conclusions

Overall, MINUSTAH's compliance with UN resolutions on Women Peace and
Security is relatively good, slow progress has been accomplished and a gender
perspective has been integrated by and large as a cross cutting issue in the mission's
actions on the field.

Most advances though can be identified within the police

component, due to the intrinsic features o f police work and the Haitian context; being
directly in contact with the population and local police on a daily basis puts them on alert
to issues that may often be less clear to the military. The work developed by the Gender
Mobile Unit, the Norwegian Sexual Violence Team and the sexual violence database are
examples o f how serious gender is taken within this component.
However, despite being slow, progress has also been accomplished by the military
component. The appointment o f gender focal points and the increasing awareness
regarding gender issues is the result o f a joint work between the gender unit and the U-9
and has proven to be invaluable for gender mainstreaming amongst military personnel.
Nonetheless, challenges ahead are varied and mostly dependent on member states
willingness to promote change.
The existence of a Gender Unit as a coordinator section on gender issues has been
pivotal for accomplishments observed thus far. The generation of tools to enhance gender
awareness and o f initiatives throughout MINUSTAH civilian sections and police and
military components have contributed to increase the mission's understanding ofh the
reality for local Haitian women, their needs and specific threats. Although still far from
accomplishing an equitable Haitian society, MINUSTAH has given important steps in
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that direction, particularly when strengthening local institution's capacity and advancing
an enhanced status for local women.
The different accomplishments though reflect the possibilities o f the mission to
have more or less interference in the different components and actions undertaken. The
police component, for example, is divided in UNPols who come in individual missions
and who do not respond to any national institution, and the FPUs that have a structure
similar to that of a military institution. The creation o f the different teams dedicated to
different gender aspects was a top down initiative from the Police Commissioner - with
the exception o f the Norwegian Sexual Violence team - that is carried out by individual
police personnel from different nationalities that do not come under a hierarchical
structure. Although, the specialization and number of police sent by contributing
countries

matter;

because

they

comply

with

individual missions,

the

Police

Commissioner has the option o f using most UNPol to perform whatever functions for
which he or she is most suitable, and amongst those, having gender specialists to work
within these teams.
For the military component though, it may be more difficult and it will reflect one
of the main challenges for the UN to fulfill its learning process and accomplish
institutional change. An example is that women's representation remains extremely low
within the military component and in particular within Asian countries. The presence o f
uniformed women in peace operations reflects the kind of national policies implemented
at home. The same can be said about the tasks and duties they perform.
Considerations regarding the role they perform within the battalion, if they have
equal opportunities and similar duties, are also important for analysis. Often, though,
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these important elements are dependent on the personal leadership o f the commander
who may have the female personnel performing similar tasks and duties according to
their military branch. Unfortunately, it is also the case that because they are women they
are given different tasks. Although manning policies and equal opportunities for
uniformed personnel within peace operations is part o f the UN normative, not all member
states have similar initiative and attitude, particularly in regard to gender.
Pre-deployment training goes along the same lines. For the UN to comply with its
protection o f civilian mandates and be in a better position to protect women and girls
from sexual violence, it matters how well the deployed personnel are trained on gender
issues. It also matters how soldiers behave and how much the population trust them.
Although the UN can and has in the past sent whole contingents back home due to
accusations of SEA, what can the UN do to oblige states to incorporate more women into
their military forces and have them incorporated into branches that results in more
contact with the population?
The answer is very little. Nevertheless, states committed to peace operations with
an interest in further enhancing its participation in international politics are adapting their
internal context to that o f the UN. Evidence points that some developing states are
increasingly adopting UN Resolutions on Women, Peace and security; while developed
states, particularly Europeans, promote change possibly as a ways to enhance
performance on the ground and to serve as an example. Many Latin American countries
have indeed promoted national policies to promote the participation o f women in the
military and these policies are being translated into the increasing presence o f women in
peace operations, at least amongst the military from this particular region.
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Although the different historical and cultural context may put extra challenges
amongst some countries to include a gender perspective into the work o f the deployed
personnel, few actions can be undertaken to prompt them to perform changes. The
understanding o f the operational needs o f having military women, the performance o f
functions directly related to the protection o f women, the contact with local women's
organizations promoted on the ground may slowly show the advantage o f promoting
change.
The case study o f Haiti showed, despite being slow, that a peace operation can
promote gender within the host nation and into the contributing countries as well. Gender
is an important instance through which the importance of the individual is being
enhanced in the UN. If organizational learning is an interdependent process through
which the organization creates and disseminates new practices, this case study has shown
that these practices are indeed being adopted by some member states although at a
different pace throughout different components and the various countries. The
accomplishment of positive change in this particular area has spillover effects to the
peacekeeping in general by promoting a more equitable society, sustainable economic
development and strong institutions capable of carrying out the state basic functions.
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CHAPTER 5
WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
CONGO

The case studies provide an important insight into the specific challenges the UN
confronts in disseminating a gender approach to peace operations with the intent o f better
responding to threats on the ground. The analysis o f the efforts undertaken by United
Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic o f Congo (MONUSCO)1 is
particularly important. Different from the Haiti case, where sexual violence is not an
easily recognized feature o f the crisis, the DRC is widely known as the world capital of
rape. While the attention to the topic has generated a sound normative framework and
specific strategies to protect civilians and combat sexual violence, the conflict does not
dwindle, and fighting continues, particularly in the Eastern part.
The direct consequence of the extreme levels of sexual violence and the existence
of a normative framework to deal with the problem is that awareness about gender and
the impact of war on women and girls are disseminated and specific tasks to better
protect them are in place. However, with the increasing levels of disturbances between
armed groups, the constant displacement o f the population and the government’s inability
to exercise state authority over its territory, sustained peace efforts are hampered.
Despite that, the UN’s organizational learning as an interdependent process
through which new practices are generated by the organization and disseminated to the
states has met with fertile ground in the DRC. The country has been the scenario where
1 From the French M ission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Republique
Democratique du Congo.
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numerous innovative actions to better protect the population are constantly generated.
The Analytical Inventory2 on how to address conflict-related sexual violence, for
example, draws on a number o f lessons learned from the Congolese case. However, it is
also the place where levels of violence against women do not decrease and where more
challenges are added every day.
Considering this complex scenario, this chapter will analyze MONUSCO’s
gender policy and the specific challenges it has confronted on the ground as a way to
pinpoint where the implementation gap lies, whether in the UN itself or member-states’
inability and/or unwillingness to adopt this renewed gender approach. Ultimately, this
analysis will contribute to determine whether the UN’s organizational learning and its
renewed focus on the individual are being implemented, taken into account by member
states and if changes towards that goal are being promoted.
The chapter will thus be divided in three main sections. The first provides a rich
background on Congo’s history and the vulnerable status of women within its society. An
analysis of the UN’s capacity o f delivery could not ignore the extremely complicated
context presented in the DRC. International and local dynamics constantly spurs violence
within the country, and what is worst, the targeting o f civilians has become an integral
part of warring parties’ strategy for territory dominance. “All bad things can be found in
this one place”3: intruding neighbors; local and international militia groups; a corrupt
government; an inadequate, unprepared and mischievous defense force; illegal

2 United Nations Department o f Peacekeeping Operations, "Addressing Conflict Related Sexual Violence:
An Analytical Inventory o f Peacekeeping Practice."
3 Interview with representative o f Doctors without Borders carried out in Eastern Democratic Republic o f
Congo, February, 2012.
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exploitation o f natural resources; widespread diseases and starvation and a population
that has been violated, displaced, abused and attacked many times throughout history.
In this context, women’s inferior status in Congolese society and historical
incidence of sexual violence further contributed to have this crime become its most
recognizable feature. The country has unfortunately earned the fame o f being the world
capital o f rape and “the worst place on earth to be a woman,” attracting the attention o f
the international community to the dreadful consequences o f the massive and systematic
use of sexual violence as a cheap and effective tool o f war. While attention is welcome
and joint efforts necessary, the feeling of insecurity has not faded, and social and
economic indicators have even worsened in some parts of the country. Most importantly,
in light of the Congolese context the effectiveness o f the international community efforts
are constantly questioned.
Considering this background, the second section evaluates the UN’s presence in
the country, focusing on the MONUSCO’s structure and mandate in the light of current
challenges. From the beginning, the UN’s presence in the DRC has been “special.” In
fact, the first UN mission established in the country in 1960 did not follow the traditional
parameters o f UN peacekeeping practices o f the time and was the first to incorporate a
civilian component and functions that went beyond the traditional cease-fire monitoring
to directly support the government in its efforts to maintain rule o f law and oversee the
withdrawal o f Belgian forces. MONUSCO, the last of the UN missions established in the
country, is one o f the first missions that had a mandate to protect civilians as a high
priority. Hence the UN approach to the increasing threats to civilians is based on the
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robust use o f force and innovative joint initiatives between civilian, military and police
components to better assess threats against civilians.
The third section evaluates MONUSCO’s gender policy in accordance to the five
previously defined indicators - legal framework, gender balance, security sector,
protection, women’s empowerment. Protection against sexual violence is founded on a
national strategy with various implementing partners. Likewise, peacekeepers are
authorized to use all necessary means to protect women and girls from attacks. For that
purpose, a renewed integrated mission structure with a strong protection component
running through all its sections was established. Specific offices that deal with gender
mainstreaming and sexual violence are also part o f MONUSCO’s task force to better
protect the local population.
This approach is based on an inclusive protection concept that goes well beyond
physical security. Under this premise, a strong linkage between democracy, development,
a sound judiciary system and an environment free from sexual violence and other crimes
committed against civilians exists. It then becomes evident that as such, MONUSCO’s
strategy is encompassing and depends on the joint efforts o f all its components - the
military, the police and the civilian - , UN agencies, civil society and local government to
apply this inclusive view as a crosscutting strategy to better protect Congolese citizens.
The specific features o f the Congolese background means that the military
component, being the main armed institution on the ground, does have a special role in
securing the civilian population, supporting the reaching out to remote areas, facilitating
civilian expert outreach and supporting the national forces. It is thus imperative to
understand the contextual challenges, achievements and shortcomings o f their presence
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on the ground along with the civilian initiatives as a ways of facilitating a thorough
understanding of the UN’s institutional transformation.
Despite the challenges posed by a state-driven international system, the United
Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) is a hub o f initiatives that place
the individual in the spotlight. These efforts are a direct consequence o f the protection o f
civilians mandate as a top priority and the specific context encountered in the Congo that
highlights the extreme insecurity lived by the population on a daily basis. While the
mission was planned in accordance to this renewed mandate, having norms and a
structure that fully supports this goal, there are still implementation gaps mostly related to
the inability o f Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) to adequate their input as
stipulated by the UN: the execution o f a robust mandate where a gender perspective is
integrated in terms of gender balance, adequate protection strategies and community
outreach.

The Democratic Republic of Congo, its people and their struggle for peace

The history o f the Democratic Republic of Congo is a sad story. The country is
the second largest in Africa with a population of over 71 million and one o f the poorest in
the world, with a total of 1.7 million internally displaced people and 500 thousand
refugees elsewhere.4 It is located in the heart o f sub-Saharan Africa, having borders with
eight different countries. Considering the immensity of its territory, Congo5 is lightly

4 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, “2012 UNHCR country operations profile - Democratic Republic
o f the Congo.” January, 2012. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45c366.html. Accessed:
11/28/2012.
5 From 1960 to 1965 the DRC's name was “Republic o f Congo” as its neighbor, the French Colonized
country that had Brazzaville as the capital. In that period the two Congos were distinguished either by
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populated with its inhabitants spread across a vast territory and complex geography.
Filled with jungles, natural resources and active volcanoes, the lack o f infrastructure is
still one o f the main challenges for the implementation of a successful protection strategy.
The continued violence in the country reflects a past of foreign intervention, a
corrupt dictatorship and presence of various armed groups, local and international, that
constantly attack the population and exploit its resources. While the two Congo wars
were an expression of the extreme levels o f violence, corruption and exploitation always
present in the country, the specific impact o f war on women was the reflection o f a
continuum o f violence and disregard associated with the inferior status they have held
throughout the years in society.
Foreign interventions and the presence o f armed groups are not the only
explanatory factors for the extreme levels present in the country. Complicated civilmilitary relations and internal divisions also contribute to rising disturbances and
comprise yet another layer of complexity to the causes o f war. In a place where the armed
forces were historically built to serve the elite and formed by elements o f a controversial
and ineffective DDR program, the level o f brutality is high, and human rights violation
common place. In this context, women have become the central elements o f a hideous
tactic to advance in war. Worst, sexual violence has become not only the most
recognizable feature of the conflict but also normalcy in that society.
This complex scenario requires innovative actions on the part of the UN and other
international actors involved with peace efforts. In order to adequately protect the
population and incorporate a gender approach to the peace operation established in the
Congo-Leopoldville (today Kinshasa) and Congo-Brazzaville, or simply by “the Congo” and “Congo”
respectively.
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country it is imperative that the historical roots o f the conflict and the multiple
explanatory factors that prompted it are fully understood. This section then will be
provide a thorough background of Congo’s history, focusing on the underlining factors
that led to the continued conflict in the Eastern part o f the country, the context in which
its armed forces were created and the status and current conditions o f Congolese women.

A contextual note: exploitation and war

The history of Congo has been largely characterized by the exploitation o f its
resources, its people and war. Years o f exploratory colonialism, decades o f dictatorship
and several years o f war have left a mark in this country and its people. Many o f the
Congolese have not known peace or a different life than that o f constant fear,
militarization and foreign intervention. For women, the impact o f war has been
particularly harsh. Not only have they suffered with the movement o f illegal armed
groups, lack o f economic opportunities and constant displacement, they have also been
victims of gender based crimes and fallen prey of a vicious tactic to win the war.
The exploitation o f Congo’s riches began early.6 In 1885, King Leopold II o f
Belgium acquired the country as his private property, and exploited his land - the “Congo
Free State” - with disregard to the population, having caused the death of several
thousand indigenous Congolese and enriched at the expense of his colony.7 Following
international pressure and criticism to Leopold’s actions in the Congo, the country was
“promoted” to being a Belgian colony from 1908 to 1960.

6 On a brilliant account o f King Leopold’s rule in the Congo see: Adam Hochschild, King Leopold's Ghost
: A Story o f Greed, Terror, an d Heroism in Colonial Africa (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998).
7 Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline o f the Zairian State (Madison, Wis.:
University o f Wisconsin Press, 1985). p.7
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As it is the case in most recently independent states, the Congo also had its share
of dictators, one in particular. Mobutu Sese Seko, a young army officer promoted a coup
d ’etat in 1965 ending with the initial democratic movement that followed Congo’s
independence in 1960 and concluding the government o f the first elected Congolese
president, Patrice Lumumba, assassinated in that same year.
In the Cold War environment, Mobutu’s “kleptocracy”8 would not be o f great
concern to Western observers mostly concerned with events in Europe. The leader had
successfully institutionalized a corrupt regime that contributed to the private enrichment
of the elite in power. Violation o f human rights and oppression were just the short list of
numerous other problematic actions undertaken during his rule. Soon after his rise to
power, Mobutu outlawed all political activity claiming political diversity was dangerous
for stability and created his own party, the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR)
[Popular Movement of the Revolution].9 Although presidential and legislative elections
took place in 1970, 1975, 1977, 1977, 1982 and 1987, they did not threaten Mobutu’s
autocracy, who ran as the sole candidate in a few of those.10
As opposition grew stronger against Mobutu, disturbances re-started in the
1990’s. In addition, in 1994, when 2 million Hutu refugees, including the Interahamwe
militia, who actively participated in the massacres in Rwanda, were placed in the South
Kivu, the situation deteriorated quickly. The Hutu Rwandan refugees were perceived as a
threat to Congolese with Rwandan ancestry (mostly Tutsis), who were brought to Congo
8 The term refers to the kind o f regime established during Mobutu’s rule. Widely recognized as extremely
corrupt, Mobutu’s regime would benefit a small elite by the personal enrichment through embezzlement o f
state resources.
9 Zoe Marriage, "Divisive ‘Commonality’: State and Insecurity in the Democratic Republic o f Congo,"
Third World Quaterly 32, no. 10 (2011). p.1895-6
10 Rene Lemarchand, The Dynamics o f Violence in Central Africa, National and Ethnic Conflict in the
Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 2009). p.194
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in the 1930’s by the Belgian colonizers to alleviate the over-populated neighboring
country. Violence soon broke out with attacks promoted by the recently placed refugees
against the Congolese Tutsis and Rwanda through the border and vice-versa. Rwanda
then launched an invasion in the DRC to allegedly defend these Tutsi Congolese, having
as partners anti-Mobutu elements including Laurent-Desire K abila,11 soon to be president
of the Democratic Republic o f Congo. (DRC)12
Laurent-Desire Kabila would play an important role in the following years. He
gathered support from neighboring countries, Angola in particular, and advanced through
the East and West Kasais, leading Mobutu to flee the country and the capital Kinshasa to
fall. Kabila initially placed Rwandan and Tutsi in important key positions in the
government. In fact, even the chief o f staff post was occupied by a Rwandan army
officer. However, the relationship between them soon deteriorated, prompting the
president to expel all foreign forces from Congolese territory. Angola, Zimbabwe and
Namibia came in support of the president and so began the Second Congo War.
Also known as the Third World War, the Second Congo War initiated in 1998 can
hardly be considered a civil war. Congo was divided in three parts: 1. Kabila had
Kinshasa and the south part of the territory from the Atlantic to the southern parts o f the
Kasais and Katanga, maintaining control over oil and mineral resources; 2. The north
including Equateur (Mobutu’s former Province) was controlled by the Mouvement de

11 Thomas Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and R eality (London ; New York: Zed Books, 2007).
p.2
12 Congo’s name has changed many times. After independence from Belgium, the Belgian Congo became
the Republic o f Congo. In 1965, though, the name was once again changed to the Democratic Republic o f
Congo, until 1971, when Mobutu named the country Republic o f Zaire. At that time, city names were also
changed such as Leopoldsville (Kinshasa), Stanlayville (Kisangani), Elisabethville (Lubumbashi), and
Coquihatville (Mbandaka). Finally after Kabila was in power in 2003, Zaire became once again the
Democratic Republic o f Congo.
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Liberation du Congo (MLC) [Congo Liberation Movement] backed by Uganda; 3. And
finally the East was held by Rwandan backed Congolese rebels from the Rassemblement
Congolais pour la Democratic (RCD) [Congolese Rally for Democracy] and comprised
the former Kivu, and parts o f Katanga, the Kasais and O rientale.13
Following increasing pressure from the international community a ceasefire
agreement was signed in Lusaka, 1999. The agreement fell short of its objective and with
the assassination of Kabila and the emergence o f his son Joseph Kabila as a new leader,
hopes to an effective agreement increased. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue with the
different warring parts was formed, having served as a platform of negotiation between
the different groups during the Sun City process in 2001 and Pretoria, later the same year.
Agreements with Rwanda and other foreign forces were accomplished and in exchange
for the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration o f Rwandan militia forces,
Rwanda left the DRC accompanied by the forces o f other countries.
However, one should not consider the international involvement o f Rwanda and
other regional states as the sole cause o f the First and Second Congo Wars, the Rwandan
genocide was just the catalyst for the continued violence that has taken place since then.14
The conflict in Congo is multi-layered and effortless explanations are deemed to be oversimplistic. Autessere argues that dominant narratives that focuses on the illegal
exploitation of minerals as the cause o f violence, sexual violence as the main
consequence and the extension o f the Congolese state authority as a solution to the
problem have in fact contributed to the deterioration to the situation o f Congo during the

13 Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, an d Reality, p.6
14 Gerard Prunier, A frica'S W orld War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide and the Making o f a Continental
Catastrophe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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transition period (2003-2006).15 Her argument is that grassroots rivalries over land,
corruption, controversial civil-military relations and the influence o f external powers
have all contributed to the violence in the Congo during and after the wars.
It seems indeed that the “resource curse” is a popular explanation for Congo’s
demise. The simplicity of the logic, though, may hinder domestic aspects that are o f
outmost importance to understand the events that took place in 1996 and 1998 and which
resulted in the escalation o f violence committed by various armed groups, national and
international, against the civilian population. The understanding of these complex aspects
of the Congolese context is imperative to the design o f adequate strategies o f protection,
including those regarding women and girls from sexual violence.
During the war, 81% of the Eastern population was obliged to flee the country
and more than one third had been abducted for at least a week.16 The presence o f foreign
forces, in particular foreign militia, aligned to Mobutu’s elitist government led the
indigenous population to organize themselves as well. That was the origins o f the Mai
Mai, which comprise different indigenous combatant groups originally dedicated to
protecting the native population from the attacks o f foreign bands.
The Mai Mai, which in Swahili means “water water”, became numerous and
powerful, particularly over the 1990’s with 10 to 25 thousand soldiers that joined forces
with Kabila in the 1996/97 conflict against Mobutu.17 They maintain a confusing
relationship with the local population until nowadays. Although originally formed to

15 Severine Autesserre, "Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and Their Unintended
Consequences " African Affairs 111, no. 443 (2012).
16 Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality, p. 10
17 Jocelyn Kelly, "Rape in War: M otives o f Militia in the Drc," in Special Report (Washington D. C.:
United States Institute o f Peace, June, 2010). p. 4
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protect the local villages, with the deterioration o f economic conditions over the war,
they soon started to loot them too.18 As explained by a military observer in the Walikale
territory “Many Mai Mai know nothing but to combat, and so they try to integrate them
into the national army. They protect the people, but also attack them, it is a paradoxical
relationship.” 19 In fact, some Mai Mai groups are also involved in massive rapes and
other human rights violations, one o f the reasons why they are also included in the peace
negotiation process and the following DDR approach to be integrated into the national
army.20
As this brief description of the Congolese context shows, there are foreign and
international factors accounting for the wars as much as macro and micro dynamics that
contributed to spur violence locally. Although the peace settlement had momentarily
solved the international and macro-level dynamics with the disengagement of the
neighboring countries from the Congolese conflict, the sub-national and micro-dynamics
continued to take place with the alleged backing of bordering states and the constant
attack and looting of villages, especially in the eastern part of Congo. The continued
failure of the international community to address conflict mediation at this local level
partially explains the unrelenting violence that continues to take place in the DRC.21
These micro and macro dynamics influence and feed each other. Although the
peace process has formally brought an end to the conflict, the influence of external
18 Severine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: L ocal Violence and the Failure o f International
Peacebuilding, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010). p.7
19 Interview carried out with military observer deployed in the Walikale territory on February, 2012.
20 On an interesting account o f motivations and reasons for committing sexual violence against the
population, USIP has conducted a number o f interviews with members o f two different Mai Mai groups.
For a report on the research results, see: Kelly, "Rape in War: Motives o f Militia in the Drc.".
21Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: L ocal Violence and the Failure o f International Peacebuilding.
p.8

256

powers in the DRC continues affecting thus the local levels of violence. Rwanda in
particular is accused by several local organizations and experts o f illegally supporting
militia groups as a way to continue benefitting from Congo resources and influencing
Congolese politics in regards to the Tutsi minority with Rwandan ancestry. As an
illustration, in November 2012, a “new” militia group - the M23 - had taken over the city
o f Goma in North Kivu increasing the levels o f insecurity and uncertainty regarding the
future o f Congo as a unified state.22
Amongst civil society representatives accusations of Rwandan intervention in the
DRC were numerous. “The conflict keeps going, the weapons multiply, it is obvious that
there is someone behind it. Where are they [rebels] getting the weapons from? The
international community needs to speak to Rwanda and they need to be out of here.”23 In
another instance, the interviewee questioned: “This is a Rwandan occupation, and
everybody knows, why the silence?”24
Amongst women’s group, Rwanda was accused of using sexual violence in the
DRC, as a strategy of occupation. “It is an act of humiliation and o f destruction. They
introduce weapons, objects and sand in the women, they transmit AIDS. It is a form of

22 As o f March 2013, the group left the city o f Goma and other key cities that were occupied and his leader
turned him self in to the ICC. It is argued that the group was weakened when divided in two as they fought
against each other. A s o f March, rebels were on the run or had turned themselves to UN peacekeepers. For
an account o f M-23 invasion o f Goma. See: Anjan Sundaram, "That Other War," Foreign Policy,
November 20th 2012. For more recent information see: Malcom Webb, "Congo’s M23 Rebels on the Run,"
AI Jazeera, March 18,2013.
23 Interview carried out with representative from the local organization Caucus de Femme Congolaise in
Bukavu, February, 2012.
24 Interview carried out with representative from the Panzi hospital in Bukavu, February, 2012.
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genocide and a strategy o f occupation by the foreign forces to annex the DRC, explore its
resources and exterminate the local population.” 25
M23 is not the only group though, fighting continues amongst several armed
groups, both Congolese, including the Mai Mai and from neighboring countries such as
the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), acting especially in the
Kivus and the Lord Resistant Army (LRA) in the Orientale Province, just to cite some.
Although some of these groups still fight for the domination of different territories,
especially in the East, some of them have lost force, consisting in groups of bandits who
promote looting and banditry, sometimes by extremely violent actions, including mass
rapes.
Despite that, the top-down conflict resolution implemented by the United Nations
and other involved organizations and diplomatic efforts have allowed the country to
experience relative calm in the Western part o f the country, where democratic elections in
2006 and 2011, elected Joseph Kabila as President o f the Democratic Republic o f Congo.
By no means a strong and democratic state has been established in the Congo tough.
Besides unable to control the immense Congolese territory, various irregularities were
noted on election day, such as missing ballots and voter registration; and prior to the
elections, constitutional amendments have allegedly changed electoral rules in favor of
Kabila “in blatant violation o f democratic principles” .26
The reality thus is that the DRC is in the limbo between a conflict and post
conflict state, with armed groups moving around, shifting motivations and alliances,
25 Interview carried out with representative from the local organization Caucus de Femme Congolaise in
Bukavu, February, 2012.
26 Mvemba Phezo Dizolele and Pascal Kalume Kambale, "The Drc’s Crumbling Legitimacy," Journal o f
D em ocracy 23 no. 3 (2012). p .l 10
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many o f them using sexual violence and other forms o f abuse as a weapon o f war and a
way to undermine the enemy’s ability to fight by raping men, women and children.

The security sector in the DRC

The security sector in the DRC is in deep need o f reform. Both the police and the
armed forces have been continuously implicated in pillages and abuses against the
civilian population. The common assumption emphasizes that the main reason for the
recurrence o f these acts is the low salaries and living conditions o f Congolese security
forces.27 However, this one dimensional explanation may be too simplistic, leaving aside
important contextual factors that are important to understand Congolese security forces
behavior associated with rampant human rights violations (including sexual violence)28,
illegal exploitation o f natural resources, deteriorated civil-military relations, and low
quality service.
In varied occasions during the field work in the DRC uniformed personnel’s low
salary was pointed to as an important factor explaining the opportunity cost o f security
forces personnel involved with illegal activities.29 The average salary o f the police and
military is between 45 to 70 dollars as was informed by many of the interviewees on the

27 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Ola Olsson, "Feeding the Horse: Unofficial Economic Activities within the
Police Force in the Democratic Republic o f the Congo," African Security 4, no. 4 (2011). p.224
28According to a Harvard Humanitarian Initiative research. 52% o f victims o f rape that were taken to Panzi
hospital described their perpetrator as armed combatant .including Congolese uniformed personnel; while
42% were identified as “assailants”. The research strongly suggests though that the pattern o f violence
indicates that this group is also mostly comprised o f armed combatants. See: Harvard Humanitarian
Initiative, '"Now, the World without Me': An Investigation o f Sexual V iolence in Eastern o f the Democratic
Republic o f Congo," (Cambridge: OXFAM International; Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, April, 2010).
29 Different actors on the ground, including MONUSCO high rank civilians, military and police
representatives from Kinshasa and elsewhere shared concern regarding personnel low salaries and delayed
payments, attributing it as an important explanation for their involvement in criminal activities.
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field.30 Although, it is certainly true that the reported amount is not enough to establish
acceptable standards of living for the personnel and their families, explanations focused
on a deteriorated payment structure for security agents should be accompanied by
considerations on the background facts on the security sector in the DRC.
Congo has never had a military force with adequate functioning standards as
envisioned by the West. Even before independence, Congo’s force, the “Force Publique,”
[Public Force] was formed by Belgian officers and native soldiers with the objective of
refraining any resistance to the exploitation of the country by the metropolis.31 In fact, it
was not until the end o f the colonization period that Congolese nationals would start to be
trained as commissioned officers. Consequently, when the sudden independence came,
the recently created Armee Nationale Congolaise (ANC) [Congolese National Army]
would soon be dragged into a mutiny.
The expulsion of more than 1,000 European officers from the army and the
concession of officers’ rank to Congolese non-commissioned officers did not improve the
situation, and when Mobutu and his kleptocratic state came into power the same pattern
of exploitation was established. The leader would privilege a few divisions, often from
the same ethnic group that he pertained to, exporting to the now Congolese Armed Force
(from the French Forces Armees Congolaise - FAC) the same model he used to rule the
country: a small privileged group that received most o f the resources, creating thus
division and tensions within the army.32 After the 1990’s the situation of the armed forces

30 Information gathered through a series o f interviewees with different actors on the ground that have
repeatedly repeated the low salaries as one explanatory factor for continued violence by Congolese forces.
31 Colin Robinson, "Army Reconstruction in the Democratic Republic o f the Congo 2003-2009," Small
Wars & Insurgencies 23, no. 3 (2012). p. 475
32 Ibid. p.477
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would deteriorate even more as they were left to forage on its own when Mobutu
considered his position could be threatened by a strong national army.
Congolese forces also presented - and still do - very low quality, having been
“saved” by foreign support that came in their help during the 1970’s against Angola’s
incursions (Morocco, France and Belgium) and in the 1990’s against Rwanda (Angola,
Zimbabwe and Namibia). It is thus in this context that the process of Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) took place after the signing o f the Global and
All-inclusive Agreement in 2002 that put a formal end to the conflict in the DRC. It was
then decided that the new military force, the French Forces Armees de la Republique
Democratic du Congo - FARDC) [Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic o f Congo],
would be formed by warring factions including the former FAC, Congolese Rally for
Democracy, Movement for the Liberation o f Congo, Ituri militias and Mai Mai. Later, in
2009, an accelerated process o f integration also allowed members o f the National
Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), highly implicated in human rights
violation, to be part of the national military forces.33
The inclusion of the warring parties was done through the “brassage” process,
consisting in the re-grouping o f disarmed fighters, 45-day training at different
orientations centers and the creation of 18 brigades to defend Congolese territory.34 Most
critics to the process refer to the incipient training, delayed brigade formations and the
issuance of ranks to militia men that have abused and looted the population for years as
33 The CNDP is a political armed militia established by Laurent Nkunda. Nkunda and his rebel force are
accused o f having swept through from the northeast and occupying the city o f Bukavu in an episode that
passed to history as “the killing o f Bukavu”. The destruction path caused by Nkunda earned him an arrest
warrant from the International Criminal Court, brought about in 2009 in Rwanda.
34 It is also important to add that since Mobutu’s reign and still nowadays, Congolese government prefers
bilateral agreements with donors willing to support the national armed forces, resulting in different
countries being responsible for different training centers, without a unified method and doctrine.
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one o f the main factors that explains the continued levels o f violence in the country.35
Moreover, it is arguable that the formation o f new brigades to break down old loyalties
and establish a unified chain o f command was achieved. Baaz and Stem argue that
mostly they remain responsive to their former belligerent leaders creating thus a
dysfunctional accountability and command structure.36
While the armed forces of Congo have never had an ethos directed towards
national security or of protection, the re-integration o f combatants into society through
their inclusion in the armed forces, and occasionally in the police, has been the object of
criticism by various observers and counted as one of MONUSCO’s main failures. The
involvement o f these groups with sexual violence prior and after the DDR process further
fuels the discussion.
Indeed, considerations regarding MONUSCO’s role in the pacification process of
the DRC varied according to different actors, particularly amongst different local and
international civil society organizations, but critics would focus on the organization’s
involvement in the DDR. Most were aware o f MONUSCO’s role in supporting the
security situation and argued that without the fortified UN presence, the country would
quickly revert to generalized chaos.37 Some though, would directly blame the

35 Interviews with local civil society organizations showed that these were particularly critical o f DDR
process and how it promoted the institutionalization o f violence against civilians through the integration o f
combatants into the armed forces.
36 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stem, "The Complexity o f Violence: A Critical Analysis o f Sexual
V iolence in the Democratic Republic o f Congo (Drc)," in SID A Working P aper on G ender ba sed Violence
(Uppsala, Sweden: SID A, 2010).p. 17.
37 Interviewed civil society organizations included two major international organizations, International
Committee o f the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders; local organizations included the Reseau Action
Femme ( a network conformed by several grassroots organizations dedicated to different aspects o f women
empowerment), the Comite National Femme et Developpement (another network o f organizations
throughout all Congolese territory that work to advance a gender approach in the society) and Caucus de
Femme Congolaises du Sud Kivu (an organization that attempts to advance women’s rights and
empowerment in South Kivu).
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organization for the continued levels of violence due to its direct involvement in the DDR
process that resulted in unprepared and unwilling state force that often harasses those
they should protect, and their inability to act and stop massacres, that often happen not far
away from peacekeepers’ military bases.38 A representative from a local civil society
organization explains “In order to have them join the army, they promote them, increase
their ranks. What they are doing is giving state authority to criminals”.39 Along the same
lines, an employee from Doctors without Borders highlighted the problem of having
militia men without resources as an official state authority “Problem is that they let them
join the military with the same fictitious rank they had when part o f the militia and with
no money, they blatantly attack the population.”40
Others though, would blame MONUSCO’s contradictory mandate o f protecting
the population and supporting a week government and its inadequate security forces.
“MONUSCO has the mandate to protect civilians and support local government. That
then becomes, MONUSCO observes and the government supposedly protects. It doesn’t
work. In the end, the government does not protect and MONUSCO does not interfere.
MONUSCO is a spectator, it is the civil society who does it all.” 41

38 Accounts o f UN inability to respond to attacks are various. A well-documented case is the Walikale
massacre, when in the period o f three days 303 men, women and children were raped in six villages within
the Walikale territory, North Kivu. Although a UN military base was not far from the place where the
incident took place, it was not until three days later that the UN allegedly learned about the incident. It was
argued that the poor infra-structure for transport and communication contributed to U N ’s alienation. Since
then, an Indian company was detached to the territory to improve the security. On the investigation o f the
case, see: MONUSCO and Office o f the High Commissiner for Human Rights, "Final Report o f the FactFinding Missions o f the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office into the Mass Rapes and Other Human
Rights Violations Committed by a Coalition o f Armed Groups Along the Kibua-Mpofi A xis in Walikale
Territory, North Kivu, from 30 July to 2 August, 2010" (Kinshasa: United Nations, July, 2011).
39 Interview carried out with representative from the Caucus de Femme Congolaises du Sud Kivu in
Bukavu, February, 2012.
40 Interview carried out with representative o f Doctors Without Borders in Bukavu, February, 2012.
41 Interview carried out with representative from the Caucus de Femme Congolaises du Sud Kivuin
Bukavu, February, 2012.
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Although less in the spotlight, the involvement o f Congolese police, the Police
National Congolaise (PNC) [Congolese National Police], has also been reported.
According to Baaz and Olsson, the predation o f resources and other abuses is also found
in the police.42 In fact, they argue that these acts are not the result o f random
undisciplined soldiers but a well-organized movement that goes all the way up into the
hierarchy. As much as the armed forces are in deep need o f reform, so is the police.
Although at a much lesser extent, combatants were also integrated into the police formed
by a wide range o f Congolese that include former members o f the military and the newly
integrated militia men.43

Women in the DRC

The continued presence o f armed groups, particularly in the Eastern part o f the
country, the long history o f political instability and the vulnerable status of the
population, particularly women and children have facilitated the continued recurrence of
sexual violence and attacks. In fact, over 200,000 cases of rape have been recorded in the
DRC since 1996. The precise data is unknown since the limited access to remote areas,
stigma and fear of victims to come forward, and lack of clinics for medical treatment,
have impeded the appropriate data collection and it is believed that many more cases
remain unnoticed.
The root causes o f sexual violence in the DRC are varied and cannot be
oversimplified. While widespread and systematic violence committed by uniformed

42 Baaz and Olsson, "Feeding the Horse: Unofficial Economic Activities within the Police Force in the
Democratic Republic o f the Congo." p.223
43 Ibid. p.226
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personnel (armed groups and government security forces) comprise the majority o f cases,
the conflict is not the only to blame. The practice is not new in the country, and is also
connected to the inferior status o f women. Since the time o f King Leopold II, sexual
violence was practiced as a way to punish communities and teach a lesson.44 The
inferiority of women has been an embedded feature o f the indigenous social system since
the colonial era and has persisted ever since 45
Restrained to the private sphere, as wives and mothers, Congolese women have
always had limited access to education, being mostly involved with agricultural work,
firewood gathering, water hauling and the conduct o f informal small businesses.
According to Puechguirbal,46 prior to the conflict there was a gap between Congolese law
and reality in regard to gender equality. Evidence o f that was the reaffirming o f the
equality o f rights between men and women and the prohibition of forced marriage to
young girls, when customary practice indicated the opposite. Not only girls were and
continue to be forced to marry at a very young age, women were deprived of inheritance
at the death of the husband, and in-laws would keep the house and goods the couple had
acquired. Activities outside the household required an authorization from the husband,
including acquisition o f passport, severely limiting their possibilities o f becoming
independent and strengthening their social and economic status in the society.
Another paradoxical reality is the legal prohibition of polygamy and the
customary practice. According to a representative of the Gender Affairs Office, these are
44 Muadi Mukenge, Aim ee Mwadi Kady, and Caitlin Stanton, "Funding W om en's Movement against
Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic o f Congo: 2004-2009 " (San Francisco: Globan Fund for
Women, February, 2010). p. 10
45 Sandra W. Meditz et al., Zaire: A Country Study, 4th ed., Area Handbook Series, (Washington, D.C.: The
Division : For sale by the Supt. o f D ocs., U.S. G.P.O., 1994).
46 Nadine Puechguirbal, "Women and War in the Democratic Republic o f the Congo," Signs 28, no. 4
(2003). p.1272
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gender issues that persist in Congolese society and ought to be considered in all actions
carried by the UN.47 The Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and
Resettlement program (DDR/RR), for example, needs to consider the fact that a
combatant may have more than one wife and each have different kids. In practice, what
happens is that only one o f the women is included in the DDR/RR program and the others
are left behind with the children without a place to stay, further increasing their
vulnerability.
As it is seen from this example, this was true in the pre-war period and it still is
nowadays, putting into evidence the need o f a better understanding o f Congolese culture
and customs as a way to better protect the population. A research carried out with leaders
o f local communities supports this claim 48 According to the study, women are from a
young age socialized that men are positioned above her, and while they grow up with the
pride o f superiority women are raised accustomed to their inferiority. “Leaders implied
that violence against women was tacitly condoned by institutionalized, male dominance
with husbands often cited as perpetrators.”49
It is also important to note that most literature depicts Congolese women as
victims, when their role as active participants o f the peace process should also be
reinforced. War affect men, women and children in different ways, however, it also
changes established gender relations by empowering women left behind. It is thus

47 Interview carried out with Gender Affairs Office representative in Eastern Democratic Republic o f
Congo, February, 2012.
48P. Olssona and B.M. Ahlberg J.E. Trenholma, "Battles on W om en’s Bodies: War, Rape and
Traumatisation in Eastern Democratic Republic o f Congo," G lobal Public Health 6, no. 2 (2011).
49 Ibid. p. 145
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imperative to reconsider gender relations in the post-war period so that local society does
not return to pre-war normalcy.
The two Congo wars have affected the women in many ways: they end up bearing
the brunt of the household, being left behind to care for the children and the elderly,
confronting shortage of food, wood, water and health care. They often have to travel
large distances to find resources, further exposing themselves to violence. Moreover, to
escape violence, many run to the jungle where access to humanitarian aid, food or
medical assistance is limited. The International Rescue Committee has reported that
deaths in 2001 were mostly indirectly caused by the conflict as they were the result of
malnutrion and disease due to the population’s difficulties to access resources.50
However, the war has also brought women some independence and comprised an
important moment seized by women’s organization as a way to start changing the pattern
o f gender relations in the DRC. When they were left alone to care for themselves, they
were able to control their own income, gaining relative independence.51 As prices o f
goods would become higher during the conflict, women would organize themselves to
acquire goods and sell for increased prices, being able to maximize their profits.
Nevertheless, their presence in the peace process that took place was limited,
particularly in the initial phase and confronted several challenges. The 1999 Lusaka
Agreement did not have any women delegates and did not consider specific gender needs.
Moreover, as the integration o f women delegates was not a requirement for the Inter

50 Robert Les et al., "Mortality in Eastern Democratic Republic o f the Congo: Results from Eleven
Mortality Surveys," (Bukavu, Democratic Republic o f Congo: International Rescue Committee, 2001).
51 Puechguirbal, "Women and War in the Democratic Republic o f the Congo." p .1274
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Congolese Dialogue52, it became extremely difficult for Congolese women to join the
negotiation table.53
Parties of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue included the Government o f the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), the
Movement for the Liberation o f the Congo (MLC), the political opposition, civil society,
the Congolese Rally for Democracy/Liberation Movement (RDC/ML), the Congolese
Rally for Democracy/National (RCD/N) and the Mai-Mai.54 The objective was to agree
on the reunification of the Congo and on pressing matters o f post-war reconstruction,
such as the judiciary system, the security sector, peace process, etc. It was thus important
to include specific concerns o f Congolese women, highly victimized during the conflict,
and establish landmarks to the creation of a more equitable local society.
Being an important interested party, the women should thus be included. As
expressed by a representative of the Caucus de Femme Congolaise, an organization that
participated in the Dialogue, “In war, women are the first victim. There is no peace if
women are not at peace. Peace for men is different from the peace for women. A
sustainable peace is only accomplished if the two are considered.”55 And so, despite
initial difficulties, with the support of UNIFEM and the Dialogue facilitator, Sir Ketumile

52 The Inter Congolese Dialogue consisted in a series o f conversations between the warring parties,
members o f the Congolese government and civil society organization to draft a peace agreement between
all parties. It was facilitated by the former president o f Botswana, Ketumile Masire, and was opened in
Addis Ababa. Its main contribution though occurred during the Sun City process, when parties to the
Dialogue discussed and agreed on various issues to be included in the Global and Inclusive Agreement on
Transition in the DR Congo signed in Pretoria, South Africa.
53 Shelly Whitman, "Women and Peace-Building in the Democratic Republic o f Congo: A s Assessment o f
Their Role in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue," AJCR 6, no. 1 (2006). p.37
54 Inter Congolese Dialogue, "Political Negotiations on the Peace Process and on Transition in the Drc:
Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic o f Congo" (Pretoria: December
16, 2002).
55 Interview carried out with representative from the Caucus de Femme Congolaises du Sud Kivu in
Bukavu, February, 2012.
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Masire, former President of Bostwana, financial support, expertise and pressure on the
agreement parties and regional governments 40 women delegates participated in the
negotiations. They were able to provide limited, although invaluable, contributions to
peace efforts and include gender considerations in some o f the Dialogue’s commission,
particularly on the Humanitarian, Social and Cultural Commission, during the 2001 Sun
City negotiations.56
Amongst contributions, specific recommendation on the need o f rehabilitation
centers for victims, establishment of a national watchdog on human rights issues, the
review o f legal instruments that discriminate women, and in the framework o f the Peace
and Reconciliation Commission, the presence o f women in the National Commission for
Truth and Reconciliation so that their specific concerns are heard and considered.
Nonetheless, some pressing issues, including discussions on the reconfiguration o f the
armed forces and the reform of the judiciary system were not fully discussed during the
2001 Sun City process. Although parties reached and signed the agreement in Pretoria,
December 2002, containing specifications on these two issues, gender issues were not
fully considered.
This is not a complete backlash though. The participation of the female delegates
contributed to bringing the subject to the table and reinforcing women’s movement in
Congo. Delegates and other women activists received multiple training on gender issues
to better participate during the process, women’s organizations increased considerably

56 On the participation o f the female delegates in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue See: Whitman, "Women
and Peace-Building in the Democratic Republic o f Congo: As Assessment o f Their Role in the InterCongolese Dialogue.", Puechguirbal, "Women and War in the Democratic Republic o f the Congo."
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during the period and finally they were also in contact with women’s movement from
neighboring countries, particularly Burundi, Kenya and Rwanda.57
In February 2002, women from across the DRC met with warring parties,
government and civil society representatives to share their concerns. The product was the
Nairobi Declaration and an Action Plan that called for an immediate cease-fire, inclusion
o f women and their concerns in all aspects o f the peace process, the formation o f a
Congolese women’s caucus and the adoption o f a 30% quota for women at all levels of
government. The document was delivered to His Excellency Ketumile Masire, facilitator
of the Dialogue, to be included in the agenda o f the initiative.
Although the 30% quota of women in government was not included and the
underrepresentation of women in the Congolese government continues until nowadays,
important achievements were made. Women political participation has increased and
women’s social movements have multiplied and gathered resources. In the 2005
referendum on the new Constitution, women comprised 60% of voters and despite the
limited number o f candidates (and elected representatives for that matter) their
participation in the 2006 democratic elections was massive.58 According to the Inter
parliamentary Union, today women comprise 12.5% o f all ministerial positions, 8.9% of
Congress representatives and only 4.6% of Senate delegates.59

57 Workshops and conferences with regional w om en’s organization were important as it offered a forum to
share experiences and strengthen a regional perspective. More on this topic, see Doris Mpomou, "Women’s
Participation in Peace Negotiations: Discourse in the Democratic Republic o f the Congo," in The
Implementation o f Quotas: African Experiences, Quota R eport Series, ed. Julie Ballington (Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assitance, 2004).
58 Mukenge, Kady, and Stanton, "Funding W om en's Movement against Sexual V iolence in the Democratic
Republic o f Congo: 2004-2009 ". p.8
59 Data concerning Congolese women ministerial positions is from 2010 while women position in the
Congress and Senate are from 2010. Information can be found at: www.ipu.org. Access: 11/11/2012
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Women’s organizations have received renewed support and have worked
tirelessly on the promotion of women’s rights and awareness through workshops and
trainings, the economic and political empowerment o f women through the promotion of
professional education and support to women candidates, legal and medical assistance to
victims o f rape, strengthening networks and contributing thus to the solidification o f their
movement in the country and across the region.60
It is also important to note that in 2006, a landmark bill criminalizing rape was
passed by the government, providing thus the legal support victims need to accomplish
justice. However, the implementation gap is still wide, “Law is good, but implementation
gap is very big” confirmed a representative from the UN’s Gender Affairs Office.61
Women’s vulnerable status in a war tom society, weak state authority and incapacity to
apply the law and activate the judiciary system (when there is one) along with the
breakdown o f the community’s protection mechanisms all contribute to the escalation of
sexual and gender based violence in conflict and post conflict situations, including the
DRC.
While rape and other forms of sexual violence remain widespread amongst militia
groups and even government forces, recent statistics have shown that male civilian
perpetrators are increasing, bringing yet another challenge: avoid that rape and sexual
violence be normalized in society. In an interview with a Sexual Violence representative
in Eastern DRC, it was explained that the case o f Province Orientale, where most
60 On the work o f different wom en’s organizations in the DRC. See: Muadi Mukenge, "Funding Women's
Movement Against Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic o f Congo: 2004-2009 ".The analysis is
limited to the organizations that received the financial support o f the Global Fund for Women, however it
comprises an illustration o f the varied work developed by these grassroots and local organizations in
English and the impact they have at the local level.
61 Interview with representative o f MONUSCO Gender Affairs Office was carried out in Kinshasa,
February, 2012.
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recorded cases of sexual violence are caused by civilians, is a quagmire and a sign that
these acts may be becoming “normalized” in Congolese society.62 It was added that the
existence o f traditional mechanisms o f compensation between the family and the
perpetrator is contributing to this process.
In a visit to Bunia, located in that same province, representatives from Human
Rights and Rule of Law sections reinforced that claim.63 They both mentioned that most
cases in this region are committed by civilians against other civilians, in which case they
cannot interfere since the UN has jurisdiction only in cases where combatants and
uniformed personnel are involved. Consequently, only the cases involving armed groups,
the national police or the armed forces benefit from their role of supporting the national
judicial system.64 According to the Human Rights representative, the biggest problem in
the country is corruption and the challenge to put the judicial system in place in detriment
of financial arrangements.
The Rule o f Law representative on its part also spoke about the local mindset and
the perception regarding Congolese women. Many times, young girls are given to marry
in exchange of a dowry, and so changing a local practice may also present itself as an
extra challenge. Another problem he pointed out is the lack of resources for PNC and
FARDC. “You know what they often do? They just give them a weapon and say ‘Here is

62 Interview with representative o f Sexual V iolence Unit was carried out in Eastern Democratic Republic o f
Congo, February, 2012.
63 Interviews with MONUSCO substantive sections in Province Oriental were carried out in Bunia,
Province Oriental, February, 2012. Besides representatives from the Human Rights and Rule o f Law
Sections, Civilian Affairs, STAREC, Child protection, CDU and UNPol were also present. The meeting
was presided by the Head o f Office.
64 Although the MONUSCO cannot start judicial process, they can put pressure on local authorities and
support investigation and trial processes. The Prosecution Supporting C ells, for example, are multi-sector
teams, conformed by civilian, military and police experts that actively engage with the national military
justice system to advance prosecutions o f human rights violence cases.
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your salary, your food and your woman’. And so they use the weapon, they loot and
rape.”65
The number of cases in Province Oriental is impressive, particularly when
considering that most cases involve civilians and as such, the UN has no jurisdiction to
act on victims’ behalf. However, it is the provinces o f South and North Kivu where the
greatest number of cases o f sexual violence have been reported. In these places,
perpetrators are often uniformed personnel, either belonging to armed groups or
government forces. The UN does have jurisdiction to act in cases involving armed groups
and it has often done so, as in the case o f the Walikale massacre; however, getting the
Congolese justice system to work is a challenge that cannot be understated.
Statistical analysis is complicated. First they do not show all actual cases and may
in fact hide an even more abominable reality; secondly, it can misguide actions. The
increase o f recorded cases may only indicate that reporting systems are more readily
available for victims, while a decrease in recorded cases may be a sign that women are
less willing to come forward or fearful o f reprisals.
Despite that, collecting information and mapping cases of sexual violence in the
DRC facilitate the provision o f an adequate response based on geographical area where
incidents happen, perpetrators’ profile, type, etc. The data provided by MONUSCO’s
Sexual Violence Unit indicate that cases in 2008 summed up 15,314, in 2009 15,297 and
in 2010 14,591.66 The figure below shows the breakdown o f cases in 2010 for each
province.

65 Interview with representative from M ONUSCO Joint Human Rights O ffice was carried out in Bunia,
February, 2012.
66 Data provided by Sexual Violence Unit by e-mail on February, 2012.
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Figure 5: Cases of rape in the DRC, 2010
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There are different trends regarding the recurrence o f sexual violence in the
DRC:67
Widespread and systematic: this is mostly identified in the East, particularly in the
South Kivu Province, with frequent occurrences in North Kivu and more randomly in
Orientale Province. It refers to those cases in which rape is deployed as a method of
warfare by armed groups and is used to subjugate and undermine the enemy and mark
control o f territory.
Widespread and opportunistic: also mostly identified in the East, these are
unfortunately a common feature o f attacks by armed groups and ordinary civilians taking

67 The categorization and analysis on sexual violence trends were provided by the Sexual V iolence Unit by
e-mail on February, 2012.
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advantage of conflict and chaos to attack women. Interviews carried out in the three
Eastern provinces, showed that many armed groups, foreign and national, and even the
Congolese National Armed Force, attack and loot villages randomly, sometimes without
a political agenda as is the case o f LRA in Orientale. A side effect o f these attacks is rape
against women and young girls.
Isolated and random: encompassing a domestic criminal matter, unrelated to
political strategy or to international peace and security, these were commonly found in
the Western part o f the country, but also in the Eastern provinces. The U N ’s difficulty in
dealing with these cases is that it is usually committed by civilians, corresponding
exclusively to the national government the responsibility to act and push for a judicial
response.
Sexual violence, including rape, forced prostitution, sexual mutilation and slavery
is a particular hideous crime that has serious consequences for the whole community and
not only for the victim. Occasionally, members o f the family are forced to watch rape or
to have sexual intercourse with their relatives leading to moral destruction and the
erosion o f the fabric of the society. Besides the public humiliation, victims are often
exposed to sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV, and are seen as a source of
destruction by the rest of society. Husbands and children are often traumatized too, not
only because of public stigmatization, but also because they are often unable to defend
their family, thus affecting men’s mental health and masculinity.
Denis Mukwege is a doctor at the Panzi hospital, one o f the few centers
specialized in gynecology and obstetrics in Bukavu, South Kivu Province. Throughout

275

his life he has dedicated his life to women victim of sexual violence. In an interview with
Eve Ensler to Glamour, he says:
When rape is done in front o f your family, it destroys everyone. I have
seen men suffer who watched their wives raped; they are not mentally
stable anymore. The children are in even worse condition. Most o f the
time, when a woman suffers this much violence, she is not able to bear
children afterward. Clearly these rapes are not done to satisfy any sexual
desire but to destroy the soul. The whole family and community are
broken.68
For that reason, specific provisions for women have been present in UN
resolutions concerning the mission’s mandate from the beginning. Security Council
Resolution 1291 (2000)69, for example, included as MONUC’s mandate the facilitation of
humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring, with particular attention to
vulnerable groups including women, children and demobilized child soldiers. Resolution
1565 (2004)70 on its part mandated MONUC with the assistance in the promotion and
protection o f human rights, with particular attention to women, children and vulnerable
persons, including investigating human rights violations to put an end to impunity.
Finally, resolution 1794 (2007) condemned sexual violence perpetrated by militias,
armed groups, elements of Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC), National Police (PNC)
and any other security forces and urged UN Country team and partners “to strengthen
prevention, protection, and response to sexual violence, including through training for the
Congolese security forces in accordance with its mandate, and to regularly report,

68 Eve Ensler, “Women Left for Dead - and the Man who is saving them”, Glamour, August, 2007.
Available at: http://www.glamour.com/maeazine/2007/08/rape-in-the-congo . Accessed: 11/11/2012.
69 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1291", February 24, 2000,
http ://www. un.org/ ga/ search/vie w d o c .asp?symbol=S/RES/1291 (2000).
70 "Resolution 1565", October 1, 2004,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1565% 20% 282004% 29.
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including in a separate annex if necessary, on actions taken in this regard, including
factual data and trend analyses of the problem”.71
Since then, MONUSCO has supported Congolese government efforts to combat
sexual violence through a coordinated work of all its components. The national
ownership o f the Strategy to Combat Sexual Violence, the involvement o f a broad range
of actors, a strengthened coordination mechanism and continuous exchange of
information are the core of the UN’s efforts. On another note, actions to improve
women’s status and strengthen their position in Congolese society are also taken by the
mission. These are to be analyzed in the following sections.
The analysis in this section has shown that Congo’s long history o f exploitation
and war have had an unforgiving impact on the population. From its inception, Congo has
been exploited at the expense o f its people and has been the object o f foreign
interventions aimed at exploiting its riches and its population. At the same time though,
Congo itself has been the scenario of micro-level and internal conflicts amongst different
ethnic groups that further enhanced the vulnerability of its population. The lack of
government capacity to exercise authority over its territory and the ill-trained and
implicated armed forces are extra challenges to add to this already complex scenario
where rule of law is practically absent.
In this context women have been and remain the biggest victims. As much as the
Haitian case, there is a continuum o f violence that has been present before the wars in
Congo. Rather than simply a war-time atrocity, rape in the DRC is a reflection o f the
vulnerable status of women in that society. Throughout time they have been regarded as
71 "Resolution 1794", December 21, 2007,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1794%282007%29.

277

second class citizens and stripped from their rights. That is why, any protection strategy
will only be effective if it considers this continuum of violence and addresses their
structural vulnerability as well.
The following section will provide a rich background on the UN’s past
intervention in the DRC and the current configuration o f the peace mission present in the
country for the analysis o f how gender was integrated in the DRC.

The UN in the DRC

As much as foreign involvement in the DRC and recurrence o f violence against
an unarmed civilian population is a constant in its history, the involvement o f the UN is
also not new in the country. During the 1960’s crisis the UN was called by the new
Congolese government to support the country’s independence and territorial integrity.
Interestingly, the United Nations Operations in the Congo (O N U C )72 is considered a
milestone in the history of UN peacekeeping “in terms of the responsibilities it had to
assume, the size of its area o f operation and the manpower involved.”73
ONUC comprised one o f the first peacekeeping missions that had an important
civilian component and whose military strength reached a peak of 20,000 personnel.74
Compared to past peace operations, ONUC was considerably more comprehensive and
had a mandate that went well beyond the traditional cease-fire monitoring, including the

72 From the French Operation des Nations Unies au Congo
73 Information available at ONUC's website. “United Nations Operation in Congo,” 11/14/2012,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onucB.htm.
74 ONUC was authorized by Resolution 143(1960). United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 143",
July 14, 1960, http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/157/3 2/IM G/NR015732.pdf?OpenElement.
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support o f rule of law and the maintenance o f Congo’s territorial integrity and political
independence.
Along the same lines, following the first and second Congo Wars, MONUSCO’s
predecessor, MONUC, represented yet another innovation within the UN system. It had a
specific protection o f civilians mandate and a structure that fully supported that goal. As
a result MONUSCO is an example o f strong civilian leadership and collaboration
between components. The specific characteristics o f the Congolese context require that
the military is fully integrated into civilian work, supporting the outreach in isolated areas
and providing security for the personnel. At the same time, the multi-dimensional threats
posed against civilians entail that force is not the only source of security and that a
comprehensive protection strategy is necessary. This section will thus discuss past UN
interventions and explain the current structure that supports peace efforts

Past operations

In a first demonstration o f how grassroots conflicts could escalate into a national
issue, from 1960 to 1963, secession movements took place in the provinces of Katanga
and South Kasai. These provinces declared themselves independent from the rest o f the
country and counted on the support of Belgian forces. The national government, wary of
increasing levels o f violence and the presence o f foreign troops, requested the UN to
intervene, and thus in July 1960, ONUC was established.
Although the initial mandate was to support the Congolese government to ensure
the withdrawal of Belgian forces, the secession movements o f the provinces o f Katanga
and South Kasai prompted a mandate change and Congo’s territorial integrity and
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political independence was considered the mission’s primary goal.75 Even after national
reunification, a reduced number o f UN troops remained in the Congo at the government’s
request and civilian aid continued in the years to come. The UN program of assistance to
the Congo was the largest undertaken at that time and it reached a peak o f up to 2,000
civilian personnel, foreseeing the importance that civilians would eventually fulfill with
the structure of UN peace operations.
It was not until 1999, after the Lusaka Ceasefire agreement that the UN would
return to the country. Since then, its presence has expanded quantitatively and
qualitatively.

Following the

Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the United Nations

Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) was established with the mandate of
monitoring the ceasefire between signatories.76 However, over the years its strength and
mandate have expanded enormously, reaching a peak of 20,000 uniformed personnel in
2007. The revised mandate of MONUC included increasing military, police and civilian
personnel to establish a safe environment; contribute to the improvement o f the security
conditions for humanitarian assistance access and for the voluntary return o f refugees and
internally displaced persons; support operations to disarm foreign combatants led by the
Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic o f the Congo (FARDC); contribute to the
DDR program of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) o f Congolese
combatants and their dependants as well as support the disarmament, demobilization,

75 O NUC’s mandate was reinforced with renewed objective and means by Resolutions 161 (1961) and 169
(1961) that authorized “vigorous” action to prevent civil war in the Congo. See: "Resolution 161", February
21, 1961, http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTlON/GEN/NRO/171 /68/IMG/NRO17168.pdf?OpenElement; "Resolution 169",
November 24, 1961, http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/171 /76/IMG/NRO17176.pdf?OpenElement.
76 MONUC was established by Resolution 1279 (1999). See: "Resolution 1279", November 30, 1999,
http ://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1279(l 999).
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repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDR/RR) o f foreign armed groups;
contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process; assist in the promotion
and protection o f human rights, with particular attention to women, children and
vulnerable persons; investigate human rights violations and finally support a security
sector reform.
The crisis in the Eastern part of the country received particular attention over the
years with the re-deployment o f forces to that region and the adoption of the protection of
civilians as the top priority in the UN’s mandate. Extending MONUC’s mandate, in June
2010, the Security Council decided that MONUC would bear the title of UN Stabilization
Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), in view o f the new phase o f transition towards peace
consolidation and a strong partnership with the Congolese government.77 While most o f
MONUSCO’s functions remained the same under the new name, there was a reduction o f
military personnel from areas considered secured and a re-deployment o f forces to the
East where most incidents occur. Future reconfigurations would thus be determined as
the situation evolved on the ground, including: the completion o f ongoing military
operations in North and South Kivu as well as Orientale provinces; improved government
capacity to protect the population effectively; and the consolidation of state authority
throughout the territory.
The special feature o f MONUSCO/MONUC is the protection o f civilians mandate
as a top priority and a mission structure that fully supports this goal. As part o f challenges
inherent to the transition from war to a lasting peace and to better protect civilians and
address the complex situation in the DRC, the Security Council provided MONUC and
77 MONUSCO was established by resolution 1925 (2010). See: "Resolution 1925", May 28, 2010,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?synibol=S/RES/l 925(2010).
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later MONUSCO with a structure that allows a system-wide UN response. As an
integrated peace mission, MONUSCO aims to bring together the civilian, military and
police components to act under the leadership o f the Special Representative of the
Secretary General (SRSG) in order to fulfill its integrated mandate.
There has been however “systematic shortcomings in terms o f fostering the
necessary political will and military capabilities to implement its robust mandate”.78 It is
common that TCCs prefer not to have its forces involved with direct combat and have
special provisions

so that their actions are

constrained to

certain activities.

MONUSCO/MONUC has adapted its mandate and actions on the ground to better
address protection needs. The number o f articles and books that accounts the mission
responsible for different massacres and accusation o f inability to act holds true in many
cases, however, it is also true that throughout time the mission has incorporated a number
o f mechanisms to enhance its performance.
The successful implementation o f this mandate is thus dependent on civil-military
cooperation and in this regard, MONUSCO is an example and a hub o f lessons learned.
MONUSCO has created a series of joint mechanisms undertaken and carried out by all its
components in an integrated manner. These mechanisms are supported by a UN SystemWide Strategy on the Protection of Civilians facilitated by MONUSCO and the UN
Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and endorsed in January 2011. The UN system-wide strategy
is responsible for building and implementing innovative protection mechanisms that
include the comprehensive package of protection-related measures including Joint
Protection Teams (JPTs), Community Liaison Assistants, amongst others that are
78 Stian Kjeksmd and Jacob Aasland Ravndal, "Emerging Lessons from the United Missions in the Drc:
Military Contributions to Protection o f Civilians," African Security Review 20, no. 2 (2011). p. 11
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overseen by Civilian Affairs, but implemented by all components and UN agencies on the
ground, in a clear example of cooperation between the humanitarian community and the
mission, including its armed personnel.

MONUSCO: mandate, structure and personnel

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC is the largest UN mission in
the world, and a clear example o f an integrated mission, in which the civilian, military
and police components ought to coordinate its actions. The operational challenges
presented by the geography of the country, the characteristics o f the conflict and its
central mandate to protect civilians make this mission one of the most challenging
nowadays. It is also illustrative o f the renewed context in which the UN establishes peace
operations and its transformed role in the field.
The transformation in the nature and scope o f modem conflicts has affected the
UN capacity to respond. Peace operations have assumed a plethora o f renewed functions
that goes far beyond reestablishing security. In a context in which central authority is
weak or absent and years long conflict and internal upheavals have seriously damaged a
country’s infrastructure and social economic and political system, the UN has also
assumed the role o f laying the foundations for the state to function on its own.
That is the context found in the DRC. As a consequence, MONUSCO civilian
section’s role to strengthen the local authority and promote capacity comprise its main
functions. Showing that civilians in the UN no longer comply with peripheral and
political roles only, they are in fact responsible for most o f the mandated tasks o f
contemporary peacekeeping operations, with functions that range from observing
monitoring human rights violations to reestablishing the judicial system .
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In peace operations, where its protection strategy is based on an inclusive
conception o f security that considers both physical and structural threats to the
population’s well-being, UN civilian staff form the backbone of military operations. As
in other UN integrated peace operations, each civilian section is responsible for a
different sector and sections are roughly the same as in other missions: Human Rights,
Civilian Affairs, Child Protection, Rule of Law, Political Affairs, Gender Affairs Office,
Sexual Violence and so on. Nonetheless, since protection o f civilians is a high priority, to
a more or lesser degree these sections are involved with joint operations with the military.
With specific expertise and know how, they are responsible for identifying priority needs
and adopting an integrated approach to protection beyond physical security.
MONUSCO’s police component has been in place since 2001 with the main role
of strengthening the capacity o f Congolese National Police (PNC) through the reform of
its institutions and training of its members. Besides that, the police component also
supports rule of law efforts, being engaged in crowd control in the main urban centers
and in the security efforts to maintain a stable environment. The fight against sexual
violence and against the trafficking o f Congo’s natural resources are also two important
elements o f the mandate of MONUSCO’s police in the DRC.
MONUSCO’s police component is formed by UNPol officers and Formed Police
Units (FPU). While UNPol officers offer direct support and mentoring to the PNC in the
framework o f its institutional reform and improvement of its operational capacities, the
FPUs complement and strengthen PNC actions, especially through the support to law and
order and joint patrols.
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MONUSCO’s military component is the largest but also one with the toughest
jobs. Protecting civilians in such an immense territory such as that of the DRC can be
indeed a challenging task. The lack of infra-structure connecting the different regions, its
geographical traits with 80% o f its territory covered by jungle and volatile weather
conditions only adds to a diversified array of challenges confronted by this component on
the ground.
Besides having the top priority o f protecting civilians and humanitarian personnel,
MONUSCO’s military component is also responsible for: supporting Congolese
government to establish sustainable defense security forces, minimize armed groups
threats and establish stability, support the consolidation o f state authority over the
territory and support DDR/RR activities and security during electoral process, besides
protecting UN facilities and equipment. Nevertheless, often these roles may be
contradictory, especially in regard to the support o f Congolese national armed forces
when they are responsible for an important percentage o f sexual violence (18% as of
February 2012 in the South Kivu Province).79
In order to accomplish all these goals, MONUSCO counts on a total o f seventeen
Infantry Battalions, three Special Forces Companies, six Aviation Units, one Riverine
Company, six Engineer Companies, several Water treatment Units, Airfield Support
Units, four hospitals, and forty-eight military observer team sites. The absolute majority
of the force is placed in the Eastern part of the country. As a matter of fact 95% of all
military personnel are in the 4 Brigades MONUSCO has in the East - North and South

79 Randi Solhjell et al., "Turning Unsc Resolution 1325 into Operational Practice: A Cross-Country Study
on Implementing Resoltuion 1325 in Peacekeeping and Military Operations," (Oslo: Norwegian Institute o f
International Affairs, November, 2012). p.20
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Kivu Brigades with 35% and 34% o f the strength respectively, Ituri Brigade with 21%,
the Katanga Brigade with 3% and Sector 3 with 2%. In the Western part there is only the
Western Brigade encompassing the remaining 5% of the military personnel.

Figure 6: MONUSCO's military contingents
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Source: MONUSCO, 2013.

Despite the strong presence, it is not enough to cover the whole area as a great
part of Congolese territory is covered by jungle, and most roads and airport fields are
unpaved. The lack of infrastructure combined with the difficult geography and volatile
weather makes it even more difficult to reach remote areas. As informed by the airfield
units interviewed during the field work, because o f weather conditions, flights are
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constantly cancelled also because of the challenges for landing and taking off under
severe weather conditions on unpaved landing airfields.80 For that reason, helicopters are
an important asset for the mission. As a matter of fact, many remote areas can only be
reached by helicopters, and it is common that military personnel are transported by air to
be able to carry out foot patrols in these more isolated villages hidden in the entrails of
the Congolese jungle. This ability is particularly important in the context o f protection of
civilian mandate. As analyzed in the following sections, MONUSCO military component
carries out a series of joint operations with civilian teams in order to better assess security
threats in remote areas as described above.
This section has shown that UN’s presence in the DRC has been marked by a
strong integrated mandate present even in the first UN mission established in the country.
Indeed, ONUC was considerably different from the kind o f peace operations established
throughout the Cold War period, and counted not only with a civilian component but also
had tasks that resembles those that are currently part o f the UN’s mandate worldwide. At
the same time, MONUC, the predecessor o f MONUSCO, has an encompassing and
robust mandate that from the very beginning had protection o f civilians as a top priority.
It becomes clear that the presence o f a clear protection o f civilian mandate results in a
specific and context driven normative framework as expressed by the System-Wide
Strategy to protect civilians in the DRC.
The existence o f this normative framework and the highly publicized and extreme
levels of violence in the country led to a context in which incorporating a gender
perspective into the activities o f all the mission’s components is not only expected but
80 Interviews with Uruguayan and Bangladeshi airfield units were carried out in Bukavu and Bunia,
February, 2012.
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pursued by most actors on the ground. As the following section will describe the path
towards a full incorporation o f this perspective into the daily work o f MONUSCO, a
clearer view o f UN’s organizational learning will be provided. While in Haiti the lack of
widespread understanding in regard to the importance of incorporating a gender approach
to MINUSTAH may be the result o f an almost complete silence in official documents
that establish the mission’s mandate, in the DRC, challenges are found in multiple fronts
from member-states’ straightforward unwillingness to the complexity o f the context
itself.

Incorporating gender into peacekeeping: MONUSCO gender policy and the UN's
learning process

On paper, MONUSCO has a strong gender policy substantiated by its mandate
resolutions and supported by the Office o f Gender Affairs (OGA) as the main section
involved with the advancement o f gender issues within the mission and the Congolese
government. Gender is considered

a cross cutting issue,

taken into account by all

civilian sections and police and military components on the development o f projects and
actions on the ground. Gender focal points are thus appointed within civilian sections,
police and military components as a ways to enhance the mission's capacity o f delivery
in gender matters. However, the amount o f different mechanisms, sections, agencies and
other organizations working on gender and sexual violence may be overwhelming and
coordination is often a problem. It also became clear that some military contingents
confronted serious difficulties in applying a gender approach to their actions.
Measuring the impact o f MONUSCO's policy, however is very difficult. The
organization reportedly lacks personnel to provide impact assessment after new policies
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are created and implemented. Additionally, data on levels of violence against women are
unreliable and may hinder the truth. At the same time though, it becomes clear that the
mission has supported national authorities to create a local normative framework and
structure to combat sexual violence and to improve the living conditions and status o f
Congolese women.
However, challenges still remain. If a successful learning process entails an
interdependent relationship between the organization and member states, analyzing the
incorporation of a gender perspective in a mission that has a normative framework fully
developed can offer valuable insights on where the limits o f UN action lies.
The following section will thus provide detail information on MONUSCO's
gender policy and describe its accomplishments and shortcomings for each o f the five
variables:

legal

framework,

gender

balance,

security

sector,

protection

and

empowerment.

Gender policy

The Gender Office is the main coordinator for gender mainstreaming in
MONUSCO institutions; it is mainly responsible for guaranteeing that a gender approach
is taken under consideration at all levels within the UN and its partners and supporting
activities in this area. The office was established in March 2002 following
recommendations o f Resolution 1325 and also ensures linkages between women's
organizations and government institutions so that women’s participation in peace and
post reconstruction efforts are guaranteed. At the same time, it also makes sure that their
needs are taken into account by MONUSCO sections and other UN partners.
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For the successful promotion o f gender mainstreaming within MONUSCO, the
Gender Office works with the appointment o f gender focal points within all components
and different civilian sections. Currently, the UN Police and Correction Units, along with
all other substantive MONUSCO sections have gender focal points. With regard to the
military, the appointment of gender focal point is a work-in-progress. OGA is currently
working with the office o f the Force Commander to have gender focal points in all
military units, from Brigades HQ down to the Battalion level. Particularly within the
military they have the important role o f guaranteeing that patrol routes are defined
according to local women's needs and concerns.81
Due to Congo's territory size and complexity, particularly in the Eastern part,
there is a central office in Kinshasa to coordinate all efforts in the DRC and another in
Goma to coordinate efforts in the Eastern part of the country. Other field offices are
found in different provinces, such as South Kivu and Province Orientale.
For the successful fulfillment o f its role, OGA establishes an annual priority
plan82 and works in close cooperation with other UN and local partners, promoting
sensitization campaigns, conducting training, and defining joint strategies. These areas
are very encompassing and symbolize how an inclusive conception o f security requires
an inclusive protection strategy. Consequently, not only do they provide training on
gender issues for MONUSCO, UN partners and local institutions, they also support
women's candidates in electoral processes, and attempt to strengthen local institutional

81 MONUSCO, “Spotlight on Female Peacekeeper”, 12/10/2012,
http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=10750&ctl=Details&mid=13744&ItemlD=19376&1ang
uage=en-US.
82 The 2012 Plan o f Action has seven priority areas: 1. Protection o f civilians, 2. Support to electoral
process, 3. Development o f security sector and fight against impunity, 4. Gender in DDR/RR, 5. Gender
focal points, 6. Stabilization and Peace Consolidation, and 7. Communication Strategy
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capacity to respond to specific gender needs through a gender sensitive security sector
reform and a strong legal system. It also focuses on an important aspect emphasized by
Resolution 1325; the full participation o f women in peace negotiations, political talks and
the economic life o f the state. The improvement of the system aligned to the betterment
of women's status in Congolese society would have a positive spillover effect in its
protection needs.
In order to assess and evaluate the progress of the mission in gender related
issues, OGA has taken advantage of the UN System Wide Action Plan's operational
targets - Prevention, Participation, Protection and Relief and Recovery - as a way to
measure the impact of its actions on the ground. Interestingly, it requires close
cooperation with MONUSCO's uniformed personnel reinforcing the comprehensive
character o f actions aiming to curb women's vulnerability on the ground.

Figure 7: Gender Affairs Office operational targets
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Source: O ffice o f Gender Affairs, April, 2012.
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Amongst MONUSCO's main achievements in terms of advancing a gender
policy, the inclusion o f articles 14 and 15 on gender parity in the Constitution and the co
participation in the production o f the country's National Action Plan based on resolution
1325 are most significant. The office's actions during the 2011 elections were also
important as they advanced training on gender and elections and promoted sensitization
and monitoring on gender based violence during elections.83
An interesting initiative, the gender affairs office originated, was to create a
specific category for sexual and gender based violent crimes for military flash reports, so
that they are accurately categorized in the Joint Military Analysis Center (J-MAC)
database, facilitating data mapping and collection. This is an important step. The absence
of a specific category for sexual and gender based violence previously caused sexual and
gender based violent crimes to be categorized under other types of crime, such as murder
and kidnapping.
Another section directly involved with gender affairs is the Sexual Violence Unit
(SVU), primarily responsible for the coordination efforts to implement the National
Strategy for the Fight against Gender Based Violence and to guarantee that the
government is taking ownership of it.

The establishment of the SVU is a direct

consequence of Resolution 1820 that requires sexual violence to be addressed by all
components in peace operations as a security problem.
MONUSCO's Sexual Violence Unit was created in 2009 and it became fully
operational not only in Kinshasa but also in other field offices in Bukavu (South Kivu,

83 Information presented by MONUSCO Senior Gender Adviser, Elsie Efange Mbella at the International
Conference “Promote Gender to Build a Lasting Peace: Reflection on the Latin American Experience”,
Buenos Aires, April 25-26, 2012.
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Maniema and Katanga) and Goma (North Kivu and Province Orientale) throughout 2010
and 2011. Besides coordinating the implementation o f the Strategy, SVU field officers
also promote training on do’s and don’ts o f how to act in cases o f sexual violence
amongst military observers, troops and police.
Representatives from this Unit continuously expressed their concern regarding
military capacity to appropriately deal with the victims:
(...) the military observers are important actors collecting information and
the contingents are usually the first to reach victims. Problem is, they
don't know how to collect information on sexual violence or how to
question victims. They take pictures, identify victims, collect documents
and addresses and often are not very careful keeping victims' anonymity.
They don't intend to put victims under danger, but they might end up
doing so if their identity is not protected. This is why we have started with
a training on do's and don'ts. When trained they understand the reasons
and follow instructions.84
The problem is that the personnel assigned to military contingents change
constantly and the learning curve is rather steep, since there is very limited transferred
knowledge from one contingent to the other.
Other mechanisms o f coordination to strengthen the U N 's capacity to respond to
gender specific needs were also implemented in partnership with other actors, mostly UN
agencies. Amongst those, there is the International Security and Stabilization Strategy
(I4S)85, that has sexual violence as one o f the five main pillars; the UN system-wide
strategy on the protection of civilians in the DRC; the Senior Management Group, that

84 Interview carried out with representative o f MONUSCO Sexual Violence unit in Eastern Democratic
Republic o f Congo, February, 2012.
85 In order to support the Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC), the UN
system and key partners revised the existing Stabilization strategy to align with the government priorities as
defined in the new STAREC Plan. The I4S has the objective to support national efforts to promote a secure
and stable environment in key conflict-affected areas o f Eastern DRC. The five main areas covered by
U N ’s I4S are: improving security, supporting political dialogue, strengthening the state, return and re
integration and sexual violence.
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plans operational response on identified threats to civilians at the local level, and the
Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP), designed to provide an emergency response to areas
considered to have major humanitarian risks, being protection one o f them.
The coordination mechanisms put in place by varied civilian institutions on the
ground have positively impacted the efforts to better address sexual violence in the DRC.
These efforts seem to prioritize a strategic and encompassing view based on particular
challenges encountered on the field at provincial levels. All analyzed sections and
mechanisms have field offices to expedite and improve a UN tailored response to specific
threats, incidents and needs.
However, the existence o f numerous mechanisms with overlapping functions may
confuse and duplicate efforts, adding an extra problem o f coordination. While a UN
System-Wide Strategy allows better coordination o f existing protection mechanisms
within the UN, the relationship is not clear between those and HAP on one side and I4S
on another. It becomes evident that the challenges to a successful implementation o f a
gender policy lie primarily on coordination strategies and widespread understanding of
the matter. Besides avoiding duplication by different UN bodies, the involvement o f the
national government and the implementation of initiatives that attempt to improve
women's social, economic and political status are necessary for sustained stabilization
efforts.
A final comment on MONUSCO's gender policy refers to the missions'
commitment to curb inappropriate behavior. Different from expected, most complaints
regarding sexual abuse and exploitation o f locals by UN staff is directed against civilians,
who also are in a much smaller number than military and police units. Proportionally,
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civilians are the champions in complaints regarding cases o f Sexual Exploitation and
Abuse (SEA), followed by the police and the military. However, inappropriate acts by the
military tend to be more visible than those committed by civilians and since the military
members have immunity, it becomes an issue between the contributing and host
countries. In most cases, these soldiers are repatriated and the incident becomes an
internal issue to be tried by the national military justice system in the home country. In
the case of civilians, where control over inappropriate behavior is more difficult, they
confront more consequences. For example, in the event o f an offspring resulting from a
sexual assault, a portion o f their salary may be taken to support the child.
As shown, MONUSCO's gender policy is comprehensive and takes under
consideration specific features o f the Congolese context, such as the geography o f the
country and the widespread sexual violence. While the attention to that topic is positive,
there needs to be careful attention not to oversimplify the implications o f war as solely
sexual violence, nor condemn it as a merely spoil of war. It is necessary that the
continuum of violence be fully understood and that protection strategies are sufficiently
attentive to the pre-existent vulnerable status o f women.
The following sections will evaluate MONUSCO's gender policy according to the
five previously defined variables: legal framework, gender balance, security sector,
protection and empowerment.

Legal framework

The legal framework indicator refers to the existence of specific mandates and
guidelines regarding protection o f civilians, particularly women and girls against sexual
violence and how it translates into practice. One o f MONUSCO's biggest contributions is
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the presence o f a clear protection o f civilians mandate, including the protection o f women
and girls against sexual violence. The clear statement of this goal as a top priority is in
the Security Council Resolution that specifies the mission mandate provide the normative
framework for protection strategies and other initiatives to take place. As determined by
Resolution 1925 (2010) that defines MONUSCO’s mandate, the mission is tasked with
the responsibility of supporting Government efforts to fight impunity and ensure the
protection of civilians from violations o f international human rights and humanitarian
law, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence.86
In this sense, the mission also has a UN System-Wide Strategy to Protect
Civilians in the Democratic Republic o f Congo87 and a Comprehensive Strategy to
Combat Sexual Violence, both o f which comprise important documents that frame the
scope of actions to be undertaken on the ground. Importantly, they consider an inclusive
concept o f protection not limited to physical security.
The UN System-Wide Strategy to Protect Civilians defines the specific role of
UN actors to better mitigate threats against Congolese population and takes into account
the need to reconcile and integrate MONUSCO's mandate, including the support of
FARDC operations, with the protection o f civilians responsibility. It also recognizes the
primary responsibility o f the state to protect its own citizens, and adopts a protection
concept that consider the humanitarian, security

and human rights considerations as

important dimensions of the concept.

86 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1925."
87 M ONUSCO, "Un System-Wide Strategy to Protect Civilians in the Democratic Republic o f Congo,"
(Kinshasa: United Nations, 2010).
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The Strategy to Combat Sexual Violence was initially designed by the Sexual
Violence Unit in April 2009 under the name o f Comprehensive Strategy to Combat
Sexual Violence. Nonetheless, it was important that local ownership was accomplished
so that in the future the Congolese government could implement it on its own.
Consequently, in November 2009, the national government endorsed the U N 's strategy.
The Strategy to Combat Sexual Violence is now under the auspices o f Congolese national
authorities in partnership with the U N .88
The Strategy encompasses important aspects o f the different types o f response
needed by victims of sexual violence, spanning from improving the security forces and
the overall situation on the ground to legal, medical and even financial assistance to
victims. The collection of data is also a component o f the Strategy and will not only
provide reliable data on cases, but will impact assessment and generation o f more
accurate policies strategies. Most importantly, each o f its five components are co-chaired
by a UN and a government partner ensuring that local ownership is accomplished and
local capacity to respond is enhanced.89
The existence o f a strong legal framework and structure to guarantee that gender
is considered as a cross-cutting issue led to an important fact: gender is fully integrated in
MONUSCO's military planning and analysis. The enormous amount of sexual violence
cases could not be ignored in the DRC and the UN has replicated on the ground a
88 Republique Democratique du Congo, "Strategic Nationale De La Lutte Contre Les Violences Basees Sur
Le Genre."
89 The five components are: 1. Fighting impunity, led by the Ministry o f Justice and UN Joint Human
Rights Office; 2. Protection and Prevention, led by the Ministry o f Social Affairs and Human Rights and
UN High Commissioner o f Refugee (UNHCR); 3. Multi-Sector Assistance, led by the Ministry o f Health
and UNICEF; 4. Security Sector Reform, led by the Ministry o f Defense and M ONUSCO's Section o f
Security Sector Development; 5. Collection and Mapping: led by the Ministry o f Gender and the UN
Population Fund. The role o f the MONUSCO's SVU role is to coordinate all efforts amongst implementing
partners. See Appendix on the National Strategy on the Fight Against Gender Based Violence.
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structure able to firmly establish the importance of Women, Peace and Security
resolutions within the mission. In fact, the design of policies and operational activities all
take gender under consideration and attempt to foster the full incorporation o f the
differential impact of peacekeeping activities on women, men, girls and boys as well as
advance equal rights and reverse gender-based discrimination in all aspects o f the post
conflict and peace-building processes.90

Gender balance

The Gender Balance indicator refers to female representation amongst uniformed
personnel and the role they carry out. It also refers to the existence o f affirmative policies
to include more women amongst personnel (uniformed and civilian), and in decision
making positions within the mission. Unfortunately data on civilian personnel
disaggregated by sex is not available and thus an analysis o f the civilian component could
not be included. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the presence o f women as head
of the two main sections related to gender issues is ensured. Both the Office o f Gender
Affairs Office and the Sexual Violence Unit are headed by women. Moreover, the Rule
of Law Special Representative o f the secretary General is also headed by a woman. In
regard to uniformed personnel, however, there is still a lot to improve, particularly within
the military contingents.

90 Elsie Effange-Mbella, D P K O M ission in the DRC: Evolution o f the Gender Mandate, Presentation by
MONUSCO Senior Gender Adviser at the International Conference “Promoting Gender to accomplish
Peace: Reflecting on the Latin American experience,” Buenos Aires, 26-28 April 2012.
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While within the military the participation o f women reaches only 2.5%, the
participation o f women is considerably higher in the police component reaching 10%.91
Mostly, they are sent as UNPols by member states, although they also comprise an
important number within FPUs due to the presence o f a female FPU from Bangladesh.
Indeed, an analysis of the incorporation o f women in police and military institutions show
that women have been allowed to join the police before the military and are carrying out
functions more similar to those carried out by their male counterparts. That does not
mean that they are not victims o f discriminatory behavior. Although, interviews carried
out in the DRC did not indicated the recurrence o f discrimination, interviews carried out
with female police officers in Brazil, that have participated in more than one
peacekeeping mission, indicated that they are usually the object o f discriminatory
practices, mostly related to a male superior, or they become the center o f the attention,
particularly if they are single.92

91 DPKO statistics as o f October 2012. Available at: Department o f Peacekeeping operations, “Troop and
Police Contributors,” 12/10/2012,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml.
92 Interviews carried out with Brazilian UNPol were performed under RESDAL's projects “Improving and
Sharing a Latin American gender approach to build peace: the United Nations Security Council Resolutions
1325 and 1820”; “Women in the Armed and Police forces in Latin America and the Caribbean: a gender
approach to peace operations.” Field work in Brazil was performed throughout 2008 and 2009 in Brazil and
in July, 2012. Interviews included women in the military and in the police who had participated in peace
operations and main Brazilian institutions related to the participation o f Brazilian personnel in UN peace
m issions, including: peacekeeping training center, Ministry o f Defense, Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, and
COTER (Comando de Opera95es Terrestres).

29 9

Table 9: Police Contribution disaggregated by sex, as of October 2012
Police Contribution

M ale

Female

Total

% o f W omen

Individual Police

209

39

248

15.73%

FPU

957

90

1047

8.60%

TOTAL

1166

129

1295

9.96%

Source: DPKO Statistics, 2012.

T a b le 10: M ilita r y co n tr ib u tio n s d isa g g r eg a te d b y sex as o f O cto b er :
M ilitary contribution

M ale

Female

Total

% o f Women

M ilitary observers

665

23

688

3.34%

M ilitary troops

16641

425

17 0 6 6

2.49%

TOTAL

17306

448

17 7 5 4

2.52%

Source: DPKO Statistics, 2012

Military contributions are divided into military observers and military troops.
Military observers are assigned to individual missions. They are usually placed in small
team sites often located in red area zones. Members o f these teams are often o f different
nationalities. They are unarmed and their main function is to gather intelligence on the
movement and activities of armed groups, and displacement of the population. As a
result, a good relationship between them and the local population and strong
communication skills are necessary. In areas coded as red or extremely volatile, they
must go with a military escort provided by troop contributing countries in their specific
area of operation. As informed by one of the military observers interviewed, they usually
stay for a period o f 12 months - although that may vary from one country to another and initiate in a red zone, being later transferred to calmer places either a green or yellow
zone.
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The participation o f women as military observers is extremely important since
they could facilitate the contact with local women and serve as an important bridge
between the local women and the mission.93 As Captain Caroline Obame, military
observer from Cameroon, argues in an interview with MONUSCO: “The Congolese
women we meet are often hesitant to speak to outsiders. When they meet female
patrolling officers, even if they are still uncertain, they will be more likely to speak. I
have spoken to victims of sexual violence and there is still a lot of stigma they face from
their husbands and in their communities.”94 Nonetheless, military observers must have a
minimum rank and receive adequate military training. Most countries have only recently
allowed women to enter the military academy in various branches, including combat and
command. For that reason, the number o f military women that comply with the
requirements to participate in peace operations as observers is very low.
Female participation amongst military observers reaches only 3.34%. Moreover,
only 12, out o f 48 military observer contributing countries send women. Amongst those,
the United States, Zambia, Bolivia and Cameroon present the highest proportional
percentage with 33%, 25%, and 20% respectively (Bolivia and Cameroon with 20%
each). In absolute terms, Malaysia, South Africa and Zambia with a contribution o f 3
female military observers each are the top contributing countries. Interestingly, the top
military observer contributing countries - India (62 observers), Pakistan (52 observers),

93 The necessity for more female blue helmets is a question o f gender equality, which sets an example to the
Congolese population that MONUSCO is here to support. However, UN documents also point out to the
fact that victims o f sexual violence, may be more responsive to other women.
94 MONUSCO, “Spotlight on Female Peacekeeper”, 12/10/2012,
http;//monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=10750&ctl=Details&mid=13744&ItemID=19376&lang
uage=en-US.
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and Tunisia (31 observers) - present low female representation. India sends only 2
women, comprising 3.2% and both Pakistan and Tunisia, do not send any.

Table 11: Military observers contributions as of October, 2012
Country
Algeria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Benin
Bolivia
Bosnia and H ezergovina
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Canada
China
Czeck Republic
Egypt
France
Ghana
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Jordan
Kenya
M alawi
M alaysia
M ali
M ongolia
M orocco
Nepal
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Paraguay
Peru
Poland
Romania
Russian Federation
Senegal
Serbia
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Tanzania
Tunisia

M ale
5
34
3
8
8
5
7
4
7
16
3
26
5
22
60
17
3
26
22
7
14
17
2
6
22
13
22
1
52
17
7
2
21
27
22
2
12
4
5
3
2
31

Fem ale
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
2
1
3
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0

Total
5
34
3
8
10
5
7
5
7
16
3
26
5
24
62
17
3
26
24
8
17
17
2
6
22
15
23
1
52
17
7
2
21
27
22
2
15
4
5
3
2
31

% of W omen
0%
0%
0%
0%
20.00%
0%
0%
20%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
8.33%
3.23%
0%
0%
0%
8.33%
12.50%
17.65%
0%
0%
0%
0%
13.33%
4.35%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
20%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
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Table 11: Continued
Country
Ukraine
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Yemen
Zambia
TOTAL

M ale
15
4
2
37
6
9
665

Fem ale
0
0
1
0
0
3
23

Total
15
4
3
37
6
12
688

% o f W omen
0%
0%
33.33%
0%
0%
25%
3.34%

Source: DPKO Statistics, 2012

Troop contributions comprise the bulk o f UN peacekeepers. They are the ones
responsible for the daily routine military activities, such as patrols, checkpoints and
escorts, in addition to the planning and execution of special operations and strategies to
combat armed groups and protect the civilian population. This is the area where the full
incorporation o f women has been the slowest. Primarily because it depends on states
willingness to adopt national policies that allow the participation o f women in their
military. However, it is also important to analyze the role women carry out on the field.
The absolute majority o f military women sent to peace operations comply with
“professional” or “logistics” duties, being confined to the barracks and they have very
limited, if any, contact with the population.
In regard to vetting procedures for inadequate behavior, it tends to be easier
amongst troops since they are usually confined within the base and are not allowed to
leave the barracks unless accompanied by officers or in groups to special events where
their participation is authorized, these include for example national medal parades,
peacekeeping day festivities and MONUSCO house, where some contingents take their
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soldiers over the weekend for entertainment.95 However, they are also the ones that have
the most visibility. Consequently, although inappropriate behaviors amongst troop
contributors are the lowest, these can harm the UN image the most.
Female participation amongst troop contributing countries reaches only 2.5%. The
low participation is due to the fact that the biggest troop contributing countries - Pakistan
(3,698 troops), India (3,694 troops) and Bangladesh (2,520) - either do not have any
women in the case o f Pakistan and India, or have very few in the case o f Bangladesh (6).
In contrast, some countries present a much larger female representation, highlighted in
the case of South Africa with a total contribution of 268 military women that represent
22.7% of its total troop contribution.
This positive South African female participation reflects the kind o f national
policies implemented at home. Unfortunately, the South African battalion could not be
interviewed during the field work. However, amongst civilians involved with gender
efforts, the contingent was mentioned as an example o f gender mainstreaming policy. It
also important to mention that South Africans speak Swahili, an important asset to get
closer to the population as some o f the Congolese people speak that language
Nonetheless, interviews with a civil society organization emphasized that the UN had
problems in the past with South Africa military involved with prostitution and other
abuses.96

95 These are just some o f the locations that peacekeepers are allowed to go. During the field work, most
contingents would emphasize that soldiers are not allowed to leave unless to one o f those events. The
MONUSCO house is a UN establishment, usually within the field headquarter where UN staff, including
civilians, police and military personnel can get together and entertain.
96 Interview carried out with an important international civil society organization in Eastern Democratic
Republic o f Congo, February, 2012.
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Ghana also presents a good female representation amongst its troops with 37
military women (8%) o f its total contribution o f 462 military personnel. The field work
indicated that currently, Ghana women do not have many constraints to join the military
in that country. Although most of the interviewed personnel were in “professional”
positions, the commander emphasized that there are combatants and that they perform the
same duties as their male counterparts.

Table 12: Military troops contribution as of October, 2012
Country

M ale

Female

Total

Bangladesh
Belgium
Benin
China
Egypt
Ghana
G uatem ala
India
Indonesia
Jordan
M orocco
Nepal
Pakistan
Serbia
South Africa
Ukraine
Uruguay
TOTAL

2514
20
438
206
1000
425
145
3694
175
216
831
1005
3798
4
911
154
1105
16641

6
1
12
12
0
37
5
0
0
4
0
19
0
2
268
0
59
425

2520
21
450
218
1000
462
150
3694
175
220
831
1024
3698
6
1179
154
1164
17066

% o f W omen
0.24%
4.76%
2.67%
5.50%
0%
8.01%
3.33%
0%
0%
1.82%
0%
1.86%
0%
33.33%
22.73%
0%
5.07%
2.49%

Source: DPKO Statistics, 2012.

Police contributions are divided in UNPols and FPUs. UNPols are sent in
individual missions, just like the military observers. They are placed in varied positions
all over the territory of the Democratic Republic o f Congo. Interviews with UNPols were
mostly carried out in Goma, where they were directly involved with the construction o f a
training center for the PNC and with one UNPol involved with a Prosecution Supporting
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Cell, responsible for assisting the national government to prosecute Congolese uniformed
personnel perpetrators.
The participation o f women amongst UNPols reached 15.7%, well above that o f
military observers. The top UNPol contributing countries are Cote d ’Ivoire (35 UNPols),
Chad (28 UNPols), Benin (26 UNPols) and Burkina Faso (26 UNPols), all of which
present an important female representation with 34.3%, 21.4% and 11.5% (both Benin
and Burkina Faso) respectively. Djibouti and Central African Republic also present an
important proportional female participation - 66.7% and 42.86% - although their overall
contribution is relatively low, with totals of 3 and 7 respectively.

Table 13: Individual Police Contribution as of October, 2012
Country

M ale

Fem ale

Total

% o f W omen

Belgium
Benin
Burkina Faso
Canada
Central African Republic
Chad
Cote d'Ivoire
Djibouti

1
23
23
2
4
22
23
1
4
9
19
7
17
5
18
9
13
5
4
209

0
3
3
1
3
6
12
2
0
0
4
0
1
1
2
0
1

1
26
26
3
7
28
35
3
4
9
23
7
18
6
20
9
14
5
4

0%
11.54%
11.54%
33.33%
42.86%
21.43%
34.29%
66.67%
0%
0%
17.39%
0%
5.56%
16.67%
10%
0%
7.14%
0%
0%
15.73%

Egypt
France
Guinea
Jordan
M adagascar
Sweden
Senegal
Togo
Turkey
Ukraine
Yemen
TOTAL
Source: DPKO Statistics, 2012.

0
0
39

248
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Finally, only four countries contribute with FPUs, these are Bangladesh, Egypt,
India and Senegal. Female representation amongst these reached 8.6%. Bangladesh
contributed the highest percent o f women with 19.3%, followed by Senegal with 10%
female representation. As in Haiti, one of Bangladesh's FPU in the DRC is a female FPU,
where the majority of the personnel are women (75 out o f 124), including the post of
commander and its staff. Male personnel tend to be of the non-commissioned corp. A
visit to Bangladesh's female FPU in Kinshasa was carried out during the field work, and
although they were still receiving training (after 3 months of their arrival), it was
emphasized that they would be soon deployed and develop similar duties as those carried
out by other FPU units, including protection of UN facilities and crowd control.

Table 14: Formed Police Unit Contribution as of October, 2012
Country

M ale

Bangladesh
Egypt
India

Fem ale

Total

% of W omen

313

75

388

19.33%

140

0

140

0%

265

5

270

1.85%

Senegal

239

10

249

4.02%

TOTAL

957

90

1047

8.60%

Source: DPKO Statistics, 2012.

Although all contingents, military and police, receive induction training on the
field regarding gender and sexual violence, there is still room for improvement. In some
field offices, Gender Affairs and Sexual Violence representatives talked about the
existence o f training programs developed with the military component to improve their
know-how on gender mainstreaming and gender analysis as well as expertise on how to
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deal with sexual violence victims.97 However, they also pointed out the lack o f civilian
personnel that could enhance outreach and continue efforts to refine response 98
At the same time, the lack o f facilities to receive women in some military bases is
worrisome. Although some of them do not have women in the military, they should be
prepared to receive female UN civilian staff if a joint action is taken. In these cases, the
inability o f placing female Community Liaison Assistants (CLA)99 that have an important
role in communicating with local women in some places, especially in the eastern side of
the country can seriously undermine actions.
The military component is usually the first one to arrive after attacks and have a
primary role during these first hours. They should know how to deal with victims, first by
being able to provide immediate care and then have references for specialized medical
centers. Investigations should comply with victim confidentiality in order to protect them.
Moreover, they should use the standardized template and forms to report cases to
facilitate data collection and mapping.
However in interviews with MONUSCO in substantive sections o f South Kivu
province, it was revealed that the military component not only was unaware of the
confidentiality policy, ultimately putting victims in danger, they would also conclude that

97 Interviews carried out with representatives from the Gender Affairs Office and Sexual V iolence Unit in
Kinshasa, Bukavu, Goma and Bunia, February 2012.
98 The lack o f civilian experts in U N peace operations in general is worrisome. As an illustration, the
Sexual V iolence Unit has only one person, responsible for the provinces o f South Kivu, Maniema and
Katanga and another for North Kivu and Province Orientale. A third officer coordinates the Units efforts in
the Eastern part o f the country. These regions are where m ost cases o f sexual violence are encountered and
it becomes evident that although those are dedicated professionals, they lack resources and personnel for a
successful fulfillment o f the Unit's mandate.
99 As it w ill be explained in the following section CLA's are local people that work as translators for the
military personnel. Their role however, is not only to support communication between the military and
civilian personnel, but also to promote confidence building between the local population and UN blue
helmets.
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no sexual violence had happened if for example victims and perpetrators lived under the
same roof. Rape and other forms o f violence would not be considered as such if
committed by another family member. As one interviewee stated: “There are many cases
that the population search for us and say they were raped. But when we arrive there, they
all live together, it is the husband. So there is no rape.” 100
This example illustrates the need for increased training in gender and sexual
violence for the military component. It was also evident that different contingents had
different perspectives regarding gender roles, sexual violence and the role o f civilian and
uniformed women that can affect the kind o f responses they provide for victims. This
makes the guidelines on specific actions to be undertaken extremely important.

The

guidelines then need to be included in training so that a pattern of response is established.

Security sector

As defined by the UN, security sector is: “a broad term often used to describe the
structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and
oversight of security in a country.” 101

These include defense, law enforcement,

corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for the justice system,
border management, customs and civil emergencies. Actors that play a role in the
security sector include ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. For the
purpose of this dissertation, only the initiatives related to the improvement o f the justice
system, rule of law and police institutions are taken into account.

100 Interview carried out with a senior military officer deployed in the Eastern Democratic Republic o f
Congo, February, 2012.
101 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f the Secretary General on Securing Peace and
Development: The Role o f the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform."
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Security Sector reform is a necessary step towards the strengthening of
accountability, effectiveness and respect for human rights and rule o f law in a society.102
MONUSCO's efforts in this area can be divided in three main components: 1. Improving
victim's access to Justice; 2. Curtailing impunity; and 3. Structuring the PNC and
FARDC through the development o f joint actions, monitoring of actions and DDR/RR
program. Unfortunately, though, MONUSCO's ability to improve Congolese justice
system responsiveness is limited, since the mission only has jurisdiction over military
justice.
“Access to Justice” Program is mainly concerned about fighting impunity for
sexual violence, and developing new, appropriate mechanisms for reparations with
increased victim and Government participation. The program, overseen and implemented
by the Human Rights section, is a multi-disciplinary office that covers varied issues
regarding human rights. It is one of the biggest and most interlinked sections within
MONUSCO.103 The Access to Justice Program also attempts to reinforce women’s
capacity and position within Congolese society in order to improve their status and
decrease their vulnerable condition. As a matter of fact, the difficulty in prosecuting and
accomplishing justice was one o f the main topics discussed in all interviews. Regretfully
though, representatives from Kinshasa and Goma emphasized the difficulties to
accomplish justice in any case as corruption and impunity rein in the Congolese judiciary
system.

102 Ibid.
103 Interviews carried out with representatives from MONUSCO Joint Human Rights Section were carried
out in Kinshasa, Goma and Bunia, February, 2012.
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Quite complementary to the work undertaken by the Human Rights section, the
Rule of Law section focuses on the Congolese Legal system, including military justice
with the aim o f building a strong justice system in the DRC. An interesting mechanism
under Rule of Law and which has a direct impact on sexual violence trials are the
Prosecution Supporting Cells (PSCs). Following a decade long of insecurity and patterns
of incidents that signaled an institutionalized impunity, Resolution I960104 stressed the
importance o f fighting impunity and improving the capacity to respond to human rights
violations. In this context, the PSCs were created under the MONUSCO Rule o f Law
section in order to support national efforts to prosecute perpetrators o f human rights
violations.105
The Walikale massacre trials illustrate their work in dealing with sexual violence.
In order to support Congolese authorities, in this particular case, PSC fact finding teams
carried out a reconnaissance mission for places where the court could be established and
the trial done, evaluated the security situation, provided technical expertise, and in
conjunction with Human Rights provided transport for victims.
Finally, in regard to the strengthening of the police and armed forces capabilities,
both MONUSCO's military and police components perform a series of actions with the
PNC and FARDC, opening the opportunity to provide mentoring on joint actions and
patrols as well as monitoring. The support to the establishment o f training centers and

104 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1960", December 16, 2010, http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N 10/698/34/PD F/N 1069834,pdf?OpenElement.
105 They are entitled to two major forms o f support to the local authorities: 1. through technical advice in all
procedures, from the investigation to the trial; and 2. through material and logistical support, through the
provision o f vehicles, transportation and even security. This work is coordinated with U N -agencies and
MONUSCO components that can adequately provide the logistic support needed. Their support is provided
according to requests coming from the Congolese authorities; however they are entitled to suggest cases as
well.
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training modules are overseen by the UNPol, most focused on improving local
capacity.106 As part of MONUSCO conditionality policy, the military component can
only participate in joint operations with the FARDC if they do not have a record of
human rights violations. At the same time, it is well known that a great percentage of
sexual violence perpetrators are members o f FARDC. Part o f the military component’s
role is to monitor members of FARDC and report misbehaviors.
In partnership with the Ministry o f Defense, the military component occasionally
participates in training and sensitization campaigns. Handbooks and training manuals on
the subject of sexual violence have been distributed to the local forces; however, “the
actual implementation o f these codes would mean fundamental changes to the army
structure, the political, economic and social situation within the military and in the
country more broadly.”107 As explained earlier, the Congolese military (and police for
that matter) is widely unprepared and more importantly it lacks an ethos o f protection.
Having entered the military through the brassage process or previously, personnel are
part of a military structure that previously promoted looting and attacks as a form of
survival and which has parallel commands and confusing loyalties. The new policies,
regulations and handbooks encompasses not only appropriate behavior and guidelines on
how to act, they also represent a different mindset that cannot be fully comprehended in a
single day.
The military, in conjunction with MONUSCO's DDR/RR section, is also
responsible for overseeing the government led process of developing an effective security
106 A visit to a training center financially supported by Canada and overseen by UN Police was undertaken
during the field work in Goma, Democratic Republic o f Congo.
107 Solhjell et al., "Turning Unsc Resolution 1325 into Operational Practice: A Cross-Country Study on
Implementing Resoltuion 1325 in Peacekeeping and Military Operations." p.25
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sector to assure that the state will provide its population with a safe environment, rule of
law, and good governance. While their mandate is to monitor and support government
actions, they also provide sensitization and training for Congolese defense and security
forces as a way to promote gender mainstreaming, improve their capacity to respond to
SGBV and prevent recurrence o f SGBV.
It is usually within and/or nearby the military bases that DDR/RR camps are
based as they are in constant contact with various armed groups. Military personnel are
thus the first to encounter combatants willing to join the DDR program. It is thus
important that they are also aware o f a gender perspective in DDR/RR and that they
include female officers who can support outreach to women combatants, as well as wives
and children o f male combatants.108
DDR/RR is an important instance where promoting a gender approach is
extremely necessary. After arms are handed over and conflict settled, violence against
women tends to increase. DDR programs need to incorporate a gender perspective that
also demobilizes masculinities. During conflicts, gender relations within a society tends
to change, while a masculine role may become important to protect the community, the
family and its goods, women also have a differentiated role as they may have to flee, be
subjected to different forms o f violence, and have intensified previous domestic
responsibilities as they become responsible for securing food, shelter and protecting
themselves and immediate family. Consequently not only must DDR programs consider

108 U N ’s Standard Operation Procedures on Gender and DDR focuses on the negotiation process when the
parameters o f the DDR process to take place are defined. It aims to contribute that women and girl ex
combatants, women working in support functions to armed groups and forces, wives and dependents as
well as members o f the receiving community are informed and included in shaping any peace accord and
related DDR plans. For more information on this particular subject, see: United Nations Development Fund
for Women, "Standard Operations Procedures on Gender and Ddr" (2004).
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these differentiated gender relations during war, there is yet another challenge. As DDR
program advances and weapons are collected up and conflict settled, rehabilitation needs
to focus not only on economic aspects o f the community life but on the psychological
consequences of demobilization and disarmament. Often, rates o f domestic violence
increase after war.109 “Demobilizing masculinities” though is not an easy task and
requires a deep understanding o f the issue and the local culture. As previously mentioned
earlier, the DDR program carried out with MONUSCO's support lacks a gender
perspective. Although the families o f combatants are included, not all o f his “wives” and
children may be included, as they tend to have more than one women. Moreover, the
DDR program for female combatants is very limited.110

Protection

The Protection indicator is mostly concerned with actions undertaken by the
police and military component to protect women and girls from gender based violence.
As previously

analyzed

in this

chapter,

MONUSCO's protection

strategy

is

comprehensive and considers the economic, political and social vulnerabilities o f women,
besides those mostly related to the physical threats they are subjected to. MONUSCO has
specific protection mechanisms that have been cited in various documents, including the
Analytical Inventory on Peacekeeping practices,111 an effective lessons learned inventory,
to be exported to other missions. The accomplishments o f the mission include military

109 United Nations, "Gender Perspectives on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," (2001). p.2
110 However, actors on the field agreed that a limited number o f female combatants exist in the DRC. The
main gender concern, would be with the “abandoned” w ives and children, not included in the DDR
program that are left behind without a house a ways to survive.
111 United Nations Department o f Peacekeeping Operations, "Addressing Conflict Related Sexual Violence:
An Analytical Inventory o f Peacekeeping Practice."
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patrols and escorts and the establishment o f joint mechanisms with the civilian
component to enhance the

mission's

capacity to

address women's

structural

vulnerabilities.
The main o f these mechanisms are the so called Joint Protection Teams (JPTs).
These are planned by the Civilian Affairs section, but carried out as a multi-sectoral team
that aims to assess and identify the primary protection needs and threats to the security of
local population; they are a promising tool that can improve UN's overall capacity to
respond to these context driven needs of the local population. Moreover, they can also
improve the relationship between UN civilians and military and the local population,
bring diverse civilian expertise to inaccessible areas and provide a tailored response to
the population's needs.
JPTs are implemented in all DRC territories and add to the presence o f varied
MONUSCO sections, such as Civilian Affairs, Child Protection, Human Rights, Sexual
Violence and others, along with the police and military components and other UN
agencies, such as UNHCR, UNICEF, etc. More importantly, though, after a thorough
assessment o f the situation, a specific response is planned, being thus a pro-active and
preventive mechanism paramount to protection of civilians.
In a context of widespread sexual violence, JPTs can activate mechanisms of
coordination between local women's organizations and the military, resulting in
improved patrols in the market and at firewood and water recollection places,
establishment o f temporary and mobile military operating bases in close-by areas and
escorts to women. At the same time, bringing women to the spotlight o f the protection
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planning strategy empowers them and is key for improving their overall vulnerable
status.
Another important mechanism where the military component has an important
participation is the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM). While JPTs are designed to assess
primary protection needs, JAMs are concerned with the overall situation o f a particular
place. It consists of a general evaluation of the humanitarian, protection, development,
human rights and/or social political situation o f a specific area and as JPTs, provides a
tailored response. JAMs are put in place more frequently than JPTs and may support the
overall situation o f local women by addressing their needs. Same as JPTs, these are also a
pro-active and preventive response mechanism.
The Joint Investigating Team (JIT) is also an important mechanism that the
military component can take part in, but usually as experts under MONUSCO's
leadership, rather than part o f a military contingent. JITs are designed to support the
Congolese Justice system to conduct investigations on alleged human rights violations,
including sexual and gender based violence allegedly committed in remote and
inaccessible areas. In this case, military contingents can support logistics, with
transportation and security. Different from JPTs and JAMs, JITs are a post facto response
that intends to improve the judiciary and ultimately fight impunity.
Finally, the military can also take part in Joint Monitoring Teams (JMTs),
established in support of MONUSCO's strategy to restore state authority by deploying
PNC units, government and Justice delegates to stabilized zones in eastern provinces
after disengagement of armed groups. These are primarily focused on police capabilities
and are overseen by UNPol and civilian observers, but may have the military component
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taking part to support logistics and security. Indirectly, by improving the Congolese
government’s authority in Congolese territory, the overall situation o f the civilian
population, as well as women and girls vulnerability to sexual and gender based violence,
is decreased.
However, in any of these mechanisms, it is paramount that personnel with
expertise in sexual violence and/or gender be included in order to be able to identify and
assess specific needs. Engaging local women and women's organizations with JPTs'
activities is also a necessary condition to better evaluate protection needs. Moreover, the
presence o f women in these teams may facilitate the contact with possible victims,
supporting the information data collection as well as formulation o f a perpetrator profile.
This improves the capacity to plan a security response.
These initiatives comprise important innovations in the traditional ways the
military operate. This information was provided by the office of the Force Commander
and very limited military personnel on the ground seemed to be aware o f the
initiatives.112 Interviews with the different military contingents113 showed general
awareness regarding the importance o f JPTs, although these were not brought up as an
important part o f their protection mandate. JPTs were usually discussed after the topic
was brought up by interviewers and interpreted as a civilian activity to which the military
component offered mere protection. Joint Assessment Missions, Joint Investigation
Teams and Joint Monitoring Teams, were never brought up by any o f the military

112 Data provided by the MONUSCO's military component gender focal point during presentation at the
International Conference “Promoting Gender to Build a Lasting Peace: Reflections on the Latin American
Experience” carried out in Buenos Aires, April, 2012. See:RESDAL, “International Conference,”
03/22/2013, www.resdal.org.
113 Interviews carried out with the military included contingents from Bangladesh, Egypt, Ghana,
Guatemala, India, Morocco, Pakistan and Uruguay deployed in different parts of the country.

317

contingents interviewed. However, high ranking civilian personnel commented that a
possible explanation was that low ranking soldiers may be unaware o f the specific names
of these activities.114
Although this may indicate only unawareness regarding the proper names o f these
operations, it may also be a sign that the central role o f the joint effort between civilians
and military to protect civilians may be overshadowed. It is imperative that the military
component see themselves as an integral and central part of each o f these mechanisms,
particularly JPTs, rather than just “escorts.” An important analysis would be to evaluate,
by rank and function o f military personnel sent along with civilians in these different
mechanisms, what they understand their role to be.
Other important actions carried out by MONUSCO military component include:
foot patrols in market areas, long-term patrols, establishment of Temporary Operating
Bases (TOB), Mobile Operating Bases (MOB) and Company Operating Bases (COB) in
sexual violence affected areas, and emergency cells. The interviews with the different
military contingents showed varied response to these specific protection mechanisms.
The following actions were observed:
- Patrols: Although all interviewed contingents are engaged with patrols, some are
less eager to proceed with foot patrols in areas not accessible by vehicle. However, it is in
these remote areas, where women confront higher risks of being attacked, far from main
roads and in the forest or jungle. Interviews with contingents from North Kivu (India,
Uruguay) and Ituri (Bangladesh, Guatemala) Brigades had a very positive response,
reaffirming the necessity to perform foot patrols in areas inaccessible by vehicle. In the

114 Interview carried out w ith high rank civilian personnel in Kinshasa, February, 2012.
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case of the Indian Battalion in North Kivu, some o f these patrols were planned according
to previous contact with local women's organizations.
In Province Orientale, due to characteristics o f the terrain, widely covered by the
jungle, long-term patrols ought to be carried out. In some cases they go by vehicles,
camping during the night on the way, until reaching the final destination where a
perimeter is set and foot patrols are done in that particular area. In other cases, a
helicopter drops soldiers on the ground where they patrol for a few hours. Both
Bangladesh and Guatemala carried out patrols o f this sort in their areas o f responsibility.
- Establishment of COBs, TOBs and MOBs. All interviewed contingents in the
East (Pakistan, Egypt, Uruguay, India, Bangladesh, Morocco and Guatemala) had COBs
and TOBs established in more isolated areas. The main objective o f having these bases
established is to cover a wider area, showing MONUSCO's presence and supporting the
government's efforts to control the territory.
As a matter o f fact some o f these are established in quite stark environments and
are cut out of the rest of the contingent. An example is the Uruguayan COB in Kimua,
reachable only by helicopter. Living conditions in these COBs and TOBs vary. As
informed by the Mission Support representative, due to budget constrains a few TOBs
intended to be established for only a few months became COBs without much
amelioration.115 Currently, the policy is to not open any more TOBs unless another one is
closed, putting into evidence the budgetary limits of the peace mission.
- Emergency Cells: these are envisioned to provide victims o f sexual violence
with an emergency response that includes medical and psychological care along with an

115 Interview carried out with M O N USCO M ission Support representative in Kinshasa, February, 2012.
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investigation in less than 72 hours. Although, at the time of the field work, they were still
not in place, conversations with South Kivu Brigade were already in place to start
implementing them in that region. We could not verify if the initiative was also being
discussed in other regions, or if currently they are already in place in South Kivu and/or
elsewhere.
An important component of the protection strategy is the relationship with the
local population and the capacity to respond to their needs in a timely manner. Amongst
the civilian components and UN agencies, the contact with local leaders and the
development actions with national institutions is common ground. Nonetheless, the
military component's engagement with the local population, despite their primary
protection role is still limited. Some initiatives aiming to improve this relationship are
being put in place.
The scope of engagement between the military and local population will depend
on the tasks o f each unit, resources available and language barriers.116 It is often common
that the population in rural areas does not speak French and translators of Lingala and
Swahili, the largest spoken languages in the DRC are relatively rare. Occasionally,
contact is established with the chief o f a village and maybe his wife to determine the
main needs o f the villagers. However, each battalion has very large areas o f responsibility
and a constant presence and steady communication is a challenge.
One o f the main instruments put in place to establish a connection with the local
population is the placement o f Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) in military bases.
CLAs are local staff with the double function o f serving as translators and as a bridge
116 Solhjell et al., "Turning Unsc Resolution 1325 into Operational Practice: A Cross-Country Study on
Implementing Resoltuion 1325 in Peacekeeping and Military Operations." p.22
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between the local population and the military component. All CLAs can speak English,
French and the local language. Living within the military compound, they are responsible
for collecting information with the local population to support the military component
efforts to identify protection needs. Due to security reasons, they are never placed in the
same city or region where they come from.
Another important channel o f communication between the military and the
civilian population is the Community Alert Network (CAN). These refer to electronic and
telephone communications placed within communities and serve as an early warning
system or hot line. However, in an interview with military contingents it was suggested
that CAN often confronts challenges o f implementation due to conditions in the field,
such as limited to no electricity and know how to manage the system amongst locals.117
Moreover, there is also a certain lack of willingness to fulfill this role on the part o f the
population who tend to be afraid of assuming a more active role for fear o f being
repressed.
In regard to communication with local women's organizations, the only military
contingent to mention frequent contact with the local women's organization was the
Indian contingent, particularly those settled in the COB located in the Walikale territory.
The initiative took place after the Walikale massacre, when MONUSCO was heavily
criticized when a nearby COB did not respond to an attack until a few days later. As
informed by the Indian COB commander o f that particular area, weekly meetings with
the women's organization are carried out as well as market patrols and escorts for the
local women are provided upon request.

117 Interview with senior officers from Indian Battalion w as carried out in Goma, February, 2012.
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Several MONUSCO sections have confirmed the difficulty in working with some
contingents, particularly the Pakistan contingent, that not only avoids talking to local
women, but also with UN women staff. As a matter o f fact, it was confirmed in more than
one interview that women (civilian or military) are not allowed to stay in any o f their
bases. This may undermine the possibility o f having UN female personnel, or local
female translators participate as CLAs in JPTs, JAMs, or in any other joint activities that
they may have to carry out. Moreover, by refusing to talk to local women's organizations
about their protection needs, protecting them may become an even more challenging task.
The existence of these initiatives shows that the protection o f civilian mandate
generated a series o f actions towards improving UN capacity to respond to threats against
the local population. In addition, the difficult context confronted by Congolese women,
has led the mission to create specific mechanism for their protection, such as the market
patrols and special escorts. However, the extent to which these initiatives are actually
implemented by the different military contingents is a different story. Interviews with
different civil society organizations and humanitarian actors, including UN agencies,
reinforced the existence of differences between each contingent, some being more prone
than others to act and use the authorized means to protect the population. Allegations that
UN peacekeepers did not act in a timely manner in various incidents proved indeed to be
true, including in the recent takeover o f Goma by the rebel group M2 3. While there are
mechanisms that put into practice the U N 's normative focus on the protection of the
individual, not all military contingents put them in place. In fact, one interviewed
contingent commanders affirmed that before taking an order from the UN he awaits a
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response from his capital, indicating that in some instances the UN still struggles in a
state dominated world.

Empowerment:

Empowerment refers to initiatives undertaken by all mission components with the
objective of strengthening women's social, economic and political status in the society.
Different MONUSCO sections have been involved in activities that directly impact the
empowerment o f women within Congolese society. The financial support provided by
different sections and components to women's organizations, the training and protection
of female candidates during elections and support to the implementation of a 1325 Plan
of Action can be highlighted.
UN agencies and sections are often involved with the financial support o f
grassroot organizations, government institutions and individuals involved with the fight
of women's rights and the improvement o f their status in the society. Besides the Human
Rights section compensation program to victims o f sexual violence, OGA maintains
partnerships with various women's organizations and the Ministry o f Women's and
Children's Affairs aiming to strengthen women's economic and social conditions.
At the forefront of these actions is the support and training o f female candidates
for elections. An increased presence of women in Congolese politics will facilitate a topdown approach, thus facilitating gender mainstreaming and the implementation o f a
political agenda that is responsive to women's needs. Pressure to change discriminatory
Congolese law is also undertaken aiming to elevate the society from the intrinsic
obstacles for the full development of social and gender equity.
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Also worth mentioning is the training o f PNC and FARDC members on gender
related issues and the pressure for the implementation of an Action Plan that would
contribute to the inclusion and full participation o f Congolese women in the armed and
police forces of the country. Their full participation would represent an important
accomplishment in terms o f empowerment since military and police institutions tend to
be the last bastions to open their doors to women and allow equal participation between
men and women.
Likewise, the military component is involved with empowerment initiatives.
Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and Civil-Military Activities, commonly known as CIMIC
are an important way through which the military component can communicate with the
local population and support women’s empowerment to reduce risks o f expose to all
types o f violence. While QIPs allow the military component to propose projects that can
be rapidly implemented (3 months) with a small budget (up to 25,000 USD) to support
the local community in varied ways, CIMIC provides activities with the local community
such as soccer matches and distribution o f food, water and other supplies.
The implementation o f QIPs and CIMIC activities has a double objective. They
can improve the life conditions of local population through the implementation o f these
small projects within the area of responsibility o f each military contingent, alternatively,
they support efforts to win the hearts and minds o f the population, building a more
trustful relationship between the military and the population.
It was interesting to observe that there are not many QIP and CIMIC activities
being carried out in the DRC. Distribution o f fuel and firewood could, for example,
decrease women's exposure to attack by being alone in the woods. At the same time, the
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construction o f women’s shelters, female latrines and placement o f self-efficient stoves
would all enhance women's security. Moreover, projects dedicated to building selfsustainable small businesses in charge o f local women could also be an important way of
strengthening women's status in the society thus decreasing their vulnerability.
These are just some o f the various examples in which the military can contribute
to local women's security and status. However, we did not observe many o f these actions
taking place. In a few cases, such as in Province Orientale, application to QIPs was
denied. For example, every Guatemalan contingent attempts to leave behind something
they built for the population;118 however, we were informed that their last QIP application
had been denied. Consequently, their support to population resorted to CIMIC activities
all funded by their home country.
Alternatively, the Pakistani contingent was involved with the remodeling o f a
school which contributed to the education of several Congolese boys and girls as a result
of QIP. At the same time, Uruguayan personnel commented that they frequently (every
day) provide food to different organizations in the city of Goma, including a shelter for
handicapped boys and a school for young boys and girls. In previous years they
supported a shelter for abused girls.
The context in the DRC, where troops are daily involved with security activities
explains why they are not as involved in CIMIC activities as military contingents in other
missions, such as MINUSTAH, where CIMIC has become a central part o f their role.
Although, these contribute to establishing an improved relationship with the local
population, other initiatives, such as the contact with community leaders and women's
118 Interview with Guatemalan personnel, including commander, commissioned and non-commissioned
officers and troops were carried out, in Dungu, February, 2012.
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organizations may enhance this relationship, building trust and improving their capacity
to respond to the specific threats confronted by the local population within their area of
responsibility.
The analysis of MONUSCO's gender policy and how a gender perspective is
incorporated into the work o f all its components indicates that the existence o f a context
marked by extreme high levels o f sexual violence. This has influenced the creation o f a
normative framework that offers a blueprint for an adequate protection strategy. Progress,
however is slow and in a few areas MONUSCO has been confronted with serious
implementation challenges. The most easily recognizable are the difficulties encountered
by some o f the military contingents to incorporate a gender perspective. Not only do they
purposely not have any women in their military, they have different conceptions of what
sexual crimes consist o f and tend to be wary of training. That of course, is not a general
trend and was present only in a few contingents.
Having a “support national authority” mandate, although extremely important,
can be problematic. Accomplishing national ownership o f projects so that the local
government acquires the necessary capabilities to sustain peace efforts on its own is
necessary; however, when institutions are corrupt and involved with human rights
violations, it becomes a central obstacle for a successful protection strategy. This is
particularly true in the case of the national military, highly implicated in rape cases in the
DRC. Not only may joint operations with the FARDC bring MONUSCO a negative
image, but working with the Congolese military justice system to accomplish prosecution
can also be challenging. Moreover, as previously mentioned, MONUSCO does not have
the mandate to interfere in the case of sexual crimes committed by civilians. These
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however are the kind of crimes in ascent and there is a lack o f initiatives as to how the
mission can further contribute in this area.
Finally, there is the problem o f a lack o f resources in general. It is clear that the
mission indeed has an encompassing and thorough approach to the problem o f sexual
violence and has attempted to implement different policies in all o f the five indicators.
However, there is only so much the UN can do with limited staff, reduced uniformed
personnel and scarce resources to further support national efforts to pacify the country
and protect its people.

Conclusions

The protection of civilian mandate dictates that the needs of individuals should be
the mission's highest priority and as a consequence, MONUSCO's efforts are centralized
towards identifying and responding to these needs in cooperation with government
institutions and humanitarian actors, including the UN agencies and civil society
organizations. The analysis showed that MONUSCO has indeed accomplished a number
of important benchmarks in terms o f incorporating a gender perspective into the daily
work of its staff and most importantly into the planning, execution and evaluation of
protection operations, often carried out jointly by the military and the civilian
components.
As much as pre-deployment training helps any commander and its soldiers to go
through situations in which the lives o f civilians are under threat, the truth is that in such
a context driven environment, sometimes they have to leam on the spot and have a pro
active attitude in order best attend those in need. That is not always easy; as General
Cammaert pointed out when talking about his own experience in the DRC as a
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commander, “The majority o f the troops were physically and mentally insufficiently
prepared to implement the mandate o f protection o f civilians, including sexual violence,
and had insufficient knowledge o f the Rules o f Engagement.” 119
That was true in 2005 when he was a commander and is still true. Years after the
first mandated operations to protect civilians, including from sexual violence, the UN and
the international community in general still struggle to grasp this renewed context in
which the physical and psychological damage directed towards the population is a central
feature. In the light o f uncertainty, and the need to act, the UN has come up with
innovative actions that contribute to improving the organization's capacity to adequately
respond to this complex and multi-layered context.
As seen, the implementation o f these actions varies from contingent to contingent
and from area to area. Complicating factors related to the volatile environment where
troops operate, along with ill-trained personnel, impose further challenges to a successful
learning process. Still, a clear mandate for the protection of civilians generated a
normative framework and practices that aimed to place the individual lives o f each
Congolese as the mission's top priority. As such, the mission is a hub o f lessons learned
that can be exported to other missions. The problem has been approached in a
comprehensive manner that attempted to increase security by strengthening the
economic, administrative and judicial capacity o f Congolese state. Most importantly,
joint actions between all components have been generated.

119 General Patrick Cammaert, “The practical Implications o f a Gender Perspective in Peacekeeping
operations”, Lecture delivered at the International Conference Prom oting Gender to B uild a Lasting Peace:
Reflecting on the Latin American Experience, Buenos Aires, 25th-26th April, 2012. See: RESDAL,
“International Conference,” 03/22/2013, www.resdal.org.ar.

In this context, considerations regarding gender equality, economic empowerment
of women, and an environment free from sexual violence, aim to generate initiatives to
improve the functionality of the government, the judicial system and the inclusion o f
women's voices in the peace process. In this regard, the UN has achieved very limited
results. By one side it lacks resources and experts, by another, the persistent o f patriarchic
societal features are not simply erased overnight. A long-term impact assessment will be
necessary.
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CHAPTER 6
PROMOTING GENDER TO BUILD PEACE: A SUCCESSFUL LEARNING
PROCESS?

The incorporation o f a gender approach to peace operations is part o f a learning
process initiated since the 90's when the international security environment changed
abruptly. As individuals living within the states became targets and the main victims of
wars, UN peacekeeping practices passed through a transformation and incorporated a
series of actions whose scope went well beyond the traditional ceasefire monitoring and
incorporated efforts to strengthen the state and its institutions (e.g. judicial system, police,
rule of law, etc) as a way to protect the population and promote international peace and
security. Along these lines, the incorporation o f a gender approach was the result o f a
number o f factors, among which the disproportionate impact of war on women and
children and the use of sexual violence as weapon o f war comprise the central reasons for
this increasing concern.
Nonetheless, as it was shown in Chapter Three, the U N 's strategy to combat
sexual violence and the organization's normative and legal framework to pursue a gender
approach in a peace operations setting established a strong link between the improvement
of women's lives and peace. While this logic is perfectly plausible, it implies an
underlying reasoning that assumes that “fixing” gender relations in accordance with a
Western cultural pattern will result in peace. Evidence o f this are the numerous UN
documents that repeatedly establish this relationship and the UN strategy to approach the
problem. As the analysis of UN resolutions on Women, Peace and Security showed, the
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UN's strategy to combat sexual violence is comprehensive and considers war-time
violence as a continuum o f violence resultant from the previous status and vulnerability
held by women in these societies. The implementation o f broad gender approaches that
attempts to not only provide protection against physical violence but also promote
women's empowerment and the reform o f state's institutions illustrate this concern.
While advances have been made, major obstacles remain. In terms o f
accomplishments, the elaboration of a strong normative framework based on Security
Council resolutions, and supporting documents, such as the Analytical Inventory on the
military role to combat sexual violence and the guidelines to incorporate a gender
approach to peace operations by the police, are by themselves noteworthy successes.
Indeed, as suggested by the case studies, it is only after some form o f legal base and
normative framework exist that specific tasks to promote gender approaches are passed
on to the different missions' components. Furthermore, these documents established
important monitoring and implementing mechanisms and benchmarks to evaluate the
organization's progress on the issue. Among those are the goal o f 10% female uniformed
personnel in the field, the reports of the Secretary General on the advancement o f these
resolutions, the “naming and shaming” strategy to prosecute perpetrators and shame
countries that do not hold them accountable and the establishment o f an “infra-structure”
(Gender and Sexual Violence Units) to support gender mainstreaming in operations. As a
matter of fact, the appointment o f senior gender advisers in the field and at headquarters
levels was central to increase the understanding o f gender issues within different missions
and to the establishment o f gender sensitive actions by the different missions'
components.
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At the same time, however, the case studies showed major implementation gaps
on the specific issues that, from the beginning, comprised the main puzzle of this
dissertation. The implementation gap remained wide on those issues that depended more
on member state’s compliance, such as gender balance and protection. In both case
studies, it was evident that member states are still far from reaching an ideal gender
balance among uniformed personnel. Nonetheless, what is worse is the fact that national
identity and culture played an important role in determining how actions on the ground
were carried out. The multiple complaints among female personnel (from different
components) in regard to some of the contingents’ behavior toward women were
worrisome, especially in the light of unanimous endorsement o f UN resolutions on
Women, Peace and Security.
What do these challenges say about the U N 's organizational learning and its
ability to act as an agent o f norms disseminator? The reality in the field and the
mandates' scope remain disconnected. The likelihood that the UN mandates will become
a reality is low. The question o f whether setting high aspirational goals contributes to
norm diffusion, even at a slow pace, cannot be answered conclusively in this dissertation.
Nonetheless, important evidence supports this claim, including the generation o f local
instruments to better protect women and girls (such as local laws and government
strategies); women's empowerment, particularly in the political domain, an area where
missions have been very active; and finally an improved understanding among member
states of the operational need to have both more female uniformed personnel and more
economic assistance dedicated to combat sexual violence.
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The analysis of the case studies also identified some elements that, when present,
would either facilitate or impede learning. For example, it became clear that in the
presence o f specific mandates to protect civilians and combat sexual violence, better
protection strategies are adopted and more detailed tasks are issued to the military
component. Nonetheless, the study o f the specific case of Congo showed that even
though a strong gender normative framework was in place its protection strategies
constantly failed, as is illustrated by the increasing levels of violence in the country.
Success was stymied by three complicating factors. They are: the presence o f an ongoing
and complex conflict, the geo-political environment of the country, and intrinsic
obstacles to reaching the population.
Overall the analysis showed that gender approaches to peace operations are a
Western based idea that is difficult to implement due to the distinct political and cultural
reality in the majority of the member states. Nonetheless, it was successfully put in the
international agenda and will remain so in future years. As a consequence, despite the
slow pace, the UN has been an agent o f dissemination. This conclusion not only supports
the U N 's specific role in disseminating a gender approach to its member states, but most
importantly, it also shows that institutions can indeed serve as agents o f norms
dissemination by influencing member states to adopt new norms that are at odds with
their traditional practices.
In order to further discuss the contributions of this dissertation, this chapter will
be divided into three main sections. The first compares the results from the two case
studies It evaluates whether the implementation gaps found in field missions were
hampering the learning process and defines which elements can be considered learning
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enablers which should be disseminated to other missions. The second section discusses
the UN's role as an agent o f dissemination and will evaluate its success in promoting
gender approaches to member states participating in these missions. The third section
discusses the contributions o f this dissertation's conclusions to the study o f institutions in
general, particularly their role in generating and disseminating norms to member states.

Lessons from the field

The learning model used in this dissertation attempted to show the dynamic
process through which new norms are created and incorporated within organizations, and
specifically how gender norms were incorporated into the scope o f peacekeeping
practices by the UN. As previously discussed in Chapter 2, an important part o f the
learning process refers to disseminating these norms throughout the U N 's different
bodies, agencies, and institutions and to its member states. The analysis o f the case
studies was paramount to determining the areas where the UN learning process confronts
major difficulties.
As expected it is the distant political and cultural reality o f member states and
host nations themselves that posed the greatest obstacle to a successful learning process.
This is particularly true in the specific areas where U N 's mandate was carried out by
member state’s troops or through their direct contribution. In other cases, it became clear
that, despite the push for the reform o f local institutions to incorporate gender
approaches, local security forces remained ill-trained and/or maintained a patriarchic
structure.
However, a few advances were achieved, some lessons were learned, and there is
evidence o f slow norm diffusion. In particular, observations included the development of
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local legal mechanisms to protect women and girls, the political empowerment of
women, the recognition within some contingents o f the operational requirement to
include uniformed women in their ranks, and the need to address women's needs in the
field.
These indicators are the basis for a comparison o f the accomplishments and
shortcomings o f the two case studies in this section. From this evidence conclusions are
drawn regarding the best practices for successful gender mandate implementation and
improved ways to promote organizational learning.

Legal framework

In this regard the analysis showed a major difference between the two case studies
with differing impact in the field. The Haitian case is marked by the constant absence of
protection o f civilian mandates to combat sexual violence which led to the absence of
gender considerations in the mission's planning. In fact, it was not until the earthquake
and the massive displacement o f the Haitian population to IDP camps that resolutions
acknowledged the need to protect civilians in those areas, including women and girls,
who were increasingly becoming victims o f sexual violence. The inclusion o f this issue in
the mandate led to the incorporation o f specific tasks for each o f MINUSTAH's
components to address this issue more effectively. For example, the military was tasked
with patrols within some o f the most dangerous IDP camps, the police created a mobile
team that operated within the camps, and the Gender Unit worked closely with
government institutions and police to improve the commissariat’s ability to receive
victims, e.g. creation of separate spaces to receive victims.
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However, as previously discussed, sexual violence is a constant in Haiti's history.
Civil society organizations and scholarly analysis point out to the recurrence o f sexual
violence as a form o f political oppression when women were targeted due to their, or
their relatives' political affiliation. Moreover, as mentioned on different occasions by
members o f the Gender Unit gang, rapes still occurs in the country and comprise vestiges
o f the high levels o f violence committed by those paramilitary and militia groups created
by governmental authorities to protect their power.1 Although the areas where they
operate have been pacified, gang activities and occasional sexual violence occurs, often
related to the initiation of new gang members or to their other activities. Consequently,
although the inclusion o f protection mandates to MINUSTAH has produced positive
results and generated specific tasks to address sexual violence, it perpetuated a singleminded view o f this crime in Haitian society as a bi-product o f the earthquake, rather than
the continued societal violence that existed before January 2010.
By contrast, the case of Congo shows a different picture. Sexual violence has
been widely recognized as a central feature o f the conflict and thus it is always included
in MONUSCO's mandate. As a result, specific strategies to protect civilians and combat
sexual violence have been generated and each o f MONUSCO's components has specific
tasks aimed at protecting women and girls from sexual violence. Besides the mission's
initiatives there are also complementary plans o f action in cooperation with UN agencies
and other organs o f the international community, such as the Humanitarian Action Plan
and the Protection Cluster along with the I4S Plan for the Stabilization in the DRC that
also contemplates efforts to combat sexual violence.
1 Interviews with representatives from M INUSTAH's Gender Unit carried out in Port-au-Prince, September
2012.
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Paradoxically though, despite the presence o f a strong legal and normative basis
to address the problem in the DRC the situation has not improved and, in fact, it
worsened with the systematic resurgence o f different armed groups that openly attack the
population and usurp the country's resources. In fact, the DRC case is further
complicated by the persistence o f the ongoing conflict, the lack of strong local leadership
and inability to reinforce state authority throughout its territory, and the inaccessibility of
population segments living in isolated areas, often only accessible by helicopters. While
these do not offer a full explanation as to why the situation in the Congo has not
improved, despite the implementation o f a normative framework and corrective action,
they do explain the contextual complexity. They also show that further attention and
robust action on the part of the international community is required.2

Gender balance

Gender balance is one o f those areas that is very dependent on member state’s
national policies and their political willingness to adopt resolutions' provisions,
particularly among uniformed personnel. The civilian personnel hired to staff peace
missions are selected by the Department o f Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Even
though the exact gender balance in the two missions for the civilian component could not
be assessed, the number is relatively low. An inability to support accompanying family
members was cited by some interviewees as an important factor that explained the

2 On March 28th, 2013 the Security Council approved yet another resolution as a ways to improve the
security situation in the DRC. Resolution 2098 created a specialized “intervention brigade” in an attempt to
“neutralize and disarm the notorious 23 March Movement (M 23), as well as other Congolese rebels and
foreign armed groups in strife-riven eastern Democratic Republic o f Congo.” See: Department o f Public
Information, “Intervention Brigade Authorized as Security Council grants mandate renewal for United
Nation M ission in Congo,” 04/17/2013, https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/scl0964.doc.htm .
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decreased number of women in the civilian component. Nonetheless, in both missions,
women led the major civilian sections dedicated to improving these missions' response to
gender specific needs (i.e., Gender Unit in Haiti and Gender Affairs Office and Sexual
Violence in the DRC). Moreover, in the DRC, the Special Representative of the Secretary
General for Rule o f Law was a woman.
Since UNSCR1325 gender balance among uniformed personnel has improved in
both missions. The approval of the resolution by the Security Council and the initiatives
generated by the organization, such as the creation of gender units, and the inclusion o f
guidelines and training modules have influenced member states to send more female
uniformed personnel to peace missions. However, the military remains the main
challenge, especially because increasing the number of female military depends on
member state’s national policies and their willingness to change them. Currently 2.45%
o f the military and 10% o f the police force are women among MINUSTAH uniformed
personnel; and 2.52% o f the military and 9.96% o f the police are women in MONUSCO.
As was previously suggested, the presence o f women in the field reflects national
policies of member states. The late incorporation of women in the military and their
complete absence in some specialty fields, particular combatant positions, explains why until now - they have low ranking and remain restricted from some tasks, such as security
patrols and escorts that would allow them to have direct contact with the population. In
both UN missions, military women were mostly confined to the barracks o f the military
based on their specific military branch and specialty. In the case of the Congo, interviews
indicated that within the South African and Ghana Battalion there were combatant
women in patrols, however, the contingents present in the areas where most rape cases
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are recorded (North and South Kivu and Province Oriental) have a very limited number
o f female personnel (Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Morocco).
Interviews with female uniformed personnel and some male personnel indicated
that they agreed with the idea that the presence of female personnel facilitates contact
with the local population and may serve as a role model to the local society. Almost all
accounts included observations that they attracted a lot of attention among the local
population and that could serve as an example used by local women to enhance their own
empowerment.

Security sector

In both missions, the bulk o f action towards improving the security sector refer to
strengthening local capabilities, particularly national security and military forces and the
justice system. Because Haiti does not have a military force, efforts are focused on the
police, while in the DRC both the military and the police capabilities are tackled. It is
also important to note that there is increased attention towards providing gender training
for police and military in the two countries, with varying results. Haiti is considered
more successful in this regard because it has a special UNPol team dedicated only to that
matter. Nonetheless, in the DRC there is increased attention on the military due to the
elevated number o f rape cases that have been perpetrated by them. In fact, as the UN
supported DDR processes that incorporated subjects responsible for serious violations o f
human rights into the Congolese military, the UN is also considered responsible for the
current gruesome condition of Congolese forces. Unfortunately about half o f the reported
cases in South Kivu were allegedly committed by members o f the Congolese military.

In regard to strengthening the local justice system, interviews in Haiti and in the
DRC showed that deployed civilian personnel tend to think that cultural features hamper
the efficacy and liability o f local systems and impunity remains common place. Local
mechanisms of mediation between community leaders and families were cited in the two
countries as factors that contribute to low prosecution rates. It is common practice that
agreements between the family of the victim and the perpetrator are settled, usually
incurring in financial compensation. The main concern is that by having these informal
mechanisms, the formal legal pathways are under-utilized and continue to be perceived as
untrustworthy by victims. Other factors also affect these systems, such as corruption and
a lack of functioning local justice system. This is one o f UN's major challenges, not only
in regard to improving its responsiveness to sexual violence, but to enhancing its
performance in peace building and post-reconstruction. The UN lacks civilian capabilities
and resources to send experts to support the re-habilitation of local institutions, a step that
is necessary for the full recovery o f any society.
Part o f building a sound justice system is having the necessary legal framework.
Many o f these countries have inadequate laws prohibiting violence against women,
including rape. In fact, laws criminalizing rape were not passed in Haiti until 2005 in
Haiti and in the Democratic Republic of Congo until 2006. The UN missions, particularly
its gender offices, actively participate in the efforts to improve national laws related to
sex discrimination, gender equality and violence against women. However, in both cases
the hard work o f grassroots organizations, UN agencies that work separately from the
mission, and, in particular, UNIFEM (now UN-Women) were key players in addressing
the deficient legal system. A recent project to reform Haitian penal code and tighten the
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law on sexual violence was sent to the parliament. Among the provisions, the
criminalization of marital rape and facilitating measures for prosecution, such as the
abolition o f the need o f a medical certificate, are important measures that will improve
domestic response to sexual violence.3

Protection

Protection was yet another area in which the U N 's organizational learning and its
capacity to disseminate norms was tested. These aspects are heavily dependent on
member states willingness to comply with UN guidelines and best practices for protecting
local women from sexual violence. This indicator was highly correlated to impediments
of member state culture.. The analysis o f the two cases revealed that contingents in both
the DRC and Haiti were charged with serious allegation o f sex discrimination. This is
problematic because some of the DRC contingents are deployed to areas o f high levels of
sexual violence, as is the case of the Pakistani contingent in South Kivu and the
Moroccan contingent in Province Oriental.
The field work showed that contingents in general have a limited understanding of
their role in protecting women and girls.

Despite clear UN guidance directing

communicate with local women's organizations for the purpose o f gathering first-hand
information on their need to provide patrols and escorts in dangerous areas, the military
contingents argue that UN policy strictly forbids their interaction with local women. UN
policy forbids sexual contact between troops and locals. The military interpretation that
routine interaction is forbidden undermines the development of more effective protection
3 For more information on the recent Haitian law project, see: Ansel Hertz, “Haiti m oves to tighten laws on
sexual violence,” G lobal Issues, 04/15/2013, http://www.globalissues.org/news/2013/03/Q7/16030.
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strategies. Some contingents, such as the Indian and Latin Americans, affirmed that they
interact with locals, although only the Indian contingent confirmed having a close
relationship with local women's organization.

Specifically they have established an

effective relationship in the Walikale territory, the site of, where previous massacres.
Allegations against contingents included their refusal to speak to women, even
UN staff, or to host them in their base during joint activities. As previously shown in the
Congolese case, joint operations between civilians and military often include female
civilian participants. Interviewees stated that they were restricted from the base which
contradicts the military function o f protecting civilian and UN personnel. Female military
personnel from other contingents also complained that they were excluded from
participating in joint patrols because the Pakistani contingent forbade them from entering
their base.
The interviews showed a differentiated attitude towards the female researchers in
the team. The research team was comprised o f two female interviewers and one male.
Some military contingents would not shake hands with women interviewers and would
only speak with the male interviewer. These impressions were confirmed by interviews
with different civilian sections in both missions. In the most extreme cases sexual
exploitation and abuse against the population were viewed as normal.
Consequently, although great lessons learned could be observed in the DRC, an
example of which are the escorts and patrols of the Joint Protection Teams, these actions
are of varying impact due to the prevalence o f these attitude. The strong influence o f
attitude as an obstruction to norm diffusion works at cross purpose to the UN “Women,
Peace and Security” resolutions. These resolutions prescribe addressing gender relations

3 42

as a way to accomplish peace, but have little if any enforcement mechanisms for
appropriate gender relations in troop-contributing countries. The question o f whether
these high aspirational goals support the dissemination o f norms to, and acceptance by,
member states cannot be fully answered although there is evidence o f positive effects in
some countries. Further research o f the military contingents that originate from countries
with ingrained cultural attitudes against gender equality is needed to evaluate the
effectiveness o f the UN as an agent of norm dissemination.
In Haiti, protective actions are undertaken by both the military and the police,
however it is the predominantly the police component that works with cases o f sexual
violence. They primarily focus on the IDP camps. Although it is well known among
members o f the Gender Unit staff that sexual violence is widespread, their attempt to
expand police activities beyond IDP camps have not yet been successful. The military,
from troops to leadership, has a very limited understanding o f the nature o f the problem
in Haiti. They associate sexual violence with the lack o f security in the camps and, thus,
praise the military’s security enforcement within the camps as instrumental to reducing.
However, equally important were the military efforts to stabilize and pacify the
neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince. This was instrumental in reducing sexual violence, yet
the military seems to be unaware its importance.
A final comment on this topic is necessary. Interviews with contingents from
some nationalities showed that, despite the UN's provision that peacekeepers are
deployed on a voluntary basis, some contingents affirmed that they are ordered and
deployed abroad. Among those military contingents interviewed, battalions from Jordan,
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India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan were ordered. This is another factor to consider as
influencing peacekeepers' performance.

Empowerment

In both missions, the gender office is involved with actions toward women's
empowerment in all domains, from compensation for victims to support during electoral
campaigns to female candidacy opportunities. This last domain has seen the highest level
o f success as exemplified in by increased participation o f women in elections both as
voters and as candidates. Joint work with the military component to protect women
candidates, who are often targeted, was performed in both cases.
However, the different reality in the two countries led to varying degrees of
involvement by the different missions' components in actions toward women's
empowerment. In Haiti, as the country becomes more stable and the mission enters the
consolidation phase, political volatility and fragile democracy are the main threats to
reversing women's gains. Interestingly, since the security situation has improved in the
country, all components - including the military - have worked with social and economic
projects to promote women's empowerment. Battalions have implemented Quick Impact
Projects (QIPs) that benefit local women, by both improving the mission's image and
their contact with the population and by promoting women's empowerment.
The volatile environment in the DRC creates further challenges which have
stymied reducing sexual violence and increasing the social and economic conditions of
women. As a consequence, MONUSCO civilian sections finance the activities of
women's organizations and support government efforts to implement UNSCR1325.
Mechanisms of compensation to victims of violence have been put in place and a few
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QIPs focus on women's specific needs, such as the construction o f latrines, maternity
facilities, etc. One o f MONUSCO's biggest contribution, in partnership with other UN
agencies, especially UN-Women, is the generation of a strong civil society and a space
for women's voices.
This analysis highlighted the U N 's main accomplishments and challenges for the
future. The comparative analysis specified areas in which the U N 's organizational
learning process has been more successful and which factors contributed or hampered
that process. As expected the U N 's attempt to incorporate a gender approach faced major
difficulties of norms dissemination to member states. This is illustrated by the difficulty
of implementing gender mandates that are being carried out by culturally diverse troops.
There is another differentiated cultural .matter that affects actions and is important to
address. Different organizational cultures, such as those o f humanitarian personnel, UN
civilian staff, and the military each have unique ethos, norms and behavioral approaches
to problems. Yet the problems they face require joint solutions. Healthy civil-military
relations are a necessary condition for the implementation o f these mandates.
The two countries showed different realities in that regard. Because Haiti is
stabilized through military action, the military troops are increasingly involved with
humanitarian activities, which is a source of friction with the humanitarian community. In
the DRC, the relationship between the military and civilians is generally positive.
However their relative unawareness o f each other's unique institutional cultures caused
occasional friction, particularly when dealing with information sharing. An area that
worked well was the coordination mechanisms to incorporate gender approaches in the
military work. At the higher level, such as heads o f civilian units, force commanders, and
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the component's gender focal point leader, the relationship was extremely positive
characterized by frequent meetings.
The comparative analysis o f the case studies has shown that despite the
shortcomings, there are important accomplishments that should not be taken for granted.
In particular, the generation o f a space where gender themes are discussed and action
towards promoting gender equality are increasingly becoming a priority (at least at the
missions' leadership level). Despite difficulties in changing traditional patriarchic
features in host nations, the continued weakness o f domestic institutions, and member
state’s unwillingness to implement certain changes themselves, it is important to
recognize the accomplishments.

Important steps have been taken toward recognizing

gender issues as central when addressing conflict roots and establishing the foundation of
a lasting peace.
The analysis, however, did point out important elements that are necessary for
successful implementation of a gender mandate. It identified the major obstacles for the
UN 's renewed policy focused on the individual, its attempt to improve protection o f
women and girls, and to identify and address their needs. The contextual analysis o f the
cases shows that indeed war violence is a continuation of previously existing unbalanced
gender relations in these countries that were exacerbated by instability and conflict. In
both countries, the status of women and the state's capacity and willingness to protect
their rights were extremely limited. Moreover, there was a prevailing inferior social status
of women that further increased their vulnerability and decreased their access to basic
economic opportunities. This reality shows that indeed “fixing” gender relations is an
essential step to re-building societies. Thus the UN has adopted an appropriate strategy
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that focuses on the root causes of wartime violence against women and establishes the
conditions for ensuring those gains are not reversed in the aftermath of war.
Nonetheless, the political and social reality o f member states entrusted with the
responsibility o f carrying out these mandates is the foremost obstacle to improving local
gender relations. As shown, the different domestic reality of member states was
influential and shaped the action of troops in the field. There is another potentially
harmful effect. The UN troops serve as a role model to local societies. One o f the main
justifications for incorporating more female uniformed personnel was that their inclusion
would serve as a role model. They would exemplify a different reality, one in which
women could pursue the same career paths as men, including the military. What are the
harmful effects of deploying contingents whose gender views reflect the same problems
that these policies are supposed to address? If the UN is working with the notion that
these norms generated at headquarters and perfected through lessons learned from the
field can be disseminated to host nations and member states, then it should also consider
the possibility that by having these contingents in these areas, rather than fixing, they
may be reinforcing those same prevailing patriarchic features the organization is trying to
change.

Their actions are at cross-purposes with their intention and stated policy

objectives.
The UN's problem of generating member state support in terms o f troops,
financial contributions, and equipment are not new. However, better assessment o f the
cultural background o f troop-contributing countries should be conducted before
deploying troops to sensitive areas where the impact of war on women and girls is
particularly harsh. The UN should place a higher priority on assigning troops that
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exemplify the gender norms that the UN intends to diffuse to target countries. This is a
difficult but necessary task.
To conclude this section, indicators are identified that can be used to evaluate the
effectiveness o f the UN in implementing a gender approach in its peacekeeping practices
and disseminating gender norms.

Table 15: Analytical indicators for assessing the UN's implementation capacity in
the field
Strategy com ponent

Indicators

Legal fram ework

Presence o f gender sensitive mandates with specific protection
provisions.

G ender balance

Female personnel comprise at least 10% o f uniformed personnel and
30% o f civilian personnel. Military women in patrols and police
women in constant contact with victims and involved in all efforts to
address sexual violence. Civilian, women in decision-making
positions.

Security sector

Generation o f local legislation regarding sex discrimination and other
forms o f sexual and gender-based violence and the criminalization o f
rape. Gender training for local security and defense forces and
initiatives to increase the number and contribution o f women in these
institutions. Initiatives to improve the justice system.

Protection

Consultation with local wom en's organizations and participation o f
women, uniformed and civilian, in assessment missions to both
identify protection needs and the impact o f war on women.

Em powerm ent

Increased number o f women participating in elections as voters and
candidates. Improved economic and social indicators disaggregated
by sex. Initiatives to improve the status and benefits o f women
undertaken by all components.

These indicators comprise a useful method to assess the U N 's ability to
implement a gender approach to peace operations and to point out the specific areas in
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which the organization's efforts have experienced the most difficulties. At the same time,
given that gender is a hard case, the analysis will identify the U N 's deficiencies in
promoting norm dissemination to other countries as well as within its own organization.
The following section explores the final stage o f organizational learning dissemination. This assessment will provide insight regarding the U N 's effectiveness in
influencing member states to implement national policy that reflects the UN’s new
gender norms. Is the UN an effective role model for member nations?

The UN as an agent of dissemination

The learning model proposed in this dissertation attempts to assess whether or not
organizational learning can take place when member states have not yet learned
themselves and serve as an agent o f norms and practice dissemination. This focus was
derived from the main puzzle o f this dissertation, that is, the fact that the UN has linked a
lasting peace with “normalized” gender relation and proposed a comprehensive strategy
aimed at improving women's status, state capacity, and the security environment. The
focus on gender relations seems plausible, however it entails certain cultural features that
are still not acceptable among member states. The question is whether the UN could “fix”
gender relations in host nations when member states, whose troops are responsible for
carrying out mandates in the field, originate from a domestic societal context in which
gender equality does not exist.
In this regard, the analysis o f the case studies showed that the U N 's gender
approach is adequate since there seemed indeed to exist previous unbalanced gender
relations that contributed to the increasing levels o f sexual violence during wartime, in
the case of the DRC, and during political disturbances, in the case o f Haiti. Despite the
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differences in scale and applied tactics, women were targets in both countries as a result
o f a strategic thinking that aimed to either punish them for political views or, in the
complex case of Congo, undermine opponent’s will to fight, distress local society, and
exterminate a particular ethnicity.
The difference in the degree in which violence has been used is the result o f the
particular context in each country, the level o f conflict instability, and the international
community’s scale o f success establishing a lasting peace. As the security environment
improves and political disruptions decrease in Haiti, the cause o f violence against women
has become less of a tactic and more opportunistic. This clarifies the root o f the problem
as being Haitian women’s structural inferior status in the society. In Congo, as armed
conflict continues so does the violence against women. Rape and other forms o f sexual
violence may be accepted and normalized in their society.
The field work identified the UN’s difficulty in norm dissemination in both host
nations and member states.

This is shown by the limited impact of its policies on

national institutions and the slow pace at which member states have taken in adopting the
provisions o f “Women, Peace and Security” resolutions. However, the successful actions,
pointed out in the previous section, should not be underestimated. Creating domestic laws
to establish and protect women's rights, eradicate violence and sex discrimination,
strengthen the role o f women's organizations, and create a space in the political arena for
women are significant. These are important advances that may contribute to further
disseminate the new norms and practices regarding gender. They also may have spillover
effects in other areas, such as reform of host nation’s security sector, institutional
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improvement o f women's physical and structural vulnerability (and thus decreased levels
of violence against them), and lay the foundation for lasting peace.
The case studies show that a member state’s inability to comply with certain
provisions does affect UN actions in the field, particularly in regard to protection
strategies that can be seriously undermined with contingents that are not prepared to deal
with this problem or that are unwilling to incorporate gender approaches to their actions.
In these cases, the main problems are: 1. Inability to adequately communicate with local
women's organizations or local women as a way to better understand their protection
needs; 2. Failure to adequately prosecute these crimes and protect victims, as exemplified
by improper interrogation methods and reporting procedures that reveal victims'
identities and endanger them; 3. Ignorance in regard to the nature of the crime itself as
illustrated in an interview with one o f the interviewed battalions commander who
affirmed that sexual violence committed within the family is not a crime; 4. Difficulties
derived from some of the battalions' unwillingness to host female personnel which
hinders joint protection strategies and effective communications with local community; 5.
Misbehavior and involvement in cases o f sexual exploitation, abuse, and violence,
including rape.
Despite the adverse effects resultant from troop contributing countries inability to
adopt a gender approach, it is important to note that the abovementioned problems are not
ignored by the civilian sections responsible for improving the UN's response to sexual
violence and for incorporating gender approaches throughout all UN actions. In fact,
interviews with members of the Gender Unit in Haiti, the Gender Affairs Office, the
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Sexual Violence Unit in Congo, and other civilian sections in the two countries show that
they are aware o f these problems and are addressing them.
For example, the Sexual Violence Unit in Bukavu, DRC, was aware o f recurrent
inadequate interrogation procedures in the South Kivu area and created a training course
for military contingents. The simple and straightforward language, “D o’s and Don’ts”
format, provided guidelines for how to deal with a victim o f sexual violence. The UN
staff responsible for that course commented that the military responded very well to the
instruction and became more involved with the unit. Their relationship improved
considerably because they understood the importance of their role. For example, after a
recent massacre in Walikale, a Mobile Operating Base was established, continuous
patrols were conducted, and weekly meetings with local women's organizations were
organized. Another example is in Haiti.

Contingents continued to display a lack of

understanding in regard to gender issues. In response the Gender Unit worked closely
with the military component gender focal point to promulgate a force commander
directive that all contingents must appoint a gender focal point at the battalion and/or
company level. Further, these liaisons should participate in a specific three-day training
on gender which would enable them to disseminate the information to the rest of the
contingent.
These initiatives illustrate that even though member states do not adopt UN
provisions which may hamper efforts, the infrastructure put in place as a result of
“Women, Peace and Security” resolutions has a positive impact.

An example is the

appointment of gender advisers and emplacement of sexual violence units which have the
effect o f circumventing member states' non-compliance. Most importantly, these efforts
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identify another instance through which institutions can promote norms dissemination to
member states. The constant repetition o f contingent deployment and readministration of
appropriate gender sensitive training to the troops diffuses these norms to the member
states. This is a result of the continuous replacement of military and law enforcement
contingents. Once their six, nine or twelve month tours end they return home and new
personnel take their place in the contingents. However, that also means that the learning
curve is rather steep due the constant replacement o f troops in the field.
Although this study does not provide enough evidence to conclusively trace the
ways through which gender norms and practices are adopted by member states, it
provides important insight on norm dissemination and confirms that some diffusion takes
place. Future research and long-term analysis is necessary to adequately assess the U N 's
ability to act as an agent of norm and practice dissemination in the gender domain.
Assessing the hard case o f gender in the UN is an important step toward evaluating an
institution’s ability to promote norm dissemination and their efficacy.
The analysis carried out in this dissertation, however, also contributed to identify
factors that contribute to the dissemination o f norms by motivating member states to
adopt these changes. In the specific case of gender in peace operations, the use o f peace
operations as a foreign policy pillar led some states to incorporate provisions o f “
Women, Peace, and Security” resolutions in their national policies.
Figure 9, below, shows that contributions to peace operations have increasingly
switched from developed countries to developing states over time. International
organizations are usually the arena of choice through which these states attempt to
propagate their national interests and participate in international politics architecture.
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Figure 8: Contributions to peace operations by region

Year 2000

Year 2009

■ A s ia (34%)

■ Asia (46.7%)

1 Africa (23.9%)

Kf Africa (34.1%)

W estern Europe (18.1%)

W estern Europe (8.8%)

E astern Europe (9.4%)

Latin America and the C aribbean (6.9%)

B O ceania (8.6%)

S

Eastern Europe (2.7%)

I

■

O ceania (0.5%)

■

North America (0.3%)

North America (3.9%)

■ Latin America and the Caribbean (2.1%)

In 2000, out of 1,000 effectives in peace operations:
- 340 came from Asian countries
- 240 from Africa
-180 from Western Europe
- 90 from Eastern Europe
- 90 from Oceania
- 40 from North America
- 20 from Latin America and the Caribbean

In 2009, those 1,000 effectives would be sorted as follows:
- 468 from Asia
- 341 from Africa
- 88 from Western Europe
- 69 from Latin America and the Caribbean
- 26 from Eastern Europe
- 5 from Oceania
- 3 from North America

Source: RESDAL, 2009.

An important factor to be considered in regard to these developing states is that
most have passed through the processes of political, economic, and social upheavals
themselves. This gives them a comparative advantage when acting in the other conflict
and post-conflicts scenarios. In some cases, this experience is reflected in specific tactical
capabilities that create a safe and secure environment through a comprehensive approach
to security. This approach includes development projects as key to achieving long-term
stability and building relationships o f trust with the local population that facilitate overall
goal accomplishment. This is the case o f Latin American countries. Brazil, in particular,
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has a special interest in showing its capabilities in peace operations as a way of
strengthening its pledge for a more active role in the international security agenda and to
support its pursuit of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
Not all countries that have increased contribution have the same motivation and
commitment to the UN’s principles and norms, as say Brazil and South Africa, too. In
some cases, an increased contribution to peace operations reflects a need to employ
national armed forces and take advantage of an extra source o f income. In these cases,
countries have limited incentives to comply with UN provisions. As the case studies
further showed, some contingents order personnel to participate in peace operations,
rather than sending them on a voluntary basis. This was the case with all Asian and
Middle Eastern contingents interviewed (Bangladesh, India, Jordan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
and Morocco). The result may be an elevated number o f troops that do not comply with
minimum training standards and often misunderstand some o f the norms the UN attempts
to foster in host nations.
While this may be true in some instances, as was shown in the case studies, some
o f these countries are taking important steps toward incorporating UN norms into their
own practices as a way to enhance their international image. Bangladesh and India, for
example, have created all female FPUs. The Sri Lanka battalion in Haiti will incorporate
female military in its next contingents based on what they learned regarding the
operational needs of female uniformed personnel through the interaction with gender
specialists in the field. These examples show that in some instances, the U N 's role as an
agent of norms and practices dissemination has worked and contributes to improve its
own response in the field. It depicts a cycle of learning.
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As the analysis has shown, there is evidence that the UN serves as an agent o f
dissemination to member states, although evidence does not support drawing a definitive
conclusion. Regions and countries that use the UN as a platform to actively participate in
international politics have a stronger incentive to comply with UN norms. An example is
the advancement o f gender norms in Latin American countries.
Since 2000, Latin American participation in peacekeeping operations has
increased by nearly 1,000 percent. Unlike troops from other large contributing countries,
Latin American troops present an open institutional culture recognized as an important
asset to work in an environment such as that in the DRC or Haiti. Moreover, the “LatinAmerican way o f doing peacekeeping” seems to emphasize two important actions that are
at the core o f modem peacekeeping operations: close contact with the population and
development of projects aimed at enhancing local capacity.
Latin American participation in peace operations has a long history. A few
countries have participated since the first UN missions, namely Argentina, Brazil and
Uruguay, and have accumulated almost 60 years of experience. These Latin American
countries have adapted to the new international demands in line with the transformation
o f the U N 's peace operations. They have created national peacekeeping training centers
and training course with high standards to satisfy

the demands of the international

community.
Since 2008, these countries have reaffirmed at the biannual Conference o f
Defense Ministers of the Americas their intention to retain a gender perspective in peace
operations. Individually, some Latin American countries have achieved measurable
progress. Chile adopted a National Action Plan for RES 1325 in 2009. Others, such as
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Argentina and Uruguay, evaluate the possibilities o f launching their own National Action
Plan. In 2012, Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff announced that within five years all
military branches of Brazilian armed forces should include women, something
considerable unthinkable just few years ago. A diplomatic-military partnership is being
forged between Ministries of Foreign Affairs, who are concerned with the international
image of their countries, and Ministries o f Defense. The partnership serves to reinforce
UN gender norms. Adequately incorporating these norms becomes a priority for those
aiming to have a major role in the organization.
It is in this particular area that further research is needed. Separate studies
concentrating on the mechanisms o f norm dissemination and methods o f gender norms
adoption in other regions, particularly Africa and Asia, are necessary. As Chapter Three
showed, there are only 39 states that have adopted National Action Plans. Those that are
developed states adopted their NAPs independently and those African states have NAPs
as a result o f receiving UN intervention. However, implemented is another matter
altogether. Senegal, for example, adopted a NAP on its own initiative. It would be
interesting to analyze to what extent the NAPs are, or are not, being implemented in these
African nations. Senegal is an ideal case for such a comparison.
Another area for future research is the measuring the effect differential o f gender
training modules between countries that do not deploy military women, such as Pakistan
and Jordan, to countries that deploy women. Interviews with personnel that return home
from peace operations where gender units are established and gender training is
conducted would also be interesting as a way to assess how much information is retained
and if there are instruments to further disseminate these norms nationally. Finally,
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focusing on which countries contribute troops

when analyzing the dissemination of

gender norms and practices may be central to understanding and explaining the impact of
national culture on the UN’s organizational learning process.
The analysis of the specific case of the UN's organizational learning process in
adopting a gender approach to peace operations can contribute to a general analysis of
how institutions can lead the way in facilitating norm dissemination and influencing
states to adopt international practices.

International organizations, norms dissemination, and organizational learning

The objective of this section is to explain the main implications of the study of
gender in peace operations to the overall study of institutions as central actors in the
international system, the nature o f their relationship with member states, and their role as
agents of norm dissemination and facilitators o f learning.
The analysis of how the UN incorporated a gender perspective to peace operations
highlighted three elements that are central for the study of institutions and their
importance for international politics. First, the international organization’s culture,
specifically the organization’s composition, purpose and relationship with its members.
Second, the dynamics behind organizational learning and how norms and practices are
created and disseminated through this process. Third, the international organization’s
role in influencing states to adopt new policies.
First, the study of U N 's organizational culture proved that membership
composition affects the IO ’s values, purpose, and, most importantly, its capacity to learn
and change over time. An organization such as the UN, composed o f 193 culturally
different states is subjected to the pressures and political dynamics o f each o f its member
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states. These cultural and political differences present major obstacles to creating norms
that require consensus among all members.
It then becomes clear that IOs' composition incur in differentiated challenges
when changes in its original purposes, norms and practices are needed, as the more
culturally diverse the organization is, the harder it will be reach a consensus. In this
regard, the analysis of organizational learning not only clarified all five steps behind the
dynamics of learning, but it also showed how IOs can serve as facilitators, assuming a
leading role in disseminating norms. As a consequence, learning can be understood as a
process that aims not only to improve IOs' capacity to adapt to changes in the
environment in which they operate; but also their ability to generate consensus amongst
member states about the need to change policies in accordance with new international
challenges.
The study of the U N 's organizational learning process and how gender was
incorporated as a new practice necessary to accomplish peace underscores the importance
of IOs as facilitators of learning and identifies the difficulties associated with this role.
Indeed, it became clear that incorporating gender approaches to peacekeeping was the
result of the combined efforts o f the epistemic community and a few concerned member
states. As the Secretariat assumed the leadership of this process and had major resolutions
approved by the Security Council, it transformed wishful thinking into institutionalized
policies, influencing member states to adopt them when acting under the organization's
scope.
Nonetheless, gender is a hard case. It is one of those issues that is far from
reaching consensus amongst member states. Moreover, the UN's gender norms and
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practices represent values that are mostly associated with the West and are at odds with
the cultural reality o f the majority of member states, many of who are major troopcontributing countries. As a result of these cultural differences it was anticipated that
gender norm dissemination in the field and to member states would be a difficult process.
This project supports that expected outcome but also identified instances through which
norms dissemination occurred at the field level where first-hand experiences facilitated
learning as well as at national level.
This realization has implications for the study of institutions. As pointed out in
Chapter Two, this dissertation departures from an understanding of institutions as
autonomous actors that can generate knowledge and learn on their own. The fact that
international organizations are comprised o f member states that define institutional
purpose, design budgets, and allocate resources provides both opportunities for, and
limitations on, IOs’ actions. While limits are obvious and related to institution’s
dependence on member state resources and willingness to support IOs' policies,
opportunities come from the authority, legitimacy, and reach that IOs can provide to
norms and practices directed to the common good.
In other words, their contribution to international politics comes less from their
capacity to act on their own and more from their ability to generate knowledge, norms
and practices and, most importantly, from their leading role in influencing member states
to transform policies. In this regard, the analysis of the U N 's organizational learning
process was paramount to identify the instances through which knowledge was
transmitted from the organization to member states pointing the way through which
organizations can further enhance their leading capacity as agents of norm dissemination.
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For future research, the mechanisms through which knowledge is transmitted
from the organization to the member states should be emphasized. In particular, if and
how first-hand experience and accumulated field learning is transmitted and incorporated
at the national level. This analysis would be paramount to conclusively determine 1 0 ’s
influence in constructing international politics and the norms and rules to which states
abide.
As a final word, I would like to emphasize that this research strives to view
institutions differently. Rather than seeing them as instruments of states or actors in their
own right, we should analyze them as facilitators and enablers o f norm creation and
diffusion through the world. The understanding o f institutions as enablers and facilitators
indicates that the role of IOs in international politics is greater than realists would think
though not as protagonist as institutionalists would argue. In practice, it is an important
venue to connect different actors and form epistemic communities, who in turn create and
transmit specialized information and knowledge designed for the common good to
different national governments.

Conclusions

The analysis provided in the chapter summarized the UN’s main successes and
shortcomings in implementing its learning process as well as highlighting the
implications o f this analysis to the study o f institutions. Among shortcomings and
proposed future research is a deeper analysis o f the UN as an agent of gender norm
dissemination and the mechanisms to improve channels o f communication and norms
diffusion between the organization, the field and to member states.

There are, however, other observations that need to be further evaluated. The
analysis of the two case studies and how gender has been incorporated to peacekeeping
practices encountered a few discrepancies. For example, despite the existence o f a strong
protection mandate where gender considerations are fully integrated into the mission's
mandate and military planning in Congo, advances have not been noticed. In this regard,
compared to Haiti which has experienced an improvement, the role o f individual
personalities is noteworthy. The absence of specific guidelines on how to incorporate
gender into MINUSTAH's work or strategies to better protect women and girls is
problematic because personality contingent action ends when leadership change. Gender
needs to be institutionalized in the mission mandate. Until this occurs it is imperative
that like-minded individuals be placed in key roles to support the U N 's performance in
this regard.
Finally, the analysis showed that learning is a dynamic process in which the
different phases happen simultaneously making it impossible to determine when a
process has finished and learning has been successfully accomplished. In fact, successful
learning processes may be those that are continuous and are characterized by constant
transformation of the policies being implemented in accordance to the evolution o f the
context in which missions are deployed.
To conclude, a positive impact in the field should not be a definitive criterion
determining the success or failure o f a learning process. While the impact o f these
policies in the field are important and should be taken into consideration, there are often
complicating factors, such as the local culture and violence levels that may hinder the
effects o f these approaches. Long-term assessment is necessary and provides a method of
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evaluating whether these policies address the root causes o f unbalanced gender relations
and their effectiveness as a foundation for lasting peace.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS

The analysis showed that the United Nations has incorporated a gender approach
to peace operations as a way to better respond to the challenges that modem day conflict
has imposed on the international community in general. In fact, throughout time, UN
peacekeeping operations have evolved as much as the nature of conflicts and of threats
have changed, highlighting the UN’s capacity to adapt its practices in accordance to
transformations in the security environment and the resulting impact for the security of
states and its people. These adjustments, however, have not come without difficulties and
still remain today, despite the enlargement o f mandates and o f peacekeeping personnel,
particularly civilians, and the transformation of peacekeeping practice itself, the UN is
constantly put in the spotlight for its failures in the field.
Beyond the specific topic o f gender discussed in this dissertation, the UN has
proposed a number o f solutions that follows a Western recipe of success with limited
analysis o f whether or not these may work in host nations and if one solution can indeed
fit all cases. As underlined by Paris, the UN's peace template seems to be based on the
idea that founding Western, liberal and capitalist democracies where there barely was a
state is the best approach to lay the foundation o f a lasting peace. He admonishes,
however, that establishing democratic elections in places where there has not been
previous democratic experience and promoting market liberalization “is inherently
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tumultuous, it can exacerbate social tensions and undermine the prospects o f stable peace
in the fragile conditions that typically exist in war-shattered countries.” 1
This and other related “recipes o f success” are habitually relayed by the UN and
other organizations, often conditioning their support to the adoption o f policies that were
formulated in the West and by the West. In the UN however, particularly in the field o f
international peace and security, these Western recipes are carried out by non-Westem
countries as most uniformed personnel come from African and Asian countries whose
political, economic and social traditions are considerably diverse from the policies they
are entitled to implement. Amongst civilian experts many come from the West with no
historical memory of a post-conflict reconstruction o f their own, or from countries that
are currently passing through similar situations as host nations where they are deployed,
but whose experience is most likely to be different from the policies they put in practice.
This is not to say that throughout time UN staff does not learn the specificities
from the field and develop a strong sense of what should and can be implemented, but
rather, they become pragmatic and immersed in this world. A world in which the
mismatch between headquarters’ policies and the reality in the field is just too big to be
implemented “by the book,” but where there is space for creativity and few innovative
actions that attempts to strengthen local capacity and ownership. The pace o f progress,
however, is slow and not enough to compete with the constant changing and deteriorating
conditions that are usually present in intervened societies.
As part o f this discussion, this dissertation embarked in the account o f how gender
considerations became a central piece in UN peace efforts despite the unrelenting cultural

1 Paris, A t War’s End: Building Peace after C ivil Conflict, p.7
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diversity o f its membership. While the presence o f cultural chasms was Ernst Haas main
point of contention when discussing his own model of organizational learning, in light of
the already adopted renewed normative framework on gender approaches to peace
operations, this dissertation attempted to assess whether or not learning could effectively
take place without member states’ full compliance and if the organization could
ultimately serve as an agent of dissemination.
The model proposed here predicted a five step learning process - organizational
dysfunctional,

re-examination,

minimum

consensus,

institutionalization

and

dissemination - that reinforced the last phase or dissemination as the most problematic
and one o f the main factors that explains the U N’s limited impact in the field. However, it
also showed that putting forth these policies has contributed to limited diffusion among
member states and host nations and further research on possible long term effects should
be carried out.
Indeed, the UN’s incorporation of gender approaches to peacekeeping was the
direct result o f continued dysfunction observed in the field. The U N ’s difficulty to
successfully carry out peace mission mandates was common place throughout the 90’s,
however in no other situation, as those occurred in Rwanda and Bosnia, it became clearer
that the available set of norms, practices and tools at the UN’s disposal were inadequate
to adequately address the horrors experienced in these war-torn societies. Sexual violence
was never before perceived as a weapon or as part of a strategic thinking underlying war
strategies. The international community was unprepared to even understand these acts
and thus it was not until much later that they became widely recognized as a powerful
tactic and first propositions as to how to address them were put forth.
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The realization o f the U N ’s inability to act generated a process o f re-examination
in which its peace efforts passed through a transformation still in place nowadays but that
ultimately rests on the assumption that it is no longer states’ security that matter the most
but that o f the individuals living within them. In other words, the security o f the state
became associated with that o f the individual, and thus measures to secure the state
included actions to address individuals’ needs and vice-versa measures to protect the
individual included efforts to strengthen the state.
The incorporation of gender approaches to peacekeeping is part o f this process
and was generated as a consequence o f increasing considerations in regard to human
security, the incorporation o f protection of civilians mandates and the increasing
importance o f women’s rights in the international agenda. It also resulted from the
increasing efforts of civil society organizations, practitioners and scholars - in other
words members of the epistemic community - concerned with the UN’s capacity to
adequately address renewed challenges in the field, but most importantly, connoisseur of
the reality on the ground, the specific needs o f the populations and alarmed with the
relative absence of any discussions in regards to the impact o f war on different gender
groups, particularly women and girls.
Despite time, these discussions entered the UN through the front door. It managed
to forge a minimum consensus and debut in the international peace and security arena
through the adoption of a series of resolutions by the Security Council as a way to
incorporate a gender perspective to all peace efforts and to institutionalize it as a new
international practice.
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The appointment o f senior gender advisers in the field and at headquarters levels
and the advancement of gender guidelines, training modules and strategies to better
respond to the specific needs of women and girls in conflict and reconstruction settings
were the first initiatives undertaken. Moreover, the organization also urged member states
to incorporate a few changes, such as increasing the number o f female uniformed
personnel as a ways to both serve as a role model, but also to improve the outreach to
local communities and potential victims. The strategy put forth was based on the concept
of gender equality and had gender balance and gender mainstreaming as main
components. As a result, actions aiming to improve national capabilities, promote
women's empowerment and enhance protection were put in place.
Nonetheless, the case studies showed that while this approach is being
implemented in the field, challenges remain, specifically in regards to the generation o f
context specific frameworks, a volatile security environment, and member states’
differentiated response for adopting the new gender normative. It then becomes clear that
while the UN has already institutionalized gender as a new practice, it has confronted
difficulties disseminating it.
This dissertation argued that while the UN has adopted gender mainstreaming as a
central part o f peace efforts, the impact on the ground has been slow, due especially to
member states inability or unwillingness to comply with provisions. This was indeed the
case, as shown throughout the dissertation, however, other complicating factors also
contributed to this limited impact. The unrelenting violent context in some o f these
countries, lack o f resources and challenges to reverse patriarchic institutions and
transform them further complicates the UN’s capacity to successfully fulfill its mandates.
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Moreover, as it was pointed out in the previous sessions, despite the slow pace and
limited scope a few instances of dissemination could be observed and partial
accomplishments obtained. The generation of local instruments to better protect women
and girls and improve their social, political and economic status is an important indicator
of success. Considering that local ownership o f policies and capabilities is necessary for
sustainable peace efforts and a lasting peace, the UN’s success in strengthening national
legal systems, generating national policies and strategies and improving the national
security sectors are important steps towards that goal.
However, this dissertation also highlighted the need to reinforce certain
mechanisms as a way to improve the UN’s overall response and accelerate this learning
process. Amongst which, I would like to cite four:
1. Strengthening feedback loops between field operations and headquarters and
between those and member states.
The mismatch between the “bubble” and the field is symptomatic and a constant
reality in peace practices. Even though there are sound mechanisms to inform
headquarters of the reality in the field, documents, policies and reports seem to constantly
ignore the intricate challenges to incorporate these policies in light o f the lack of
resources, personnel and a reality so far from the farfetched proposed solutions. At the
same time, it became clear that the UN has limited ways to engage states in complying
with resolutions where learning has been most challenging. Nonetheless, the case studies
analysis identified a few instances in which some of these proposed norms and practices
were transmitted to member states personnel in the field, as was the case o f the Sri
Lankan battalion increasing understanding o f the operational needs o f having female
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uniformed personnel and the decision to send a few in the next contingent’s deployment.
Supporting feedback loops between field and member states themselves, can thus support
an accelerated learning process.
2. Including gender mainstreaming and provisions to protect women in all missions’
mandates.
It became clear in Haiti’s case that the absence o f specific provisions on
protection of civilians and impact o f sexual violence contributed to the lack o f specific
and context driven strategies to better protect the Haitian population in general and
women and girls against sexual violence in particular. Adding the topic to missions’
mandates is a relatively easy step that can immensely affect the kind o f policies, actions
and operations that are planned in the field. In fact, all missions that have gender
provisions in the mandate have presented increasing efforts to address the issue, as shown
by the case of Haiti itself, when the issue started to be included in the aftermath o f the
2010 earthquake.
3. Provide follow-up assessment analysis to all new policies implemented on the
ground, documenting its specific accomplishments and setbacks in the light o f
community stability and women's status.
The field work carried out in Congo showed a myriad of initiatives in the East
that are often unknown not only by the international community in general but even to
headquarters in Kinshasa in the same country. These initiatives rise in the wake of
unforeseen circumstances, such as the need to improve military capacity to interrogate
victims, and do not receive follow up analysis on the specific impact that they promote in
the field. The UN’s lack of civilian capacity is no news, however, increasing the presence
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o f civilian experts in position to provide insightful analysis on UN’s own policies is
valuable to ascertain the next steps for an improved response and phase out actions that
have had limited impact.
4. Improve monitoring mechanisms to oversee member states troops gender training.
As much as the UN needs personnel and troops to carry out its mandates, it needs
well-trained personnel able to successfully impact host societies. It is often the case that
ill-trained personnel become involved in the conflict themselves, even participating in
atrocities or silencing of them. As training is carried out by member states themselves,
often without the UN’s supervision, it would be important to establish monitoring and
vetting mechanisms as a way to preempt the involvement of peacekeepers with the
mayhem in the field.
These are just some of an endless list of actions needed to improve the UN’s own
response to the challenges present in peace operations. Despite that it is necessary to
recognize the advances that have been made and continue working to accelerate the UN’s
organizational learning process so that improved implementation tools are put in place
and information sharing mechanisms allow different missions to take advantage of the
innovative actions that are sometimes spontaneously generated as a way to curb an
unforeseen obstacle. Altogether these actions comprise valuable efforts towards the
improvement of the international community’s assessment and capacity to delivery when
dealing with crimes of this nature.
This dissertation offered a nuanced analysis o f the UN’s organizational learning
process, pinpointing the many obstacles and few advances that have been accomplished
thus far. The take away is that learning is a fluid and dynamic process where boundaries
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separating successful processes from failed ones is grey and must consider more than just
measurable and positive impacts in the field. Improving national legal frameworks and
strengthening the local civil society, for example, is an important advance that will lead
to spillover effects, accelerate dissemination and lay the seeds for the successful
implementation of UN mandates and the foundations for a lasting peace.
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APPENDICES

1. Interviews Questionnaire
A) Military Component
1.

What are your daily activities and tasks?

2.

What are the most common incidents reported during patrols?

3.

Do you perform joint operations with local institutions? (National Police and

Military) How is it?
4.

Do you perform joint operations with other UN military contingents? How about the

police? How is it?
5.

Do you carry out activities with UN civilian component? What activities? How is the

relationship?
6.

Do you carry out activities with UN humanitarian agencies and other organizations?

What activities? How is the relationship?
7.

What kind of CIMIC activities and Quick Impact Projects does your battalion

develops with the local population?
8.

How do you think the security situation in Haiti/DRC have changed since you

arrived?
9.

Have you encountered any cases o f SGBV? Tell the story. If not, what is the

procedure?
10. Do you think the female peacekeeper have a special role?
11. Do you receive pre-deployment training? How is it?
12. Is your participation voluntary?
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13. What is biggest challenge in participating on a peace operation? What have you
learned?
14. Would you participate again? Why?
B) Police Component
1.

What are your daily activities and tasks?

2.

What are the most common incidents reported during patrols?

3.

Do you perform joint operations with local institutions? (National Police and

Military) How is it?
4.

Do you perform joint operations with UN military contingents?

5.

Do you carry out activities with UN civilian component? What activities? How is the

relationship?
6.

Do you carry out activities with UN humanitarian agencies and other organizations?

What activities? How is the relationship?
8.

How do you think the security situation in Haiti/DRC have changed since you

arrived?
9.

Have you encountered any cases o f SGBV? Tell the story. If not, what is the

procedure?
10. Do you think the female police have a special role?
11. Do you receive pre-deployment training? How is it?
12. Is your participation voluntary?
13. What is biggest challenge in participating on a peace operation? What have you
learned?
14. Would you participate again? Why?
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C) Civilian Component and UN Agencies
1.

What is the role o f your unit/agency?

2.

What is the relationship between your unit/agency and the military component?

3.

What programs do you have regarding gender and sexual violence?

4.

What do you think is the perception o f the local population regarding the UN?

5.

What channels of communication exist between your unit/agency and the national

government.
6.

What is the nature of sexual violence in Haiti/DRC?

7.

How has the situation improved or not over time?
D ) Civil Society

1.

What is the main activities carried out by your organization?

2.

What is the relationship if there is any between your organization and the UN?

3.

What do you think of UN military component?

4.

What programs do you have regarding gender and sexual violence?

5.

What do you think is the perception o f the local population regarding the UN?

6.

What channels of communication exist between your unit/agency and the national

government.
7.

What is the nature of sexual violence in Haiti/DRC?

8.

How has the situation improved or not over time?
E) Government

1.

What are the channels of communication between the government and the UN?

How is the relationship?
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2.

What other organizations do you cooperate with? What kind o f activities are

developed together?
3.

What do you think o f UN 's military component?

4.

What is the nature of sexual violence in Haiti/DRC?

5.

How has the situation improved or not over time?
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2. Interviewed actors
I.

H aiti

1) Military Component
1.1 Contingents:
Argentine Battalion (ARGBATT)
Argentine Aviation Unit
Argentine Military Hospital
Bolivian Company (BOLCOY)
Brazilian Battalions (BRABATT I and II)
Chilean Battalion (CHIBATT)
Chilean Helicopter Unit
Chilean-Ecuadorian Engineer Unit
Jordanian Battalion (JORBATT)
Nepalese Battalion (NEPBATT)
Paraguayan Engineer Company (PARENCOY)
Peruvian Company (PERCOY)
Sri Lanka Battalion (SRIBATT)
Uruguayan Battalion (URUBATT I and II)
Uruguayan Naval Unit (URUMAR)
1.2 Others:
Force Commander
Chief of Operations
Chief o f CIMIC
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2) Police component
2.1 UNPol
MINUSTAH Police Commissioner
MINUSTAH UNPol Gender Adviser
MINUSTAH IDP camp Chief
Gender mobile Units
Norwegian Police Officers
Brazilian Police Officers
Argentine Police Officers
2.2 Formed Police Units:
Bangladesh Female Formed Police Unit
Indian Formed Police Unit
3) Civilian component
- Special Representative o f the Secretary General
- Deputy Special Representative o f the Secretary General - Humanitarian Coordinator
- Deputy Special Representative o f the Secretary General - Security Coordinator
3.1 MINUSTAH substantive sections:
Gender Unit
HIV Office
Rule o f Law
Human Rights Section
Child Protection
Community Violence Reduction

Civil Affairs
Conduct and Discipline
Joint Military Analysis Center (J-MAC)
4) UN Agencies
UN-Women
UNDP
OCHA
UNHCR
5) Civil Society
5.1 Local civil society organizations
Concertacion Nacional
SOFA
5.2 Intemacional civil society organizations
Red Cross
Doctors Without Borders
Lawyers without borders
Viva Rio
World Vision
AVSI
International Organization for Migration
6) Government.
Ministry of W omen's Conditions and Rights
Hatian National Police
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II. Congo
1) Military component
1.1 Contingents
Guatemalan Special Forces (GUASFOR)
Uruguayan Battalion (URUBATT)
Uruguayan Airfield Support Unit (URUASU)
Uruguayan Naval Company
Ghana Battalion (GANBATT)
Moroccan Battalion (MORBATT)
Pakistan Battalion II (PAKBATT II)
Indian Battalion IV (INDBATT IV)
Bangladesh Battalion I (BANBATT I)
Bangladesh Aviation Unit (BANAIR)
1.2 Others
North Kivu Brigade Commander
South Kivu Brigade Commander
Military Observers (various nationalities)
2) Police component
2.1 UNPols
UNPol Representatives in Bukavu
UNPol Representatives in Goma
UNPol Representative in Bunia
2.1. Formed Police Units

Senegalese Formed Police Unit
Indian Formed Police Unit
Bangladesh Female Formed Police Unit
Bangladesh Formed Police Unit
Egyptian Formed Police Unit
3) Civilian component
Special Representative o f the Secretary General for Rule o f Law
2.1 MONUSCO substantive sections
Office o f Gender Affairs
Sexual Violence Unit
Civil Affairs
Rule of Law
Prosecution Supporting Cells
Joint Human Rights Office
Political Affairs
Security Sector Reform
Mission Support
Conduct and Discipline Unit
Child Protection
4) UN Agencies
UNHCR
UNFPA
OCHA

5) Civil Society Organizations
5.1 Local civil society organizations
Reseau Action Femme in Kinshasa
CONAFED in Kinshasa
REFED in Goma
Caucus de femme Congolaise in Bukavu
5.2 International Civil Society Organization
ICRC representatives in Goma
ICRC representatives sin Kinshasa
MSF representatives in Bukavu
6) Government
- Minister of Gender, Children and Family
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3. National Strategy to Combat Sexual Violence
The mechanism of coordination for the implementation o f the National Strategy is
done at three different levels, nationally through the office in Kinshasa, regionally
through the provincial units, and locally through a network o f partners on the field. All
the three levels focus on five main components, each with a UN and a government
counterpart.
1. Fighting impunity: led by the Ministry o f Justice and UN Joint Human Rights
Office, this component aims to improve access to justice for victims o f Sexual Violence
and reinforce and evaluate the judicial referral and treatment o f cases of sexual violence,
including the collection and analysis of statistics on the judicial process.
2. Protection and Prevention: led by the Ministry o f Social Affairs and Human
Rights and UN High Commissioner of Refugee (UNHCR), this component aims to
contribute to protection and prevention of sexual violence and work with local actors to
improve awareness o f sexual violence within communities.
3. Multi-Sector Assistance: led by the Ministry of Health and UNICEF, this
component aims to contribute to improve national protocol on multi-sectoral assistance
and assuring access to qualify services for victims.
4. Security Sector Reform: led by the Ministry o f Defense and MONUSCO's
Section of Security Sector Development, this component aims to sensitize elements o f
FARDC on the prevention and reduction of sexual violence.
5. Data Collection and Mapping: led by the Ministry of Gender and the UN
Population Fund, this component aims to improve and reinforce data collection on sexual
violence.
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Figure 9: Mechanism for the coordination of the National Strategy on the fight
against sexual violence
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